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PREFACE 
Despite the growing number of works being added to the already large 
and impressive list of Whiteheadian literature, few aathors have offered a 
detailed examination of 'Whitehead's explanation of human freedom. ntose who 
have written on the subject have not attempted to follow the thread of White-
head's speculation through the labyrinth of texts that connect the freedom of 
individual "actual entitles" with the freedom of human beings. Thus, the 
study of Edward Stevens is a fine analysis of freedom and other related ideas. 
Yet as Stevens ls quick to point out, his treatment of Whitehead's conception 
of freedom was not intended to be exhaustive, and ln fact lt makes up but a 
small portion of the work. 1 
Edward Pols and John Cobb have written more extensively on the role of 
freedom. Pols' important works, especially his recently published book, are 
excellent critical studies of the metaphysical basis of freedom. 2 However, 
hFreedom, Determinism and Responsibility-An Analysis and a White-
headian Interpretation," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, 1963). nie 'Whiteheadlan interpretation constitutes approximately 23 
pages of this study: Part II, pp. 181 to the end. 
2Whitehead•s Metaphysics: A Critical Examination of Process and Real-
~ (Carbondale and EdWardsvtiie, ITlinois: Southern Illinois Un{ver=:ify==== 
Press; London and Amsterdam: Feffer and Simons, Inc., 1967; "nte Idea of Free 
dom in the Metaphysics of Whitehead, 0 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University Press, 1949). 
11 
his investigations remain on the general level of the metaphysics of freedom 
and do not consider how on Whitehead's analysis human freedom ls explained as 
a unique kind of freedom "built-up" or 11derlved" from the freedom of lndlvld-
ual "actual entitles." While Cobb does examine Whitehead's analysis of human 
freedom, he does not extensively analyze the unique type of freedom exercised 
by the regnant actual occasions of the human person or suff lclently trnee the 
link between the freedom of actual El\tltles and that of human belngs. 1 Cobb 
presupposes and leaves unexamined what m.tst be carefully worked out. 
'lhls absence of secondary literature ls surprising, given the central 
position occupied by the notion of freedom in Whitehead's metaphysics. It ls 
even more surprising whEI\ one realizes the sparsity of passages ln his writ· 
lngs explicitly dealing with the metaphysical basis of freedom and the even 
fewer passages explaining human freedom. 
The purpose of this dissertation ls to provide an introduction to 
Whitehead's explanation of human freedom. 'Ille first step ls to locate the 
discussion of human freedom within the context of Whitehead's philosophical 
speculation. In the first chapter, it ls shown that Whitehead affirms the 
reality of h.nnan freedom as a stubborn and irrecl.lcible fact of common experl-
ence, and that he intends to explain this fact philosophically. In the 
second chapter, Whitehead's explicit analysis of the metaphysical basis of 
freedom is analyzed. Here the nature of the !:.!!. verae ls investigated, and 
~ Christian Natural 'lheoloJty: Based .2!l ~ 'lhought g! Alfred North 
Whitehead (Philadelphia: Westmlnlster Press, 1965). 
Hi 
freedom ls seen to be grounded ln an actual entity's correlative formative 
principles: in the activity of creativity and the formal specification of 
eternal objects. In the third chapter, the transition to the macroscopic 
world of nexus and societies ls made. The nature of these fiderlvative enti-
tiestt is examined, and the principles for determining man's place in the 
hierarchy of the macroscopic world ls established. In the fourth and fifth 
chapters, the unique nature of human consciousness and human freedom is in-
vestigated in detail. In the sixth and final chapter, the findings of this 
study are summarized, and a brief concluding evaluation of Whitehead's expla-
nation of human freedom ls offered. 
I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge my gratitude to 
several members of the Department of Philosophy of Loyola University. I wish 
to thank my readers, Drs. George E. Connelly (adviser), Kenneth F. Thompson, 
Jr., and Richard Westley for their perceptive cri ticlsms and helpful sugges-
tions. I am also grateful to Dr. Connelly for his encouragement throughout 
the years of my graduate studies. In this vein, I would like to thank Fr. 
Torrens Hecht, s. J., former chairman, who guided nuch of my early graduate 
work, and especially Dr. Donald O'Grady, who f trst awakened my interest in 
philosophy during my undergraduate studies. His love of the intellectual 
life, his penetrating philosophical insights, and his personal life style 
have been a sCAJrce of inspiration. 
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CHAPTER I 
FREEDON AFFIRNED 
The purposeaf this chapter ls twofold. First, it ls to show that 
Whitehead never appears to have seriously doubted that human freedom ls an 
irreducible and stubborn fact given in the common lived experience of man-
kind, and that as a consequence, no ama..tnt of theorizing can explain away 
this fact. Second, it is to show that ~1hitehead's ai~ is to give a philo-
sophical elucidation of the basis of human freedom. 
A. Human Freedom: ill!_ Irreducible Stubborn~ 
'"1hat is the nature of a fact? What is its relationship to the in-
tellect? The philosophical writings of Alfred North Whitehead can properly 
be viewed as a prolonged attempt to answer this basic question. ~1hitehead 
himself devotes many pages to working out the relationship between fact and 
theory in the constr~ction of an adequate philosophical exposition concerning 
the nature of reality. The word 11 fact" occurs time and again in his philo-
-1-
2 
sophical writings,l and in the final analysis Whitehead envisions the prob-
lem of philosophy as nothing less than uto conceive a complete lftaVTlf..nfi 
fact. 11 
In the following chapter we will have occasion to examine in detail 
Whitehead's conception of the ultimate complete fact. For the moment, let 
us reflect upon the general character of the problem he ls examining. It 
arises almost immediately and consists in the realization that facts are not 
all of a kind, nor are they il!IIlediately compatible. 'Ille facts given in sense 
experience are not necessarily identical with those given in religious or 
aesthetic or moral experience, and none are identical with those of Quanta 
theory or astrophysics or Freudian psychology. Nevertheless, these and other 
facts all demand a hearing at the bar of speculative reason. Consequently 
Whitehead can ask quite seriously and pointedly, "What are the evidences to 
which philosophy appeals?" since "Whether we be ancient or modern, we can 
lror example, facts appear as the "irreducible and stubborn facts" of 
Science !ru! !!!.! Modern World (New York: Macmillan Co., 1925), pp. 3-4, 11, 
22-23, 60-63, (Hereafter referred to as SMW.); as the "matter-of-fact" of The 
Function 2£. Reason (Boston: Beacon Pres;;-1958), PP• 31-32, (Hereafter re-::--
ferred to as !!!.• ); as the "Matter-of-fact•' contrasted to "importance" in 
Modes 2! Thought (New York: Capricorn Books of G. P. f>!!tnam's Sons, 1958 
lidentical pagination as the 1938 Macmillan co. edition/), see all of Chapter 
i, PP• 1-27 and also 183-84, (Hereafter referred to as MT.); and as the 
"facts" contrasted to ttvalue" in ''Immortality," Whltehe;:f•s last published 
philosophical work. "Immortality,•• in !h!. Philosophy~ Alfred ~White­
h!.!!!, The Library of Living Philosophers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (2nd ed.; New 
York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951), PP• 682-700. 
2Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 203. 
(Hereafter referred to as..!ll_.) 
1 
only deal with things, in some sense, experienced... It is precisely the 
complexity of experience evidenced by the complexity of the body of fact 
that constitutes the data upon which philosophy lll1St construct its specula-
3 
tions. The importance of doing justice to all the facts ls incorporated into 
the definition of Speculative Philosophy as it appears in the opening passage 
of Process !!ll!, Reality. There we find Whitehead defining it as 
the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical,necessary system of general 
ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be inter-
preted. By this notion of 'interpretation• I mean that everything of 
which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall 
have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme.2 
Speculative Philosophy as it came to be conceived by Whitehead ls therefore 
the attempt to make ultimate sense of every element given in experience; it 
is the endeavor to reduce the facts to their intelligible foundation. 
l&, P• 287. 
2(New York: Harper Torchbooks of Ha!J>er ~. Brothers, 1960 Lldentical 
pagination as the 1929 ~~cmillan Co. edition/, p. 4. (Hereafter referred to 
as PR.) QUotations from PR will be listed ;s modified according to the list 
of "corrigenda for Proces;-and Reality" in Alfred North Whitehead: Essays 
~ !!.!.!. Philosophy, ed. with an introduction by G. L. Kline (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: A Spectrum Book of Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 200-07, unless 
indicated to the contrary. 
Also see &, P• 285 and esp. pp. 290-91: "In order to discover some 
of the major categories under which we can classify the infinitely various 
components of experience, we nust appeal to evidence relating to every varl• 
ety of occasion. Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience 
sober, experience sleeping and experience wnking, experience drowsy and ex-
perience wide-awake, experience self-conscious and experience self.forgetful, 
experience intellectual and experience physical, experience religious and ex• 
perience sceptical, experience anxious and experience care-free, experience 
anticipatory and experience retrospective, experience happy and experience 
grieving, ecperience d001inated by emotion and ecperience under self-restraint, 
experience in the light and experience in the dark, experience normal and ex-
perience abnormal." 
4 
1. The Fact of Human Freedom 
Of the many facts, we are here concerned with the experience of 
human freedom. That freedom is given in our experience is explicitly af-
firmed in many of Whitehead's writings. More than merely acknowledging this 
fact, his works contain some forceful statements in defense of freedom as one 
of the fundamental elevating forces of evolutionary development of not only 
human existence but of all levels of actuality. Let us briefly examine a few 
representative texts. 
Whitehead's affirmation of the reality of human freedom is brought 
out in his thoughts on what could be called the social sciences~those arts 
and sciences having to do primarily with the social dimension of human exis-
tence. In the early 1920s before the appearance of his full-scale 11phllo-
sophical" works, Whitehead addresses himself to the problem of education and 
of the importance of acquiring what the ancients called "wisdom. tt The aim 
of education, says Whitehead, should not be limited to acquiring factual 
knowledge, for in itself such knowledge is barren, if not actually evil. 
Knowledge becomes important only in its use, that is, in our mastery of it. 
This mastery is what we mean by "wisdom," and thus the aim of education is 
to acquire both "knowledge'' and 0 wi sdom. 11 Wisdom 
is the way in which knowledge is held. It concerns the handling of 
knowledge, its selection for the determination of relevant issues, its 
employment to add value to our immediate experience. This mastery of 
knowledge, which is wisdom, is the most intimate freedom obtainable. l 
10The Rhythmic Claims of 
tion ~ Other Essays (New York: 
referred to as !f.) 
Freedom and Discipline," in ~ 2f Educa-
Macmillan Co., 1929), P• 46. (Hereafter 
5 
Though the acqulsltionof wisdom brings with it a most important kind of free-
dom, wisdom itself, like knowledge, is acquired through the interplay of 
freedom of inquiry coupled with dlsclpline: 
The only avenue toward wisdom is freedom in the presence of knowledge. 
But the only avenue toward knowledge is by discipline ln the acquirement 
of ordered fact. Freedom and discipline are the two essentials of edu-
1 cation •••• 
Freedom ls no less impor.tant in the other social spheres. In a speech de-
livered in 1933 at a meeting commemorating the founding of the Harvard Busi-
ness :.>chool, one of the themes of Whitehead's talk is the social, economic, 
and political significance of freedom. 
It is impossible to understand the social history of our ancestors 
unless we remember the surging freedom which then existed within the 
cities, of England, of Flanders, of the Rhine Valley, and of Northern 
Italy. Under our present industrial system, this type of freedom is 
being lost. This loss means the fading from human life of values in• 
finitely precious to it •••• I suggest that one subject of study for our 
industrial and sociological statesmen should be the preservation of free-
dom for those who are engaged ln mass production and mass distrih.ltion 
which are necessities in our modern civilization. It is a study requir-
ing penetrating insight so as to distinguish between the realities of 
freedom and its mere show, and between hurtful and fruitful ways of free-
dori.2 
On the eve of World t,;ar II, on the occasion of Germany• s seizure of Austria, 
speaking again of poll ti cal freedom Whitehead muses that "the task of democ-
1!1.h p. 47. 
2
"The study of the Past-Its Uses and Its Dangers," in Essays !!l 
Science,!!!& Philosophy (flew Yorl<: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968), pp. 
157-58. (Hereafter referred to as ESP.) It should be noted that the con-
tents of the following paperback editions of ESP differs from that of the 
Greenwood reprint edition: (1) Science !D.£. PhTiosophy (New York: The Wis-
dom Library of Philosophical Library, 1948); (2) Science !!ll!_ Philosophy 
(Peterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1964). 
racy is to relieve mass misery and yet preserve the freedom of the lndivid-
ual."1 
The theme of human freedom appears in Whitehead's more formal philo-
sophical writings as well. An indication of the importance Whitehead gives 
lt can be seen in the fact that in Part One of Adventures !!.! Ideas he ex-
amines the history of the idea of freedom of the individual, often in the 
context of the abolition of the institution of slavery, to exemplify those 
evolutions of ideas that mark the progress of civilizations. Finnlly,it ls 
very significant that in Process ~ J1.~.al,l ty Whitehead allies his philosophy 
of organism to the moral experiences of mankind with a forceful and blunt 
statement. 
Further, in the case of those actualities whose immediate experience ls 
most completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final decision of 
the immediate subject-superject, constituting the ultimate modification 
of subjective aim, is the foundation of our experience of responsibility, 
of approbation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or of self-reproach, 
of freedom of emphasis. !h!.! element .!Jl experience !.! !22_ large .£2. .2!, 
put aside merely !.!. misconstruction. .!t governs !!!!. whole S2!l.! !!.! life. 
It can be illustrated only by striking instances from fact or from fic-
tion. But these instances are only conspicious illustrations of human 
experience during each hour and each minute. The ultimate freedom of 
things, lying beyond all determinations, was whispered by Galileo--~~ 
§..!. nuove--freedom for the inquisitors to think wrongly, for Galileo to 
think ~ightly and for the world to move in despite of Galileo and inquis-
itors. 
In these few representative texts spanning some 15 years, something 
lotalogues !!.! Alfred North Whitehead, as recorded by Lucien Price 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955), March 17, 1938, P• 94. (Hereafter 
referred to as Q•) This work ls also publ lshed as a Mentor paperback; ~ew 
York: The New American Library, 1956.) 
21]., PP• 74-75. Underlining of the first two sentences ls mine. Also 
see SHw, PP• 112-21. 
7 
1 
of iihiteheac!•s ideas concerning human freerlora begins to emerge. First, he 
is affirming unequivocally both the fact and the importance of freedom for 
human civilization. Freedom ls a necessary condition for the very intelligl-
blllty of human experience. Second, \Jbitehead does not thereby want to deny 
that freedom is exercised within limitations. A careful examination of the 
data turns up deterministic as well as indeterministic factors. Third, he 
thinks lt important to account for the fact of freedom philosophically. 
Fourth, though he rarely offers a definition of the freedofi' under discussion, 
it ls apparent from these passages that w~itehead is well aware that experl-
ence discloses different types of freedom. Consequently in order to better 
understand 'What Whitehead is so strongly defending, some preliminary remarks 
are in order concerning how we think he vievs their relationship. 
2. The Types of Buman Freedom 
The most fundamental type of human freedom accord lng to \,'hi tehead ls 
what has come to be called the freedom of "self-determination. ,.2 In the pre-
vlously quoted passage from Process ~ Reality 'Whitehead is affirming this 
type of freedom in terms of his systematic language. Leaving aside our de-
l In fact these texts undoubtedly represent a cont l nu al theme of White-
head' s mature speculations, for Whitehead has noted that although his writ-
ings on philosophy began when he came to America the ideas contained therein 
"had been generating for the better part of a Ufetlme. tt (Q., June 19, 1945, 
p. 327 .) Also see £.[, p. x. 
2In distinguishing the various types of freedom discussed by Hhitehead 
we have chosen to make use of the dialectical terminology incorporated by 
t,;ortlmer J. Adler in his work entitled 1h! ls!!.!~ Freedom, {2 vols.; New 
York: Doubleday and Co., 1958, 1961). See Vol. I, pp. vii-79 for a discus-
sion of the dialectical neutrality of these terms. 
8 
tailed analysis of the system and its language for subsequent chapters, we 
merely wish to point out that here Whitehead is asserting that our experience 
itself presupposes for its very meaningfulness the fact that humans are free, 
moral agents. As we shall see presently, this would appear to imply a kind 
of practical and/or theoretical defense of the existence of human freedom. 
Moreoever, their freedom of self-determination ls natural in the sense of 
being possessed by all men simply in virtue of their being men. This natu-
ral freedom consists in an activity of self-causation whereby the human be-
ing, though in large measure a product of the settled and determining past, 
1 is nevertheless itself an originative source of genuine creative novelty. 
In the case of h..tman beings, self-determination manifests itself in direct 
and lnnnediate experience as the unique activity of choosing among possible 
alternative modes of thought and action. Though it ls not readily apparent 
from these texts, as we shall see, moral choice involves an activity directly 
related to man's unique powers of intellectual abstraction. 
The significance, if not the uniqueness, of intellectual activity to 
man's freedom of self-determination is merely alluded to toward the end of 
the quote from Process !!ll!_ Reality and is suggested in the passage where 
Whitehead was seen to speak of "wisdom.'' Whitehead is calling attention to 
lt1The freedom inherent in the universe is constituted by this ele-
ment of self-causation." (J!., p. 135.) Cf. p. 228. Although in these texts 
Whitehead is speaking of the freedom of "actual entitiestt his discussion is 
meant to ultimately account for ''human freedom." See .t!,!, p. 131. Whitehead 
has acknowledged in conversation that the source of his doctrine of the self· 
causality of an actual entity ls an examination of human experience. See 
Allison Heartz Johnson, ''Whitehead as Teacher and Philosopher," Philosophy !ill!. 
Phenomenological Research, X.UX, No. 3 (March, 1969), P• 353. 
9 
the importance of genuine intellectual inquiry, of the freedom to question, 
to doubt, to wonder, to probe, to comprehend, and finally to attempt to form-
ulate general principles in terms of which human existence can begin to be 
understood and begin to be lived fully. Generalizing, it appears to us that 
Whitehead is here referring to man's initial act of freedom which on the level 
of consciousness consists in o.ir decision to think or not about any alterna-
tive, and he is saying that one of the alms of education is to perfect and 
even give direction to this characteristically human activity. The exercise 
of free thought is not, then, restricted to mere academic inquiries commonly 
associated with formal education. On the contrary, such education is possible 
inasmuch as man is by nature capable of a conceptual grasp of real alterna-
tives of tho.ight and action, and, consequently, is capable of freely deter-
mining his present mode of existence in terms of these alternatives. It fol• 
lows that a basic aim of education, be it formal or informal, ought to be to 
build upon and to perfect this initial moment in the freedom of self-deter-
mination. 
To be sure, freedom of self-determination is not limited merely to 
willing to think or not to think about alternatives. There is a subsequent 
moment when the person nust choose to act or not to act on the possibilities 
conceptually entertained. Thus self-determination ex.tends to freedom of 
action as well as freedom of thought. But the point ls that freedom of 
thought ls prior to and ls a necessary condition of freedom of action and 
that education, in the general sense of the acquisition of knowledge, is a 
necessary condition for the exercise of all subsequent acts of human freedom 
10 
properly so called. 
The freedom of self-determination ls fundamental ln the sense that it 
is natural and as such is presupposed ln any subsequent manifestation that 
freedom may take. Every act of human freedom entails an act of self-determi• 
nation of choosing among alternative possibilities. In another sense, how-
ever, this ls not for Whitehead the most important kind of human freedom. 
For as we have observed, Whitehead speaks of a freedom possessed only by 
those who have acquired "wisdom'' or moral virtue. A higher kind of freedom 
is exercised by the person who comes to ac.quire "wisdom," for ln him alone 
the soul freely conforms to the ideals and goals established by intellectual 
insight. Thus even ln the face of the most adverse circumstances a man ls 
at least free to choose and thus himself determine his attitudes as regards 
his situation; the "wise man" has the additional freedom of determining hls 
attitudes in the light of basic moral insights as far as he can be aware of 
them. In this sense, the wise or virtuous person always retains inner free• 
dom, be he free man or captive. 
There ls a freedom lying beyond circumstance, derived from the direct 
intuition that life can be grounded upon its absorption in what is 
changeless amid change. This is the freedom at which Plato was groping, 
the freedom which Stoles and Christians obtained as the gift of Hellenism. 
It ls the freedom of that virtue directly derived from the source of all 
harmony. For lt ls conditioned only by its adequacy of understanding. 
And understanding has this quality that, however it be led up to, it 
issues in the soul freely conforming its nature to the supremacy of in-
sight. It ls the reconciliation of freedom with the com?Jlsion of the 
truth. In this sense the captive can be free, taking as his own the 
supreme insight, the indwelling persuasion towards the harmony which ls 
the height of existence.l 
1 6,!., P• 86. 
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Of course this ls not to deny that in a certain sense the captive ls 
not free. The circumstances of captivity are ~uch that they entail the in-
ability to act according to one's own wishes. This sense of cir~Jmstantlal 
freedom of self-real!zation was given its classical statement by David Hume. 
"Liberty, 1i says Hume, is 
a po\>1Cr of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the 
will; that ls, if we choose to remain at rest we may; if we choose to 
move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty ls universally allowed 
to belong to everyone who ls not a prisoner and in chalns.l 
Now Whitehead is certainly aware of the importance of freedom of self-
realization, as his references to the captive and the enslaved indicate; he 
does not wish to deny that the prisoner is not free to act according to his 
wishes. Yet in the deeper meaning of the term, even the captive or the slave 
may retain his inner freedom of self-perfection while forgoing the freedom of 
self-realization; and he may do so though he also lacks ttpolitlcal freedom." 
For he retains the element of self-determination at least as regards his 
inner states of mind and moral character. 
Lastly, Whitehead was seen to speak of "political freedom." The 
political participation of the free man greatly expands the range of self-
determination, for it concerns the individual's capacity to affect the cir-
cumstances under which he exists and exercises his choices as a social animal 
among equals. As a citizen, the individual exercising political freedom 
participates in making positive laws under which he will be obliged to llve; 
in some measure he ls thereby able to alter the structure and institutions of 
York: 
1£!.!l Inguiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis and New 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1955), Section 8, Part I, p. 104. 
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his society. Hecause man ls a social animal, political freedom also enhances 
the individual's freedom of self-perfection. 
Of the several types of freedom asserted by Whitehead, self-determina-
tion is natural, primary, and the source "f the others. It is implied in the 
freedoms of self-perfection, self-realization, and political liberty, and for 
this reason when Whitehead attempts to give a philosophical elucidation of 
the nature of human freedom,it ls self-determination that he intends to ex-
plain. This is also the reason why most of ~hitehead 1 s descriptions of the 
experience of freedom are restricted to this type of activity. In order to 
better comprehend what ~hitehead wished to explain philosophically, let us 
examine a bit more closely the manner in which this type of freedom is said 
to be disclosed in our experience. 
3. The Experience of Human Freedom 
\lhitehead claims that the experience of freedom, of responsibility, 
in short, of the moral quality of human existence ls disclosed in a kind of 
''moral intuition." He says, for example, that it is by a kind of moral in-
tuition that one becomes aware of the goodness of speculation for its own 
sake and of the importance and ground of freedom of thought. 1 It seems to us 
that Whitehead also calls attention to 11Dral intuition where he speaks of the 
decisiveness of intuition in framing our philosophical speculations: 
111There is a strong moral intuition that 
its own sake ls one of the ultimate elements in 
claim for freedom of thought is based upon it. 11 
t!!., P• 49. 
spea.ilative understanding for 
a good life. The passionate 
(£lit P• 38.) Cf • .t.s,, p. 7 5; 
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In our cosmological construction we are, therefore left with the 
final opposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and con-
junction--that is to sayt the many in one--flux and permanence, greatness 
and triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the World, in this list, 
the pairs ofopposites are in eKperience with a certain ultimate directness 
of intuition, except in the case of the final pair.l 
Just as joy and sorrow, flux and permanence, greatness and triviality are 
given in direct intuition, so also are good and evil, freedom and determina-
? 
tion, though now we can speak of moral intuition.~ 
Another indication of the intuitive character of moral experience can 
be seen by observing how Whitehead relates the moral and aesthetic spheres. 3 
lpR, l'• 518. Concluding Lecture Eight of ill, Whitehead remarks that 
"In these lectures I have not entered upon systematic metaphysical cosmology. 
The object of the lectures is to indicate those elements in our experience 
in terms of which such a cosmology sha.tld be constructed. The key notion 
from which such construction should start is that the energetic activity con-
sidered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life. 11 (Pp. 231-
32.) 
2Although Whitehead closes the chapter on the Ideal Opposites with 
the comment that the pair "God and the World0 are not ultimately given in 
intuition the way the others are, it ls important to recall that in Religion 
!!l !.!:!! Making the appeal to religious experience is fundamentally an appeal 
to a kind of religious intuition. Though Whitehead is not there appealing to 
a direct vision of the deity as is claimed by the religious mystics, he main-
tains that the experience is "intuitive" nevertheless. Furthermore, in his 
later works, Whitehead does not, we think, abandon the view of Religion .!!l 
~ Viaking (New York: :Meridian Books, Inc., 1960). All of this work is im-
portant in this connection, but especially to be noted is Part D, "Religion 
and Dogma, 11 and esp. section 2, pp. 57-65; also see p. 84. (Hereafter refer-
red to as fili•) 
3For more extensive studies of the role of aesthetic experience in 
Whitehead's philosophy the reader is referred to the following works: (1) 
John B. Cobb, Jr., 11Toward Clarity in Aesthetics,'' Philosophy !!!£ Phenomeno-
logical 13.!!!!.r...£!:!., XVIII (1957 ), pp. 169-89. (2) A. H. Johnson, 11 •Truth, 
Beauty and Goodness,' in the Fhilosophy of Alfred North Whitehead," Philosophy 
tl Science, XI, No. 1 (January, 1944), pp. 9·29. Johnson defends l>:hitehead's 
analysis of value against some criticisms raised by John w. l:\lyth, White-
haad' s :r.!1.eon~ of ~ledge (ProvidP.ne'=?: •>rown University Pres3, 19!•1.), pp. 
92-93, by George Horgan," Whitehead's Theory of Value," !h! International 
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In general, the former ls subordinated to the latter. He maintains that the 
order of nature given ln experience ls properly understood as an aesthetic 
order, and that all other orders are species or aspects of aesthetic order. 1 
Moreover, since moral experience ls a certain aspect of aesthetic feeling, 
the former wlll be given in an experience which is fundamentally aesthetic: 
The metaphysical doctrine, here expounded, finds the foundations of the 
world in the aesthetic experience, rather than--as with Kant--in the cog-
nitive and conceptive experience. All order is therefore aesthetic order, 
and the moral order is merely certain aspects of aesthetic order •••• 2 
Journal of Ethics, XVII (1936-1937), pp. 308-16, and by the articles of John 
Goheen, Paul Schilpp and Bertram Morris which appear in !!:!.! Philosophy 2f 
Alfred North Whitehead, ed. by Schtlpp. (3) Nathaniel Lawrence, "Time, Value, 
and the Self," in !h! Relevance 2f Whitehead, ed. by Ivor Leet ere, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., and New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), pp. 143-
66. (4) Nathaniel Lawrence, "The Vision of Beauty and the Temporallty of 
Deity in Whitehead's Philosophy," in The Relevance of Whitehead, ed. by Ivor 
Leclerc, pp. 168-78. (5) Bertram Horili, "The Art-process and the Aesthetic 
Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy," !h! Philosophy 2f Alfred North Whitehead, ed. 
by Schilpp, PP• 461-87. (6) Eva Sharper, ttAesthetic Perception, 11 in The Rel· 
evance 2f Whitehead, ed. by Ivor Leclerc, pp. 263-85. (7) Donald Shert;i'~ 
~ Whiteheadian Aesthetic: ~ Implications tl Whitehead's Metaphysical 
Speculation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). (8) Robert c. Whit-
temore, "The Metaphysics of Whitehead's Feelings," Tulane Studies .!n Philos-
.2.l?!:!I., X, Studies in Whitehead's Philosophy, (1961), PP• 109-13. (9) Mary A. 
Wyman, .!!!.! ~ !2!. Feeling !!1 Sh.! Creative Process (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1960). 
lwnitehead holds that the question of an "order" of nature lies at 
the basis of the possibility of science. If there ls no order there can be 
no science. ttin the first place, there can be no living science unless there 
is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an Order 2! Things, 
and in particular, of an Order of Nature. I have used the word instinctive 
advisedly. It does not matter ;bat men say in words, so long as their activ-
ities are controlled by settled instincts.'' (fil;lli, p. 6.) Also see pp. 6-28, 
212-25. As with most of the themes of ~' Whitehead will develop these ideas 
on "order0 in his subsequent works. See, for example, f!, Part 2, Chapters 
iii-iv, PP• 127-97; t![, PP• 103-16 & 116-71. 
31. 
2fil1, p. 101. Also see "Analysis of Meaning," in ~. esp. pp. 129· 
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The intuitive character of aesthetic and therefore of moral experience 
is brought out in Science !ru!. lli Hodern World where Whitehead rejects the 
narrow mechanism of 18th century science. "The mechanism of God and the 
mechanism of matter, 11 he says, "were the monstrous issues of limited meta-
physics and clear logical intellect. 111 Rejecting this view he makes his own 
the feeling ex.pressed by the great poets of the following century. 2 t·!ore 
than any other 19th century poet, Wordsworth was moved by a kind of moral re-
pulsion in regard to the Newtonian synthesis. He was moved by the feeling 
"that something had been left out, and that what had been left out comprised 
everything that was most important. 113 More specifically Wordsworth's crlti-
cism of science was its •1absorptlon in abstractlons. 11 The themeof so many 
of his poems ls that the important things eluded the scientific method. 
Whitehead feels that it ls therefore important to ask what Wordsworth fCllnd 
in nature that failed to receive expression in science. 4 Let us listen to 
Whitehead's answer: 
The llteratue of the nineteenth century, especially its English 
poetic literature, is a witness to the discord between the aesthetic 
intuitions ~mankind and the mechanism of science. Shelly brings 
vividlv before us the eluciveness of the eternal objects of sense as 
they ha.int the change which infects underlying organisms. Wordsworth 
is the poet of nature as being the field of enduring permanence carrying 
1sMW, p. 109. 
2The influence on Whitehead of the great poets such as Wordsworth and 
Whitman as well as some similarities between Whitehead and the important 
neo-Confucian philosopher Chu Hsi (1130-1200) are the subject of Mary A. 
Wyman's work, .'!.h!. 1!:!£.! !.£!. Feeling. 
3~, I>• 112. 4 £lli.., P• 121. 
within themselves a message of tremendous significance. The eternal 
objects are also there for him. 
'The light that never was, on 
sea or land.' 
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Both Shelley and Wordsworth emphatically bear witness that nature cannot 
be divorced from its aesthetic values.I 
In affirming the aesthetic quality of nature given in our everyday 
lived experience, Whitehead sees the English Romantic poets reacting to the 
scientism so predominant from abcut the 17th century. Based on mechanistic, 
materialistic models, this older scientific realism asserted the supremacy of 
physical causation to the extent of disjoining it from considerations of 
final causality. The effect of banning final causation from natural science 
--and from philosophy--was to empty nature of its aesthetic quality and to 
reduce all evaluative judgments to subjective projections or at worse to 
groundless illusions. The consequences of this disjunction became especially 
apparent where the canons of Newtonian science were extended to the biological 
and psychological sciences. It was to remove mind from nature by denying 
that the mind can supply experiences in the order of final causality other 
than those provided for it by the body and by its prior mental states in the 
order of efficient causality. In such mechanistic models the whole does not 
appear as really more than the sum of its parts and is finally accounted for 
solely in terms of the reality of the parts. The result is that no adequate 
explanation is offered for the fact that within at least some types of wholes 
the parts evidence characteristics that are different from the properties 
l ~., P• 127. 
17 
manifest by these parts when in isolation. The other side of the same dif-
ficulty is that a sufficient explanation is lacking for the fact that the 
parts tlppear to function for the good of the whole. 
On another level, the effect of this disjunction was, as Whitehead 
suggests, to render moral responsibility unintelligible, if not non-existent. 
Individual moral responsibility ls impossible unless both determinism and free 
wl! 1 have some relevance, ttunhampered by the difficultie·s introduced by ma-
terialistic mechanism, or by the compromise of vitalism," which ls, says 
Whitehead, in its usual forms but a version of mechanism. Appealing to the 
combined insights of the great 19th century poets, ,,'hi tehead concurs that 
individual moral responsibility can be retained along with the latest findings 
of science if, on the contrary, the concrete enduring entities are regarded 
as "organisms... On such a model 
mentAl experiences are derivative from the actions of the body, including 
of course its internal behavior. Accordingly, the sole function of the 
mind ls to have at least some of its experiences settled for it, and to 
add such others as may be open to it independently of the body's motions, 
internal and external.l 
Stated briefly, the function of mentality in the organism ls to be causally 
determined by the parts but also to supply a plan of the whole, i.e. a goal 
or end, which in some measure itself determines the very characters of the 
various subordinate parts which enter into it. The doctrine of organism im-
Plied by the poets and espoused by Whitehead would thus reintroduce mental 
activity within ''material nature" as the source of novelty in the order of 
final causality. It would contain an intelligible doctrine of self-causation 
l~, p. 113. 
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which would do justice to the more abstract data of the sciences and to the 
concrete data of human freedom given in the lived, aesthetic-filled experience 
of mankind. 
Hhen we relate ~1hi tehead' s rather general comments concerning the 
lntui tive character of our moral feelings and his remar'rn on the various 
types of freedom, notably the basic freedom of self-determination, we can ask 
how, more specifically, ls freedom disclosed in our moral experience? It ls 
somewhat surprising to realize that 1~1hitehead devotes rather little attention 
to this question despite his repeated affirmations of the reality of freedom 
and of the genuineness of our feelings of freedom. There is not to be found 
in his writings anything like a complete phenomenological analysis of this 
experience. However, what Whitehead does say is very significant and suffices 
to indicate in a general way what he means to defend philosophically. 
'Jhltehead claims that we lrranadiately and directly feel ourselves as 
an (organic) unity of body and mind (or soul). This feeling involves at 
least the follo-wing characteristics. First, it is an experience of the 
derivation of emotion from both our bodies and our own states of mind di-
rectly preceeding the immediate present of rur conscious experience. In 
other words, our present e..xperiential moment is in part constituted by our 
"feelings" of the immanence of .the Dast determining the present. Beca11se 
the uresent mor:ent is exr>crienced as growing out of th0 past we have a basis 
for f'ersonal unity, for being one person-body and o.oul-throu~h many stages 
of existence within the world. 1 
11· 
_,.,_, pp. 218-28; 155-61. 
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Second, though a true unity, our identity with our prior states of 
consciousness and with our bodies ls not numerical, that ls absolute. We 
feel Cl.lrselves growing out of the past and into a genuinely novel occasion 
of experience. This experience entails an element of creative self-determina-
tion exercised within the limitations determined by our past moments of ex-
perience-and limited by the novel possibilities realizable in the present 
and future. 
~. this entails that we directly experience the causal efficacy 
of the past determining the present, but not absolutely. For in addition, 
we have a direct experience of ourselves as ''causa-.fil!1" determining in the 
order of final causality, that is teleologically.l We are conscious of a 
purely ideal aim entertained in such a manner as to be directive of the pro-
cess of self-creation. The choice of this aim involves both the exclusion of 
real alternative possibilities-potentialities-and the inclusion of "that 
definite factor of novelty which constitutes the selected way of entertaining 
those data in the process of unificatlon."2 
Fourth, at least in its higher manifestations this experience in-
volves a direct conscious awareness of conceptually entertained alms. Bring-
ing these points together Whitehead says: 
I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, 
fears, regrets, valuations, ot altexnatives, declsions--all of them 
1111n fact we are directly conscious of our iXJrpose as directive of 
our actions.tt (Ibid., p. 213.) Also see .f!, p. 74, .fillli'._, pp. 112-21. Also 
see Johnson, "Whitehead as Teacher," p. 353. 
2
.trr., p. 108. 
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subjective reactions to the environment as active in my nature. Ly 
unity--which ls Descartes• 1 1 am•-- ls my process of shaping this welter 
of material into a consistent pattern of feelings. The individual en-
joyment is what I am in my role of a natural activity, as I shape the 
activities of the environment into a new creation, which ls myself at 
this moment; and yet, as being myself, it ls a continuation of the ante• 
cedent world. If we stress the role of my immediate pattern of active 
enjoyment. this process is causation. If we stress the role of my lm• 
mediate pattern of active enjoyment, this process is self-creation. If 
we stress the role of conceptual anticipation of the future whose ex-
istence is a necessity in the nature of the present, this process is the 
teleological aim at some ideal in the future. This aim, however, is not 
really beyond the present process. For the aim at the future ls an en• 
joyrnent in the present. It thus effectively conditions the immediate 
self-creation of the new creature.I 
Fifth, the emergence of conceptual activity evidencing ~ greater 
powers 2f.. mentality l!l ~ nature .!!, ~ source 2f.. ~unique character tl 
man's freedom of self-determination as it mnn1fests itself in the act of 
..........-.. -- -........ _____ .........,_ 
~ choice. Unlike the animals who merely enjoy structure, man can "under-
stand structure," for he can abstract the principles in the facts and can 
imagine alternative posslbllittcs. 2 Whereas animals are consciously aware 
of and are therefore able to "choose" between this or that particular thing, 
human intelligence ls capable of conceiving of types of things in abstraction 
from their concrete exemplification, and therefore man is able to exercise 
freedom of choice properly so called.3 
These are the essential characteristics of human freedom of self· 
determination disclosed within our lnnnediate lived experience that Whitehead 
1 
.!MJ!•t P• 228. 2 .!ltlS•t PP• 214-15. 
3"Mathematics and the Good," !h!_ Philosophy 2f.. Alfred North Whitehead, 
ed. by P. A. Schllpp,5VII, PP• 672-74; Cf. Q, April 5, 1942 (New York: 
Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 157-59. 
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wishes to explain philosophically. It ls of the utmost importance to under-
stand that Whitehead accepts this experience as an irreducible starting polnt 
that phllosophlcal theory tll.lst elucidate. That is to say, the ultimate ap-
peal here ts common, even naive, experience. Thus we see that in a manner 
reminiscent of Wllllam James, whom he greatly admired and whose analysis eor-
roborated his own doctrine, Whitehead's appeal to naive experience ls a demand 
that our moral Intuitions, lncludlng our feelings of freedom, should find 
'" 
their expression within phllosophlcal theory, that they should be explained 
and not explained away. We can now appreciate why Whitehead appeals to the 
writings of the poets. It ls precisely in their works--and ln the aesthetic 
experience ln general--tbnt we find expressed in an especially vivid manner 
the ultimate concrete experience of mankind. As opposed to the abstract and 
llmlted nature of scientlflc concepts, the appeal to poetry ls consequently 
the demand to be faithful to !ll the facts. As Whitehead puts tt, "I hold 
that the ultimate appeal ts to naive experience and that ls why I lay such 
stress on the evidence of poetry. ul 
Though we are not here concerned with the precise relationship be-
tween poetry and philosophy, it ls apparent that for Whitehead both are lndis-
pensable aspects ln civillzation•s attempt to express its most fundamental in-
sights. If the appeal to poetry ls an appeal to be fat thful to immediate con-
crete experiences and if philosophy, especially Speculative Philosophy, ls 
l~, PP• 129-30. The lntultlve experiences are not limited to 
poetic expressions, hOYever't In e:.I., pp. 347-48, for example, \ihitehead ap-
peals to the artist le experience, and to the even more basic aesthetic ex-
perience which lles at the basts of artistic creations and conscious awareness 
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the appeal to make ultimate sense of experience by uncovering the intelligible 
foundations of the facts, then poetry and philosophy are intimately related. 
Each governs and supplements the other. 
Philosophy is akin to poetry, and both of them seek to express that 
ultimate good sense which we term civilization. In each case there is 
reference to form beyond the direct meanings of words. Poetry allies 
itself to metre, philosophy to mathematic pattern. 
Speaking of the origins of modern science in terms of the relationship 
between facts and reason, Whitehead comments: 
Poor belated medievalists? When they used reason they were not even 
intelligible to the ruling powers of their epoch. It will take centuries 
before stubborn facts!!.!. reduced J?x reason, and meanwhile the pendulum 
swings slowly and heavily to the extreme of the historical method.2 
We have here a concrete example of what Whitehead takes to be an important 
aspect of the relationship existing between fact and reason. The task of 
science and especially Jpeculative Philosophy is to reduce the facts to their 
intelligible foundation. Their task is the attempt to make ultimate sense 
of the data-all the data. f"evertheless, though aiming at complete reduci-
bility, something less ls always obtained, for a fact is just that, namely 
a !!El• 
Now a fact is a kind of starting polnt-1\ristotle would call it a 
principle <°'PA"'r\- arc...\~). In an important sense there ls no going beyond 
facts: while we may attempt to explain them, there is no explaining them 
away. Among other reasons, Plato rejects Parmenides and Heraclitus (or at 
1t.:I, pp. 237-38. Also see Q, November 11, 1947, pp. 368-69. 
12. Underlining is mine. 
23 
ieast cratylus) because thay explain away rather than explain the objects of 
sense experience; from his point of view Aristotle rejects Plato for the same 
reason; similarly the empiricists reject the rationalists and vice versa. 
This has been the hi story of philosophical speculation. In each instance it 
appears to be a case of explaining something but explaining away something 
else. But as Wbi tehead says, ''Philosophy destroys its usefulness when it in-
1 dulges in brillinnt feats of explaining away." 
\.Jhitehead would therefore reject those recent scientific and philo-
sophical theories that deny our experience of freedom as illusory. As noted 
by John Hospers, one of the strongest current arguments of this kind is the 
psychological doctrine of unconscious motivation. In its more extreme form 
this theory maintains that an individual's conscious impulses and conscious 
actions including, of course, his feelings of free choice, are really com-
pletely determined by motives operative below the level of conscious life; 
they are wholly determined by motives of which he knows nothing. The upshot 
of this theory is that the experience of freedom--of exercising free choice, 
of consequent feelings of responsibility, of self-approbation and self-
reproach, and so forth-are explained away as totally illusory. 2 Whitehead 
1 PR, p. 25. See f.!h p. 9: "It has been remarked that a system of 
philosophY-is never refuted; it is only abandoned. The reason is that logical 
contradictions, except as temporary slips of the mind-plentiful; thrugh 
temporary-- are the most gratuitous of errors; and usually they are trivial. 
Thus, after criticism, systems do not exhibit mere illogicalities. They suf-
fer from inadequacy and incoherence. Failure to include some obvious elements 
of experience in the scope of the system is met by boldly denying the facts.'' 
Also see pp. 196-97, FH, p. 86. 
211tree Will and Psychoanalysis," in The Problem .2!.. ~ filll, ed. 
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is acutely aware of this dangerous tendency toward rationalism inherent in 
scientific and philosophical explanations and it appears that it is for this 
reason that he speaks in Science !!!£!~Modern World of irreducible stubborn 
facts. Certain facts, such as those disclosed in our moral experience and 
including the activity of self-determination, are absolute starting points 
given within the very structure of our immediate lived experience. In the 
end, these facts remain. They cannot be reduced by removing them. They are 
stubborn and simply refuse to go away. 
Consciousness and intelligence are late arrivals on the scene. For 
Whitehead, aesthetic intuitions, generically speaking, are prior to conscious-
ness; consciousness and all it may involve in the order of intellection and 
rationality come later and presuppose the aesthetic experience. This is also 
true for our moral experiences including our experiences of freedom. Though 
supplementing each other, the latter explain the former but should not explain 
them away. Accordingly, Whitehead observes that "we have either to explain 
the diverse senses in which freedom and necessity can coexist, or we have to 
explain away one or other of the most obvious presuppositions of our daily 
thoughts. 111 
What ls the meaning of Whitehead's assertion that freedom and neces-
sity are "the most obvious presuppositions of our daily thoughts" or that the 
by Willard D. Enteman (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 195-215; 
"What Means thl s Freedom?" in Determlni sm !!!.2. Freedom !!l !h! Age g£_ Modern 
§.clence, ed. by Sidney Hook (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 126-42. 
1MT, p. 10. 
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feelings of freedom• responsibility, approbation and disapprobation, and so 
forth are "too large to be put aside merely as misconstruction" ir.osmuch as 
they ''govern the whole tone of life"? We understand Whitehead to mean that 
our ordinary lived experience, as well as our scientific and philosophical 
pronouncements, all presuppose for their very intelligibility the fact that 
human beings exercise genuine though limited freedom of self determination. 
This assertion would appear to entail one of the following two positions, 
Like William James, Whitehead may mean that we cannot scientifically 
"prove" the truth or falsity of moderate freedom any more than we can "prove" 
that of complete determinism, Instead of a proof, we are left with the neces-
sity of a choice, Since we nust choose one or the other alternative, why not 
choose freedom? As James says, 
o..tr first act of freedom, if we are free, ought in all inward propriety 
to be to affirm that we are free. This should exclude, it seems to me, 
from the free-will side of the question all hope of a coercive demonstra-
tion1--a demonstration which I, for one, am perfectly content to go with-
out. 
On this rendition, to believe in strict determinism is unwarranted because it 
is indemonstrable and because it implies a pessimism and despair that would 
make a shambles of our moral lives and thereby render the greater part of <11r 
experience meaningless. Rather than giving a proof of freedom or a disproof 
of determinism, Whitehead would be interpreted as being satisfied to develop 
a philosophical explanation that elucidates the facts of freedan given in our 
moral experience and also better, or at least equally well, accounts for the 
111The Dilemma of Determinism,'' in~ Writings 2£_ William~' ed. 
by John J. McDermott (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), P• 588. 
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data that appear to require the determinist•s thesis. 
On the other hand, it might also be argued that Whitehead means 
exactly what he says, namely, that a consequence of denying human freedom 
would be to render our entire experience utterly meaningless--and therefore 
render the deterministts position unintelligible. On this stronger lnterpre-
tation, Whitehead's assertions would imply the kind of position maintained 
by such diverse thinkers as Brand Blanshard, Alburey Castell, Paul Tillich, 
and others, all of whom attempt to defend the existence of human freedom 
by demonstrating the untenable theoretical consequences entailed in its deniaL 
As Tillich succinctly puts it, "The determinist does not see that the very af-
firmationd: determinism as true presupposes the freedom of decision between 
true and false •••• 111 Peter Bertocci makes the same point in greater detail: 
The only one who can know what judgment is true is a person who can 
analyze and think freely about the data, a person who is able to resist 
any conclusion which is not based on the evidence before him. The per-
son who cannot will to think and keep thinking abo..1t the evidence and dif • 
ferent interpretations of it will !:!.!:!!. conclusions; but his conclusions 
are not necessarily !!:2!!!, the evidence. 
If what we have said is true, the person who holds that scientific 
investigation presupposes that all events are determined is in an em-
barassing position. For if there is no freedom of will, there is no 
meaning to scientific truth. Hold that the mind, in its reasoning about 
events, ls just as determined as the events are, and there ls no basis 
for holding that the scientist's conclusion ls truer than that of the 
layman. Indeed, no one is left to know which conclusion is less partial 
than the other, for everyone's conclusion proceeds not from relatively 
free or detached observation of the facts but from the nexus of events 
in his brain. But why ls one flurry of electrical events truer than 
another, unless we can have some basis for believing that subjective 
1syst!J!!t!tlc Theology, Vol. I: Reason !!!it Revelation, Beinz !!!!!!. ~ 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), PP• 200-01; also see pp. 182-
86. 
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desires and prejudices, for example, can be willfully resisted ln accord-
ance wlth an ideal of proper lnvestlgatlon.l 
In either case, whether he would have favored the type of argument offered by 
James or Bertoccl, lt ls at least certain that Whitehead regards the exper-
tence of freedom as genuine and irrefutable, and like them he intends to offez 
an explanation of its nature. 
Th.ts far we have seen Whitehead writing that our feeling of llmlted 
freedom ls a fact glven ln our dlrect lived experlence. It ls given in a 
moral intultlon that preceeds the clear conceptual analysis of sclentlflc and 
phllosophlcal theory. The poets also attest to the primacy of this experience 
aldtherefore especially in their works can be found an important reaffirma-
tlon of the reality of immediate experience that is the basis of our feelings 
of freedom. Furthermore, the radical irreducibility of this experience ls 
such that its very existence ls presupposed ln the lntelllgiblllty of at least 
1Introduction .£2.S!l! Philosophy~ Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), Chapter ix,§6, as reproduced in.!h!. Problem gt_ 
!£!!. Cholce, p. 30. 
Similar arguments will be f<11nd by the following authors: Brand 
Blanshard, "Can the Philosopher Influence Social Change?" Journal of Phllos-
~. (November 25, 1954), p. 745; Alburey Castell, (1) Science.!!. ~God~ 
Philosophy (Stockton: College of the Pacific, 1953), PP• 74-75 (2) .!!:!.! .2!!! 
!!l Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), pp. 63-79; William H. Davis, 
1h.!. Freewill question ('lhe Hague: .Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 74-85; Morris 
Ginsberg, £!!.Sh! Diversity sl. Morals, Vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1957), pp. 82, 116-17; Corliss Lamont, Freedom of Cholce Affirmed (New York: 
Horlzon Press, 1967), pp. 83-84, 115-21; E. L. Mascall, Christian lbeologx 
apd Nab.lral Science (New York: Ronald Press, 1956), pp. 213-16; Paul Welss, 
Nature and t!!!l (New York: Henry Holt and eo. 1 1947), PP• 24-26. Many of the 
above mentioned authors are cited in Adler's lb!.~ gt, Freedom, Vol. II, 
pp. 453-58. 
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8 large part, if not all, of human etlstence. 
To acknowledge the fact of human freedom is not,however, to adequately 
understand its nature. Precisely because lt ls initially experienced at the 
ievel of aesthetic feelings, lt is essential for man to seek a conceptual 
understanding of this experience. At this point there arises the danger that 
as so often ln the past theory will render experience illusory. The problem 
as Whitehead envisions lt ls therefore to give a philosophical explanation of 
the whole of reality that would not explain away any of its parts. Hore 
specifically, his aim includes an attempt to present an ultimate elucidation 
of the basis of human freedom. 
B. Whitehead's !U!!!= ~ Philosophical Elucidation 
.2f .Eh! Basis !?.£.. Human Freedom 
Akin to poetry, philosophy is not merely poetry. But to say this ls 
not to say what philosophy is. To say that it tlllSt not explain away the facts 
ls not to say what it does. What is involved in Whitehead's conception of 
Speculative Philosophy? While poetry expresses itself in meter, Speo.tlatlve 
Philosophy endeavors to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of gen-
eral ideas. In order to understand what this means, we will begin by contrast 
lng philosophy to science. 
1. The Necessity of Science and Philosophy 
But before we begin this contrast, perhaps a prior question should be 
answered. Why do we have science? Why do we have philosophy? If facts are 
stubborn, if they reject being explained away, why do we have, or rather, why 
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do ~e need anything beyond the given facts of experience? A partial answer 
had been noted earlier where it was mentioned that facts are neither all of 
8 kind nor are they immediately compatible. There are contrasting facts. A 
more nearly complete answer is giver, by Hhitehead when he objects that there 
are no ~ brute matters of fact, and that modern science as it has been 
construed is, in Whitehead's view,''an abstraction." On this point, Whitehead 
sees himself in direct opposition to the kind of thought exemplified by 
Francis Bacon. 
Bacon's writings stand as a kind of culminating expression of an 
objection dating from about the sixteenth century which in effect condemns 
philosophic speculation as a kind of useless and even dangerous adventure. 
Science, the argument runs, should limit itself to detailed observation and 
description of the matters of fact, and to the eliciting of the "laws of 
nature" which will possess a generality "strictly limited to the systemati-
zation of these described detalls."1 
For Bacon there can be no greater generality than this, and therefore 
he ls quick to reject the traditional philosophers and scientists, notably 
the Aristotelians, who, blinded by the Stagarite's Organon, continue to speak 
of non-experiential explanatory principles such as flprinciples of being," "act 
and power," "passive matter, 11 and especially tlfinal causality," as well as 
other non-experiential explanatory conceptions. 2 
1f.B., P• 21. 
2For an example of Bacon's preference for the pre-Socratic philos-
ophers see his t<owm Organum, I, 63, in !h! Philosophical ',,!orks .2!_ Francis 
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Formal and final causality are therefore to be barred from physics 
but not from metaphysics-where they are at least mentioned-nor from con-
siderations involving human acts. Bacon's dualism has two sides. Ontological 
lY it appears as the radical separation of man from nature. The laws held 
operative for nature do not appear to be applicable to man's activities. Thus 
roan is free and his activities are teleological while nature is neither free 
nor tends to established ends or goals. It appears epistemologically as the 
radical separation of the sciences of physics and metaphysics. 
such is the spirit of Bacon's philosophy. It is primarily empirical 
in origin and eenerality. Moreover, its conclusions do not escape the nar-
row empiricism of its origin. But why should finality and freedom be predi-
cated of man but not of nature, as if man was somehow outside of nature? How 
can efficient, formal, and final causality be kept separate, even in the 
physical sciences? To Whitehead such dualisms are clearly instances of phil-
osophical incoherence. 1 Unlike Bacon, ~bitehead maintains that one of the 
tasks of a sound metaphysics is to "exhibit final and efficient causes in 
their proper relation to each other, 112 and thereby to establish the very foun-
Bacon, ed. by J. N. Robertson (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; London: George 
Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1905), p. 271. For his explicit rejection of Aris-
totle's method of introducing teleological explanations in order to account 
for natural phenomena see .J2!. J\ugmentis Scientiarum, Chapter 4, and !!!!. ~­
vancement .2£. Learning, Book II, in l!l2, Philosophical Works, PP• 471 and 96-97. 
Whitehead's criticism of Bacon's rejection of final causality can be found in 
.fil:!!:!, P• 11; f!, PP• 10, 26; and ~, pp. 39-40. 
1Wh1tehead's concern that philosophical speculation be coherent can 
be seen in .!:.E_, PP• 5, 9-10. 
21],, P• 129; cf. 61, P• 251; £!, PP• 10-18. 
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dations for the physical sciences. Here, then, Whitehead's position is very 
instructive. Rejecting some of the Aristotelian tenents noted by Bacon, he 
does not reject many others, and this for very important reasons. In some 
ways \.Thi tehead is closer to the ancient Aristotle than the modern Bacon. 
Most important ls Whitehead's rejection of the Aristotelian logic. 
1 Naively trusting the facility of human language to mirror reality, Aristotle 
followed too closely the subject-predicate grammatical form in the construe-
tlon of his logic and also--if not therefore--in the construction of his phil· 
osophical systern. 2 The consequences have been most unfortunate, for Occiden-
1 Whitehead's cautions attitude toward language can be seen in many of 
his works. See for example,£!, pp. viii, 16-20, 252-54, 274-79; t[, pp. 16-
17, 44-57; g, Pl'• 197-98; "Analysis of Meaning,"!§£., pp. 122-31; ~,(all); 
D, esp. November 11, 1947, pp. 368-69, and June 19, 1945, p. 329: "'You rust 
allow,• he went on presently, 'for the imprecision of language. It is a 
point I cannot make too emphatic. Again and again I return to it. The notion 
that thought can be perfectly or even adequately expressed in verbal symbols 
ls idiotic. And that supposition has done philosophy immeasurable harm."' 
Fine works on Whitehead's notion of language include the following: 
Wilbur M. Urban, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Language and lts Relation to Hts 
Metaphysics," 11?!, Philosophy 2f. Alfred ~Whitehead, ed. by Schilpp, pp. 
301-27; for a brief systematized survey of Whitehead's later (post 1924) views 
of language see A. H. Johnson, "Whitehead On the Uses of Language," The Rel-
evance£!. Whitehead, ed. Leclerc, PP• 125-41; see Errol Harris• comm;;t"s-;,; 
Johnson • s article in his "Review Article: The Relevance of Whitehead." 
Phllosophy, XL, No. 151 (January, 1965), pp:-60-67; Bowma~ L. Clark, "Lan-
guage and E,hitehead's Conception of ~eculative Philosophy," in Process !ru! 
Divinity f.Ihe Hartshorne FestschrifS/ ed. by William L. Reese and Eugene Free• 
man (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Pub. Co., 1964), pp. 217-34; Eberhard 
Bubser, 11Sprache und .tl.etaphyslk in Whiteheads Philosophie, 11 Archlv fur 
Phllosophie, x, no. 1-2 (1964), pp. 79-106, flnall y see Charles Hart;horne, 
11 Whitehead and Ordinary Language," !h! Southern Journal 2!_ Philosophy, VII, 
No. 4 (Winter, 1969-70), pp. 437-45. 
2Hhitehead 1 s criticism of Aristotelian logic can be seen in the fol-
lowing passages: £!, pp. 45, 80-81, 208-09; !l!.,, pp. 167-73 (esp. 169-70), 
196; SHW, p. 244; TI!.! ;Principles ~ _!{elatlvity (Cambridge: The Cambridge 
University Press, 1942), pp. 13-14. (Hereafter referred to as .!:!i!.!.•) 
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• 
tal thought since Aristotle has been primarily substance orientated. This 
1 has meant speaking of accidents and of substratums, and introducing the 
2 faculty-psychology. In both instances the result has been to send science 
Of interest in relating Whitehead's metaphysics with modern formal 
logic ls Clark's "Language & Whitehead." For an Aristotelian-Thomistic cri-
tique of Whitehead's idea of logic see RaymondSmith, o. p., Whitehead's £2!l-
cept !2! Logic. Thomistic :;tudies, No. 6 (Westminister, lid.: The Newman Presfi 
1953). For another defense of classical logic see Henry Veatch•s !H2 Logics: 
The Conflict between Classical !fil!. £i!2.-Analytic ~11losophy (Bvanston: North-
;e;tern University Press, 1969). 
11n the history of science this has had, says Whitehead, unfortunate 
consequences: "Aristotle asked the fundamental question, What do we mean by 
•substance'? Here the reaction between his philosophy and his logic worked 
very unfortunately. In his logic, the fundamental type of affirmative prop-
osition is the attribution of a predicate to a subject. Accordingly, amid the 
many current uses of ~he term •substance' which he analyses, he emphasises 
its meaning as 'the ultimate substratum which is no longer predicated of any-
thing else. 1 
The unquestioned acceptance of the Aristotelian logic has led to an 
ingrained tendency to postulate a substratum for whatever is disclosed in 
sense-awareness, namely, to look below 'What we are aware of for the substance 
ln the sense of the 'concrete thing.• This is the origin of the modern sci-
entific concept of matter and of ether, namely they are the outcome of this 
insistent habitof postulation. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Personally, I think that predication ls a muddled notion confusing many dif-
ferent relations under a convenient conmon form of speech." !E.! Cone~ of 
Nab.lre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964; this paper cover ectl-
tion has the identical pagination of the 1920 edition), pp. 18-19 (see all of 
PP• 16-25). (Hereafter referred to as f.li.) 
To Whitehead, the consequences have been no less unforb.lnate in phi-
losophy. He reads the history of speculative thought since Aristotle as so 
many variations on the substance theme, as can be seen in the wr.itings of the 
medievals and moderns. Throughout his more philosophical writings Whitehead 
contrasts his philosophy of organism with the substance philosophies of 
Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz; with the statements of the em-
piricists Locke, nerkeley, and Hume; and finally with Kant, who in a signifi-
cant way brought this discussion to a head--but at the price of inverting the 
real order with the order of knowing, arid the order of knowing with the order 
of appetition. See, for example, fil, pp. 193-94; £!, pp. vi ii, 10, 45, esp. 
119-23 and 208-12, 319; f::l, PP• 169-73, 355-56, 360-61. 
2pR, p. vi ii. 
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and philosophy on a wrong turn. On the other hand, against Bacon Whitehead 
affirms the importance and reality of what are for him in fact "principles 
of being"; 1 of the reall ty of real ttpotenti all ty," which includes Whitehead• s 
2 
''eternal object"; of "final causes.'' Finally, in what some ways summarizes 
Whitehead's attitude, he affirms the necessity of going beyond generalities 
limited to mere descriptions of the facts. 
Now as Whitehead observes, Bacon's generalities are limited to the 
systematization of described details. What, if anything, is lacking in such 
8 conception of science and philosophy? Whitehead clearly sees that accord-
lng to this view general lnterpretatlons--tnterpretatlons and laws not limited 
to explaining the specific data of any one sclence--have no bearing on pro-
cedures of the liml ted sciences. The result ls that "any system of general 
interpretation, be it true or false, remains intrinsically barren." The 
whole of Bacon's procedure rests upon a suppressed assumption, namely, that 
there are self-contained brute matters of fact. However this ls precisely 
1see his discussion of physical and conceptual poles, subjective 
form and aim, creativity, eternal objects, God, and the real internal re-
lationship of past actual entitles in the concrescence of actual entitles. 
The whole of Process !D£, Reality and much of Science !!ll!. lli Modern World and 
Adventures ,2! Ideas are devoted to working out the relationships maintaining 
between these ''principles of being." To be sure, God and other actual entitles 
are beings in themselves, they are actual entitles; nevertheless, as we shall 
see they are principles precisely inasmu.ch as they contribute to the being 
of the presently existing actual entitles. Moreover, like Aristotle's matter 
and form, some of these can exist only within and through actual entitles 
(according to the "Ontological Principle"). .f!, esp. pp. 27-28, 18th '~ate­
gory of Explanation•" pp. 26-27, 64-69; cf • .tlf., PP• 92ff. 
2£!,, P• 129. Whitehead's polemic in favor of final causality and 
against Bacon and those extremists of radical empiricism the contemporary 
positivists, can be seen in his brilliant short work The Function of Reason. 
Besides !],, prolong discussions on the limitations of--p;;sitlvism a~ear in 
AI., pp. 45-51 and is1-6a. \N \ s To W 
LOYOLA 
I JN l\lr-,...,.. ·-- _ 
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what ~hitehead rejects. On the contrary, 
there are no brute, self-contained matters of fact, capable of being 
understood apart from interpretation as an element in a system. Whenever 
we attempt to ElKpress the matter of immediate experience, we find that its 
understanding leads us beyond itself, to its contemporaries, to its past, 
to its future, and to the universals in terms of which its definiteness 
ts exhibited. But such universals, by their very character of universal• 
ity, embody the potentiality of other facts with variant types of definit 
ness. Thus the understanding of the inmediate brute fact requires its 
metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world with some systematic 
relation to lt. When thought comes upon the scene, it finds the interpre-
tations as matters of practice.l 
Several ideas are directing the writing of this passage. In the first 
place, Whitehead ls rejecting the existence of self-enclosed actualities with 
lts corelatlve doctrine of "external relations.'' He ls denying the reall ty 
of all previous forms of atomism implicitly or explicitly based on substance 
metaphysics: be they the cosmological kind of the ancient Atomists or of the 
moderns such as Bacon and Newton; or their epistemological counterpart Des• 
cartes and the emplrlclsts Locke, Berkeley, and especially Hume. 2 Actuall· 
ties, what Whitehead calls 0 actual entitles," are none of them self-contained. 
Not even God needs nothing but himself in order to exist. Arguing on the 
basts of our immediate experience, Whitehead will say that actual entitles are 
internally related. There are no self-enclosed facts because there are no 
self-enclosed actualities. Therefore any body of knowledge basing itself on 
between 
port ant 
''rant•s 
XX, No. 
1E!!,, PP• 21-22; cf. PP• 7-8. £!, PP• 54-58. 
2£.U., Chapter viii, PP• 152-78. Though there will be many simllarltles 
the two, Whitehead's own brand of "atomism" will differ in some im· 
respects from that of the ''monodology'' of Leibniz. See Ivor Leclerc, 
Second Antinomy, Leibniz and Whitehead,'' .1'!l! Review£! Metaphysics, 
1 (September, 1966), PP• 25-41. 
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the denial of real internal relations ls bound to be incomplete, if not false. 
Secondly, Whitehead is saying that every assertion concerning the 
nature of any part of reality implicitly contains an attitude concerning the 
whole of reality. Or, at least every partial exposition leads beyond itself. 
Thirdly, like the sciences, philosophy will be seen to be limited by the 
tools tt uses. Philosophy's tool ls language, and this ls why Whitehead deems 
lt necessary to fashion new tools to construct his new philosophy of organ-
lsm.1 In fine, there ts a need for both science and for something that has 
traditionally gone by the name philosophy. Science, because there tmJst be 
general methods and means of organizing and relating the many data given in 
the particular classes of experience; philosophy, because sciences are by 
their very method abstractive. Proceeding by abstraction, the particular 
sciences begin by eliminating certain classes of data as being irrelevant to 
the sciences. But if the world ls really related in some kind of meaningful 
11whole, 11 that ls, if reality ls really one, then it is necessary to recognize 
the limitations of the sciences but also to overcome them by constructing a 
philosophy. What, then, is philosophy and what are its dimensions? What ls 
its role? What ls the extent of its generalities? 
2. 'Ille Distinction Between Science and Philosophy 
It ls beyond the scope of this work to present a complete answer 
to these questlons--especlally since this would involve a detailed study of 
1 £!, pp. 16-20, 12. 
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the hlstorlcal development of \lhitehead•s thought. 1 None the less, a summary 
observation is in order, for understanding Whitehead's conception of Specula-
tive Philosophy and his critique of the abstract cosmology of modern science 
wlll enable us to better grasp his doctrine of human freedom. Let us begin 
with his distinction between science and philosophy. 
In the late works of his middle period Whitehead had begun to see 
clearly the distinction between science, philosophy, and metaphysics. The 
aim of both h!l Enquiry Concerning !b,! Principles ~ Natural Knowledge and .TI.!.! 
coocept 2i_ Nature, published in 1919 and 1920 respectively, was twofold: 
first, to fornulate the meaning of scientific exposition in the light of con-
temporary scientific findings; second, to show that these sciences, and indeed 
all science, are in turn dependent on philosophical conceptions. 
A science ls an organized, that is, unified, body of knowledge whose 
subject matter is restricted to some particular body of data, that is facts. 
For example the starting point of the science of nature is nature taken as 
1 The development of Whitehead's thought has been the object of several 
excellent studies. First, there are the two indispensable works by Victor 
Lowe: "The Development of Whitehead's Philosophy,'' !!:!..! Philosophy .2!. Alfred 
~Whitehead, ed. by Sch11pp, pp. 15-124; Understanding Whitehead (Balti• 
more: John Hopkins Press, 1968). Then there is Nathaniel Lawrence's scholar-
ly work entitled Whitehead's Philosophical Development: £1 Critical History 
~ ~ Background 2i_ Process ~ Reality (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1956); (New York: Greenwood Press, Pubs., 1968). Also 
see E. P. Shahan, Whitehead's Theory2i_ Experience (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity, King's Crown Press, 1950); and George Helal, "Le sens du developpe-
ment phllosophique de Whitehead," Dialogue, II, No. 4 (1964), pp. 398-422. 
In addition to these, there are the shorter summaries such as Johnson, White-
head's TheofI 2i_ Reality (New York: Dover Pub. Inc. , 1962) , "Appendix A: 
Whitehead's Early Thought," pp. 201-212; and Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead's Meta-
.ehYsics: fill Introductoty Exposition (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd~d 
New York: The 1'iacmillan Co., 1958), Part 1, Chapter i,§1: "Whitehead's 
Earlier Philosophical Interest,•1 pp. 3-11. 
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1 that which we observe through the senses. As the study of nature, science 
makes use of concepts like "matter," "space,'' tttime, 11 "motion,tt and "caus-
alitY" to name but a few. The philosophy of the sciences woold relate these 
ideas to the concepts en~loyed in the other particular sciences--such as 
"electron," "atom," "molecule11 in physics; "cell, 11 "organism," "life," in the 
study of biology; the "ego, u "consciousness," of psychology-wt th the aim of 
discovering unifying conceptions, i.e., those ideas which are common to these 
particular studies precisely because they implicitly underlie them all. 2 
At this time, Whitehead also maintained that science and the philos-
ophy of science do not ex.haust the domain of knowledge, and therefore for all 
their value they leave untouched many other areas of experience and other 
fields of knowledge. In short, Whitehead is aware that there is such a thing 
as metaphysics, but he is determined not to give a metaphysical exposition. 3 
Furthermore, when he wrote 1'.h!. Conce,pt g£, Nature Whitehead seemed to even have 
disparged the intrusion of metaphysics into the philosophy of science, for he 
says: 
The immediate thesis for discussion is that any metaphysical in-
terpretation is an illegitimate importaticrt into the philosophy of 
natural science. By a metaphysical interpretation I mean any discussion 
of the how (beyond nature) and of the why (beyond nature) of thought and 
sense awareness. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The recourse to metaphysics is like throwing a match into a powder 
magazine. It blows up the whole arena. This ls exactly what scientific 
philosophers do when they are driven into a corner and convinced of in• 
coherence. They at once drag in the mind and talk of entities in the mind 
or out of the mind as the case may be. For natural philosophy everything 
perceived is in nature •••• It is for natural philosophy to analyze how 
these various elements of nature are connected.4 
1cr· 3 
__:.:., p. • 2 !!2!.£., P• 2. Also see p. 46. 
3 .!.!:?.!!!. • ' p. 5 • 4 .!.2!.i!.•t PP• 28·29. 
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Nevertheless, four years later, the year before the publication of Science 
and the hodern "World, Whl tehead penned the ''Preface" to the Second Edi tlon of 
----
the Enquiry ln which he announces his intention to do what he earlier thought 
should not be done: he intends to write a metaphysics: 
Since the publication of the first edition of this book in 1919, the 
varlo..ts topics contained ln it have been also considered by me in !b.! 
Concept S!£. Nature (Camb. Univ. Press, 1920) and in.!!:!!. Principle S!!!!l-
atlvitY (Camb. Univ. Press, 1922). I hope in the immediate future to 
embody in the standpoint of these volumes in a more complete metaphysical 
study. 1 
With the writing of Science~!!:!.!. Modern World, or with the preface 
to the second edition of the Enquiry, Whitehead begins his third intellectual 
period. He had been content to do science and the philosophy of science. 
Now he turns to philosophical speculation proper, and specifically to meta-
physics. 
The philosophical tenor of Science .!!l2. !!:!.!. Modern World is stated in 
the 11Preface" where it ls announced that "in one of its functions," philos-
ophy "ls the critic of cosmologies. 112 Its function ls to 
harmonise, re-fashion, and justify divergent intuitions as to the nature 
of things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the ultimate ideas, and 
on the retention of the whole evidence in shaping our cosmological scheme. 
Its business is to render explicit, and--so far as may be--efflcient, a 
process which otherwise is unconsciously performed without rational 
tests. 3 
It seems clear that these divergent intuitions refer to what were 
called the "irreducible stubborn facts" (in the previous section of this 
chapter). It includes the poetic, religious, moral, in short all the aes-
l~, "Preface to Second Edition," p. ix. 
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thetic intuitions of mankind, as well as the data of ordinary sense experience 
and of the various sciences and philosophies of science. Philosophy must con-
sider and harmonize, even refashion, all the facts. It leaves nothing un-
touched: "It retains the whole evidences." Inasnuch as these data are either 
e~plicitly or implicitly embodied in ideas of ultimate generality and often 
function within a particular cosmological scheme, philosophy's business, as 
Whitehead says, is to make these ideas explicit where necessary and to be the 
critic of cosmologies. Summarizing his own view of the philosopher's task he 
says: 
Philosophers are rationalists. They are seeking to go behind stubborn 
and irreducible facts: They wish to GKplain in the light of universal 
principles the nutual reference betveen the various details entering into 
the flux of things. Also, they seek such principles as will eliminate 
mere arbitrariness; so that, whatever portion of fact ls assumed or given, 
the existence of the remainder of things shall satisfy some demand of 
rationality. They demand meaning.l 
To state this a blt differently, science and the philosophy of science 
do not exhaust the domain of knowledge. Therefore for all their value they 
leave untouched many other areas of experience and other fields of knowledge 
and to that extent proceed by way of abstractions. "But science makes the 
abstraction, and ls content to understand the complete fact in respect to only 
some of its essential aspects •••• A philosophic system Lultlmately metaphys-
ica~ should present an elucidation of concrete fact from which the sciences 
abstract. t1 2 It is when the scientist-or the philosopher, for that matter-
mistakes his abstractions (parts) for the concrete reality (the whole) that 
1
.!.21£., P• 142. Also see !ll.,, pp. 132-33, 147-49, 161-78, 180-81. 
2!b p. 186. 
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he is guilty of what Whitehead calls "The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. 0 1 
Since knowledge implicitly or explicitly assumes ideas of more or less 
generality, and since the human understanding inevitably attempts to formulate 
its insights in terms of conceptions of greater and greater generality, it 
follows that the attempt to articulate a scheme of the most general ideas 
applicable to all levels of experience. is not merely desirable; it is ab-
solutely necessary. The articulation of this scheme is precisely what White-
head attempts with the writing of his major metaphysical work Process !E.!!, 
Reality. 
That he is doing metaphysics there is no doubt. In Process !..!!£! 
Reality Whitehead again speaks to the question of the general difference be-
tween science and philosophy. He contrasts these disciplines according to 
their degree of generality: 
The field of a special science ls confined to one genus of facts, in 
the sense that no statements are made respecting facts which lie outside 
that genus. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The study of philosophy is a voyage towards the larger generalities.2 
l~, pp. 74-82, 85-86; f!, PP• 11, 143. 
2 f!., p. 14. He continues: "For this reason in the infancy of science 
when the main stress lay in the discovery of the most general ideas usefully 
applicable to the subject-matter in question, philosophy was not sharply dis-
tinguished from science. To this day, a new science with any substantial 
novelty in its notions is considered to be in some way peculiarly phllosophlca 
In their later stages, apart from occasional disturbances, most sciences ac-
cept without question the general notions in terms of which they develop. The 
main stress is laid on the adjustment and direct verification of more special 
statements. In such periods scientists repudiate philosophy; Newton, justly 
satisfied with his physical principles, disclaimed metaphysics." (Pp. 14-15.) 
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A statement of the largest generalltles in terms of which alt of reality ls 
described ls what ·.~ttehead calts *'f·'.etaphystcs11 : flJvietaphystes is nothing but 
the descrtptlon of the generalities 'f.1-hich apply to all the details of prac-
tice ... 1 It ls just such a metaphysical description that Vhltehead attempts 
tn Process and R~altty. 
In the '*Preface" ~.:rt1t tehead states lolhat is a key to understanding the 
underlying direction and purpose of thts work. Speaking of the divisions of 
the work he says that 
In the first part, the method 1t1 explalnod, and the schome of ideas, in 
terms of which the cosmology ls to be framed, ts stated summarlly. 
In tho secood part an endeavor 1 s ms de to exhl bl t th! s scheme as 
adequate for tha interpretation of the ideas and problems 'Which form 
the complex texture of civilized thought.2 
tte envisions his task as (1) form..tlatlng a scheme of ldeaz and (2) as golng 
on to Interpret the 'Whole of reallty ln terms of this general scheme. He 
catls (1) ,.The Categoreal Scherr.e" and refers to (2) as t t ls µresented in 
Process ~ R,ea,U tx variously as the ''cosmotogy0 or the °Cosmo1ogleat Scheme. n 
It seernD to follow that ~J'hltehead proceeds to ldentl fy ••metaphyst cs" prlmar-
Uy with the etueldatlon of (l) and S~leculatlve Ph11osophy as the cornbtnatlon 
ot (l) and (2). "Speoutatlve Philosophy ls the endeavor to frame a coherent, 
logical, necessary system of general ideas ln terms of which every element of 
3 
our experience CM\ be interpreted. u The absolute genernlity of such a scheme 
of ideas ls expllcttly stated were Whitehead explains the meanings of 
1Ibid., P• 19. 
3tbtd., p. 4; cf • .eJ., p. 285. · 
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"interpretation" and then "adequacytt: 
By this notion of 'interpretation' I mean that everything of which we 
are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the 
character of a particular instance of the general scheme. Thus the phil-
osophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and in respect to its in-
terpretation applicable and adequate. Here 'applicable' means that some 
items of experience are thus interpretable, and 'adeyiate• means that 
there are no items incapable of such interpretation. 
Now if Speculative Philosophy endeavors to frame the system in terms 
of which all our experience is interpreted, there can be no Speculative Philo-
sophy apart from that adequate interpretation. For the reality of these Cat-
egoreal Ideas is to be exemplified in this experience. Nor can experience 
ever fall to exemplify the principles represented by these ideas, for White-
head makes it very clear that •1The metaphysical first principles can never 
fall of exemplification. We can never catch the actual world taking a hollda 
from their sway. u2 Thus Speculative Philosophy mst accoont for all the facts 
by not explaining away any one of them. 
But if it is to explain all the facts, Speculative Philosophy cannot 
hope to begin with all the facts, yet begin it nust. In the concrete, the 
metaphysician must begin with some limited body of data, and from these with 
the aid of "free imagination" discover therein those general principles which 
are exemplified by the data and which, hopefully, also exemplify all other 
data by virtue of the ideas• very generality and the "trueness" of the imagi-
native insight. This ls to state generally what Whitehead conveys very po-
etically by his image of the flight of an airplane: 
1 f!!., p. 4; cf. &. p. 285. 2!!., P• 7 • 
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The true method of discovery ls like the flight of an aeroplane. It sta 
from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin 
air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed obser-
vation rendered acute by rational interpretatlon.l 
Precisely because he nust begin with a limited body of data and be-
cause he is seeking principles of the greatest generality--~ich means prln-
ciples applicable to all the data-the metaphyslclan nust introduce the play 
of "free imagination"; and therefore it ls always possible that his insights 
either do not express ideas which explain the original data, or do not extend 
to all the other data. 2 In either case it ls necessary to return to the stub· 
born and irreducible facts of the world taken in their original experience. 
It is in terms of explaining these that the Cosmological Scheme receives its 
ultimate justification and the C.ategoreal Ideas their verification. It is 
this returning to the facts that Whitehead represents as the return of the 
airplane to earth. 
3. 'lhe Place of Freedom Within the 
Philosophical System 
William Christian has perceptively called attention to an implicit 
7; cf. 61, PP• 286-87, 177-78. 
2
"The success of the imaginative experiment ls always to be tested by 
the applicability of its results beyond the restricted locus from which it 
originated. In default of such extended application, n generRlization started 
from physics, for example, remains merely an altr->rnative expression of notions 
applicable to physics. The partially successful philosophical generalization 
will, if derived from physics, find applications in fields of experience be-
yond physics. It will enlighten observP.tion in those remote fields, so that 
general principles can be discerned as in process of illustration, which in 
the absence of the imaginative generalization are obscured by their persistent 
oxemplification. 11 (fli, p. 8.) 
44 
distinction operative ln the philosophical writings of Whitehead. We nrust 
iearn to distinguish, says Christian, between Whitehead's three sorts of dis-
course: 
In some passages Whitehead ls evoking and describing the concrete ex-
perience he tAkes as his basic data. This we might call presystematic 
language. In others he is constructing and developing the concepts which 
compose his categoreal scheme. This we might call systematic language. 
Elsewhere he uses these systematic terms to interpret sense experience, 
the order of nature, art, morality, or religion. Here he ls applying his 
scheme, and we might call this postsystematlc language.1 
Summarizing the preceeding pages and applying Christian's terminology, 
we can say that human freedom ls first given as a kind of stubborn and irre-
duclble fact in a kind of moral lntui ti on. Whitehead uses presystematic 
language to describe this facet of human experience. Secondly, in the light 
of this and other facts he attempts to derive his ''Categoreal Scheme." Here 
Whitehead is working out his systematic language--that tool constructed to 
enable him to express those insights grasped within the experience of the 
original fact. Finally, returning to these same facts, lxlt also going to all 
the others in their turn, he attempts to explain them in terms of the tntel-
ligible principles formulated in the systematic language. This is the domain 
of postsystematic language. In terms of human freedom, it ls at this point 
that Whitehead ls presenting the philosophy of organism's analysis of the fact 
of human freedom. 
l~Hlliam A. C'hristian, ~ Interpretation~ ~!hitehead's retaphysics. 
<New Haven: Yale university Press, 1967), p. 3. This paper-bound edition has 
the identical pngination of the original 1959 edition and is not otherwise 
modified except for "some corrections and a few changes in wrding. 11 (p. v.) 
Christian greatly elaborates on this distinction in his article entitled 
" ., Some Uses of Reason,'' !!!.!. Relevance 21._ Whitehead, ed. by Leclerc, pp. 45-89 
(esp. pp. 7 lff.) 
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These three languages meet in a passage from Process .!!l!:!, Reality 
quoted earlier in the chapter but which because of its importance should be 
noted again: 
Further, in the case of those actualities whose immediate experience ls 
most completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final debision of 
the immediate subject-superject, constituting the ul~imate modification 
of subjective alm, ls the foundation of our experience of responsibility, 
of approbation or of disapprobation,of self-approval or of self-reproach, 
of freedom, of emphasis. This element in experience is too large to be 
put aside merely as misconstruction. It governs the whole tone of life.l 
In this text Whitehead ls interpreting (postsystematic language) freedom and 
other irreducible and stubborn moral facts given in lived human experience 
(presystematic language) in the terminology of his Categoreal Scheme (sys-
tematic language). Truly, Whitehead's task can be said to be the giving of 
a metaphysical elucidation of the basis of human freedom. 
One final observation. Whitehead certainly does not mean that his 
system of general ideas is the final word in Speculative Philosophy. The at-
tempt to reduce the stubborn facts to their intelligible foundation is seen 
to be limited from t-wo directions: it is limited by the nature of the facts 
and by the nature of human reason. By the facts inasnuch as the world is a 
complexus of beings really interrelated; and by reason inasmuch as man's is 
a finite intellect which is greatly dependent upon language in order to exer-
cise its activities. 2 Adopting a realistic stance 'Whitehead says: 
1f!, p. 74. 
2Whitehead's criticism of previous forms of atomisms is that they lead 
to utter unintelligibility, for "each substantial thing is conceived as com-
plete in itself, without any reference to any other substantial thing. Such 
an account of the ultimate atoms, or of the ultimate monads, or of the ulti-
mate subjects enjoying experience, renders an interconnected world of real 
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Thus a complete understanding ls a perfect grasp of the Universe in its 
totality. We are finite beings; and such a grasp is denied to us. 
This is not to say that there are finite aspects of things which are 
intrinsically incapable of entering into human knowledge. vthatever ex-
ists, ls capable of knowledge in respect to the finltude of its connec-
tions with the rest of things. In other words, we can know anything in 
some of its perspectives. But the totality of perspectives involves an 
infinite beyond finite knowledge.l 
Applying this criterion to his own speculative system Whitehead can say in the 
"Preface" to Process ~ Reality: 
There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny, and imperfect 
are efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things. In philosoph-
ical discussion, the merest hint of ~ogmatic certainty as to finality of 
statement is an exhibition of folly. 
This is important in evaluating Whitehead's examination of human free-
dom. He never means to deny the reality of human beings or their lived ex-
perience of freedom. On the contrary, he takes these as given. His aim ls 
to give a metaphysical accounting of the fact of freedom; to explain lt, not 
to explain it away: 3 "For we have either to explain the diverse senses in 
individuals unintelligible." (!!._, pp. 169-70.) 
Another llmltatlon ls that imposed by our dependence upon language. 
Whitehead's awareness of this limitation was noted on page 31, footnote no. 1. 
lllf., p. 58. 
2~, P• x. In the "Epilogue11 to t-1odes 2£_ Thought (adapted from an 
address delivered ln 1935) Whitehead conveys a similar idea in what he calls 
"The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary." He says: 0 There is an insistent pre-
supposition continually sterilizing philosophical thought. It is the belief, 
the very natural belief, that mankind has consciously entertained all the fun-
damental ideas which are applicable to its experience. Further it is held 
that human language, in single words or in phrases, explicitly expresses 
these ideas. I will term this presupposl tion, The Fallacy of t;he Perfect 
Dictionary.'' Q:.[, p. 235.) Cf. the "Fallacy of Dogmatic Finality,'' in !ll_, 
pp. 208-11, 380-81; also see "Hathematlcs and the Good,"§ 4, ~ Philosor.>.~ 
a!. Alfred North Whitehead, ed by Schilpp, pp. 670-71. 
3fil, p. 10. 
which freedom and necessity can coexlst, or we have to explain away one or 
other of the most obvious presupposltlons of rur datly thooghts." In the 
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end, lf lt comes to a choice between the system so elucidated and the fact of 
bulMl'I freedom lntultlvely experienced, there ts little doubt as to which 
iaust be chosen. For the categorea1 scheme, llke the more narrower schemes 
of any science, la '*a matrix from which true 1>roposltlons appllcable to par-
ticular circumstances can be derived.••1 Here there are. three posslblllttes: 
(i} the conclusion may agree with the observed facts; (ii) the conclusion 
may exhibit general agreement, with disagreement ln detail; (ill) the con-
clusion may be ln complete disagreement with the facts. 
In the fl rst case, the facts are known wl th more adequacy and the 
ap,licablltty ot the system to the world has been elucidated. In the 
second case, er~tlcism of the observation ot the facts and of the details 
of the scheme are both required. The history of thought shows that fnlse 
Interpretations of observed facts enter into the records of their obser-
vation. Thus both theory, and received notions as to fact, are in doubt. 
In the third case a fundamental reorganization of theory ls required 
~ther by way of limiting it to some special province, or by way of en-
tire abandonment of its main categories of thought.2 
The question to be asked, then, ls whether Whitehead's Speculative 
Philosophy establishes the basis for an adequate explanation of human freedom. 
At the conclusion of this study we will offer a brief evaluation of \Jhlte-
head's attempt to give a metaphysical bash of human freedom. For the pre-
sent we !11..lSt first establish the metaphysical basts of freedom on the micro-
scoplc level of lndlvldual ttaetu."1 entl ties. 0 This ts the task of the follow-
lng chapter. 
1
.EB._, P• 13. 
2Ibld. Also see A!,_, pp. 177-78; !B,, all of Chapter lit (esp. PP• 66-
72, 76-79r:--
S.lmUar tests are offered, it ls lnterastlng to note, by Aristotle and 
Mortimer j. Adler. See Aristotle's Nlcomachean Ethics, x, vltl, 1179a 15-25; 
anl d Adler's !h.! Condltlons g! Phllosoph~ (New York: Delta Publlshlng Co., 
967) • Chapter ix • 147-63. 
CHAPTER II 
ACTUAL F.NTITI ES: THE PLACE OF FREEDOM IN 
WHITFBF.AD' S METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION 
We have seen in the previous chapter that Whitehead firmly and un-
equivocally affirms both the reality and importance of human freedom, and 
therefore according to his conception of the function of metaphysics he ls 
intent on elucidating a system that will account for this and all the stub-
born facts given ln all levels of experience. He ls searching for the con-
ceptual framework wlthln which he can express his insights concerning the 
ultimate makeup of the whole of reality, leaving none of her parts untouched. 
In seeking the most general system of ideas, he ls attempting to express 
what must be at the ultimate basis of every particular fact of experience and 
which manifests itself ln various ways in the various facts. How, then, does 
Whitehead conceive of the complete metaphysical fact? What, for him, ls 
really real, and how does he propose to establish the metaphysical basis for 
human freedom? 
In this chapter we address ourselves to these questions. First, we 
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will present a brief introduction to Whitehead's metaphysics. Our discussion 
will be confined to summarizing Whitehead's notion of the nature and compo-
sistion of the r;s ~' Whitehead's "actual entities." The more complete 
analysis of an ac~1al entity is given in the second part of the chapter. 
There the "process of concrescence" is discussed in some detail in terms of 
Whitehead's formal discussion of freedom as stated in the 9th "Category of 
Obligation." 
A. The Res Verae: 
- ===== 
Actual Entities 
1. Actual Entitles 
In many works Whitehead suggests that the key for understanding the 
ultimate nature of reality is to be found in an analysis of human experience. 1 
In the previous chapter the most important characteristics of this experience 
lA!.t p. 284: "But if we hold, as for example in Process !!!.2. Reality, 
that all final individual actualities have the character of occasions of ex-
perience, then on that hypothesis the direct evidence as to the connectedness 
of one's imnediate present occasion of experience with one's immediate past 
occasions, can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the connect-
edness of all occasions in nature." Also see g, pp. 283-305, 237; f!, pp. 
172, 197; !:1!_, 173-232, esp. 231-32; .§., pp. 5-6; E_, pp. 15, 26; and Whitehead's 
comments in Johnson, 11h'hitehead as Teacher," pp. 352-54, 366. On the other 
hand, in .filiii, pp. 165, 207, 219 Whitehead says that this is but one of many 
possible starting points for metaphysical construction. 
Important, sympathetic discussloru of Whitehead's ttanthropomorphismtt 
will be found in these wrks: A. H. Johnson, uThe Psychology of Alfred North 
Whitehead," .!!!!. Journal ~ General Psychology, XXXII (1945), pp. 175-212; 
Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead, pp. 112-15; William Christian, £m, ~­
.e_retation, pp. 168-72; Nathanial Lawrence, "Time, Value, and the Self," esp. 
pp. 154-59; John Cobb, ~Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: The West-
minister Press, 1965), pp. 26-40. 
Nore critical are the following: Edward Pols, Whitehe:sd's t-'.etaphysics 
pp. 5-7; °Freedom and Agency: A Reply,'' !!!.!. Southern Journal .2f Philosophy, 
VII, No. 4 (Winter, 1969-70), PP• 418-19. Stephen c. Pepper, ttWhitehead's 
'Actual Occasion,"' Tulane Studies !!l Philosophy, X (1961), Studies in White-
head' s Philosophy, pp. 71-88. 
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1 ~ere outlined. As we observed, essential here is the fact of feeling our-
selves as organic unities enjoying a certain immediate individuality. There 
can be no doubt that in some irreducible sense a human being is a complex 
unity of body and mind from birth to death. When we examine this feeling 
more closely, however, especially in light of the imnediate and direct evi-
dence of the transition, the growth, from the past to the present occasion 
of conscious experience, we find, says Whitehead, that our present experience 
ls constituted as a rather complex process of ttcreatively appropriating" the 
data of our past experience into a novel unity, an "occasion of experience" 
thus an example of an actual occasion is myself here and now in my momentary 
experience as a self. As Whitehead sees it, the philosopher's task is to e-
lucidate this experience in appropriate metaphysical categories, and this 
means abandoning the older categories of substance and accident. 
As Whitehead developed his philosophy of organism, he explicitly re-
. 2 jected what he understood to be Aristotle's idea of "primary substance" as 
well as a derivative notion found in Descartes• Princi£les 2f Philosophy (Part 
I, Principle LI). There, as Whitehead notes, Descartes defines substance as 
"an existing thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. 03 In 
addition to suggesting that a particular substance is essentially unrelated 
to any other particular, the traditional notion of substance entails the idea 
of an enduring substrate characterized by essential qualities and remaining 
1 Chapter i, pp. 18-19. 2 £!, p. 79. 
31!?.!.£. ln addition to this text where Hhitehead is quoting Descartes 
also see P• 241. 
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numerically one amidst the change of accidental relations nnd of accidental 
qualities. 1 Whitehead does not wish to deny that the idea of an enduring 
substance sustaining qualities expresses a useful abstraction for many pur-
poses of life. 2 A difficulty arises, however, when in philosophy we mistake 
this abstraction for reality and "try to use it as a fundamental statement 
f hi 113 of the nature o t ngs •••• In metaphysics the notion is sheer error. 4 The 
error consists in attempting to maintain that something can exist changelessly 
and yet be the subject of change and in denying the existence or real internal 
relationships among substances. 5 For Whitehead, since the notion of substance 
ls ultimately unintelligible and since it fails to adequately explain our 
everyday lived experience, he ls convinced that it should be avoided in meta-
physics. 
Having rejected a ••substance metaphysics," and adopting a doctrine 
6 
"that •existence' (in any of its senses) cannot be abstracted from process,u 
7 Whitehead believes that the only plausible remaining alternative is to con-
lf]., p. 122 (see 119-123), 116. 2 !ill.•, P• 122. 
3.!.E!.£!., cf. also P• 78; .?!Jli, PP• 74-75. 
4
.rB:,, P• 122 (see PP• 119-23). Again, ''the erroneous notion of process 
devoid of lndivldualltles, and of individualities devoid of process can never 
be adjusted to each other. If you start with either of these falsehoods you 
mist dismiss the other as meaningless." (fil., P• 131.) 
5Th1 s 1 s not to be construed as meaning that Whitehead excludes ex-
ternal relations, for his philosophy is not reducible to that of F. H. Bradley. 
~. p. 131. 
7Whitehead does mention an alternative explanation to his phllosophy 
of organism. This occurs on p. 508, n.3 ln £!!.and ls a reference to F. s. c. 
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ceive of the ultimate metaphysical real l ties as non-endurb[': internally re-
lated units of process. Although he disagrees with Descartes on the question 
of substance, Whitehead contends that Descartes was correct when he abandoned 
the notion that endurance is a quality of a substrate. 
For he explained endurance as perpetual re-creation at each instant. 
Thus the matter of fact was, for him, to be seen in the instant and not 
in the endurance. For him endurance was a mere succession of instan-
taneous facts. l 
Following the implications of Descartes• insight, Whitehead agrees that "the 
ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism. Th t t i .,2 e crea ures are a om c •••• That 
is to say, the enduring things of nature such as those entities disclosed in 
sense perception are at their basis a procession of non-substantial atomic 
units of experience, i.e., they are not 0 substances" in the classical defi-
nltion of that term. It ls these non-enduring occasions of experience, or 
what Whitehead calls variously "epochal occasions, 11 "actual occasions," or 
- 3 
"actual entities" which are the ~ verae. Taken together in their inter-
Northrop's ttThe Macroscopic Atomic Theory: A Physical Interpretation of the 
Theory of Relativity," .!!!£. Jorunal £!.. Philosophy, X.XV, No. 17 (August 16, 
1928), pp. 449-67. 
1t[,, p. 199. 
2 Ph P• 53. Cf. PP• 29-30, 50-51, 95, 116, 147-67; !il_, PP• 258-67. 
For an excellent introduction to Whitehead's doctrine that actuality is atomic 
while potentiality ls continuous, see Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 
53-67, 71-80. Leclerc presents a more technical summary of this doctrine in 
another fine piece entitled "Kant's Second Antinomy;" cf."Kant•s Antinomie der 
Teilung und die Metaphysik von ~1hitehead," ant-Studien, LVI (1966), pp. 289-
301. -
3
,ill., pp. 17-28, 32, the 1st "Category of Existence." 
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1 relatedness they are the building blocks of the universe. Enduring things 
soch as electrons. molecules, stones, chairs, trees, dogs, and men are '~nexus" 
2 
said to 1x! ' 1derlved 11 or "built up11 from thein. 
As Leclerc has shown, by conceiving of the ultimate nature of reality 
1n terms of t1actual entitles,'' \..11ttehead's purpose in constructing a meta• 
pbyslcs is slmUar to that of Aristotle: it ts to determine "the n'lture of 
3 
•that• which ls the•complete existent•, the •tully existing• entity. n Or, 
as for Plato, tt ts to detemine vhat ls really real ( fo ow..~o~ c'I). For \<.itlte-
head, the term "actual" entaUs the notion of ''existence in the fullest sense 
4 
of the term, beyond which there ls no other." The "entitles" which are 
"actual 0 are therefore the fully real existents "beyond which there ls no 
other. 11 They constl b.tte the realm of what ls really real and thus exhaust 
reality ln the sense that apart from them there ls only absolute !!2!!,•betns. 
As Whitehead puts lt, 
'Actual entltles•-..atso termed •actual occasions• are the final real 
things of vhlch the "WOrld ts made up. There ls no going behind the actual 
entitles to find anything more reat •••• The final facts are. all alike. 
actual entitles; and these actual entitles are drops of experience, com-
plex and lnterdependent.5 
it.Thus the actual world ls hiJllt up of actual occasions; and by the 
ontological prlncl ple whatever things there nre ln any sense of 'exhtence, • 
are derived by abstract ton from actual occasions. 11 (1.],,, P• 113.) 
2,,I hold that these un ltl es of ext stance are the really real things 
vhich ln their collective unity compooe the evolving universe, ever plunging 
into the creative advance." (t[., p. 206.) 
3
v.'httehead•s potAphysios, p. 20. The entire section (pp. 20 .. 28) ts 
relevant. 
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The primacy of actual entities as the final metaphysical realities 
1 
also finds its expression in the "ontological principle." By this principle, 
Whitehead wishes to make it clear that there can be nothing in complete sep-
aration from actual entities, nothing either in being or in thought. To the 
extent that "something" is in no way related to the e..~istence of an actual 
entity "that thing'' is in reality nothing at all. It neither is nor can it 
be known: ''The ontological principle declares that every decision is refer-
able to one or more actual entities, because in separation from actual enti-
ties there is nothing, merely nonentity-'The rest is silence. •112 Consequent-
ly any explanation of the nature of reality will have to be ultimately formu-
lated in terms of the reality of actual entities; to search for an explana-
tion, for a reason, is, in the end, to search for one or more actual enti-
ties. 3 But if everything ls to be referred to actual entities, it does not 
follow that everything .!.! an actual entity. An analysis of their make up dis-
closes that actual entities are neither simple nor unrelated. Whitehead seems 
to have clearly grasped that if the !!?!. verae are many and if they are in pro-
cess, they rust in some way be composed of really distinct 11 formative ele-
ments." 
lFor an excellent analysis of the "ontological principle11 see Leclerc, 
Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 17-28. 
2£!, P• 68. 
3
"The ontological principle can be summarized as: no actual entity, 
then no reason." (fl!_, P• 28.) See fill, pp. 36-37 for the longer, formal 
statement of this principle; also see p. 64. 
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2. Composition of the !!!, Verae 
Whitehead often calls attention to the fact that the actual world 
disclosed in experience evidences a rrultlpllcity of diverse but interrelated 
1 
actual entitles. For example, there ls the evidence that our life ls an 
ongoing succession of momentary occasions of experience, and that we live in 
a world inhabited by similar types of existents. The philosophical problem 
for him ls thus the perennial one of explaining how lt ls that reality ls ln 
some respect both one and many. How ls it that the many actual entitles con-
stltute a universe? Related to this ls the problem of accounting for change 
and stablllty, for the actual world evidences itself as both one and many, 
changing and permanent. As 'Whitehead will say, in chanslns the many actual 
entitles enter into and become .2!l!. novel actual entity. Furthermore, White-
head connects the fact of freedom with both problems. This coming into belng 
of a novel individual actual entity ls both !£.!.!. and determined--lnternalty 
determined and externally free. 2 As we shalt see presently, these opposites 
3 
receive their final "explanation" ln Whitehead's "Category of the Ultimate." 
1
"The actual world can be analyzed into a rultlpllclty of occasions 
of actuallzatlon •••• Catl each such occasion an •epochal occasion.• 'lhen the 
actual world ls a cotmUnity of epochal occasions. The epochal occasions are 
the primary units of the actual CODB11Jnity, and the C011111Unity ls composed of 
the units. But each unit has in its nature a reference to every other member 
of the community, so that each unit ls a microcosm representing ln itself the 
entire all-inclusive universe." (.filt, pp. 88-89.) Cf. fil'!, p. 86. 
2see EB_, P• 518 for the complete list of Whitehead's ultimate oppo-
sites. The relevant passage from EB_ has been quoted ln Chapter l, PP• 6-7 of 
this dissertation. Two other lists of opposites are given in ~. on p. 268 
and pp. 244-45. 
3
,f!, PP• 31-32. 
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and the unlfylng thread which turns these opposites into compatible aspects 
of the Identical metaphysical sltuatlon are Whitehead's formative elements: 
"creativity'' and "eternal objects." 
As an lntroductlon to the role played by the "formative elements," 
1et us briefly consider the fact of change, for if one were to select "the" 
characteristic of the temporal world, it would have to be, for Whitehead, the 
bet "that existence cannot be separated from process." In this respect Whlt 
head ls ln baste agreement with those phllosophers who, Ul<e Heraclttus, are 
struck by the fact of change. The flux of nature, Heraclitus tells us, can 
be likened to the flow of a river. Extending this ancient doctrine Whitehead 
adds ••no thinker thinks tvlce and to put the matter more generally, no subject 
experiences tvice.n1 More speclflcally: 
~lthout doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, lntegral experience, 
unwarped by the sophistlcatlon of theory, that experience whose elucida-
tion ls the final alm of philosophy, the flux of things ls one ultimate 
generalization around which we trUst weave our phllosophlcal system. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The elucidation of the meaning involved ln the phrase •an things 
flow,• ts one chief task of metaphystcs.2 
However, llko Flato before hlm, Whl t:ehead cannot accept the Heracllt 
doctrine as lt stands, for it ignores the equally obvious ttfact" of perma-
nence. nut at the other end of the phltosophlcal spectrum ls the doctrine of 
1!'!,, il. 43. In a somevhat different context Wh ltehead says: 0we live 
ln a world of faster and faster transformation. An ancient sage has sald, 
'no one crosses the same river tvtce.• We can apply this saying to our own 
case: no one lectures to the same students twlce; no one lectures on. the same 
subject twice. Tho flux of the world has assumed n new relation to the spans 
and the period of h.tmen Ufe. n lf.fil:, P• 200. 
21],, P• 317; of • .§t!li, PP• 135-36; A!,, PP• 354-56. 
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ttfather Parmenides." In the face of the stubborn facts of mJltiplicl ty and 
change this antithetical posltlon ldentlfles reality with absolutely self-
tdent!cal and permanent belng. Though philosophers seem to be haunted by the 
ghosts of these extreme doctrines, Whitehead thinks lt ls possible to avold 
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness which lies at the basts of so many at-
te111pts at phllosophlcal reconclllatlon. Commenting on the lines "abide with 
me;" and "Fast falls the eventide" Whitehead says, 
Those philosophers who start wlth the 
physics of •substance•; and those who 
developed the metaphysics yt 'flux.• 
be torn apart in thls way. 
flrst line have glven us the meta• 
start wlth the second llne have 
But ln truth, the two lines cannot 
so like Plato before hlm, Whitehead reiterates that 
The riddle of the universe ts not so simple. 'lbere ts the aspect of 
permanence ln which a given type of attainment ls aldlessly re~ated for 
its own sake: and there ls the transltlon to other things •••• 
Far from merely echoing Plato's ancient cry, Whitehead's position ts 
fundamentally more realistic. Whitehead shares the baste Platonic tenet 
which recognizes the reality of the permanent and even eternal factors manl-
fest in some sense on all levels of experience, but he rejects Plato's ex-
treme separation of the enduring forms from the changing things of this world. 
'Ille consequences of this separation have lead to the feeling fo the tlluslve-
ness and relative unreality of the temporal world. 3 Whitehead agrres rather 
has 
pp. 
lf!, p. 318. Also see ~' PP• 125-26. 
2.§.t!li, p. 164; also P• 126: 
to face these two facts, ch@nge 
70-76. ct. Sgphlst, 249C-D. 
"Every scheme for the analysis of nature 
and endurance.'' ct • .f!, p. 207 and !fr, 
3
see "Process and Reality," ln ~' esp. P• 116. 
with Aristotle• that these principles of 2ermmience and unity together wlth 
anY other principles of chapse and muJtl2J!clty--as well as freedom and ~ 
-
.ternlntsm-nust be 0 groundedtt in the very constitutloo of the res ve_rne. As 
he says, "Aristotle in his olf.n person expressed a useful protest against the 
Platonic tendency to sei>arate a static spiritual world from a fluent ~orld of 
1 
superficial experience." 
Ultimately grounding the "ideal" w-ithln the ttrea1.0 the "potential" 
wt thin the nactual •" and inverting the Platonic relattanshtp, Whitehead says 
that "The things which are temporal arise by their f>articlpatlon ln the things 
,mtch are eternal. n2 The metaf.ityslcal question that \Jhltehead nu.st answer 
thus ls "What are those formative elements (or "principles," as they are 
called ln the Aristotelian tradition) whlch together constitute an actual en-
titY and thereby ultimately account for change amld permanence. unity amid 
plural lty• and freedom amid determlnin evidenced on the many levels of ex-
perience? 
Lest ve be taken too far afield• tt m..ust be recalled that w are 
here prlmarlly interested in the question of the ontological ground of free-
dom of the res yer1e. That freedom must be grounded in actual entitles seems 
obvious. F'or, as the bulldlng bloeks of the universe, lf actual entitles are 
1!!!!., P• 319. Also see the "5th Category of Existence," P• 32 and the 
4th ''Category of Explanation," PP• 33, 69-73. Whitehead never abandoned this 
view, as can be seen ln his last published eaaay "lmmortallty."§VI, ln !!!.!. 
PhilosoehI R! Alfred North Whitehead• ed. by Schlipp, pp. 687-88. 
2l']_• P• 63. 
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in no way free, whatever else there may be in reality, there will not be free-
dOill• Therefore our specific question is twofold: l) ••now do these formative 
elements function so as to 'account for• the ~ 2£. freedom of !!.n actual 
entity?" and 2) 11How does the answer to the first question 'account for' the 
-
tact of human freedom?" Actual entities may be free individually, that is 
----
"microscopically" speaking, but a man is a peculiar "nexus" of actual enti-
tles. Therefore '*macroscopically" speaking it is not inunediately obvious how 
men could be free agents. In the remainder of the present chapter we will 
address ourselves primarily to the first question. A brief introduction to 
the formative elements will be followed by a more lengthy examination which 
will attempt to outline how these elements function so as to account for the 
freedom evidenced by actual entities. The discussion of question two will 
be taken up in the following chapters. 
3. Formative Elements 
Recognizing that there are ''many ways of analyzing the universe con-
ceived as that which is comprehensive of all that there is,tt in Religiof! !n 
.Eh! t-laking, Whitehead suggests an analysis into "(l) the actual world, pas-
1 
sing in time; and (2) those elements which go into its formation." Of the 
reality to be assigned to the formative elements, Whitehead says, 
Such formative elements are not themselves actual and passing; they 
are the factors which are either non-actual or non-temporal, disclosed 
in the analysis of what is both actual and temporal. 
They constitute the formative character of the actual temporal world. 
We know nothing beyond this temporal world and the formative clements 
P• 87. 
which jointly constitute its character. 'lbe temporal world and its 
formative elements constitute for us the all inclusive unlverse.1 
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There are three formative elements, "Creativity," "Ideal entitles," 
or, as they come to be called, "Eternal Objects," and "God": 
1. The creativity whereby the actual world has its character of 
temporal passage to novelty. 
2. The realm of ideal entities, or forms, which are in themselves 
not actual, but are such that they are exemplified in everything that is 
actual, according to some proportion of relevance. 
3. The actual but non-temporal entity whereby the indetermination of 
mere creativity ls transmuted into a determinate freedom. This non• 
temporal actual entity ls what men call God--the supreme God of ration• 
alized rellglon.2 
The first thing to notice about creativity and eternal objects is that 
they function as really distinct correlative principles ln a manner analogous 
to the "hylomorphlc" composition in Aristotelian metaphysics. In the language 
of the schoolmen, taken together they are "that by which" (.!!!quo) an actual 
entity is "that which ls" (.!!! ~). These principles can be "abstracted" or 
"analyzed" as really distinct elements formative of an actual entity, yet in 
themselves, 1.e. apart from constituting actual entities, they are non-exis-
tent; neither creativity nor eternal objects enjoy the metaphysical status of 
"complete existents," of "fully existing entitles." It ls important to em-
phaslze this point at the outset, for any subsequent references to these 
correlative constitutive principles must not be interpreted as suggesting that 
in themselves they are r;s verae. They enjoy ontological--!!!!!!, !!2! merely 
!l?.istemologlcal--status, but their reality is that of a principle of existing 
entities. The necessity of speaking of these formative elements in terms of 
2 ~., P• 88. Cf. b!, pp. 63-64. 
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our ordinary grammatical patterns need not mislead us into thinking of the!';2 
"principles of belng0 as "beings in themselves." To do so would be to comi:.!t 
what has come to be cal led a "category-mi stake." 
a) Creativity 
Leclerc observes that by locating the principle of an existent•s 
actuality within the existent, Aristotle 
., " found himself increasinglz driven to ascribe •act• ((;\/ty(E- l~) to form 
Lfietaphyslcs, 1050, a3-21/ and 'When he came to develope a doctrine of 
the prime mover ••• he had to conclude that such an actuality nust be pure 
form devoid of all matter /Metaphysics, 1071, bll-2.2_/ •••• 1 
The upshot of this development within Aristotle's thought ls well known. In 
the later Aristotle it ls form which ls the basic--and in the case of the 47 
or 55 separate movers, the sole-constitutent principle of the real. As 
Leclerc says, 
(a)matter ls undetennined in itself, and receives its determination from 
I ,. 
form; (b) matter as such ls unknowable, and the o1)<T£(}1. is known through 
its form; (c) it ls not matter h..lt form which constitute~ the •essence' 
(;-'Or-/ ?v fflkf1) of o"\Jo-{cJ,t; (d) matter is not ' a this' (,._.o'oE 11), and it ls 
only •potentially' LMetaphyslcs, 1012~ a2if, and it is_fonn which fi-
nally_turns out to be 'actuality' (l:YfP/t:<O',) and end /Metaphysics, 1050, 
a4-21/.2 
In the final analysis, the relation of form to matter ls that of act to 
potency, where the principle of actuality ls identified with the individual's 
form. In short, act(uality) and all subsequent activity are located in a 
formal principle while potentiality ls located in an indeterminate material 
1Lecl ere, "Form and Actuality , 11 ~ Relevance 2!._ Whitehead, p. 171. 
21!?..!!!•, P• 170. Also see Etienne Cilson, Being !.!!!!. ~ Philosophers 
(2nd ed.; Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), 
Chapter ii, PP• 41-73. 
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substrate. 
Hhitehead too locates the principle of act-activity and actuality-
within the existent entity, his actual entities, but he does not conceive of 
it as a formal principle. Like Aristotle's "primary matter," creativity is 
l 
without a character of its omi.. It cannot be characterized "because all char: 
2 
acters are more special than itself.ti Nevertheless, while lacking formal 
specification or determination in itself and although it "receives" speciflca-
tion from a formal principle, creativity differs from ''primary matter" pre-
cisely in the fact that it is, according to Whitehead, the principle of ac-
tivity. It is pure undeterminate activity. As Whitehead expresses it, ere-
ativity is ''devested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form,' 
or of external relations: it is the pure notion of activity •••• 113 It fol-
lows from this that every activity displayed by acbial entities will be mani-
festations of creative activity. 
In Whitehead's system, the activity or process evidenced by actual 
entitles manifests two distinguishable though rolated aspects. If process 
be fundamental to actuality, then each ultimate actuality, each actual en-
tity, nust be describable as (a unit of) process. 4 Whitehead calls this the 
process of "concrescence." As we shal 1 see in some detail in subsequent 
111creativl ty ls wl thout a character 
sense in which the Aristotelian •matter• ls (fl!., p. 47.) Cf • .fil:.l., p. 90: 0 This protean 
us from conceiving it as an actual entity. 
nation." 
2pR 47 
_, p. • 3PR, pp. 46-47 
of its own in exactly the same 
without a character of its own." 
character of creativity forbids 
For its character lacks determl-
4t-1T, p. 120. 
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sections of this work, the activity of •1concrescence" is a complex process in 
which the actual entity bullds itself up, or "grows together, 0 through appro-
prtatlng, or "prehendtng, tt the many actual entl ti es ln its field of experle 
Now if this process be real and not merely an ittuslon, the emerging occasion 
of experience, what Whitehead calls the "subject" of this experience, DJJst be 
really different, that ls, a genuinely novel actual entity. Real process 
necessarily entails real creative novelty. In one of lts aspects creativity 
functions as the subject's intrinsic principle of emergent novelty. 
•Creativity• ls the principle of novelty. An actual occasion ls a novel 
entity diverse from any entity in the 'many• which it unifies. Thus 
•creativity• introduces novflty Into the content of the many, which are 
the universe disjunctively. 
This ts in accord with Whitehead's demand in Religion !!l Sh! Making that the 
principle of actuation be immanent in the actual entitles and not received as 
from some transcendent entity.2 As Whitehead has put it in Adventures £! 
For example, let the working hypothesis be that the ultimate realitie 
are the events ln their process of origination. Tilen each event, viewed 
in its separate lndivlduallty, ls a passage between two ideal termini, 
namely, lts components ln their ideal disjunctive diversity passing into 
these same components ln their concrete togetherness. There are two cur-
rent doctrines as to this process. One ls that of the external Creator, 
eliciting this final togetherness out of nothing. 11le other doctrine ls 
that it ls a metaphysical principle belonging to the nature of things, 
that there ls nothing in the Universe other than instances of this passage 
and components of these instances. Let this latter doctrine be adopted. 
Then the word Creativity expresses the notion that each event ls a process 
issuing in novelty.3 
2!!1, P• 69. 
3~, P• 303; also see PP• 230-31. 
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0n the other hand, 11concrescence11 cannot be divorced from the process 
of "transition." I experience myself growing out of the past, which is to Sii:/ 
that in some real sense my past is internally related to, and comes to consti-
tute a part of, my present experience. Since this experience is one of the 
basic sources of his doctrine, Whitehead intends to show that "atomlsm does 
l 
not exclude complexity, and universal relativity." It ls for this reason 
that Whitehead uses the phrase "actual entity" to refer to the !!!. verae. The 
2 
meaning of 11 entity 11 ls''potentlality for process." and therefore by calling 
the r;s verae actual entitles Whitehead means that the very being of an actual 
--
entity entails that it shall also be-for-another. The "subject" ls also 
''super~ect." The "superjectlve character" of an actual entity thus refers to 
the fact that having come to be in its process of concrescence, the actual 
entity now exists for another, for it too can now be •tapproprlated" or "pre-
3 handed" by another successive actual entity. Thus my past occasion of ex-
perience of a quarter of a second ago came to be a potential to be re-actual-
ized by me ln a novel manner ln my present experience. That process whereby 
the completed actual entity comes !2. ~ ''objectified," that ls, enters or 
passes into the constitution of another actual entity, is called "transition.'A-
The transition within the universe whereby the many individual actual entitles 
1E,B., p. 53. 
2
.f!, p. 68. The potentiality of all entitles, actual and non-actual 
for being and element ln the coming into being of an actual entity ls forrru-
lated by Whitehead as the "principle of relativity.'' See ,P!, p. 33, 44, 76-
80, 89-94, 336-42. 
PP• 43, 71-72; ~' P• 248-49. p. 320. 
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come to be "appropriateable" by a novel emerging subject expresses the second 
aspect of the principle of creativity. In this aspect creativity is viewed as 
the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It 
ls that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe dis· 
junctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe con-
junctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into 
complex unity.1 
Stated rather briefly, Whitehead's solution to the problem of the 
one and the many involves locating process and novelty within the very 
structure of the actually existent world. In concrescence a novel actual 
entity arises from the many, and in it the many become one. But the one is 
a one-more: the many have in turn been increased by one, and consequently 
with the transition a new synthesis, a novel actual entity, ls required. And 
2 
so additional ones arise !.2, infinitum. It will follow that though there is 
finality in Whitehead's metaphysics, it ls the finality of actual entities 
taken individually or microscopically. Macroscopically considered, there is 
no ultimate finality to the universe taken as a whole. 
Creativity conveys the notion of an activity absolutely devoid of 
any determinateness or specification. It refers to pure activity, so to spea 
In Whitehead's metaphysics this entails the following consequences. First, 
creativity refers to "something intrinsically incomplete and therefore im-
perfect in itself." According to Whitehead, pure indet~rminateness, even the 
3 indeterminateness of pure activity, cannot exist in itself. It is precisely 
1 ~·' p. 31. 2 !.!?.!..!!.•, PP• 347-48. 
31 t appears that Whitehead has thus returned to the post tions of the 
Greeks. For Whitehead, as for the Greek philosophers, to be is to be limited 
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here, in identifying unlimited and even infinite activity and actuality with 
imperfection (perhaps because he identifies activity with change) that White-
head's metaphysics differs most notably from that of Thomas Aquinas. 1 Unable 
or finite. For them, the infinite signifies indefiniteness or negation and 
in either case imperfection. In fact, Whitehead seems to reject, if he was 
ever aware of it, w11at with Henry of Ghent and subsequent thinkers came to 
be a conception of the 'infinite• as meaning a positive perfection as when 
predicated of Cod. See Etienne Gilson, History 2£. Christian f'hilosophy .!E_ 
the Middle ~ (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 448-49. Also see Ernan 
Mcl"ullin, "Four Senses of Potency, 11 in .!!!!. ConceBto.f Matter J.n. Greek ~ 
Medieval Philosophy. ad. by Ernan NcMullln (paperback edition; Notre Daine, 
Indiana: Jniverslty of Notre Dame Press, 1965) PP• 302-03; finally, see Leo 
Sweeney, 0 Divlne Infinity," .!h! Modern Schoolman, Xi<xV (1957-1958), pp. 38-51. 
Whitehead's explicit rejection of the identification of infinity with 
perfection appears in his treatment of God. For Whitehead too,b:> be infinite 
is to be indefinite and therefore to lack one of the characteristics of an 
actual entity. Therefore if God ls to exist as an actual entity, He 1m.1st be 
finite in some real respect. See RM, PP• 109, 144-51; MT, PP• 107-11; "Math-
ematics and the Good,tt.§'7 (pp. 672-74 in Schllpp ed.) -
1Following Aristotle, Aquinas speaks of the form which is the act of 
the substance in the order of essence. (For example, see§££, II, 54.) But 
though the ''substantial form" is act in the order of essence-and though in 
the case of material beings it functions as a correlative essential principle 
wl th "primary matter" which ls itself completely indeterminate or unformed 
and therefore purely potentlal--nevertheless substantial form is itself also 
in potency to !.!!,!, the ~ of ex:istence, in the order of existence. Thus the 
novelty of Aquinas' metaphysics is that he introduces the act of existence as 
the ontological source of all actuality and perfection. From esse ls to flow 
all existential actualization and all intelligibility. [sse i'S'"'"the source of 
all perfection, even the perfection of the substantial form; (..:?.!,I, 3, 4c; 
I, 4, 1, ad3; I, 8, le;~· f.2.E.•t VII, ad9; I ;ent., XVII, l, 2, ad3.); ~ 
is 11 subsistere," "tendere," and 11rem=!iescere." (~ Veritate, XXI, 2c; Com-
mentary ~ Q!. Trlnltate, Q6, ad2. 
If the act of existence taken in itself and ln the fullness of its 
perfection appears unintelligible to us, it ls because esse is supraintelllg-
lble and we are but limited knowers. ~ ts infinite ~ts perfection, 
we are finite in our ability to know. As an indication of the intelliribility 
of !§.!!.we have the primary analogue in God's knowledge. In God the infinite 
object of intelligibility comes together with the infinite intelligence. (ST, 
14 all;~ Verltate, II all; §.£9., I, see 44-71 all.) God is Ipsum ~Sub:­
slstens. Therefore~ ls unintelligible to us in Aquinas' analysis for a 
different reason than creativity ls unintelligible for Whitehead. Creativity 
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to maintain that infinite and unlimited activity can also signify real, in-
deed infinite, perfecticn and actuality, Whitehead nust conclude that crea-
tivity cannot exist in itself anymore than could "primary matter." Every 
actual existent must be limited, and since it ls indeterminate, creativity is 
not of itself actual. Indeterminate ln itself, it ls necessary that crea-
tivity be specified by ttanother." In a word, it needs a~ of actuality-a 
creature. Consequently Whitehead malntn\ns that the ~ verae are all of 
them "accidents11 or "creatures of Creativity. 11 Dy this he means that actual 
entitles are definite or determinate, i.e. limited, modes of creative actlvit 
Here too, God is no exception; rather He is creatlvity•s primordial accident, 
1 both limiting and being limited by its activity. 
is in no way intelligible in itself, nor can it be a source of intelllgibillt 
tor it is a surdal elemEllt at the basis of reality that makes any attempt at 
ultimate and final metaphysical analysis doomed to failure. 
From this it also follows that the metaphysical analysis of Aquinas 
and Whitehead will be similarly open-ended, but for radically divergent rea-
sons, For Aquinas, because we are finite and the meaning of being cannot be 
adequately comprehended by finite intellects. 'Illerefore we nust ultimately 
have recourse to knowledge by analogy, and even negative theology. To be sur 
Whitehead readily admits the finitude of human intelligence, as we have seen 
in Chapter 1; but beyond this Whitehead comes to suggest that the world ls 
also ultimately constituted by a surdal element which ls at once also the ul-
timate principle of activity and actuality. Therefore we nust have recourse 
to 11 free imagination" and to a knowledge that the world ls ultimately unknow-
able.!..£ itself. 
1 See I.eo Foley, ~Critique!?!,.~ Philosophy tl Being!?!,. Alfred North 
Whitehead !!l !h!, Lisht !?!,. Thomistic Philosophy (published Ph.D. dissertation; 
Washington, D. c.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946), esp. pp. 
37-38, 71-84. Foley observes that by "accident" (of creativity) Whitehead 
means "'that which gives actuality to potentiality,'" and he proceeds to say 
that hence in a way God ''exists with creativity, to perfect Himself by putting 
creativity into act ••• •" (p. 72). It should be noted that Foley ls not deny .. 
ing that creativity ls the ultimate principle of activity. Foley seems to be 
rather affirming that in order to exercise this activity creativity must be 
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In all philosophical theory there is an ultimate which is actual in 
virtue of its nccldents. It ls only then capable of character-izatlon 
through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents ls 
devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is 1 termed 'creativity•; and God is its primordial non-temporal accident. 
Second, according to Whitehead, absolute indeterminateness is ab-
solutely unknowable, for knowledge ls always 2£. ,!2!!!!. thing. Recall that to 
search for a reason is to search for some actual entity, for some definite, 
i.e., limited existent. It will follow that we can only know !h!t creativity 
exists, for we can discover its manifestations within the things, the actual 
entities, that exist "creatively," if you will. In this respect creativity 
ls analogous to Aristotle's 0 primary matter." Neither principle ls intel-
llgible in itself. Whitehead's metaphysics will not be fully intelligible, 
and therefore we will not be able to fully understand the nature of a free 
act, not even in principle. In short, we know~ creativity is but not 
~ it is, for it is not in itself any !tl!!2. of a thing. It does not answer 
to ~ question. Indeed, to ttunderstand" its ''nature'' is to realize that to 
ask "'What ls it?" is to ask the wrong question. It follows that in White-
head's metaphysics there is an irreducibl~ principle of irrationality, a 
surdal element, at the basis of actual existence. And since one of the form-
ative elements of actual entitles ls creativity, actual entities are not fully 
conditioned or specified under or as some definite mode of actuality. This ls 
a direct consequence of Whitehead's identification of the unllml ted with the 
indefinite and imperfect. Thus creativity is.!.!!. itself only a "that by which" 
and therefore needs to be "completed" by its correlative formal prlnciple(s). 
God is the first or ''primordial, non-temporal accident" of creativity (PR, p. 
11), specifying the potentialities for subsequent concrescence and thereby He 
lays the first conditions for real possibilities of the emerging world. 
l fili, PP• 10-11. 
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intelligible in then1selves, nor are they intelligible in the totality of the 
coropleK lnterrelations. 1 
Third, all actual entitles, Cod not withstanding, are defiplte or 
determinate and actual entitles. Now tf actual entities are the roly fully 
-
real e«lstents--as Whitehead so often insists by calling attention to the in· 
tent of the ontological prlnclple; tf they are creatures of crentlvity; and 
lf creatlvlty ls not itself something determinate and yet the creatures are 
determinate somethings, then, there tmlst be something else besides creativity, 
some other ontological principle, which accounts for this determination. J\n· 
other way of expressing it is to observe that these t-wo che.racteristlcs of 
Whitehead's existents, na.r.roly, their deftnlteness and thelr actuaUty-mnt-
fest ln their activity---cannot be reduced to one metaphysical principle. On 
this point, 1.e., concerning the ontological composition of the!..!! verae, 
Whitehead is Ylthln the Platonic tradition vhtch, ve think, tslick has demon· 
strated to be one of the few alternatives to E.1.catic monism. 2 Like Plato, 
1see, for example, .£!, pp. 67.6?.. 
2
u.mnard Eslick, 0 Tho Heal Distinction: A r·:eply to l'rofessor !teese,., 
.!!l! Modern Schoolman, XXXVIII (January, 1961}, PP• 149-60; 11 £xlstenc:e and Crea 
tlvlty in Whitehead," Proceedings .2£. ~American Catholtc Philosophical £!&· 
sociation, XXXV (1961), pp. 151-63. 
:~y indebtedness to the studies of Profe$SOr LeonRrd Esll ck and the 
late 'i<ialter Stokes, s. J. wi 11 be obvious ln my summary interpretation of the 
fonnative elements. Hoth men facll I tate the 1mderstmdlng of those difficult 
notions, especially creativity, by placlng Whitehead in the tradltlon of the 
great occidental metaphyslcian.s: Eslick, by way of exploring the exegesis 
open to various possible metaphysics, and by showing the baste similarity be-
t'l.'een flato nnd \:Jiitehead's metnphy.sics and Stokes, prir:1arlly by way of the 
historical comparisons presented ln PhD Dhsertation and in his summary of 
some recent interpretation!' of \;'hitehead's crentivity. 
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Whitehead comes to understand this composition as maintaining between a formal 
determining principle and an indeterminate material principle. \1hitehead dif-
fers from Plato, however, !n that his formal principles, what he calls 11eter-
nal objects," are in themselves potential and they are not separate from actu-
at entities, wherens the material receptive principle, creativity, is, as we 
have just seen, wholly active. 1 
b) Eternal Objects !!!12.. £2& 
Eternal objects are ttPure Potentials for the Specific Determination 
2 
of Fact," or "Forms of Definiteness." Taken in themselves and as not actually 
In addition to the works noted above, see Eslick' s "Aristotle and the 
Identity of lndiscernibles, 11 The }!odern Schoolman, XXXVI (May, 1959), pp. 279-
87; "The Dyadic Character of B;lng in Plato,'' ~Modern Schoolman, XXXI (1953 
-54), pp. 11-18; "The Material Substrate in Plato," Proceedings 2f .ll!,! !1!.!!.· 
osopher's ~ !!!_ Saint Louis university, III (1954-55), pp. 39-50; this 
article is printed in a somewhat expanded format in !b.2. Concept 2f Matter l!l 
~ filll! Medieval Philosophy, ed. Ernan McH.11lin (1st paperback ed.; Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), pp. 39-54; a discussion 
by Professors Eslick, NcKeon, Sellars, Hanson, and Cohen followed the de-
livery of this paper at the Notre Dame symposium and ls reprod11ced in the 
Md'.ullin vol. on pp. 55-58; "God in the Hetaphyslcs of Hhitehead," in New 
Themes !!l Christian Philosophy, ed. Ralph M. Mcinerny (Notre Dame, Indr;\a: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), pp. 64-81; "The Platonic Dialectic of 
Non-Being, 0 !!::!.!. ~ Scholastlcism, XX.IX, No. 1 (January, 1955), pp. 33-49. 
"Substance, Change, and Causality ln \U1ltehead," Philosophy!!!!£ Phenomenolog-
!E!. Research, XVIII (1957-58), pp. 503-13-also see Charles Hartshorne's com-
ments entitled "tlhitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," pp. 514-
20 and Eslick' s reply ent1 tled "Some Remarks in Reply to Professor Hartshorne,'' 
pp. 521-22. 
~ee Stokes' "The Function of Creativity in the Metaphysics of White-
head," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1960); "Recent 
Interpretations of Whitehead's Creativity," .'.!12£. Modern Schoolmrui, XXi.IX (hay, 
)Q6?), ~p. 309-33. 
1Again it must be emphasized that this is not to say that creativity 
ls an entity. See Chapter ii, pp. 60-61. 
2PR, P• 32, 5th "Category of Existence." 
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••ingressing"-that ls to say, as not actually informing an actual entity-the 
eternal objects are purely potential entities. Its whole being and being 
knomi is referred ultimately to actual entitles in which it "ingresses,tt that 
is informs. When viewed as actually ingressing in actual entities, eternal 
objects are said to "specifically determine,'' or "inform," or ingress in the 
actual entity thus making it some definite or determined individual unit of 
l 
actuality. 
As to the various kinds of eternal objects, \lhitehead maintains that 
2 
"the variation in grades is endless. 11 However, Christian has compiled a 
rough inventory of Whitehead's actual usages. Christian lists the following 
3 kinds of eternal objects mentioned by Whitehead: (1) "'Sensa• ••• for example 
green and blue ••• and definite shades of colors"; (2) "Eternal objects of the 
subjective species ••• that is universals of qual l ty"; (3) Eternal objects of 
the objective species, that ls mathematical forms in the strict modern sense 
of mathematics"; (4) "The •eternal objects designated by the words "any" and 
"just that"tta; (5) •1Patterns ••• and relations"; (6) 'The abstract essence of 
an actual occasion"; (8) "Forms of imperfection''; and finally (9) "Grades of 
1
,!'.!, p. 34, 7th "Category of Explanatl ont1: "That an eternal object 
can be described only in terms of its potentiality for 'ingression' into the 
becoming of actual entities; and that its analysis only discloses other eter-
nal objects. It is a pure potential. The term 'ingression' refers to the 
particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object ls realized 
in a particular actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that enti-
ty." Cf. pp. 38, 63, 68, 249. See Christian, ~ Interpretation, pp. 215-16. 
2111mmortality, 11 ~XI (in Schllpp ed.) p. 692. 
3~ Interpretation, pp. 202-03. 
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generic abstrnction, for example: scarlet, red, color •••• 11 It is these and 
other eternal objects, then, that ingress ln actual entitles. The outcome of 
their ingression is an actual entity informed and determined to be just the 
specifically determinate kind of individual thing that it actually is. 
It appears, then, that ifui tehead wants to say that eternal objects 
are analogous to Aristotle's form of the substance, i.e., what comes to be 
called the ''formal cause.n To complete the analogy, creativity can be re-
garded as the "material cause.'' Like 0 primary matter," creativity is totally 
lndetermined; it ls made determinate by the ingression of eternal objects. 
To be sure, we nust not lose sight of the irreducible differences between Aris 
totle's and \fuitehead's principles, some of which have been noted. 
On the basis of the above we cannot therefore agree with A. H. John-
son's repeated assertion that creativity ls one of the eternal objects. As 
Johnson puts it, "Thus in \Jhitehead's broadly Platonic language, creativity ls 
1 
an idea (eternal object) which is ex.amplified in particular actual entities." 
lwhltehead's Theory 2!, Reality, p. 70. Johnson reaffirms this 
interpretation in a recent article entitled, "Whitehead as a Teacher," pp. 
373-76. If Johnson's interpretation were correct, it appears that one of 
Edward Pols' basic thesis would be established, namely that eternal objects 
are the source of power and that creativity is in fact divested of any such 
power. (Whitehead's Hetaphysics; esp. pp. vll and 126-58.) Not that Pols' 
argument rests on Johnson's interpretation, but that Johnson's interpretation 
leads to an understanding of Whitehead's metaphysics such as that given by 
Professor Pols, and that, moreover, Pols• subsequent criticism of such a meta-
physics would be substantially correct. 
Perhaps the more obvious understanding of Whitehead's agreement with 
Johnson's interpretation of creativity ls that of John Cobb (A Christian 
!i!.tural Theology, p. 209, n.73): ttThere ls a sense in which •creativity,• 
like any other idea whatsoever, ls an eternal object. That ls, I can think 
about \.Jhitehead's idea of creativity, and when I do so, I am thinking of an 
eternal object. Similarly, •actual entity• and •prehenslon• are eternal ob-
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The more serious difficulties with Johnson's interpretation are the following. 
First, there is the primary one that it neglects the text of Religion !!!, ~ 
}:akin.& where Whitehead explicitly introduces creativity and eternal objects 
-
as distinct formative elements. Second, Whitehead maintains that eternal ob-
jects are forms of intelligibility, 1 whereas creativity is a surd. Hnally, 
jects when tha.ight of as ideas. But the entities to which Whitehead intends 
to refer us when he uses these terms are not eternal objects. 11 The only dif-
ficulty ,,·ith this interpretation is the opposite one, to wit, that according 
to Whitehead there is a surdal principle at the basis of reality and that 
this principle is creativity. Now the irrational cannot be identified with 
the rational, least all discourse cease, and therefore we can have no idea of 
creativity. In brief, the trouble with Cobb's interpretation is the difficult 
of conceptualizing the inconceptual. This problem is not unique to Whitehead' 
philosophy. Thus Plato writes of the impossibility of speaking and even con-
ceiving of absolute non-being. (Sophist, 238). What is utterly unreal is 
simply unknowable. Yet• non-being is "somehow" real, and in the end Plato has 
recourse to the "idea'' of relative non-being: 11otherness'' (Sophist, 225 to en:i 
and the "Receptacle" (Timaeus). Aristotle also agrees that absolute non-being 
is unintelligible in itself, for this, like every negation, rests on an affir-
mation. Thus he will say in criticism of Plato that even relative non-being 
presupposes relative being, and he proceeds to substitute potentiality for 
Plato's relative non-being. Now potentiality, even (or especially) pure po-
tentiality~primary matter--is and as knowable only in relation to act, 
(Metaphysic~, XV, 11, esp. 1089 al6-29.) and not at all in itself. 
Bul is Cobb entirely off the mark? For all philosophers attempt to 
"know the unknowable" in some sense, and in this Whitehead ls struggling with 
the plight of the metaphysician scrutinizing his ultimate principles. Because 
they are ultimate they and their opposites stand on the verge of unintelligi-
bility: all is known in terms of them, they in terms of themselves. ntey are 
known dialectically, Aristotle would say. Now since the principles of intel-
ligibility as intelligibility are grounded in eternal objects (never forgetting 
the import of the "Ontological Principle"), in order to speak of "creativity" 
as a "surd" is, in a sense, to attempt to make it intelligible, hence an Eter-
nal Object. But the question is can the thing be done? ile don't think so; 
not, at least, in the Whiteheadian manner, since intelligibility comes to cre-
ativity while creativity is not itself intelligible. Rather it is that real 
irrational principle at ontological poles with the rational. 
1
··p 80 ~, p. • 
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¥1bltehead's metaphysics requires that these elements function as different 
"kinds" of principles. The irreducibility of Whitehead's two ultimate meta-
physical principles means that each accounts for one distinct though related 
aspect of the actual entity. Eternal objects account for the definiteness 
or specification and creativity accounts for act--activity and actuality. 
Actuality cannot "come" from essence, since eternal objects are purely poten-
tlal forms of definiteness. Eternal objects are not actual in themselves and 
-
could hardly be the principle of actuality in another. They contribute to the 
being of that which ls actual, but they do not constitute it in its actuality. 
Nor can definiteness "come" from creativity since the latter is a totally in-
definite actlvity--less definite even than the errant necessity of Plato's 
Timaeus. InasJlllch as actuality "cornestt to "essence'' from a principle which 
is radically incomplete and ls to this extent lacking in perfection, we can 
say that it "comes" from "below'' essence-fo1 here essence is a potential 
principle of limitation, completing activity and thereby actuality in the line 
of formal or essential specification and definite perfection. Again, to speak 
precisely we should say that with the ''ingression" of the forms in creativity 
-i.e. as correlatively causitive-a limited activity, that ls 8\\actual en-
tlty, comes to be. 
Whitehead's analysis of the nature and function of eternal objects 
leads directly to the third formative element, God. According to the onto-
logical principle, everything nust be •omewhere, somewhere being some actual 
entity. ti°"· inasmuch as the eternal <'bjects are "pure potentials, .. "in them-
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1 
selves not actual... lt follows that there need be some actuaUty, some actu 
entity, which contains and orders the whole 0 realm'' of Ideal entitles and 
thereby renders them actually relevant for lngresslon. 'Ihls actual entity ls 
God functioning ln hls prlmordlal (non-temporal) nature. 
'Ihe prlmordlal created fact ls the uncondltloned conceptual valua-
tion of the entire nultlpllclty of eternal objects. This ls the 'prl· 
mordlal nature• of God. By reason of this complete valuation, the ob-
jectl flcation of God ln each derivative actual entity results ln gradu-
ation of the relevance of eternal objects to the concrescent phases of 
that derivate occasion •••• Apart from God, eternal objects unrealized ln 
the actual world be relatively non-existent for the concrescence in 
questlon.2 
God's involvement ln the world as one of lts formative elements en-
tails something more than functioning as the locus and order of the universe's 
potentialltles. For one thlng, hls system requires that God be introduced to 
explain how these potentialities come to ingress ln temporal actual entitles. 
1RM P• 88. _, 
2E,!, p. 46. ct. p. 73: "The scope of the ontological prlnclple ls 
not exhausted by the corollary that 'decision' nust be referable to an actual 
entity. Everything nust be somewhere; and here •somewhere' means •some actual 
tntlty.• Accordingly the general potentiality of the universe nust be some-
where; since lt retains its proximate relevance to actual entitles for whlch 
lt ls unrealized. Thls •proximate relevance• reappears ln subsequent concres-
cence as flnal causation regulative of the emergence of novelty. Thls •some-
where• ls the non-temporal entity. 'illus 'proximate relevance• means relevance 
as ln the primordial mind of God." Also see _f!, pp. 521-33; fil:!, pp. 88ff. 
For a clarlficatlon of the function of God ln his Primordial Nature 
see George E. Connelly's two works on this subject: "Whitehead and the Act-
uaUty of God ln Hls Primordial Nature," lb.! Modern Schoolman, XLI (May, 1964) 
pp. 309-22; and "The Existence and Natures of God ln the Phllosophy of Alfred 
North Whitehead," (unpublished PhD Dissertation: St. Louis Unlverslty, 1962). 
Also see Chrtstlan, ~ Interpretation, Chapter xtv, pp. 258-79 and the ex-
tenatve analysts of God in Part III, pp. 283-413. 
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As the source of the eternal objects, this means that God nust play an active 
role in the actual occasionk process of concrescence. In order to understand 
what this role ls, and to further clarify the nature and relationship of all 
three formative elements, it will now be necessary to analyze the actual en-
tltY in its dynamic reality, that is in terms of its process of concrescence. 
And since Whitehead maintains that the concrescence of an actual entity is 
both free and determined, we will now examine how these formative elements 
contribute both to the freedom and determinism of an actual entity. 
B. !h.!.2Sh Categoreal Obligation: Ill! Category 
2! Freedom ~ Determinism 
Its importance in what follows requires that this section begin with 
a statement of the Category of Freedom and Determinism. It is formulated as 
follows: 
The concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined 
and ls externally free. 
This category can be condensed into the formula, that in each con-
crescence whatever is determinable is determined, but that there is always 
a remainder for the decision of the subject-superject of that ~oncrescence 
This subject-superject is the universe in that synthesis; and beyond it 
there is nonentity. This final decision ls the reaction of the unity of 
the whole to its own internal determination. This reaction ls the final 
modification of emotion, appreciation, and IX!rpose. But the decision of 
the whole arises out of fhe determination of the parts, so as to be 
strictly relevant to it. 
As is the case with many statements found in the Categoreal Scheme, Whitehead 
is here succinct, even to the point of being obscure. Therefore what follows 
will attempt to elucidate those aspects of 9th Category which seem particular! 
1
.E!i., pp. 41-42. 
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relevant for under~tanding the metaphysical stn.icture of Whitehead's analysis 
of freedom. 
Whitehead places the discussion of the freedom of an actual entity 
within the context of the problem of causality. He rejects the idea that an 
actual entity ls free because it is not caused. On the contrary, just as 
there are causes which determine the actual entity, so there are causes which 
account for the entity's not being merely determined. In other words, al 1 
actual entitles including God must cause themselves, or, technically speaking, 
each nust be ~ ~: "A temporal occasion in respect to the second element 
of its character, and God in respect to the first element of his character 
l 
satisfy Spinoza's definition of substance, that it is~~·" It is 
precisely in virtue of its self-causality that an actual entity is free: 
To be causa .!!!.!. means that the process of concrescence is its own reason, 
for the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feelings. It 
is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is 
admitted to efficiency. The freedom inherent in the universe is consti-
tuted by this element of self-causation.2 
Therefore it is necessary to isolate those causes which taken together enable 
Whitehead to say that the concrescence of an actual entity is both determined 
and free. The important causal factors are (1) Past Actual Entities; (2) 
Eternal Objects; (3) the Subjective Form, the Subjective Aim, and God; (4) 
Creativity. We shall treat thern in turn.3 
l ~., p. 135. Also see pp. 339-40. 2 ~·, P• 135. 
3 
Using the classical causal terminology analosously, we can say that 
past actual occasions function as efficient causes; eternal objects as extrin• 
•le formal causes, when viewed not as ingressing in actual entities; subjec-
tive form as intrinsic formal causes, when eternal objects are actually inform 
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1. Past Actual Entitles 
lbe purpose of this section ls to briefly state how the past and pre-
sent actual entities are causally related. We have seen that according to 
Whitehead a present occasion of experience grows out of its past which it 
"appropriates" or "prehends11 as a real element constitutive of the present. 
Therefore lt ls necessary to analyze the causal factors involved ln the ac-
tlvltY of prehenslon. 
Whitehead writes that an actual entity ls constituted as a unity of 
its prehensions: "• •• the essence of an actual entity consists solely ln the 
fact that it ls a prehendlng thing (i.e., a substance whose whole essence or 
nature ls to prehend. 11 ) 1 Dynamically speaking, ve term that process whereby 
the actual entity comes to be (in) its prehension the concrescence ct the act-
ual entity. Consequently, an analyslsof an actual entity, what Whitehead calls 
a genetic analysis or genetic division, discloses the manner in which the for-
mative elements function in prehen~ion, 1.e., in the process of concrescence. 2 
lng the actual entity; subjective aim as the intrinsic final cause; God as an 
extrinsic final cause; and finally, creativity as both the material and effi-
cient cause material lnasnuch as it ls informed and made definite by the in-
gression of the eternal objects, and efficient innsnuch as it ls the ultimate 
principle of activity. The above ls not to deny that Whitehead's novel an-
alysts Entails a shift away from the classical meaning of these terms, but 
only to point in passing to some similarities with this tradition. 
l ~., P• 65. For a summary of some objections to Whitehead's con-
tention that an actual entity ls nothing more than its prehenslons, i.e., that 
there ls no center of feeling to which the feelings add content, see Johnson, 
Whitehead's Theory g!, Reality, pp. 180-81. 
2
.tB,, PP• 334-35: "The philosophy of organism ls a cell-theory of 
actuality. Each ultimate unit of fact ls a cell-complex, not analysable into 
components with equivalent completeness of actuality. 
The cell can be considered genetically and morphologically. 
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Any prehension involves essentially three factors. there ls the 
"subject," that is to say, the actual entity which ls prehending; there ls the 
"object" or''datum" which ls prehended; and there ls the "subjective form" 
1 
wttlch ls "how" the subject prehends its datum. Depending on the type of data 
Whitehead further divides prehensions into two main classes. The data of 
••physical prehensions" are other actual entitles and the data of "conceptual 
prehenslons" are eternal objects. 
To understand how these differ and the reasons for Whitehead's termin• 
ology, note that Whitehead's reactl<Xl to mechanistic materialism consists in a 
reaffirmatiCX\ that the ultimate realities be conceived of as organisms. He 
insists that lt ls incorrect to think that matter ls devoid of mind or that, 
as for Descartes, mind and matter are two separate substances. 2 In el ther 
case, the outcome ls to separate man from physical nature. Whitehead's so-
lution to the body-mind problem ls to conceive of every actual entity as es-
sentially bi-polar. 3 There is an aspect of the actual entity whereby it ls 
directly related to and inherits from the actual entltiescf its immediate 
past. This ls termed its "physical pole," and it ls manifest ln physical pre-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
In the genetic-theory, the cell ls exhibited as appropriating, for the 
foundation of its own existence, the various elements of the universe out of 
which lt arises. Each process of appropriation of a particular element ls 
termed a prehension." Cf. pp. 81-94. 
l 
.EE_, p. 35, the 11th "Category of Explanation." 
2£.S,, pp. 164-67; !],, pp. 29-30; !ll.,, pp. 244-45. 
3 I:!, pp. 72, 165, 366, 379-80; f!, pp. 32-34. Here we see an example 
of Whl tehead' s "anthropomorphl sm." 
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hension. The "tr'f:?ntal pole" is that aspect involved in the conceptual prehen-
sions of non-actualized eternal objects. As we shall presently see, whereAs 
the physical pole is the intrinsic proximate source of conformity with the 
past, the mental pole is the actual entity's proximate organ or source of 
novelty. It must not be thought that mentality involves consciousness, how-
ever. As we shall have occasion to see in some detail in chapter four, con-
sciousness arises only in the mental operations of very high grade actual en-
titles. It is the outcome of a high degree of mentality and high degree of 
complexity in the process of concrescence. 
Either class of prehensions can be further subdivided into two species 
depending on whether the prehonding subject includes or excludes the data. 
''Positive prehensions'' also termed "feelings, 11 are those in which the pre-
hended data function as components in the makeup of the concrescing subject. 
"Negative prehensions" on the other hand entail some elirninat ion of data from 
feeling. 1 Since the subjective form expresses the unique manner or 11how11 the 
subject prehends its data, the importance of negative prehension will be seen 
to lie in the fact that though negative, though eliminative of feelings, nega-
tive prehensions nevertheless contribute to the "subjective form" of the 
emerging subject. 2 
\~e are concerned with the causality of physical prehenslon, and there-
fore the question at hand is what is the causal relationship between the pre-
hending subject and its data where the latter are other actual entities? In-
l llili!·, p. 35. 2Ibid., p. 346. 
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aSllllch as more complex causal relations can be reduced to a complex of such 
primary components as are found in the simple physical feelings, 1 the an-
alysis of this section will focus on the causality said to be operative in 
simple physical prehenslons. 
In a simple physical feeling there are two actual entities, "the sub-
2 ject of that feeling" and "the initial datum of the feeling." Since the 
datum may be prehended el ther posl ti vely or negatl vely Whitehead combines 
the 11th and 12th "Categories of Explanation" and says that the positive pre-
hension considered as a transition effecting a concrescence is a complex con-
stitution "analysable into !!.Y! factors which express what that transition 
3 
consists of, and effects." These factors are, 
(i) the •subject• which feels, (ii) the 'initial data' which are to 
be felt, (111) the 'elimination• in virtue of negative prehensions, 
(iv) the 'objective datum• which is felt, (v) the 'subjective form• 
which is how that subject feels that objective datum.4 
Whitehead maintains that the simple physical feeling is an act of 
efficient causation: the initial datum ls the ''cause" and the physical feel-
ing is the "effect. 115 In virtue of the ontological principle, s!nce "the 
subject entertaining the simple physical feeling ls the actual entity 'con-
dltioned' by the effect," it is more proper to consider "conditioned" actual 
6 
entity as a whole to be the "effect.'' Whitehead maintains then, that the 
1 l!?.!.s!•t P• 361. 3 .!.!?.1.2.•, P• 337. Italics added. 
4Ibid., p. 338. Also see td_, pp. 229-30. 
summary pr;;';ntation of the meaning of these five 
Sherburne's fi Key, pp. 9-13. 
5£!1, P• 361. 
A most helpful diagram and 
factors will be found in 
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••lnltial data" are the cause and the "subject" is the effect. 
It is necessary to recall that an actual entity is a ''subject-super-
" and as Whitehead insistsL "ne\thErr half of this description can for ject, • 
l 
8 
moment be lost sight of.'' As "subject" the actual entity is to be con-
ceived of as exercising a degree of freedom in directing its process of be-
2 
coming. This corresponds to what ls very broadly implied in factor (l ). 
But having come to be, the "subiect perishes and thus what was subject may 
now come to be an object, a datum, to be prehended by subsequent subjects. 
This character of a subject to be object for future subjects is the ''superjec-
tive" aspect of its nature and expresses tJhltehead•s doctrine of "objective 
immortality": 
An actual entity is to be conceived as a ••• superject which is the atomic 
creature exercising its function of objective immortality. It has be-
come a "being"; and it belongs to the nature of every'bein~'that it is 
a potential for every nbecoming. 0 3 
The ''initial data" mentioned as factor (ii) are consequently past actual 
entities now understood as available for "exercising" objective immortality. 
These initial data can be prehended negatively (iii) or positively (iv) and 
thus it is necessary to note the kind of causality operative in both instance 
a) Negative Prehension !!.! !!!! Actual Entities 
lng." 
In order to understand the doctrine of negative prehensions, it ls 
11.lli., p. 43. 
2Technlcally speaking, it presides "over its own immediacy of becom-(E.fi, p. 71). 
3~, p. 71. The last sentence is, of course, a restatement of the 
Principle of relativity; see f!, p. 33. 
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necessary to locate our discussion within the general meaning of creativity. 
For, as we shall now attempt to show, Whitehead's discussion of negative pre-
hension is meant to specify the manner in which creativity functions as one 
of the intrinsic sources of the actual entity's freedom. 
Comparing creativity with Spinoza's "one substance," Whitehead says, 
"in analogy with Spinoza, his one substance is for me the one underlying ac-
tlvitY of realisation individualizing itself in an interlocked plurality of 
l 
modes." Again, when spealdng of creativity, Whitehead says, 
The general activity is not an entity 
casions or eternal objects are entities. 
character which underlines all occasions, 
occasion. There is nothing with which to 
one infinite substance.2 
in the sense in which oc-
I t is a general metaphysical 
in a particular mode for each 
compare it: it is Spinoza's 
Creativity is this "underlying actlvityu which interrelates all actual 
entities. But, where Spinoza's "one substancett is "illegitimately allowed a 
final •eminent• reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its accidents, 113 crea-
ti vi ty 11 ls an ul tlmate which ls actual in virtue of its accidents •••• and apart 
4 from these accidents ts devoid of actuality." In other words, while Spinoza's 
"one substance" is the final immanent reall ty because it is the fullness of 
its being, creativity ls ultimate for the antithetical reason that it func-
tlons as existing non-being. 
It is precisely in its function as non-being that Whitehead's crea-
tivity is analogous to the "receptacle" of Plato's Timaa.ts, and to "other-
1
.§!.]., P• 101. 
3!.!, p. 11. 
2
.!.!ll.!;!., p. 255; also see pp. 180-81. 
4 ~ •• pp. 10-11. 
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ness" of the Sophist, 1 Like Plato, Whitehead rrust account for actual beings 
by turning to the existence of relative non-being-and fundamentally for the 
identical metaphysical reason, 
What Plato would regard as the fleeting world of experience is for 
\lhitehead the locus of the realm of the really real. According to the "on-
tological principle" the actual entities are the oplI actualities, Therefore, 
there can be no separate world of essences existing apart from the actual en-
titles, and therefore there ls, nevertheless, a metaphysical composition of 
really distinct principles which "go into" the very constitution of actual 
entities, Further, the actuality of the actual entities is one of related-
ness. No actual entl ty exists in absolute isolation from any other actual 
entity in its actual world, nor consequently from any entity in that world. 2 
3 This is Whitehead's principle of Relativity, It is fundamental in White-
10n this point, I believe that Walter Stokes' mild criticism of 
Leclerc is justified. In his Whitehead's Netaphysics, (and to a greater ex-
tent in "Form and Actuality") Leclerc developes an excellent comparison of 
the metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle and Whitehead. However, as Stokes 
maintains, in order to understand Whitehead it ls not enough to make this 
comparison if, while so doing, one neglects the fundamental issue \Illich ls 
"the characteristic Platonic position rejected by Aristotle; namely, the real-
ity of nonbelng.1> Rather, as Stokes says, "Therefore, it is important to 
place creativity in the Platonic tradition with its insistence on the reality 
of non-being and not limit the consideration to analogies with Aristotle. 
("Recent Interpretations," p, 329,) Also see Stokes, "The Function of Crea-
tivity,'' PP• 83-89, 350-53. This interpretation of Whitehead's affinity with 
Plato ls shared by Eslick, as can be seen from his many papers on this topic. 
See for example the latter's "EKistence and Creativity," Finally, see White-
head's "Analysis of Meaning," !fil:_, pp, 130-31. 
2f!, p, 66, 
34th "Category of Explanation, 11 f!, p. 33. Al so see g, Chapter viii, 
pp, 152-78. 
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head's metaphysics. Its importance can hardly be overemphasized. 
The organic relatedness of actual entitles means that no actual en-
tltY exists in isolation-- for it could not therefore be apprehended, i.e., it 
could not affect its very objectification, nor, consequently, cOJld it be an 
object of knowledge. The point is that there is no way that such isolated 
entitles could manifest themselves. The "stubborn facts'! of the matter are 
that we know actual entities which even when analysed are found to exist rel-
atlvely. Recall that according to Whitehead we have an immediate and direct 
awareness of the unity of our momentary occasions of experience, :Moreover, 
our very knowledge of them automatically rules out total isolation. Whitehead 
means that every entity goes into the very constitution of any individual 
actual entity in its actual world. 
Whitehead offers his doctrine of relatedness as the very antithesis 
of mechanistic materialism. The individuality of an organic actual entity 
ls going to be at once an individuality which is internally related, This 
1 
will be technically expressed in Whitehead's doctrine of prehensions. 
Eslick notes, 
An organic universe requires some kind of internal relatedness in the 
very being of the entities of world, and, consequently, some kind of 
nutual dependence upon one another. Such entities are, quite literally, 
members of one another.2 
20Existence and Creativity," See the discussions on the precise mean-
ing of thls important principle (these important principles) by William P. 
Alston, "Internal Relatedness and Pluralism in mtitehead," The Review of Meta-
physics, V, No, 4 (June, 1952), pp. 535-58; and Ivor Lecl er~"InternalR;::-­
latedness in Whitehead: A Rejoinder," 1'!!!. Review g£, Metaphysics, VI, No. 2 
(December, 1952), PP• 297-99. 
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Now relatedness goes hand in hand with composition. As we have no-
the basic components of an actual entity are creativity and eternal tlcedt 
objects. In this composition, actual existence is the outcome of the extrin-
l e limitation of essence. !-
It does not flow from essence, (i.e. it is not an 
intrinsic limitation) for the eternal objects are merely the potentialities 
tor actuality. 
As pure potentialities for differentiation, the eternal objects do 
not have within themselves any principle of actual differentiation. Nor do 
they have the where-with-all to effect existential actuation. To be sure, the 
eternal objects are entities, but they are not actual entities. It neces-
sarily follows that something other than these forms of definiteness account 
tor the coming into actuality of an actual entity. Something not located 
within the nature of eternal objects accounts for the actual definiteness 
which an actual entity manifests. This something is not located within the 
nature of eternal objects. As Eslick has shown, 
The existing non-bahi; of the Platonic-i:hlteheadian family ls relative 
only, and not absolute. It is precisely that aspect of contingent, in-
determinate relatedness to others which now enters into the constitution 
of the actual being of every entity, and which is incapable of being com-
pletely expressed and rationalized by the influx of formal or essential 
definiteness. All differentiation and existential actuation is the func-
tion, not of the order of essence, which is in itself a domain of mere 
abstract possibility, but of the selective reception of essence in them-
selves unrelated and unordered into a ••material 11 matrix of common, in-
definite relatedness.l 
Having no actuality apart from other entitles, the very actuality of 
111 Existence and Creativity," p. 152. 
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., actual entity is known--but also ontologically constltuted--by the rela-
tionship into which it has entered. In a real sense an actual entlty•s ac-
tualitY ts not fully its own. In other words, there is a nutual immanence 
e<htbited in every group of actual entitles. This immanence •1is the function 
of belonging to a common Receptacle. ul 
The receptacle imposes a common relationship on all that happens but does 
not impose what that relationship shall be •••• Plato•s Receptacle may be 
conceived as the necessary community vtthln which the course of history 
ls set, ln abstraction from all the particular facts. 2 
It ts our opinion that creativity ls Whitehead's Receptacle. It ls that 
reallty--as relative non-betng--ln virtue of which actual entitles are 
"dynamis." It is that in virtue of which eternal objects are aetuaHzed and 
3 thereby there comes to be a: determined something actual, an actual entity. 
The difficulty, of course, ls to understand how creativity, which ts 
of ltself formless, can be active ond thereby account for actual entitles 
~lch are determined (t.e. informed) actualltles.4 We believe that White-
head's solution ltes ln ttcreattvlty•s abUtty0 ••to actuathe boundless ab-
5 stract posslblllty by negation end excluslon.•1 
To be an actual entity ls to be something deflnlte. Hhltehead ex-
presses this thought when he says, nAll forms of realtzation express some as-
1&, p. 258. 2 l!?!.<!•t P• 192. 3,,,. 4'- 17 ~' PP• c-. • 
4Pols acknowledges Whitehead's intention of grounding activity and 
therefore ''povertt in Creatlvi ty. But Pols denies \.1111 tehead has succeeded. 
Instead• Pols takes the vi ""1-r that the ontological ground of power ts, or shout 
be, \.ihitehead's Eternal Objects. ("11'\ltehead•s Metaphysics, esp. Oiapters 1v .. 
v, pp. 126-58.) 
5Leonard Eslick, 0 t:xlstence and Creativity," pp. f>. 158. 
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pect of finitude. Such a form expresses its nature as being ~' and not 
that. 
---
Tn other words, it expresses exclusion; and exclusion means finitude.J. 
In other words, being !h!.! involves in its very being the .!l2!;. being of sor.1e-
thing else. In this doctrine exclusion is immanent ln the very being of an 
actual entity. 
Now to be definite always means that all the elements of a 
contribute to some~ effect, to the exclusion of others. 
process is a ~rocess of exclusion to the same extent as lt 
of inclusion. 
complex whole 
The creative 
is a process 
Unl Hee the philosophy of Plato where the Demiurge acts upon the chaos 
bringing a cosmos into an imitative existence, Whitehead locates the prin-
ciple of actuality in the very constitution of actual entities and here it is 
"the force 11 which also accounts for novelty. This is expressed where White-
head speaks of decision as the expression of the actual entity itself. 
For rationalistic thought, the notion of 'glveness' carries.with it a 
reference beyond the mere data in question. It refers to a 'decision' 
whereby what is'given• is separated off from what for that occasion is 
'not given•. This element of 'giveness' in things implies some activity 
procuring limitation •••• 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The ontological principle asserts the relativity of decision; whereby 
every decision expresses the relation of the actual thing, for which a 
decision is made, to an actual thing ~.Hh!.£.!! that decision"l'"; ~3 
This point ls made even clearer in the following passage: 
Conversely, where there is no decision involving exclusion, there is 
no giveness. for example, the total multiplicity of Platonic forms is not 
'given•. But in respect of each actual entity, there is giveness of such 
fonns. The determinate definiteness of each actuality ls an expression 
of a selection from these forms. It grades thern in a diversity of rele-
vance.4 
1!:!., p. 107. 109. 
3ffi, p. 68. 4 1..!?l!l•t P• 69; cf. also pp. 70M72. 
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This elimination from feeling, this decision which ''cuts off" a t1thi s" from 
"that,u this "decision amid potentiality•• ls located within the very actualit 
of the actual entity and ts Involved In what Whitehead is describing when he 
speaks of ''negative prehenstons." Taken together positive and negative pre-
hensions specify w'hitehead's general Principle of Relativity. Through its pr 
hensions, positive and negative, an actual entity ls related to every other 
entity in the unlverse--and yet is not identical with any one of them: 
Further, in the complete particular 'givenness• for an actual entity 
there ls an element of exclusiveness. The various primary data and the 
calcrescent feelings do not form a mere m..tltiplicity. Their synthesis 
in the final unity of one actual entity is another fact of •givenness.• 
The actual entity terminates its becoming in one complex feeling lnvolvln 
a completely determinate bond with every item in th! universe, the bond 
being either a positive or a negative prfhension. This termination is 
the 'satisfaction' of the actual entity. 
Herein lies the importance of negative prehensions. The negative pre-
henslon expresses the fact that some datum ls held "as inoperative in the pro• 
2 gressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the subject.'' 
''A negative prehension is the definite exclusion of that item {;.ome item of 
the univers!_.7 from positive contribution to the subject's own real internal 
3 
constitution." Though negative, the prehension ls active "!!.!. its contribu-
tion of its subjective form to the creative process; but it dismisses its 
'object• from the possibility of entering into the datum of the final satis-
faction. 114 
1!.!?!..2., pp. 70-71; also see pp. 65-66 and 79-80. 
212th °Category of Explanation," f!., P• 35. 
3 4Al !!?.!.£., P• 34. ~• P• 298. 
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lllitehead has admitted that the doctrine of negative prehensions 
1 
"requires examination, and probably should be recast." ·whitehead has good 
reason, however, for not abandoning this doctrine. 2 Without negative prehen-
sions 11 in a metaphysics of nutual immanence and universal relativl ty, governed 
by the law that all determination ls negation, it ls impossible to preserve 
the individuality of actual entities. 113 But individuality is precisely what 
\.lhitehead wishes to preserve. The!,!!. verae are a mJltiplicity of individual 
4 
actual entities. 
£xisting non-being thus finds its way into the philosophy of White-
head as it did for Plato. But for Whitehead it appears under the guise of 
negative prehensions and ultimately in creativity which forms a part of the 
general category presupposed in this more special category. Creativity ef-
fects the individuation in existential actuation of the actual entity through 
the entity's activity of positive and negative prehensions: by positive pre-
hension, whereby as a consequence of negative prehension under the subsequent 
activity of abstractions, the emerging novel actual entity appropriates the 
the real potentialities of the past actual entities and eternal objects; and 
l l'd!:.t P• 130. 
2nHowever I adhere to the position that it is an approximation to an 
important truth. 11 .filil:., p. 130. 
3Leonard Eslick, 0 Existence and Creativity, 0 p. 162. 
4
"It is to be noted that every actual entity, including God, ls some-
thing individual for its own sake; and thereby tr~mscends the rest of actual-
ity." (.!.'.£, p. 135.) Whitehead immediately adds, however, that nevertheless 
creativity trAnscends its creatures: 0 And also it is to be noted that every 
actual entity, including God, is a creature transcended by the creativity which 
it qualifies." 
91 
bY negative prehensions, whereby the actual entity is really something novel 
and not merely a reproduction of the past. 
Process is meaningful only where the emergent actualities are genuine-
lY new. No actual entity can be completely determined to be what it is by the 
data it prehends-by what was in the past. Creativity is the ultimate prin-
ciple of novelty. Now an actual entity is novel inasmuch as it is !!!?..!:. ~ 
or that actual entity. It must be other than every other actual entity. 
--
Negative prehension is Whitehead's way of eKpressing this function of crea-
tivlty within the limits of the ontological principle. Since only actual en-
titles are really real, the "decisions amid potentiality•• nust be expressed in 
terms of the agency of actual entities. This Hhi tehead attempts to do by in-
traducing the notion of negative prehensions. Aware of his affinity to Plato 
Whitehead says, 
The point is that the subjective unity of feeling and the objective 
unity of mutual relevance express respectively a relation of exclusion 
to the world beyond. There is a completion which rejects alternatives •••• 
This doctrine extends, or distorts, the meaning of another saying of 
Plato, when he says that non-being is a form of being. Here I am saying 
that rejection is a form of prehension.l 
We can now return to our analysis of the five factors entailed in 
prehension and briefly state the causal relation between actual entities in 
negative prehension. 
On the one hand, in negative prehension the eliminated data certainly 
are not efficient causes of the subject, for factor (Hi)- 0 the 'elimination' 
in virtue of negative prehensions"-refers to the activity of negative prehen-
1
"Analysis of Meaning," in !:it,, p. 130. 
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ston. The elimination of a datum originates from the side of the subject and 
not that of the datum, for obviously the datum cannot effect its own elimina-
tion. On the contrary, negative prehenslon is a proximate principle of novel-
ty in the emerging actual entity, and therefore it ls a principle accounting 
for the actual antlty•s freedom as actual otherness. It is that by which the 
actual entity is other than its past. Moreover, as we have seen, creativity 
is the ultimate intrinsic principle of the emerging subject's activity of neg-
ative prehensions. Inasmuch as the subject ls a creature of creativity it ls, 
as subject, a being whose very actuality is one of activity and novelty. To 
be an-other actual entity, the concresclng subject re-acts negatively to the 
imposition of the definiteness and determinateness given by the datum. As a 
creature of creativity the novel actual entity, like Plato's errant necessity, 
cannot be completely determined (mastered) by the definiteness of its past. 
The subject cannot merely duplicate the past. Factor (ill) accounts for the 
fact that in the very origination of the subject from the initial datum the 
subject ls not completely determined by the total complexls of the actual en-
tlty• s actual past world. The subject ls even simply free to reject some 
data. 1 Here, then, the subject prevents some datum from being an efficient 
cause, i.e., from being "immanent" in the subject as a constitutive part of 
the subject's being. 
On the other hand, the actual entity ls determined even in its activ-
ity of eliminating data, for the negative prehenslon does contribute its sub-
jective form to the creative process. That ls to say, Sh!.! subject would not 
1 See Christian, ~ Interpretation, pp. 345-46. 
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be what it ts, if it did not eliminate !l!!S., datum. The subject ts determined 
bY having to eliminate ~ datum instead of some other datum. Thus the sub-
ject is affected even where it reacts negatively to the datum, for reaction 
ts "reaction to," elimination ts "eUmlnation of." The subject cannot react 
to the datum, even negatively, wltha.tt being affected by the encounter. The 
manner of causality of the subjective form ln negative and positive prehenslon 
will be discussed in the section dealing with subjective form. 
b) Positive Prehension gt~ Actual Entitles 
This brings us to factor (iv) whlch refers to the "objective datum" 
which ls positively felt. It ls this datum which ls the efficient causes of 
the emerging subject. 1 As Christian has shown, Whitehead's treatment of ef· 
flcient causallty has two sides. Negatively, Whitehead 0 opposes the phenom-
enalistic view that causation ls exhausltvely interpretable ln terms of mere 
succession of data,'' and the externallstlc conception which views causation as 
a "transference of accidental qualltles between things which are essentially 
isolated from each other.•• Positively, ''He differs from the phenomenalistic 
view by taking causation as a dynamic process relating real things. He dlf-
fers from the •externallstlc' view by holding that the internal natures of the 
real things can furnish an intelligible explanation of the process whlch takes 
pl ace between them." 
In other words, since "efficient causation expresses the transition 
from actual entlty to actual entlty, 11 the past nust be actually "immanent" ln 
1 ~ •• pp. 126-28. 
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the µresent. 1 We are not here concerned with a complete formulation of the 
2 
nature of this immanence; suffice it to say that to the extent that the sub-
ject is caused by the datum to that extent the subject's being is constituted 
3 by the datum~the datum is internally related to the subject --and thus the 
subject is determined by the datum to be what "it'' is. The "it" in the pre-
vious sentence ls purposely ambiguous, for it means (1) that the novel actual 
4 
entity, the subject, is determined to be what "it0 ~ ~ is; 1 t also 
means (2) that the subject ls what "it" .th! subject is precisely in virtue of 
the datum out of which it arises. The very being of the subject is originally 
derived from the being of the datum which now exists as an essential compo-
nent of the subject; which is to say that in tbe act of simple physical pre-
hension the subject is determined by the datum. 
This is not to say that the subject is completely determined by the 
datum; but it does mean that no actual entity can be so free as to be com-
pletely independent of its datum. Quite apart from the related question of 
how the subject reacts to its datum, i.e. apart from considering the nature 
1EJ!., p. 228. 
2on the meaning of 11 immanence, 1' "relatedness," and "causal efficacy1' 
see Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 100-23; also of importance is Wil-
liam Christian's thorough analysis in his ~ Interpretation, pp. 119-53. See 
the related though different interpretation implied on pp. 82ff of Chapter ii 
of this dissertation. Finally see Chapter iii of this dissertation. 
3s~w, pp. 179-80. 
4"The process creates itself but does not creat.:::the object {the data 
for that occasion/ which it receives as factors in its own nature.'' (!ll_, p. 
230.) -
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and extent of its freedom, whatever this turns out to be, the fact remains 
that since the subject originates from the datum it cannot be completely free 
of its datum. Thus m1itehead says, 
The character of an actual entity ts finally governed by its datum; 
whatever be the freedom of feeling arising in the concrescence, there can 
be no transgression of the limitations of capacity inherent in the datum. 
The datum both limits and supplies. It follows from this doctrine that 
the character of an organism depends on that of its envlronment.l 
Speaking of the more complex situation where many actual entities 
constitute the data presented to the emerging subject, Whitehead consequently 
refers to the data as exercising deterministic efficient causation: this is 
"the inflow of the actual world in its own proper character of its own feel-
ings, with their own intensive strength, felt and re-enacted by the novel 
concrescent subject. 112 From this it follows that there ls no such thing as 
absolute freedom: 
But there ls no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity pos-
sesses only such freedom, as is inherent in the primary phase 'given• by 
its standpoint of relativity to its actual universe. Freedom, giveness, 
potentiality, are notions which presuppose each other and limit each 
other.3 
Freedom as causa ~ will therefore have to be a freedom exercised within at 
least the limitations imposed by the initial data. Other determining or 
limiting factors there may be, but at least this much determination stands at 
the ontological origin of the emerging subject. 
Whitehead returns to this theme when discussing the phases of con-
crescence. Although an actual entity may be viewed as a cell manifesting 
lf!, p. 168. Also see p. 101. 
2 !E.!.!!·' p. 374. 3 lli.E.·' p. 202. 
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atOtJliC unity, there is an important sense in which it ls proper to speak of 
1 the actual entity's process of concrescence, its coming-into-being. The con-
crescing actual entity passes through a number of phases whose goal ls the co 
ptetion of the actual entl ty in the final phase termed the "satisfaction." 
In a process of concrescence, there is a succession of phases in which 
new prehensions arise by integration of prehensions in antecedent phases. 
In these integrations 'feelings' contribute their 'subjective forms• and 
their 'data• to the formation of novel integral prehensions; but •nega-
tive prehenslons• contribute only their 'subjective forms.• The process 
continues till all prehensions are components in the one determinate in-
tegral satisfaction.2 
Whitehead has nuch to say about the mechanics of the process of con-
3 crescence, as we shall see when we use the categoreal scheme in Chapter IV 
to explain human freedom. Speaking somewhat generally, the concrescence of an 
actual entity can be understood as a process falling into three basic phases: 
4 
the "initial ,u "intermediate" and ••final. 1• What is comnon to all of White-
1For an excellent statement of Whitehead's epochal theory of actuality 
see Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 63-80. Of equal value is Christian~ 
~ }nterpretation, Chapter iv, esp. pp. 78-82. Also see Sherburne, !!:. Key, 
pp. 38-39; and Vere c. Cliappell, ''Whitehead's Theory of Becoming," .!!!.! Journal 
.2! Philosophy, LVIII (1961), pp. 516-28. 
2!],, P• 39. Cf. ~' P• 248. 
3In order to completely elucidate the complexities involved in the 
process of concrescence, Whitehead introduces his nine 11Categories of Obliga-
tion": f.!i, pp. 39-42 where they are stated, and esp. pp. 317-28 and 331-428 
where they are developed and appl led. 
4~.b pp. 260-70: where he speaks of the "initial phase of reception," 
the ''intermediate phase of self formation," and the "final phase." Cf. pp. 
247-SO, 255-56. Similarity in f.!i, P• 323 Whitehead refers to the "three stage 
in the process of feeling: "(i) the responsive phase, (il) the supplemental 
stage, and (iii) the satisfaction.'' 
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head's discussions of the initial phase ls that it represents the subject's 
initial relation to the data out of which it arises: nThe first phase ls the 
phase of pure reception of the actual world in its guise of objective datum 
for aesthetic synthesis. In this phase there is the mere reception of the 
actual world as a llllltiplicity of private centers of feeling •• ,,"1 Now the 
division of a simple physical prehension can be viewed from two points of 
reference. From the side of the concrescing subject we speak of the initial 
phase in order to refer to the subject as being initially determined by its 
objectified datum and to distinguish this moment of the subject from its sub-
sequent free development. From the side of the datum we speak of it as ex-
ercising deterministic efficient causality. Therefore in the initial phAse 
the datum is the efficient cause and the subject ls the effect. 
It remains to be shown that creativity functions as a link between 
past and present actual entities. between datum and subject, We have seen 
that creativity ls operative in the activity of negative prehension and that 
this activity belongs to the concrescing actual entity. Moreover, lt consists 
of an active elimination of some data. What is being prehended either nega-
tlvely or positively is another actual entity as datum; which means that the 
datum ln the initial phase is something acti..tal conditioning the creativity. 
Therefore we can also ask what ls creativity's role when viewed from the side 
of the datum, Must not creativity be involved in the causal activity (effi-
cacy) of the datum as well? It would seem it Jm.tst since (1) creativity ls one 
p. 323; cf. f:d., pp. 229-30, 269; t!f., pp. 120-31. 
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of the formative elements constituting actuality, (2) creativity seems to 
function as the ontological s~rce of formless activity in virtue of which 
the totality of actual entities are interrelated and the t!J.1ltlplicity of ac-
tual entitles constitute a cosmos, that is one actual world, and (3) since 
the Category of the Ultimate is presupposed in the more special categories. 
Speaking of the two kinds of change or process, which he here calls 
"fluency, tt Whl tehead says, 
One kind is the fluency inherent in the constitution of the particular 
existent. This kind I have called •concrescence.• The other kind is the 
fluency whereby the perishing of the process, on the completion of the 
particular existent, constitutes that existent as an original element in 
the constitution of other particular existents elicited by repetitions of 
process. This kind I have called •transition.• Concrescence moves to-
wards its final cause, which is its subjective aim; transition is the 
vehicle £?!.. !h! efficient cause, ~ .!.! ~ immortal past. I - -
Now just as creativity ls the primordial activity grounding the process of 
concrescence, so ls it the ground of the process of transition: 
The creativity in virtue of which any relative complete actual world is, 
by the nature of things, the datum for a new concrescence, ls termed 
•transition.• Thus, by reason of transition, 'the actual world' ls al-
ways a relative term, and refers to that basis of presupposed actual oc-
casions which is a datum for the novel concrescence.2 
Furthermore the past actual world as data are also spoken of as real 
3 potentialities for concrescence, and therefore creativity should be a consti-
1IB,, p. 320. Italics added. Also, p. 228: "• •• efficient causation 
expresses the transition from actual entity." 
2.!.!?.!.i•t P• 322; cf. pp. 334-36. 
3"Thus we have always to consider two meanings of potentiality: (a) 
the 'general' potentiality, which is the bundle of possibilities ••• provided 
by the nultlplicity of eternal objects, and (b) the •real' potentiality, which 
is conditioned by the data provided by the actual '(.70rld.'' (f!, pp. 101-02.) 
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tutive principle in that which is a real potentiality. And so it is; White-
head expresses this aspect of creativity in an especially relevant though 
somewhat lengthy passage. 
•Objects' for an occasion can also be termed the 'data' for that occasion. 
The choice of terms entirely depends on the metaphor which you prefer. 
One word carries the literal meaning of 'lying in the way of', and the 
other word carries the literal meaning of 'being given to'. But both wo 
suffer from the defect of suggesting that an occasion of experience arises 
out of a passive situation which is a mere welter of many data. 
Creatlvity.--The exact contrary ls the case. The initial situation 
includes a factor of activity which is the reason for the origin of that 
occasion of experience. Tilis factor of activity is what I have called 
•Creativity•. Tile initial situation with its creativity can be termed 
the initial phase of the new occasion. It can equally well be termed the 
•actual world' relative to that occasion. It has a certain unity of its 
own, expressive of its capacity for providing the objects requisite for 
a new occasion, and also expressive of its conjoint activity whereby it 
is essentially the primary phase of a new occasion. It can thus be termed 
a 'real potentiality'. The 'potentiality• refers to the passive capa-
city, the term 'real' refers to the creative activity, where the Platonic 
definition of 'real' in the Sophist is referred to. This basic situation, 
this actual world, this primary phase, this real potentiality-.however you 
characterize it--as a whole ls active with its inherent creativity, but in 
its details provides the passive objects which derive their activity from 
the creativity of the whole. The creativity is the actualization of po-
tentiality, and the process of actualization is an occasion of experience. 
Thui:: viewed in abstraction objects are passive, but viewed in conjunction 
they carry the creativity which drives the world. The process of creation 
is the form of unity of the uni verse. l 
Let us now summarize these lengthy sections on negative and positive 
prehensions. Tile past actual entity is the efficient cause initially deter-
mining the concrescing ~1bject by supplying the datum out of which the subject 
arises. However the whole process is grounded in the agency of creativity. 
First, from the side of the datum, we have seen that to be an actual entity 
as df!tum is to be a real potentiality; which means to be internally related 
1g,, pp. 230-31; also see p. 269. 
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to (immanent in) the emerging subject under the agency of creativity. From 
this perspective, creativity ls viewed macroscopically as the ground of tran-
sltion; it is the dynamic agency ln actuality moving the world to novel ac-
tuality. Yet even here creativity functions negatively as a principle of 
novel activity. To be a novel subject ls to be internally related to past 
actual entitles by being not them: that ls, by haViry!j arisen !£2! .£h!!!l .!!!£ 
not some other, !!!.!!, yet EI, being other .E.!:!!!:!. !h!!!!• Transition therefore ex-
- -
presses the dynamic otherness characterizing the agency of creativity. Having 
come to be, the actual entity perishes and what becomes objectively immortal 
does so at the price of ceasing to be exactly what it was before. In becoming 
objectively immortal in the world, some elimination abstraction, has taken 
place and thus the past entity exists for (in) the subsequent subject only as 
an abstract version of itself. Reproduction is never complete. 
Second, from the side of the subject in concrescence--i.e. micro• 
scoplcally speaklng--two possibllltles are open. Negatively prehendlng some 
of the past datum the subject eliminates them from efficacy, and therefore 
begins to be by being simply other £h!!l its past. Nevertheless, though nega-
tive, there ls a contribution to the subject's subjective form and thereby to 
its ultimate satisfaction. Positively prehendins the datum, the subject is 
said to be efficiently caused or determined by them. However, what ls posi-
tlvely prehended ls not simply reproduced in the subject's subjective form. 
As we shall presently see, even the datum positively prehended are changed 
by the very activity of the prehension, for each subject's subnective form is 
"how'' it, the subject, feels these data in conjunction with the valuation that 
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it, the subject, brings to these data. 'Ihat ts, the subject is also a crea-
ture of creativity and therefore these data may be viewed as analogous to 
Plato's forms in that they will not be able to completely master the non-folI!la 
character of creativity's activity. 
c) Prehension !!!£! Contemporary Actual Occasions 
Before we conclude this section, something needs to be added concern-
ing contemporary actual occasions. Whitehead maintains that actual entitles 
1 
are contemporaries when neither belongs to the "given" world of the other. 
Not belonging to the given world means that "so far as physical relationships 
are concerned, contemporary events happen in causal independence of each 
other. "2 For example, AS Whl tehead says, 
actual occasions, A and B, are nutually contemporary, when A does not 
contribute to the datum for B, and B does not contribute to the datum for 
A, except that both A and B are atomic regions in the potential scheme of 
spatio-temporal extensiveness which is a datum for both A and B.3 
Now inasmuch as A and B are causally independent, neither restricts nor in 
l any way directly determined the being of the other. Nel ther is an efficient 
cause of the other. 
As Christian has cogently argued, ~hitehead's system requires this 
doctrine of contemporaries in order to explain real individuality. Unless 
some actual entities be causally independent, it is difficult to see how the 
process of concrescence could ever be completed, and how, as a consequence, an 
lf!!., P• 102. 2I.!tl.!!_,, p. 95; cf. AI, P• 255, 251. 
3~, p. 188. Also see !!., PP• 252-53; all of this chapter in !!_ (xii, 
PP• 246-57) ls important especially for Whitehead's statements concerning the 
distinction between direct and indirect immanence of actual entities. 
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entitY could attain the unity of synthesis wherein lies its lndlviduality.l 
In this sense, contemporarlty defines a necessary condition of freedom. As 
regards their contemporaries, actual entities are "completely free": 
The causal independence of contemporary occasions ls the ground for 
the freedom within the Universe. 'lhe novelties which face the contem-
porary world are solved in isolation by the contemporary occasions. 
There is complete freedom. It is not true that whatever happens is im-
mediately a condition laid upon everything else. Such a conception of 
complete nutual determination is an exaggeration of the community of the 
lJniverse.2 
Another way of saying this is to note that there is no direct pre-
hetsion between contemporaries: neither physical nor conceptual,3 positive 
nor negative. In their causal independence and concomitant freedom, con-
temporary actual entities thus bear a similarity to Leibniz's ''windowless" 
monads. But whereas Leibniz must introduce God and the doctrine of pre-
established harmony to explain the apparent interaction of the entities of 
our experience, we shall see in the following chapter that contemporary ac-
tual entities are indirectly, th<Xlgh really, immanent, 1.e. related. 
2. Eternal Objects 
Earlier it was observed that eternal objects are spoken of from two 
points of view, in themselves as pure potentials for the specific determina-
tion of fact, and in relation to actual entities as forms of definiteness. 
Two questions especially come to mind in connection with Whitehead's 
doctrine of freedom. (l) How do the eternal objects come to inform and thus 
l~ Interpretation, pp. 59-60 2~.b P• 255. 
3cf. Christian, !}!! Interpretation, pp. 57-58. 
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determine actual entities? and (2) How do they come to function as the cor-
relative ground of novelty and freedom? An answer to these questions begins 
to emerge when we recall that an actual entity is bi-polar. 
In each concrescence there ls a twofold aspect of the creative urge. 
In one aspect there is the origination of simple causal feelings; and in 
the other aspect there is the origination of conceptual feelings. 'lllese 
contrasted aspects will be called the physical and the mental poles of 
an actual entity. No actual entity is devoid of either pole; though their 
relative importance differs in different actual entitles.l 
Thus the simple causal feelings arise at the physical pole of the 
concrescing actual entity and correspond to what in the previous section 
were termed the relation of causal efficacy maintaining between the subject 
and its data. Since the data are actual entities it is in virtue of its 
physical pole that the subject faces the actual world of actual entities. 
More specifically, the physical prehension in the initial stage of concres-
cence arises at the subject's physical pole. But how are eternal objects in-
volved in physical prehenslon? 
From the physical feeling is derived "a purely conceptual feeling 
whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the definiteness of the 
actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt.•• 2 That is, an eternal object 
arises in the subject which corresponds to an eternal object which informed 
the datum. Which is to say that eternal objects function to relate both datum 
l 
.!]., P• 366. 
2.1!?!.2.•, "The Category of Conceptual Valuation," pp. 39-40. Cf. pp. 
378, 379-80. Note that the initial stage of concrescence corresponds to these 
initial moments in the subject, the moments when the subject physically and 
''then" conceptually prehends, either positively or negatively, its datum: See 
!:!, p. 380. 
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and subject. To be sure, in causal efficacy the subject "re-enacts," or "re-
II produces, 
l 
or ''conforms,'' to its data, and therefore prehensions always have 
a "vector" character: 
By reason of this duplicity in a simple physical feeling there ls a 
vector character which transfers the cause into the effect. It ts a feel-
ing !!:.2!l! the cause which acquires subjectivity of the new effect without 
loss of its original subjectivity in the cause. Simple physical feelings 
embody the reproducttv! character of nature, and also the objective im-
mortality of the past. 
Nevertheless, "conformity'' cannot be understood wt thout reference to 
the eternal objects, because it ls eternal objects functioning relationally 
between the cause and the effect, the past and the present, that ground the 
very meaning and being of "conformity": 
There are eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the objective 
datum which ls the •cause,• and eternal objects determinant of the de-
finiteness of the subjective form belonging to the 'effect.• When there 
ls re-enaction there is one eternal object with two-way functioning, 
namely, as partial determinant of the objective datum, and as partial 
determinant of the subjective form. In this two-way rate, the eternal 
object ls functioning relatia::\ally between the initial data on the one 
hand and the concrescent subject on the other. It is playing one self-
conslstent role in obedience to the category of objective identity.3 
It follows that the unity and enduring character, that ls the soll-
darlty of the universe, is grounded in this relational functioning of eternal 
objects. 
Die one eternal object in its two-way function, as a determinant of the 
datum and as a determinant of the subjective form, ts thus relational. 
libld.' p. 364. 
2 !!?!!!•, PP• 363-64; cf. PP• 177-84, 482-83, 228-29, 246-47. 
3Ibtd., P• 364. 
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In this sense the solidarity of the universe is based on the relational 
functioning of eternal objects.1 
This brings us to the second question concerning how eternal objects 
function as~ qua !!.2!! for novelty and freedom. If creativity and eternal 
objects are ccrrelative principles, and if to be an actual entity is to be a 
determinate atomic unit of process, then eternal objects should in their own 
-
waY also account for an aspect of novelty and freedom. Summarizing Hhite-
head's position on this point Leclerc states the matter succinctly: 
There cannot be anything 'novel', that is, different from what is al-
ready 'actual', unless !here be ~entities' which are 'potential'. As 
Whitehead has put it, /PR, P• 7'jj 
it is evident that J:t,he notions of/ 1giveness' and 'potentiality• are 
meaningless apart from a nultiplicity of potential entities. These po-
tentialities are the 'eternal objects•. 
Tiie point is that, by the ontological principle, something 'novel' cannot 
come into existence 'out of nowhere•; it nust be 'given' as an •unrealized 
potentiality•. This 'unrealized potentiality' must be constituted by •en-
tities'; the word •unrealized' simply underlines the contrast of 1 poten-
tiali ty' with •actuality.• Thus the notion of 'novelty• can have no mean-
ing unless there be entities which are 'pure potentials'. These are the 
eternal objects.2 
lFR, p. 364. In other words, to say that past actual entities are 
objective-;J'ata is to say that they are !1.2!! real potentialities for the emerg-
ing subject's process of concrescence. But as Leclerc has shown, "all poten-
tiality in the universe of whatever kind, ls derivable from form. For example 
when we speak of the potentiality of an actuality--that it has the potential! 
to be this or that--the potentiality to which we refer ls derivable from the 
element of form in the actuality, and not from the element of act." ("White-
head and the Theory of Form," in Process and Divinity, p. 132.) Therefore 
the past actual entity can be a real poteirt"lality not in virtue of its actu-
ality--indeed, it is no longer actual; it is superject--but in virtue of its 
eternal objects, its forms of definiteness. 
2Whitehead's t-;etaphyslcs, p. 97. The second set of brackets occur in 
the text. Christian also takes the view that eternal objects are required to 
account for novelty--and formal indlviduality--of actual entities. See 
Christian's ~ Interpretation, pp. 215-16. 
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In order for the subject to be novel, and, moreover, in order for it 
to freely initiate its novel actuality, it must be possible for the subject to 
be other than its past. It nust be able to be some other kind of definite 
actual entity. This means that some eternal objects nust be made available 
for ingression other than those given in the data of physical prehension. For 
the latter could only account for "conformity,'' whereas the subject is, as we 
have repeatedly said, a "novel" actual entity-that is it expresses the free-
dom of self-determination. 'ibis freedom entails two correlative aspects: 
negatively, it is a "freedom-from" and positively it is "freedom-for." ny 
virtue of creativity the subject is a~ entity. It is other-than and 
thereby "free-from" (to the extent that it is able to be) the extrinsic de-
terministic factors that constitute its world. Yet the subject causes itself 
to be something definite, a limited actuality. Self-determination as an ac-
tivity issuing in a positive perfection, as "freedom-for" or 0 freedom to-be 
something novel" is due to the ingression the eternal objects. Taken together, 
creativity and eternal objects are the ultimate intrinsic causal factors ac-
counting for the freedom of self-determination. 
Now whereas the physical pole is the source of conformity and re-
production, the mental pole is the source of novelty, for it is here, at the 
mental pole, that new eternal objects are introduced. 
In.!!!£ Function 2!, Reason, Whitehead reiterates that every occasion of 
experience is dipolar and that in it mental experience is integrated with 
1 
physical experience. He also reaffirms his insistence that mentality need 
1 f!, p. 32. 
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not include consclousness. 1 Indeed, the lowest forms of mental experience ls 
"blind urge towards a f2E!! 2! expert ence. •12 In physical experience the forms 
fUnction as determining factors, whereas in mental experience eternal objects 
3 
relate the subject with real possibilities for novel actualization. The ex-
perience derived from the mental pole, what Whitehead here cal ls "mental ex-
perience," ls "the organ of novelty, the urge beyond.'' As Whitehead puts it, 
mentality "seeks to vivify the massive physical fact which ls repetitive, with 
4 the novelties which beckon." As we shall see in some detail in Chapter III, 
Whitehead will consequently distinguish the grades of actual entitles on the 
basis of the degrees of mentality operative in the various phases of concres-
eences. 5 Since no actual entity is completely determined, the extent of its 
freedom depends in part upon the degree of its mentality, and therefore White-
head occasionally distinguishes between actual entitles--and also nexus--on 
the basis of their degree of freedom. 6 
With a moment's reflection, one realizes that the importance of the 
mental pole ls its two-fold relatedness. In the initial phase of concrescence 
the mental pole ls the proximate source of the conforming eternal objects, 
and in the subsequent phases the mental pole ls a proximate source of the 
novel eternal objects: 
1Ibld. Also see for example, PR, pp. 245-46; 11th "Category of Ex-
planatlon~p. 35, 83-84, 245; 269-372; 406-28. 
2f!, p. 32. 31.l?.U!· 4I bid.' p. 33. 
5.!E.!S.· , pp. 31-34; !!!_, pp. 269-74; l!!, pp. 230-31. 
6see for example, g, PP• 332-33, 269-72; f!, PP• 17 4-7 6; f.!it pp. , 
34; t[, PP• 28-57. 
26-
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The bare character of mere responsive re-enaction constituting the 
original physical feeling ln its first phase, ls enriched ln the second 
phase by the valuation accruing from integration with the cmceptual 
correlate. In thls way, the dipolar character of concrescent experience 
provides ln the physical pole for the objective side of experience, deri-
vative from an external actual world, and provides in the mental pole for 
the subjective conceptual valuations correlative to the physical feelings. 
!!'!!. mental operations !l!!.! !. double office. They achieve, in the il!ITled• 
!ate subject, the subjective aim of that subject as to the satisfaction to 
be obtained from its own lnltlal data. In this way the declslon derived 
from the actual world, which ls the efficient cause, is completed by the 
decision embodied in the subjective aim which ls the final cause.l 
This "duality within the mental pole" therefore supplles an answer to 
IX.tr two questlons. 2 lnltlally, eternal objects come to inform and determine 
actual entitles I!.! the mental pole, where here ln the initial phase the men-
tal pole ls seen as accounting for why the subject conforms to its datum--to 
the extent that lt does conform. Subsequently, with later phases of concres-
cence novel eternal objects are introduced again at the mental polet but now 
the degree and extent of novelty depends on the level (degree) of mentality 
and on complexity of concrescence of the particular actual entity. 
Finally, we have noticed creatlvlty•s role in the physical prehenslon 
and now lt ls time to note lts relationship to the mental pole and conceptual 
prehenslon: for (1) crei1tlvl ty is the actlvl ty grounding novelty and ultl-
mately freedom as activity; (2) the mental pole by virtue of its relation to 
the eternal object ls the actual entity's proximate "organ of novelty;" and 
flnnlly, (3) novelty ls always exercised ~ithln the context of at least the 
efficacy of past actual entitles. It would seem to follow, then, that the 
1
.fB,, P• 423. Italics added. 
2see above, PP• 102ff. 
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mental pole plays an indispensible role of relating creativity with the deter-
roined definiteness of the past on the one hand with the novel definiteness of 
the present on the other. As Whitehead says, 
~ ~ mental pole .!E. ~ ~ whereby ~ creativity .!!, endowed :!i!!h 
the double character of final causation, and efficient causation. The 
me;tal pole is constitt:i°ted by the decisio~in virtue of which matters 
of fact enter into the character of the creativity.l 
Before closing this section something needs to be said concerning the 
role of negative prehension in conceptual prehension. Conceptual prehenslon 
bears directly on negative prehension. In a conceptual prehension the rela-
tionship is not between two or more actual entities, but ultimately between 
an actual entity and eternal objects. 
While eternal objects are the "forms of definiteness, 11 they are, 
nevertheless, indeterminate in themselves. As "(X.lre potentials," eternal ob-
jects are completely determined as regards their internal relation, but they 
are inefficacious or lndetermined in regards to actuality. 2 Furthermore, ac-
cording to the ontological principle, if eternal objects are considered in 
themselves, in complete abstraction from actual entities, we are left with 
nonentities. 3 
It follows that eternal objects do not have within themselves the 
principle which accounts for the interrelationship of actual entitles. It 
is true that in physical ingression the eternal objects ''express the formal 
constitution of the objectified actual entity" by acting as the relational 
11..21.£. Italics added. 2.§tli, pp. 230-31. 
392. 
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factor between prehended and prehender. 1 "In this sense the solidarity of 
the universe is based on the relational functionlng or eternal objects."2 
But as Eslick notes, "there is still a surd element of brute fact, of the fact 
of interconnectedness which cannot be reduced to a set of eternal objects. 113 
QUoting A. E. Taylor's su11111ary of the Timaeus, Whitehead makes Plato's posi-
tion his own: 
But however far science may carry this procedure, it is always forced to 
retain ~ element of brute fact, the merely given, in its account of 
things. It is the presence in nature of thls element of the given, this 
surd or irrational as it has sometimes been called,4which Timaeus appears to be personifying in his language about necessity. 
creativity is this underlying unintelligible element which "accounts fortt the 
interrelationship lying at the very base of an actual entity's actuality. 
Now the ingression of eternal objects manifest in physical prehension 
can only account for conformity--for why the present resembles the past. What 
was subjective for one actual entity becomes objectively imnortal in the pre-
hending novel entity. Yet physical prehension does not account for the fact 
that process is the drive for novelty. That physical prehension is a reality 
only points to a deeper character of the actual entity. Because actual en-
titles are not substances but rather exist as successive atomic drops of ac-
tuality driving from instant to instant toward novelty, they cannot, either 
individually or collectively, exhaust the fullness of actuality. Neither de-
terminate past actuality nor creativity, either taken together or as indepen-
dent of everything else, can account for a novel actual entity. For to be is 
l!lli·' p. 91. 2 !..E!.2.•t p. 249; cf. also pp. 445-47. 
311 Existence and Creativity," p. 161. 4pR, pp. 67-68. 
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to be something definite, something finite. 
But undetermined creativity cannot bring !l2Y.!1_ determination ( a new 
actual entity) into being from 'What is already given determinately. In ad-
dition to past actual entitles and creativity there nust be some real poten-
tiality. Potentiality, both real and absolute, Jm.Jst be in order that novelty 
be. Thus while an actual entity may not be aware of the totality of pure pos-
-
sibllities, in order that process i.e. novelty be saved there nust be aware-
ness (this need not be conscious) of something other than the "merely given° 
of physical prehenslons. Were no such awareness given, absolute satisfaction 
would be the result and the process would have come to its end. At the most 
"process" would be rut mere repetitlon. l 
Therefore novelty does not lie primarily on the side of physical in-
gresslon, but on the side of conceptual ingression. The very coming into 
actuality of an actual en.ti ty ls the result of a determination, a "choice." 
The "choicett involves rejecting various possibilities of actualization in fa-
vor of some one kind. It involves being !h!.!!, and ~ .!:!'!.!!· This very act of 
determination ls located in the actual entl ty •s "conceptual pole. 11 "Concept-
ual feeling is the feeling of an unqualified negation; that ls to say, it ls 
the feeling of a definite eternal object with the definite extrusion of any 
particular reallzation. 112 It is there, in its conceptual feeling, that the 
actual entity facing the realm of potentialities moves itself into actuality 
by selecting, through negation, some 11one" form of definiteness. 
l~, PP• 333-34. 2~, p. 161. 
112 
It is through the introduction by the mental pole of an actual entity of 
prehensions of the indeterminateness of eternal objects that there can be 
an 'influx of eternal objects into a novel determinateness_of feeling 
which absorbs the actual world into a novel actuality.' /PR, p. 7£/ Cre-
ativity, therefore, conditioned by the settled facts of the actual world, 
and facing indeterminate possibility, brings to birth a new creature. Its 
primary instrument in creation is negation.l 
3. Subjective Form, Subjective Aim, and God 
It has been noted that the subjective form is h2li the emerging subject 
2 prehends its datum. Because the subject is determined by the datum in the 
manner of efficient causality, \.;thitehead's discussion of the subjective form 
is in part a further specification of the manner and extent of this determi-
nation. In the initial phase of concrescence, regardless of whether we are 
discussing negative or positive prehension, the subjective form is necessarily 
determined by the datum precisely inasnuch as this form is the subject's 
3 
"reaction to" ~ datum. But what is involved in ffreacting to" determining 
datum? \~hitehead says, 
1Leonard Eslick, "Existence and Creativity," p. 161. 
2A. H. Johnson observes that Whitehead is using two different, though 
clearly related, meanings of subjective form: (a) "attitude or emotional re-
action. For example, he mentions adversion, and aversion, horror, anger, dis-
gust, indignation, enjoyment, as instances of subjective form," and (b) those 
"numerous instances when obvirusly he is referring to the entire inner life of 
an actual entity, including subjective form in the sense of meaning •a.• For 
instance he states that 'the individual imnediacy of an occasion ••• is the fi-
nal unity of subjective form, which is the occasion as an absolute reality."' 
(Whitehead's Theory .2f. Reality, p. 33.) See !'.ll, p. 355. 
311Thus an actual entity, on its subjective side, is nothing else than 
what the universe is for it, including its reactions. The reactions are the 
subjective forms of the feelings, elaborated into definiteness through stages 
of process.'' (£E_, p. 234.) 
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The deterministic efficient causation is the inflow of the actual world 
in its own proper character of its own feelings, with their own intensive 
strength, felt and re-enacted by the novel concrescent subject. But this 
re-enaction has a mere character of conformation to pattern.l 
Co!l'lllenting on this passage, Christian says that the "subject •repro-
duces' the objective datum by producing a feeling 2f the datum with a confor-
mal subjective form.•12 With the concrescing subject there emerges a subjec-
tive form which conforms to or reproduces the datum. But as Christian asks, 
"What is conformed to?" Leclerc is in substantial agreement with Christian's 
conclusion that "What the subjective form of the present feeling conforms to, 
then, is !h! subjective !2!:.!!,t_ 2f E.h2. objective ~.113 That ls to say, though 
certainly not numerically identical, ln some important sense the subjective 
form of the objective datum is the same as that of the concresclng subject. 4 
Furthermore, Whitehead explains "conformity" in terms of the eternal objects, 
since it is eternal objects functioning relationally between cause and effect 
that ground the very meaning of "conformity." More precl sely, eternal objects 
inform the concrescing subject Y!!, its substantial form which is now viewed 
as the manner in which or the h2J:! ~ subject reacts to these eternal ob-
jects. That ls, to the extent that there ls conformity between objective data 
and the subject, this ls due to the mediation of the same eternal object ln 
1f,!, p. 374. Cf. also the following passages noted by William Chris-
tian in his ~ Interpretation, p. 143, n. 1: SMW, pp. 147, 186, 212; f.B., pp. 
196, 202-08, 234-35, 375, 380; !ll,., pp. 248-49.~ 
2~ Interpretation, p. 143. 
3Ibld., p. 136. See Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 154-56. 
4christian, !!!!. Interpretation, pp. 135-36. 
1 
the subjective forms of both. 
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This, however, raises a question that takes us to the heart of this 
discussion concerning freedom. Why isn't conformity complete? In terms of 
the discussion of the subjective form, what accounts for the subject's not be-
ing completely determined by the datum? First, no actual occasion positively 
prehends all other actual entities of the immediate past, nor does it prehend 
its contemporaries. Moreover, even physical prehension involves negation. 
ntus some data of the felt past are eliminated from causal efficacy--though 
not from importance. Again, the form of the negative prehension contributes 
to the final unity of the subjective form. 
Second, it is true that in the relationship of efficient causality 
the subjective form is a feeling of the datum, and therefore this form is 
determined to conform--at least initially-- by necessarily being the feeling 
of ~ datum and not some other. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it ls the feeling 
of .Eh.!..!?. subject it ls a novel feeling, and therefore cannot ~ simply identi-
~ ~ formally !'.!!h .!:!:!.! datum. For the subjective form is h2l!, this novel 
subject prehends, i.e., "feels," its datum. Remove the subject's contribution 
in positive physical prehension, that is, its novel reaction to the subjective 
form of the datum, and you are left with mere eternal objects. 2 Quite the con 
trary is the case: since the actual entity ll its prehensions, since the sub· 
10n this point then, and working from a different perspective, a.tr 
conclusion agrees basically with the more detailed study of Christian. See 
his ~ Interpretation, pp. 130-44. 
2pR, p. 354. 
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jectlve form is hgx the actual entity prehends its datum, and finally, since 
an actual entity is a novel entity, it appears that the very novelty of the 
actual entity nust be manifest within the subjective form even in the initial 
or •tonf ormal" phase of concrescence. This interpretation certainly seems to 
be ln keeping with Whitehead's contention that 
The essential novelty of a feeling attaches to its subjective form. 
The initial data, and even the nexus which is the objective datum, may 
have served other feelings with other subjects. But the subjective form 
is the inunedlate novelty; it is how ~ subject ls feeling that objec-
tive datum. There is1no tearing this subjective form from the novelty of this concrescence. 
Moreover, remarking on the general description of a feeling Whitehead 
says, 
A feeling is a component in concrescence of a novel actual entity. The 
feeling ls always novel in reference to its data; since its subjective 
form, though lt nust always ha!e reproductive reference to the data, ls 
not wholly determined by them. 
Even in the case of simple causal efficacy, then, the subject ls not com-
pletely determined by the datum's subjective form, since the subject ls, 
after all, a being whose very being ls to be a causa !!:!!.• 
This brings us to the third aspect of our answer, that concerning the 
freedom of the subjective aim. In subsequent phases of concrescence, addi-
tlonal eternal objects are prehended, either negatively or positively, and 
consequently additional subjective forms nust be integrated into the final 
unity of satlsfaction which ls the completed subject: 
2 !l?.!!!• , P• 355. 
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The process of concrescence ls a progressive integration of feelings con-
trolled by their subjective forms. In this synthesis feelings of an 
earlier phase sink into the components of some more complex feeling of a 
later phase. Tilus each phase adds its element of noveltyl until the final 
phase in which the one complex •satisfaction• is reached. 
It follows that an actual entity is not completely determined by its 
past world for the additional reason that although initially emergent from 
this world, though causally determined by it, additional novel forms of defi-
niteness are offered to the subject by God at subsequent phases of its con-
crescence. And in in a sense to be examined presently, the subject is no 
longer dependent on the past actual entities for these novel eternal objects. 
The fourth reason why the subjective form is not completely deter-
mined by the datum is to be found in the relationship between the subjective 
form and the subjective !!!fil• 2 Stated generally, the subject's subjective 
aim is ontologically prior to all the phases of concrescence3 in the sense 
that every act of prehension, beginning with the initial phase and ending in 
satisfaction, is causally determined by the subject's subjective aim: 
and 
~' 
A reference to the complete actuality is required to give the reason why 
such a prehension is what it is in respect to its subjective form. This 
subjective form is determined by the subjective aim at further integra-
tion, so as to obtain the •satisfaction' of the completed subject.4 
The subjective aim determines in the manner of a final ~: 
1 lli.£•, also see ~.b PP• 324-27. Cf. ~, pp. 378-90, 161-62. 
2There is a relationship between 11the subjective form of a prehension 
the spontaneity involved in the subjective aim of the prehending occasion.' 
p. 325.) 
3E.E,, p. 342. 
4!..k!£., p. 29; also see pp. 355-56. 
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The world is self creative •••• In its self-creation the actual entity 
is guided by its ideal o~ itself as individual satisfaction and as trans-
cendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the •subjective aim,' by 
reason of which the actual entity is a determinate process.1 
As the intrinsic final cause, the subjective aim functions as a guide 
or lure for the process of concrescence. The subjective aim represents, then, 
that within the subject which ls the reason why the subject has the subjective 
forms tho.t it does. It is the reason for h2l'! the subject prehends its datum. 
Tl'l.ts whereas the past actllal entities constitute determining efficient causes, 
the subjective aim constitutes the element of freedom in the order of final 
cause of concrescence. As Hhi tehead says, 
The 'objectifications' of the actual entities in the actual world, 
relative to a definite actual entity, constitute the efficient causes out 
of which~ actual entity arises; the •subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' 
constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate con-
crescence; and that attained 'satisfaction' remains as an element in the 
content of creative purpose.2 
An actual entity is one being constituted by the synthesis of subjec-
tive forms in its process of concrescence. Inasmuch as the subjective forms 
expressive of this final unity termed "satisfaction" originate in the subjec-
tive aim, this aim may also be viewed as the unifying factor of the actual 
entity. Whitehead says, 
This process of the synthesis of subjective forms derived conformally is 
not settled by the antecedent fact of the data. For these data in their 
own separate natures do not carry any regulative principle for their syn-
thesis. The regulative principle is derived from the novel unity which is 
imposed on them by the novel creature in process of constitution. Thus 
the immediate occasion from the spontaneity of its own essence must supply 
the missi~g determination for the synthesis of subjective form. Thus the 
1 ~., p. 130. 2~., p. 134. 
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future of the Universe, though conditioned by the immanence of its past, 
awaits for its complete determination the spontaneity of the novel in-
dividual occasions as in their season they come into being. 1 
It is now possible to remove an apparent paradox found in Whitehead's 
statement of the "Category of Freedom and neterminism, 11 namely, that the con-
crescence of each individual actual entity is "internally determined and ex-
ternally free. 11 To be sure, ·whitehead maintains that the antecedent world 
functions to determine the subject in the order of efficient causality and t 
the s11bject is free in the order of final causality. In these terms, the sub-
ject is externally determined .fill2_ internally free. Yet, precisely because it 
is internally free Whitehead can say that the subject is internally determined 
and externally free, which is to say that Whitehead uses the terms freedom and 
determinism in different but related ways: (1) as~~' the subject 2!-
termines itself~or, is internally determined; and (2) is !l2!, completely 
determined by its antecedent world-or, ls to that extent indetermined or ex-
ternally free of these data. 
vie can now note the fil.!h. and final reason why the subject's subjective 
form is not completely determined by the datum. The initial phase of the sub-
jective aim "is an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable 
orderings of things, conceptually realized In the nature of God. 11 2 Though 
giving the subjective aim and thus initially limi tlnr; the freedom of the actua 
entity, Whitehead maintains that God does not completely detennine the concres 
1AI, p. 134. Also see PR 
egoreal Obllgatlon•1 (t!The CategMy 
28, 322, 343, 470. 
2PR, p. 373. 
for the formal explanation of the 1st "Cat-
of Subjective Unity"), p. 39; also PP• 227-
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cil'IS actual entity; for although the initial stage of the subjective aim ls 
rooted in the nature of God, "its completion depends on the self-causation 
l 
of the subject-superject." From this it follows that each actual (temporal) 
entity "derives its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet 
2 
with indetenninations awaiting its own decisions." 
There appears to be two basic reasons why God cannot completely deter-
mine an actual entity. (1) God is present to existing actual entltles as a 
1ure for feeling inasmuch as he provides the initial phase of the subjective 
aim.3 That is to say, as an object of love God exercises extrinsic final 
causallty, and according to Hhitehead this can never completely remove the 
subject's freedom. 4 (2) From the side of the actual entity the ultimate reas 
l !.!'!!..2.•, Also see pp. 343-75. 
3Previously it was noted that since according to the ontological 
principle the general potentiality of the universe nust be somewhere, this 
somewhere 1 s ''within the non-temporal actua 1 entl ty" which Whl tehead calls the 
primordial nature of God. (.!:B., p. 73.) In His consequent nature God also 
functions to join the past objectively immortal actual entities with the pre-
sent actuality. (f!, PP• 523-24.) "The consequent nature of God is his judg• 
ment on the world. He saves the world as it passes into the innnediac:1 of his 
own life.'' (.!:B., p. 525.) 
For extensive analyses of God's natures see the following excellent 
works. Christian, ~ Interpretation, Part III, pp. 283-413; Cobb, t:., Christian 
Nab.1ral Theolosy, esp. Chapters iv-v, pp. 135-214; James Collins, QE£ in. 
Modern Philosophy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959), PP• 315-24; George Con-
nelly's two works, "The Existence and Nature of God ln the Philosophy of Alf re 
North Whitehead," (unpublished PhD dissertation; St. Louis University, 1962), 
and "Whitehead and the Actuality of God"; Eslick, "God in the Metaphysics of 
Whitehead"; Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, Chapter xvi, pp. 189-208; Allx 
Parmentier, !:!. Philosophle ~ Whitehead !!_ .!!, P!'.OJ:>lemede ~ (Paris: 
Beauchesne, 1968), esp. Part III, pp. 349-574; finally, see Kenneth Thompson, 
Jr., Whitehead's Philosophy 2f Religion (The Hague: Mouton, 1971). 
4see, for example, PR, pp. 519-23. 
~hY Whitehead's God cannot completely determine is that the subject is a 
creature of creativity, and this is to be causa §1!!_: 
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To be causa ~means that the process of concrescence is its own reason 
for the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feelings. It 
is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is 
admitted to efficiency. The freedom inherent in the universe is consti-
tuted by this element of self-creation.l 
It seems that this entails that there can be some degree of a negative pre-
hension of the hybrid physical feeling of God. 
In seeking the cause of the actual entity's indetermination we have 
thus come full circle. Creativity and eternal objects are the correlative 
principles accounting for novelty and freedom. But creativity is irrational 
in itself, and thus to seek for a reason for freedom is to ask for something 
more than creativity. Hence in one sense the "subjective aim" is the final 
reason one can give for the actual entity's being causa §1!!_. As a conse-
quence Whitehead says that this aim is both an example and limitation of the 
2 
ontological principle. Nevertheless, in another and most important sense 
creativity!.! lli ultimate "explanation" accounting for freedom as novelty, 
that is as "different" or "otherness." 
Because of the "nature" of creativity, Whitehead's God, unlike the 
3 Christian God of the metaphysics of Aquinas, cannot completely determine the 
actual entity in the order of final causality. More like Aristotle's primary 
1 
.!.l!..2.·' p. 135. 2 ll?..!!!·' p. 373. 
3 21, I, 82, esp. le and 2c; I-II, 2 all; I-II, 10, 2 all; De Veritate, 
Yi.XII, 6 all and 8 all. 
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mover who moves in the manner of a final cause1 and Plato's divine element in 
the world conceived a persuasive agency, 2 Whitehead's God is conceived as the 
divine element in the world moving it toward completion and perfection as an 
object of desire, persuading but never compelling. Moreover, since he does 
3 
not exercise creative efficacy properly so called, as does the God of St. 
Thomas Aquinas and the medieval theologians, Whitehead's God operates within 
the general conditions placed upon him by the creativity, and in this, again, 
~e have an analogue in Plato's Demiourgos. 
The eternal objects are offered by God as lures drawing actual en-
titles toward ideal perfection, but these forms cannot completely determine 
--i.e., remove the freedom of--the actual entity because the creature is also 
constituted by creativity. Now creativity is the principle of novelty functi 
ing to constitute correlatively the being of actual entitles. Therefore how-
ever nuch the eternal objects lure and even when they are accepted for ingres-
sion, yes, even when the form of the initial phase of the subjective aim is 
determined by God, these objects never completely determine the actual entity. 
An actual entity is a creature of creativity and thus it is free to determine 
itself its manner of existence: it is causa ~· 
Therefore Whitehead is being consistent with the principles of his 
l~, PP• 522-23. 2AI, pp. 213-19; 105; 188-89. 
3~, p. 519. For a statement of the Christian understanding see 
Claude Tresmontant, Christian Metaphysics, translated Gerard Slevin (New York: 
Sheed and Ward, 1965), pp. 45-62. An analysis of Whitehead's rejection of the 
"classical" Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and of his alternative 
doctrine can be found in Thompson, Whl tehe;d°'• s Philosophy S?£. Religion, pp. 
101-28. 
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system when he speaks of the initial situation of an actual entity in terms 
of (a) God, (b) the actual world, and (c) creativity. 
If we prefer the phraseology, we can say that God and the actual world 
jointly constitute the character of creativity for the initial phase of 
the novel concrescence. The subject, thus constituted! ls the autonomous 
master of its own concrescence into subject-superject. 
4. Creativity: Sunnnary 
Creativity has been discussed throughout the chapter, and therefore we 
will but sun111arize our findings. whitehead maintains that creativity is one 
of the notions presupposed in all the more special categories of his "Cate-
goreal Scheme, 112 by this he means, among other things, that all the more 
special discussions would ultimately lead, if pushed far enough, to an an-
alysis of this principle of creative advance operative in the world. Because 
creativity is a correlative principle, this analysis also leads to the role 
played by eternal objects and God. The second part of this chapter was ad-
dressed to isolating and summarily stating various causal factors directly 
accounting for the determination and freedom of actual occasions in terms of 
these formative elements. 
An actual occasion was seen to be constituted in its very being--or 
becoming~as the product of the ingression of eternal objects in creativity 
arising from the efficacy of past actual entities and through the mediation 
of God. When this is stated precisely and in terms of a causal analysis, 
eternal objects, creativity, past actual occasions, and God were seen to func-
lpR, P• 374. 2~., p. 31. 
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tton as formal, material, efficient, and final causes respectively. To be 
sure, Whitehead has changed the meaning of these terms in important ways; so 
~e observed that the material cause is purely active though informable, while 
his formal determining principles are wholly potential; also, the efficient 
cause "exists in the past" and the effect "is in the present," and not even 
God can completely determine the world'=i process in the order of extrinsic 
final causal lty. 
An actual occasion is causa !!!it and to this extent it freely deter-
mines its own process of concrescence. The mental pole is the subject's in-
trinsic source of self-determination. In virtue of its mental activity the 
subject determines for itself h.2li it will realize the possibilities offered to 
it by the past world and by God. That is to say, self-determination entails 
self-causation in the order of intrinsic final causality. 
There is a negative and positve aspect of the freedom of self deter-
mination, both grounded in one of the correlative principles and together 
explaining this free act taken as a whole: creativity ls the ultimate intrin-
sic principle accounting for novelty as otherness, i.e. for freedom--1!:.2!!1 the 
determinism of (1) the efficient causality of the past and (2) the final caus-
ality of God's lure; whereas eternal objects account for the definite form 
that novelty takes, i.e. for freedom-.t2, become a specific or limited kind of 
novel actuality. 
Christian asks "How can the subjective form of the initial aim be 
conditioned by the subject when no prior unity of the subject e..'<ists? 11 and 
'~ow can the subject affect the subjective form of that feeling which is itsel 
I 
\ 
\ 
\ 
; 
l 
~ 
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1 
the basis of the unity of the subj ect? 11 I'erhaps an answer can be worked out 
along the following lines. L'ven though God is the cause of the initial phase 
of the subjective aim, nevertheless this aim as received in the coming-to-be 
of the subject ls received according to the conditions imposed by creativity. 
Now if creativity is "conceived" as a principle "determining" by radical ne-
gation and otherness, can we not say that the very condition of receiving an 
initial subjective aim from God requires that in virtue of its creativity the 
subject necessarily modifies this aim? The initial subjective aim of this 
subject is consequently other than, different from, that aim as invisioned by 
God. If we be permitted a metaphor, creativity leaves everything it touches 
changed by the experience. So rruch is creativity a principle that rejects 
determination, that no sooner does the actual entity come to be completed than 
it begins to function as potentiality for future occasions. Its birth ls its 
death. This is one important aspect of the ultimate explanation for the 
entity's being called a subject-superject, of its being one individual among 
and for others. In virtue of its creativity, there is an existential tendency 
ruilt into the subject to be an-other (as subject) and to be for another(as 
auger Ject). 
This chapter has attempted to outline the metaphysical basis of freedom 
in Whi tehead 1 s philosophy. We have seen that freedom is exercised by actual 
entities. These entities are the ultimate realities in terms of which every-
thing else is explained. But what of man? Can V..111tehead 1 s metaphysical an-
l!!.!!, Interpretation, p. 313. 
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dysi s with stand the condl tlons placed upon l t that were noted at the end of 
'I'? Chapter ,. Has Whitehead laid the grounds for explaining or explaining away 
hUtnan freedom? In order to answer this question we nust pass to tLe macro-
scopic level of analysts; we nust determine precisely what a man ls and how 
he exercises his mode of freedom. This ls to be the subject of the following 
chapters. 
CHAf'fER I I I 
THE 'MACROCOSMIC UNIVERSE: FREEDOM REAFFIRMED 
Having considered the question of the metaphysical basis of freedom, 
and having observed that it lies in the very being of individual actual en-
titles, we nust now consider the other half of Whitehead's metaphysical an-
alysis: l the macrocosmic analysis. For none of the beings of our direct 
experience such as stones, trees, and men are individual actual entities. On 
the contrary, these events are compost tes "bull t-up" from individual actual 
entities. Whitehead calls these entities ne~s and/or societies. Any freedom 
on the macrocosmic level must similarily be "built-up" from the freedom of 
individual actual entities. 
In this chapter we will attempt to determine the manner of reality 
manifested by rnacrocosmic entities. Here we are ultimately concerned with 
discovering man's place in the hierarchy of macroscopic organisms. First, the 
nature of macroscopic entities will be briefly examined. Second, the classi-
lWhitehead sometimes refers to the macroscopic and microscopic orders 
rather than the macrocosmic and microcosmic, but it is clear that he uses 
these terms interchangingly, and therefore we have used both forms. 
-126-
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ftcation of actual entities will be established as the ground for classifying 
macrocosmic entities. Finally, Whitehead's actual classification of nexus 
will be examined in order to establish man's exact place in the macrocosmic 
scheme. 
A. .'.!!!.! Macrocosmic Universe .21, Nexus 
1. The Immanence of Actual Occasions 
Though Whitehead enumerates "eight categories of existence," he is 
quick to point out that of these "actual entities and eternal objects stand oo 
1 
with a certain extreme finality." The idea is expanded somewhat by the 19th 
"Category of Explanation" which states 
That the fundamental types of entities are actual entities, and 
eternal objects and that the other types of entities only e>cpress how 
all entities of the two fundamental types are in community with each 
other, in the actual world.2 
These statements do not contradict Whitehead's assertions that the res verae 
are actual entities (or actual occasions), for although eternal objects are 
entities, they are of themselves "pure potentials" and as such are devoid of 
actuality. Moreover, Whitehead is consistent in not listing creativity among 
these ultimate "entitles"-though he has listed it as a "formative principle" 
~for creativity is his ultimate principle of act, of actuality and activity, 
and is not a principle of potentiality. For as we have seen, the definition 
of "entity" is "potentiality for process."3 Also, creativity is not listed 
1f!, P• 33; also see fil, pp. 95-97, "Immortality,"§ VI Philosophy of 
Whitehead, ed by Schilpp, pp. 687-88. 
2pR, P• 37. 3 
.!E.!.!!•t p. 68; cf • .fil:lli., P• 255. 
l 
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81110ng the "Categories of Existence." I.e. Whitehead's creativity is ultimate 
in the sense of being his ultimate principle of being as activity. 
Among the other 11 proper en tit ies"-i. e. excluding 11mul ti pl lei ties"-
1,'hitehead lists the important 3rd "Category of l::xistence": "Nexus (plural of 
Nexus), or Public riatters of Fact. 111 He proceeds to explain that "a nexus ls 
8 set of actual entitles in the unity of each other, or-what is the same thin 
conversely expressed-constituted by their objectification in each other. 112 
In Chapter II, we observed that an actual entity is "objectified" in being 
"prehended" by a concrescing subject. Connecting the doctrine of nexus with 
the technical terms 11objectifi cation11 and "prehension," Whitehead coherently 
grounds the very being of a nexus in this real concrete relationship between 
actual entities~as indeed he !lllst, given the ontological principle: 
Actual entities involve each other by reason of their prehension of 
each other. 'lltere are thus real individual facts of togetherness of act-
ual entitles, which are real, individual, and particular, in the c:ame 
sense in which actual entities and prehensions are real, ind! vi dual, and 
particular. Any such part! cular fact of togetherness_amon~ actual enti -
ties is called a 'nexus' (plural form ls written 'nexus•). 
It follows that although the~ verae are actual entities existing individ-
ually and possessing self identity, nevertheless each actual entity is really 
related to other actual entities inasnuch as each is constituted by its pre-
hensions. This is merely an application of the principle of relatlvity4 and 
expresses the general idea that actual entities are nutually immanent. Their 
P• 32; cf. ili.t PP• 254, 258. 
2f!i, p. 35, 14th "Category of Explanation." 
4For example, see ~' pp. 33, 79-80. 
3~, pp. 29-30. 
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iJTITlanence is 1 constitutive of a real unity. \fuitehead calls this unity a 
2. First Division of Nexus Based on 
the Kinds of Immanence 
In the Adventures !!!, Ideas, Whitehead enumerates three kinds of im-
2 
manence evidenced in our cosmic epoch. The immanence of the past in the 
present, the present in the present, and the future in the present.3 The im-
manence of the past in the present is the ''direct immanence" of causal effi-
cacy. Here, the past actual occasion is immanent as object for the concres-
cing subject: "This individual objective existence of the actual occasions 
of the past, each functioning in each present occasion, constitutes the 
causal relationship which is efficient causation. 114 Stated in the terminology 
of ''relations," the past actual occasion is internally related to the present 
actual occasion. 5 The price of "direct immanence" is the objective immortal-
i ty of the past. 
The future is also immanent in the present as an object for the subject, 
but its objective existence differs from that whereby the past is object. Ob-
1.~:!f., P• 225. 2&, p. 259. 
3For example, see ~, p. 246. Cf. ~' pp. 105-08. 4 g, I>• 251. 
S~, PP• 179-86; f!, PP• 470-71; !ll_, pp. 201, 254-57. See Leclerc, 
Whitehead's MetaI?hyslcs, pp. 115-23, 126-30; Cliristian, ~Interpretation, pp. 
158-68; Paul Schmidt, Perception ~ Cosmology!!!. Whitehead's Philosophy (New 
Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 91-98. 
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\'iously the future actual occasions cannot exercise causal efficacy, for as 
future they have not yet existed. Consequently they are not objects in the 
1118nner of exercising objective ltmnortality. 1 Rather, as Whitehead says, 
What is objective in the present is the necessity of a future of actual 
occasions, and the necessity that these future occasions conform to the 
condition inherent in the essence of the present occasion. The future 
belongs to the essence of the present fact, and has no actuality other 
than the actuality of the present. But its particular relationships to 
the present fact are already realized in the nature of present fact.2 
There are two ways of understanding this passage. (1) The future is 
1nnnanent in the present in the sense that it is determined by the present. 
(2) The future is immanent in the present by determining the present. Ob-
viously we have here two divergent senses of "to determine.'' Number (1) says 
that the present will become objectified in the future, which is to apply the 
doctrine of causal efficacy to the present subject and to view the subject as 
datum for future subjects. This ls the proper or fonnal meaning of "to deter-
mine" in Whitehead's philosophy. Viewed in this way, the subject will causal-
ly determine the future when, in {or with) the future, it attains objective 
immortality. But it will determine the future inasmuch as the subject ls 
what it is at the present. To this extent the present is pregnant with the 
future. In other words, the present is being regarded as a real potentiality 
for the future. 
Whereas (1) states the doctrine of efficient causality, (2) expresses 
the role of final causality. Here Whitehead wishes to make the point that 
although the end of an actual occasion resides in its final phase of satis-
l&, P• 247 2 1!!!.£., p. 251. 
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faction whereby it exists completed, definite, fully actual, and fully indi-
vidual, yet it belongs to the essence of the subject "that it passes into ob-
jective immortality." This is to say that objective inunortality is the other 
aspect of a subject's essence; an actual occasion is a being whose very being 
atso involves being-for-another: "Thus its own constitution involves that its 
own activity in filtl!-formation passes into its activity of other-formation."l 
This sense of being-for-another receives its systematic expression as the 8th 
11categoreal Obligation," the "Category of Subjective Intensity." This cate-
gory expresses the two-sidedness of the subjective aim and therefore of the 
subject: 
The subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, 
is at intensity of feeling (~) in the il'!llllediate subject, and (0\) in the 
~VJ!!!.t future. 
This double aim~at the ~diate present and the relevant future--
ls less divided than appears on the surface. For the determination of 
the relevant future, and the antlcipatorI feeling respecting provision for 
its grade of intensity, are elements affecting the immediate complex of 
feeling. The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of rel-
evance in the future. The relevant future consists of those elements ln 
the anticlapted future which are felt with effective intensity by the pre-
sent subject by reason of the real potentiality for them to be derived 
from itself.2 
The subjective aim which ls the unifying goal drawing on the concres-
cing subject ls at once directed to the subject as subject, i.e. as actual, ln 
the present as well as to the subject as object, i.e. as potential in the 
future. 3 When you emphasize this latter aspect of the subject the importance 
l!.!?l!!•, P• 248; cf. f!, p. 34, 8th "Category of Explanation. 11 See 
Christian, ~ Interpretation, pp. 21-38 for a detailed analysis of the rela-
tionship between "satisfaction" and "object! fication. '' 
2
.f!i, p. 41; cf. pp. 424-25; AI, pp. 247-50. 3 fli, p. 343. 
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of the future functioning as a lure and a real element in the present becomes 
1 
apparent. Future possibilities !!!.!! relevant data for the present. 2 As we 
shall see, in the case of high grade actual entities consci'"s awareness of 
the future as future will be an essential element in distinguishing their 
higher kind of freedom and the moral responsibility this entails. It ls along 
these lines that Whitehead wishes to explain the persistent deliveries of com-
mon sense3 witnessing to the fact that the future is something for the present 
Legal contracts, social understandings of every type ambitions, anxieties, 
railway timetables, are futile gestures of consci'"sness apart from the 
fact that the present bears in its own realized constitution relation-
ships to the future. Cut away the future and the present collapses, emp-
tied of its proper content.4 
The immanence of the present in the present is of the "indirect" sort 
of immanence, like that of the future in the present. Here, however, the 
indirect immanence is that which maintains between "contemporary" actual en-
titles. Now contemporaries are so related thatreither belongs to the past of 
the other, and therefore they 11are not in any direct relation of efficient 
causation. uS Foregoing Whitehead's more technical analysts, 6 his post tion can 
l~., pp. 128-34. 
2sMw, PP• 105-80; "Itranortality,"§III, Philosophy.2!_Whitehead, ed. by 
Schilpp, III, p. 684. 
3&, p. 247. 4 ~., P• 246. 
5M_, P• 251; .2_, P• 25. Cf. f!, PP• 95-96; 188: "This is in fact the 
definition of contemporaneousness •••• namely, that actual occasions, A and B, 
art· mutually contemporary, when A does not c·:>ntribute to the datum for B, and 
B does not contribute to the datum for A, except that both A and B are atomic 
regions in the potential scheme of spatial-temporal extensiveness which is a 
datum for both A and B." Finally, see Whitehead's article entitled "Time," 
!'..._roceedings £!. ~ Sixth International Congress 2£. Philosophy LHeld at Harvard 
r 
I 
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be stated very generally. The mutual immanence of contemporary actual enti-
ties lies in this fact, namely, that their immanence ls mediated inasmuch as 
lt is exercised through a common past and a comnon future: 
The occasions originate from a common past and their objective immortality 
operates within a common future. Thus indirectly, !!.! the immanence of 
the past and the inrnanence of the future, the occasions are connected. 
But the immediate activity of self-creation ls separate and private, so 
far as contemporaries are concerned.l 
But what has all of this to do with Whitehead's discussion of nexus? 
Simply that a n~:-rus derives its being from the nutual immanence of its com-
ponent actual entitles. Therefore the more fundamental or direct immanence 
of the past in the present constitutes one kind of nexus, namely, a temporal 
nexus whose members form a strand of actual occasions causally (efficient 
causality) related and therefore temporally (serially-1 inearly) spread. 
The indirect immanence of the present in the present constitutes 
University, Cambridge, Iv'.ass., 192§] This article ls reprinted in Alfred North 
Whitehead, .:!'.h2, Interpretation 2f Science: Selected Essays, ed. by A. H. 
Johnson (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 240-
47. 
6Agaln the reader ls referred to Christian's detailed analysis of 0 im-
manence": ~ Interpretation, pp. 50-76 and all of Chapter vi, pp. 119-29. 
l~, P• 252, see all of Chapter xii, pp. 246-57; also see pp. 277-82. 
Whitehead al so speaks of the ti obj ecti fi ca ti on" of contemporaries. 111'1utual 
lnnnanencett implies that each actual occasion be considered both "formally'' and 
''objectively": formally in its being-for-itself, objectively in its being-for 
another. The objectification of the present in the present ls, like that of 
the future in the present, significantly different from the objectification of 
the past in the present. Whitehead notes this when comparing the two modes of 
perc~ption. Whereas the objectification of the past in the present ls the 
primary meaning of objectification (f!, pp. 34, 72) and occurs in perception 
in the mode of causal efficacy, contemporaries are objectified when perceived 
in the mode of presentational immediacy (.2., p. 25; cf. £B., pp. 91-92). 
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another kind of nexus. The actual occasions constituting this n~s are 
causally independent and therefore they are not temporally spread. Indeed, 
the idea of contemporaries, as conlllon sense attests, is that of entitles ex-
1 istlng at the same time or "sircultaneously." Here then is another kind of 
possible nexus, one that is spread spatially at any given ~nstant of time. 
Whereas a spatial nexus is spread in three dimensions and a temporal nexus 
is spread in another dimension, the nexus of our immediate experience such as 
stones, trees, and men are more complex for they are spread both spatially 
and temporally, 1tlich ls to say that they are four dimensional. On the other 
hand, such spatially spread nexus do depend in some important sense on tempor 
order, i.e. they are also in fact a member of a temporally spread nexus. 
Finally, what of that other type of indirect immanence? What kind of 
nexus is formed by the immanence of the future in the present? There are two 
ways in which the future can be said to be immanent in the present. One is in 
the manner of efficient causality whereby the future is said to be in the pre-
sent by being determined by the present. Now this is but a reversion to the 
two previous kinds of immanence, since on this level the question is one of 
determining how the past influences the present. Here there are but two pos-
sibilities: (a) the direct mode of imnanence, i.e. causal efficacy and (b) 
the mediated or indirect mode of innnanence, i.e. causal independence--and here 
we are really speaking of contemporaries. Therefore it is a reversion of the 
two previously mentioned nexus. 
45. 
111Time, '' 5 V in !b2 Interpretation 2f_ Science, ed. by Johnson, pp. 244-
Cf. 2.tlli'..' Chapter vii, esp. pp. 174-79. 
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On the other hand, the future ls immanent ln the present as a final 
cause. From this perspective the question ls how the future can causally 
affect the present. Because the future does not yet exist actuall;y, the pre• 
sent actual occasions cannot form actual, existential, concrete, particular 
bonds of togetherness with future occasions. Precisely because nexus are 
just such bonds, there .!!:.!. !!.2 nexU's formed .!!:2!! .!:!l!!. !.2S!!. gt_ indirect .!!!!!!!.· 
nence. At best such nex.Us would''be" possibilities-though £!.!!. posslbllitles, 
to be sure. Just as actual entities are real possibilities for the future, 
so also as derivatives from actual entitles, nexU"s slmilarlly can be spoken of 
!.! future. Now future actual entitles are cnly possible in the present, and 
hence nexus can be similarly understood. Nexus are and can be known as future 
- --
and therefore as immanent, but their being and their status as objects of 
knowledge ls that of real posslbllitles of togetherness.1 
B. A Further Division 2f. Nexus Based .2!l .! 
Classification gS_ Actual Occasions 
This summary presented what could be called Whitehead's general an• 
alysls and division of nexUs.2 It states the most general characteristics 
to be found ln the nexU"s of our present cosmic epoch. 3 -These nexus fall into 
three main divisions: the purely temporal, the }.Urely spatial, and the lnte-
lFor example, see .f!, PP• 350-53. 2AI P• 260. 
-· 3see Sherburne•s comments ln h_ Key, pp. 80-81. Sherb.trne calls at-
tention to the fact that the society of pure extension admits of many more 
possibilities than those actualized ln our own cosmic epoch, as, for example, 
5, 6, etc. dimensionality. 
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grated temporal-spatial type. An additional classlflcatlon ls needed, one 
'(lhich would be a subdivision of the previous groups. Nowhere ln this discus-
sion have we found anything that wOJld enable us to account for different 
kinds of temporal, or spatial, or temporal-spatial nexlis such as electrons, 
JllOlecules, living cells, animals, and so forth. Principles of specification 
are clearly ln order. As an introduction to this discussion, it ls well at 
least to note the derivative mode of existence attributed to nexus by Whitehea 
Though merely introduced at this point, the notion of "derivative exlstencett 
will help introduce the principle by which Whitehead further distinguishes the 
hierarchy of nexus. 
1. The Derivative Status of Nexus Noted 
Since a nexus expresses any real, individual, particular fact of 
togetherness among actual entitles, it follows that all of the ultimate facts 
-of inunedlate actual experience are "actual entities, prehenslons, and nexus,., 
1 
and that everything else ••ts, for our experience, derivative abstraction." 
On the other hand, actual entitles "stand out with a certain extreme finality.• 
Given the ontological principle, the I.!.! verae are complete, individual, con-
crete, existing actual entities, and therefore everything else shQ.lld be in 
the end, a derivative abstraction from actual entitles. In point of fact Whlt 
head does say that "the actual world ls built up of actual occasions; and by 
the ontological principle whatever things there are in any sense of •existence/ 
are derived by abstraction from actual occaslons. 0 2 This ls a strong statemen 
lf!, p. 30; see p. 27. 
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In one sense it means that actual entities are more fully real than nexus, 
since the latter are meant to express but the unity maintaining between actual 
entitles, Leclerc states the matter precisely: 
Whitehead acknowledges that for most everyday purposes the things 
with which we are concerned are legitimately and correctly conceived as 
self-identically enduring entities: 'the simple notion of an enduring 
substance sustaining persistent qualities, either essentially O.£. acclden-_ 
tally, express a useful abstract for many purposes of life.' /PR, P• 121/ 
But lt is the concept of an 'abstraction' and not of a concrete actuality, 
That is to say, though they are •entitles', they are not actual entities; 
though they do exist, their 'existence• is not the 'full' existence of 
actual entities, but ls existence of a 'derivative' kind. In saying that 
they are 'abstractions• Whitehead means that their existence ls of a kind 
derivative from that of actual entltles.l 
Chapter VI will examine what appears to this writer to be some of the 
difficulties inherent in Whitehead's conception of nexus as derivative exls-
tents. For the moment we are concerned wlth the question of the principle to 
be used in determining the hierarchy of nexus. Inasmuch as nexus derive their 
being from the relationships of actual occasions, we will have to return 
briefly to the microscopic level. For, the basic principle operating here 
ls that actual occasions are graded into "klnds,tt and that they are thereby 
-the "reasons" why nexus can be so graded, 
2. Classification of Actual Entitles 
What does it mean to say that actual entities are graded into "kinds"? 
There can be a multiplicity of two or more "whatevers" only if "they" differ 
in some respect. Indeed, at the very beginning there appears to be two un-
avoidable paths to radical monism. ''Two things" that are really identical 
lWhltehead's Metaphysics, p. 63. 
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from every respect are not really two at all. They are really one and the 
same. That ls, they can neither be nor be thought of as two. On the other 
band, "two things" that are really .!J!. !!2 way whatsoever alike cannot both be, 
nor can they both be thought of. For dlfferlng ln all things whatsoever, what 
ever is said of either nust be denied of the other, even that both of them 
are. For if one be, the other can only not-be, and if one be the object of 
thought the other can only be the object of ignorance, which ls not to be an 
object at all. 
The primary instance of "two things" being ln no way whatsoever alike 
has lts logical and metaphysical expression ln the contradictory terms "be-
ing" and ••non-being", where the former may be conceived as (absolute) being 
and all else as (absolute-ly) non-being. The ancient proponent of such a con-
ceptl on was, of co.irse, the formidable Pannenldes. Now nultiplicity implies 
difference, and therefore two things can really differ-1.e. really "be" and 
be "two"-only lf they are both similar and dissimilar. The history of phi-
losophy can be read as a narrative of the attempts to make some sense of the 
slmilaritles and differences manifest between things. l'he classification of 
actual entitles-and nexus-.that follows ls our lnterpretatlon of Whitehead's 
contribution to this long history. 
a) ~Interpretation .2!: Whitehead's Posltlon 
The world ls made up of a nultlpliclty of actual entitles. 1'llltl-
Pllclty implies difference and therefore Whitehead writes that these actual 
entitles "differ among themselves: God ls an actual entity, and so ls the 
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11105t trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space." But how do they 
dlffer? Ideally lt would be hoped that there ls but one genus of actual en-
tlttes, 2 so that though different, all actual entities would exemplify lden· 
ttcal metaphysical principles. Even in the extreme case, namely that concern-
lng God, lt would turn out that he would "not be treated as an exception to 
all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse.••3 All actual 
entities, God included, would consequently be similar lnasnuch as they ex-
emplify the same metaphysical principles, though they would differ in the 
manner in which, l.e., the degree to which, these would be manifest in each. 
(1) God and Actual Occasions 
Though the ideal, Whitehead ls lead, in our opinion, to conclude that 
there ls a !.!!!. difference !!l !tl!l!!-and not merely a ''distinction of reason"4 
between at least God and temporal actual entitles (i.e. actual occasions): 
The presumption that there ls only one geRJs of actual entitles consti-
tutes an ideal of cosmological theory to which the philosophy of organism 
endeavours to conform. The description of the generic character of actual 
entity should include God, as well as the lowest actual occasion, though 
there ts a specific difference between the nature of God and that of any 
occaslon.5 
Our concern ls not primarily with the question of how God differs 
l.fil!., P• 28. 2~., PP• 168, 28. 
3Ibld., p. 521; also see~' pp. 215-21. 
5.!!?!.!!,., P• 168. See the two recent works on analogy in Whitehead's 
philosophy: Donald J. Hogan, "Whitehead's God: The Analogy of Actual Entity," 
!!!..! !!!!! Scholasttctsm, XLVI (.Autunn, 1972), pp. 411-26; Herbert R. Reinelt, 
"A Whtteheadlan Doctrine of Analogy,"!!!.! Modern Schoolman, XLVIII (May, 1971), 
pp. 327-42. 
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from other actual entities, It should be noted, however, that we interpret 
lrlhltehead to mean that God ls fundamentally unlike temporal actual entitles, 
even though Whitehead writes that He ls similar to them ln many important 
ways. For example, He too ls a creature of creativity, He too ls dipolar, etc 
Nevertheless, an indication of the extreme difference between God and actual 
occasions ls seen in the fact that God is required to be operative in the pro-
cess of concrescence of every actual occasion, whereas no actual occasion ls 
il!llilediately involved in the concrescence of every other actual occasion.-past, 
present, and future, More specifically, God appears to be the only actual en-
tlty of his kind for at least the following reasons: (1) only God in his pri-
mordial nature originates with his timeless prehenslon and valuation of the 
whole realm of eternal objects; 1 (2) only in His consequent nature does the 
world 
to pay 
become "everlasting lmmortaltt; 2 (3) only God is superject without having 
3 the price of objective iJllllortallty; (4) God is the only non-temporal 
actual entity;4 (5) God ls the absolute standard of subjective intensity 
- -5 ld!!£h. allows g£, ~comparisons Lot more or les!f; (6) God alone supplies the 
initial phase of the concrescing actual occasion's subjective aim; 6 (7) God 
!.!.2!l! ls the "aboriginal instance of creativity, and is therefore the aborlg• 
inal condition which qualifies its actlon."7 The upshot of these differences 
--especially (3)--ls that some interpreters argue that God ought not to be 
1 
.!!?!S,., PP• 46, 73. 2 E!t P• 427. 3 .!.!?!E.•t p. 532. 
41bid., pp. 135, 119. 5Ibld., P• 75 
6Ibid,, PP• 343, 373-74, 522. 7 
.!.2.!$!.•t P• 344. 
141 
regarded as an actual entlty at all but rather as a "society•• of actual en-
tl tles. 1 
(2) Actual Occasions Among Themselves 
Wlth the exceptlon of God, and this ls admittedly a very lmportant 
etceptlon, Whitehead intends to malntain the metaphysical ideal, namely, that 
all actual occasions should exempllfy ldentical metaphysical prlnciples. The 
metaphysical analysis of actual occasions in terms of their generic similar-
itles and differences would therefore uncover those principles, characterls-
tics, activities, etc. which are manifested by every actual occasion. 
The analysis of the !.!.!. verse given in Chapter II of this work was in 
part an attempt to elucidate the generic traits manifested by every actual 
occasion with emphasis placed on the roles of creativity and eternal objects 
in the production of novelty and free activity. It was seen that every actual 
occasion ls constituted by the formative principles of creativity and eternal 
objects operating under the agency of Gocl--and the efficient determination of 
past actual occasions. Every actual occasion ls bl polar. Every actual oc-
caslon emerges as a concrescence of prehenslons. Every process of concrescen 
ls guided by the subjective aim and la analyzable into various phases whose 
end ls the final satisfaction and decision of the actual occasion. 
On the other hand, there are a nultiplicity of actual occasions, and 
lsee Gene Reeves and Delwin Brown, ''The Development of Process The-
ology,'' in Process Philosophy !!!J! Christian Thought t ed. by Delwln Brown, 
Ralph E. James Jr., and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 39-40. 
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therefore although actual occaslons can be vlewed as manlfestlng the same 
nietaphyslcal princlples, Whitehead also contends that existentially they are 
!fP-1• But thelr existential JtUltlpllclty ls as uuch a part of their reallty 
as ls the fact that they can be "thought oftt as "really*' manifesting slmllar 
generic structures. 11le generic descriptlon Jll.lst also elucidate the prin-
ciple(s) in terms of which eKlstentlal indlvlduation and differentiatlon are 
to be explained. 11lere ls a question of accounting for the uniqueness of 
actual entitles that manifest genetically similar structures, activities, and 
actuality. 
In summary, an actual occasion ls unique ln virtue of the following; 
(1) ll.!. !!!!:,! !!. uniaue. No two subjects have identical pasts. It follows 
that the efficient causality of the past determines each subject to be dlf· 
ferent.l 
(2) !!.! subJectl ve forms .!!.!. uni SH•• As was observed in Chapter I I, the 
subject form ls ''how" ~ actual occasion prehends !£.! data. 2 
(3) lli subjective !.!!!! !!. unique. Whereas the uniqueness of (1) has an EIK• 
trinslc source in the objective data, that of (2) ls ground also ln an inter-
nal source, namely, the subjective alm. But n9 t~ subjects have ldentlcal 
subjective alms. Perhaps the importance of (3) can be grasped when lt ls re-
called that the same eternal objects can ingress in many actual occasions. 
Now two actual occasions cannot be dlfferentlated if one considers only the 
eternal objects 1\nvolved" in each, that ls, lf one considers them apart from 
the actual ingression. For, eternal objects are not of themselves determined 
to ingress in °thls" or ''that0 actual occasion. An analysis restricted to the 
realm of eternal objects will yield only other eternal objects; it is an an-
alysts of possibility, not of actuality. What nust be explained is how ''these'' 
eternal objects come to be uniquely mingled in °thls" actual subject. On one 
level the subjective aim ls Whitehead's explanation. As Christian says, 
Every actual occasion is a novel unity •••• In lts experience it alms at a 
unique posslblllty. This possibility ls not a class or a species or a 
genus. It ls the ideal for that concrescence and determines how actual 
- -
lf!, PP• 33-34; 321. 2 !.!?.!.!!•• P• 354, 
- 143 
entitles and eternal objects may mingle ln its experience. That ls to 
say the subjective aim of an occasion is a "form of composition" (t!!, 
129). It defines a pattern, or mode of togetherness, relevant to the 
situation ln which the concrescence arises. It defines !:!.2!, the concres-
cence may become concrete.1 
(4) !!!. relationship !2 Q22. !.! unique. This follows from (3) for God is the 
origin of the initial phase of the subjective aim.2 
(5) ~activity constituting!!!, mental pole!.! unique. It ls the proximate 
intrinsic source of the subject's creative energy.3 
l~ Interpretation, pp. 251-52. Johnson (Whitehead's Theory .2£. 
Reality, PP• 34-36) and Rlchard_Rorty (''Matter and Event," in !!:!!. Concept .2!. 
Matter, ed._by Ernan Mc1'illlin LNotre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1961/) offer similar interpretations. The latter says that the prin-
ciple of individuation is the subjective aim as "defining a mode of together-
ness of actual entities and eternal objects." (p. 506.) 
In commenting upon Rorty•s paper, v. c. Chappell observes that Rorty 
in fact seems to give additional and differing explanations for what accounts 
for the "individuality, particularity, and uniqueness of actual entitles." 
Chappell himself thinks that the extensive continuum is the principle in terms 
of which individuality is to be explained (p. 527). On our interpretation thi! 
is untenable. For as was noted in Chapter ii, the activity of the subjective 
aim ls grounded in the activity of creativity. But the extensive continul.Ull 
cannot be identified with creativity, nor can it be included within the mean-
ing of creativity as Shahan attempted to show. (Whitehead's 'lbeory of Ex-
perience, esp._pp. 5-6, 93-94, 114-18). For as Eumet {Whitehead's Phllosophy 
2! Organism, L2nd ed.; New York: St. Martin's Press, 196!if, PP• 223-41.) 
Stokes ("Recent Interpretations,") and others have shown, and as Shahan him-
self also points out, creativity ls totally formless activity whereas the ex-
tensive continuum ls the most general scheme of real potentiality. Therefore 
since we interpret Whitehead as grounding the principle of existential lndivid· 
uation within creativity, we cannot then maintain that this ls identical with 
what Whitehead variously describes as the extensive continuum. 
Also see Leclerc, "Whitehead and the Problem of Extension,'' in Alfred 
North Whitehead: Essays .2!l !!!.! Philosophy, ed. by George Kline (A Spectrum 
Book, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963) pp. 117-23; "Kant's 
Second Antinomytt; David L. Miller, ''Whitehead's Extensive Continuum," Philos-
$>hY .2!, Science, XIII (1946), PP• 144-49. 
2!!.t p. 256. 
3see Chapter ii of this dissertation. 
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(6) !! !! unlQ!lely .! creature 2f creativity. As was noted in the previoos 
chapter, creativity ls the ultimate intrinsic source of the subject's being 
a 99ve1 individual; lt ls the principle accounting for the actual occasion being causa ~· It ls that which accounts for the subjective aim being 
unique, for not even God can fully determine the subjective aim. Thus we must 
go farther than Christian and say that creativity ls the more ultimate source 
of the subject's individuality and dlfferentlatlon. Moreover, creativity 
individuates by negation. Existential individuation ls negation. The actual 
occasion begins to be by being "other-than": other-than its past and other-
than the Ideal received from God. This real relationship to 0 an-other" enters 
into the very constitution of its being. However all ls not meant to be ne-
gation, for what comes to be ls an-other synthesis: the many become...2!1! and 
are increased by .2!!.!.• Now to be one ls to be a definite 2U!.t i.e. to be an 
informed something, and therefore though other, the actual occasion is none 
the less a determinate somethlng---other. 
(7) From (6) it follows that!!!. formal constitution.!.!. unlgue. 1 
(8) .!!!. satisfaction ls uniaue. The goal of the subjective aim is the com-
pletion of the subject in the process of concrescence. This completion ls 
called the ttsatisfactlon" and is that moment or point at which the actual oc-
casion has attained its lndlvldual separation from other things. Therefore 
it ls self-evident that no two subjects can have identical satisfactions; in 
Whitehead's philosophy the very idea ls contradictory.2 
(9) !.! .!.!. unigue .!!. !. superJect. Each subject ls also a superject and there-
fore each actual occasion comes to be a unique datum for future subjects. 
(10) Finally, given (1-9)--and the discussion of the .previous chapter--its fre 
activttx !.! .! unique S?!!.!.• That ls, its free activity of self-causation"""'f"S not 
completely identical with that of any other actual occasion. 
That is to say, although all actual occasions evidence the same meta-
physical principles, the manner in which these are exemplified differs with 
each. If actual occasions exhibit the same metaphysical "structure;'' but they 
differ in the degree of complexity in their process of concrescence and in 
their powers of mentality and so differ in degree from one another. That is, 
although actual occasions may appear to fall into distinct types, 3 in fact upo 
l~, PP• 335-36. 2 ~·· p. 233. 3 !lli.•t P• 168. 
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a closer inspection of their internal make-up they are seen to exemplify iden-
tical princlples. 1 Therefore actual occasions are similar in that none of 
them has anything ln their underlying make-up not had ln some degree by any 
other occasion; they are dissimilar in that each has more-or-less of lt than 
the others. When one actual occasion ls sufficiently more complex, i.e., suf-
flclently exceeds another in its powers of mentality and in the complexity of 
the process of concrescence, ln effect a point, a critical threshold, ls 
crossed. The result is that there emerges an occasion of experience manifest-
ing a new and higher level of actuality not found in the lower occasion. 2 
b) Textual Evidence !!!. Support 2f !!!!.! Interpretation 
3 What follows is a very general outline of Whitehead's classification 
of actual occasions which will attempt to substantiate the above interpreta-
21t seems that this analysis better enables us to understand ~hite­
head' s position on the classification of actual occasions than does the state-
ment by Rorty that each actual entity can be compared to an Aristotelian 
Primary Substance "distinctive in being a species unto itself (resembling, in 
this respect, angels as characterized by lbomas Aquinas)~ No two Whltehe~dlan 
occasions have the same subjective aim (cf. Christian, /An Interpretation/, p. 
310), and thus there ls no distinction in Whitehead between specification and 
individuation.'' ("Matter and Event," p. 505). Though contributing to our under-
standing of Whitehead by placing the discussion within a fairly well known 
philosophical tradition, Rorty•s analysis must be reconciled with Whitehead's 
often repeated insistence that 
(1) all actual entities should exemplifY the same principles, 
(2) that actual occasions and also nexus nust differ only in degree, 
(3) yet some manifest activities not at all evidenced in others. 
3For an analysis of Whitehead's thoughts on "classification'' 
Christian,~ Interpretation, Chapter xii, pp. 221-41 and especially 
Xil i, "Classl fl cation, u pp. 242-56. 
see 
Chapter 
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tion. In Process .!ru!. Reality Whitehead says that the most concrete elements 
in the nature of an actual entity are exhibited by an analysis of its pre-
hensions.l Therefore he discovers a basts for distinguishing various grades 
of actual occasions by analysing the prehensions involved in the subject's 
process of concrescence. The process involves data, feelings, and the stages 
of concrescence; 
the difference between actual occasions arising from the characters of 
their data, and from the narrowness and wldth of their feelings, and from 
the comparitive importance of various stages, enables a classification to 
be made whereb~ these occasions are graded into various types.2 
Whitehead immediately adds, however, that "From the metaphysical 
standpoint these types are not to be sharply discriminated; as a matter of 
empirical observation, the occasions do seem to fall into fairly distinct 
types. 03 Because the process has as its goal the ''one determinate integral 
satisfaction of the subject,"4 an alternative way of summarily stating the 
basis of classification is to differentiate actual occasions "in regards to 
their 'satisfaction,"' which arises out of their ''datum by operations consti-
tuting {their../ 'process. 1115 More specifically, inasmuch as satisfaction are 
l,E!, p. 28. 
2!.!?!S., p. 168. It should be noted that Whitehead offers different 
analyses of actual occasions, as we shall see presently; for example, PR, pp. 
169-70, 227; ~' pp. 121, 127. However, these can with little dlfficu'ity be 
shown to be consistent with the present analysis. 
3fil!., p. 168. 
4see £.li, PP• 38-39, the 25th-27th ''Categories of Explanation." 
5~., PP• 169-70; cf. PP• 129-30. 
classlfled by reference to "trlviallty,u "vagueness," "narrowness," and 
"width," 1 actual occasions can be similarUy graded by reference to these 
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terms. ni.ese two passages are complementary, however, for the data may be 
classlfled as 11trlvial" or "vague"2 and feelings as "narrow" or "wide." 
Neither classlflcatlon has any meaning apart from the process ~ concrescence 
which they entail and which ls itself divided into phases. Whitehead ls here 
attempting to specify how the process of concrescence culminating in a partlc· 
ular level or type of satisfaction arises from two basic sources: (1) extrln-
sicallY from the datum determining in the order of efficient causality and (2) 
intrinsically from the mental pole self-determining in the order of final caus 
allty. As a consequence, actual occasion will be classified from either or 
both perspectives. Before turning to Whitehead's classifications of actual 
l!!?!.2.•t PP• 169-70. 
2rhese four terms (*'trivlallty,'' "vagueness, 0 "narrowness," and 
"width") are used to describe how actual occasions synthesize their data and 
thereby Uliclt the maximum "intensity" of satisfaction. It would therefore 
appear that they cannot be incorporated to classify all actual occasions for 
they seem to eliminate from consideration that extreme actual occasion whose 
datum ls absolutely simple. However this does not appear to be a serious ob-
jection for several reasons. First, given the "principle of relativity" it ls 
difficult to conceive how the datum which makes the actual world of an actual 
occasion can ever be absolutely simple. Cf!, pp. 33, 42). Second, even where 
only one actual occasion ls the initial datum, only aspects of this datum are 
positively prehended, others being negatively prehended. (See, for example, 
f!, pp. 363-64, 337-38.) This means that complexity ls introduced with the 
datum, for the sJbject D1Jst synthesize the subjective forms arising from both 
the positive and negative prehensions. 'nlird, in fact Whitehead speaks of the 
simplest occasions as experiencing a few "sensa" (data). (PR, P• 176, see pp. 
174-76.) Fourth, every actual occasion also prehends God. -CPR, pp. 523-33.) 
Finally, even disregarding the above reasons, the point could"°be made that 
where the data ls the simplest the actual occasion cannot but be the simplest 
grade actuality. 
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occasions and nexus, we should at least summarize his general discussion of 
how differences arise in the data and in the role of mentality. This summary 
will be filled ln when, ln the following chapters, we will analyze the unique-
ness of the data and the role of mentality ln human intellectual conception 
and free choice properly so called. 
(1) Datum: the Extrinsic Source of Classification 
The importance of the datum (in the initial stage of concrescence and 
consequently through<11t the process) is the ironclad d~termlnation which it 
places upon the freedom of the emerging subject. The datum ls one "reason" 
why no actual occasion can be completely free, completely and radically novel. 
Its datum 11both limits and supplies," and "there can be no transgression of 
the limitations of capacity inherent in the datum."1 Whitehead specifies two 
extreme limitations of the data: the data may be 11trivlal" or "vague.'' 
In speaking of "triviality" and '.'vagueness," Whitehead ls attempting 
to further specify the principle of relativity in terms of the mechanics of 
his system. According to this principle, if we allow for degrees of relevance 
and for negligible relevance,it ls necessary to say that every actual entity 
--both past and present (i.e. contemporary)--ls present in every other actual 
entlty. 2 Taken together these entitles ccnstltute the total environment out 
of which the subject emerges. 
However, we must discriminate broadly two layers of this environment: 
the more direct environment providing a massive "systematic" uniformity throu 
lpR, p. 168. 2 ~ •• p. 79. 
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discrimination, contrasts, and dismissals of irrelevant diversities, and the 
snore remote chaotic background where the uniformity ls massive but "trivial" 
and •vague. 11 1 Tri vi all ty and vagueness are important because they express a 
crucial fact about the given data, namely, that though everything ls ultl-
mately glven, some data are more-or-less trivial, that ls incompatible, others 
111<>re-or-less vague, that is faintly discernible individually. In either case, 
the satisfaction of the subject to the extent that it ls dependent upon such 
factors of the data is itself trlvlal and/or vague. 
In its stage of process during which lt ls not fully definite the 
actual entity "determines its own ultimate deflnlteness. 112 It accomplishes 
this by "unifying" or "synthesizing" the data of its prehensions under the 
guidance of its subjective alm and/more remotely in virtue of the activity of 
its mental pole. Whitehead calls the resultant unity of entitles a "contrast.~ 
l!lli,., PP• 171-72: "According to this account, the background ln 
which the environment ls set nust be discriminated into two layers. There ls 
first the relevant background, providing a massive systematic uniformity. This 
background ls the presupposed world to which all ordinary propositions refer. 
Secondly, there ls the more remote chaotic background which has merely an ir-
relevant triviality, so far as concerns direct objectification ln the actual 
entity ln question. This background represents those entitles ln the actual 
world with such perspective remoteness that there ls even a chaos of diverse 
cosmic epochs. In the background there is triviality, vagueness, and massive 
uniformity; ln the foreground discrimination and contrasts, but always negative 
prehenslons of irrelevant dlversl ti es. tt Because triviality and vagueness take 
on significance in terms of a subjects comparisen of various data in its actual 
world, they are important in regard to the category of transnutation. Trans-
mutation ls examined ln the following chapter. 
2~., P• 390. 
3!.lli•, P• 33, 7th "Category of Existency"; and p. 36, 17th "Category 
of Explanat ton'': "That whatever ls a datum for a feeling has a unity !.! .!'..!!!.• 
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The data are "trivial'' when no feeling arising from one factor of the datum 
ls reinforced by any feeling arising from another factor. This occurs when 
the data are experienced as incompatible and when as a consequence the unity 
of contrast is minimal. When this happens the actual occasion does not ''eli-
1 
cit" depth of feeling from contrasts thus presented." Since the data cannot 
be coordinated and synthesized they are dismissed and the higher complexities 
of the process of concrescence cannot be attained. The result ls an actual 
occasion that ls enslaved to the data and whose satisfaction evidences a low-
level of intensity. Such are the simple grade actual occasions: 
'lhe simplest grade of actual occasions nust be conceived as experi-
encing a few sensa, with the mlnl1J11m of patterned contrast. 'lhe sensa 
are then experienced emotJonally, and constitute the specific feelings 
whose intensities sum up into the unity of satisfaction. In such oc-
casions the process ls deficient in its highest phases; the process ls 
the slave to the datum. 'lllere ls the individualizing phase of conformal 
feelings, but the originative phases of supplementary and conceptual feel-
ings are negllglble.2 
''Vagueness" arises from an opposite characteristic of the data. 
Whereas triviality originates because of a lack of coordination and ldentifi-
cation of the data, vagueness is due to excessive coordination and identlflca-
tion. 3 That is to say, where the actual occasions constituting the data are 
very similar, it ls possible that they be expert enced as one, as a t1con-
4 trast." It ls also possible that the many actual occasions be experienced as 
Thus the many components of a complex datum have a unity: this unity ls a 
'contrast' of entities. In a sense this means that there are an endless num-
ber of categories of existence, since the synthesis of entitles into a con-
trast in general produces a new existential type." 
1 !!?.!..!!• , P• 170 2 !!?.!..!!~, p. 176. 
3PR, p. 170; also see pp. 179, 362-63. 4tbid., P• 36; ~' pp. 324-25 
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a ••vague one," not a ''definite one,'' and consequently they become more-or-less 
irrelevant for the process of concrescence: "When there is such vague pre-
hension, the difference between the actual entities so prehended are faint 
chaotic factors in the environment, and have thereby been relegated to ir-
relevance.111 
Whitehead then calls attention to the characteristic of vagueness 
'*1en contrasted with triviality. With the latter, contrast between the ob-
jectified data is minimal because the data "resist" unification whereas with 
the former, contrast ls minimal due to excessive unification. Mentality is 
the agency of simplification and abstraction. Therefore while the lack of 
coordination or simplification manifested in triviality tends to produce a 
tow-grade actuality, i.e., low-grade actual entities, vagueness ts a tendency 
in the opposite direction; vagueness arises from a compatibility among the da 
and therefore is the extrinsic reason why these many data can be experienced 
as if they were one. 2 
To the extent that the data a.tt of which the present experience grows 
are trivial or vague, to that extent they do not directly contribute to--
causally determine--the 11Ubject. This is but one side of the picture, though 
obviously an important one. For after all, not all the data are trivial or 
vague. In the immediate environment are data that are "significant" and "dis-
tinct," that is to say, data which do causally determine the emerging subject 
in the order of efficient causality. 
lpR, P• 170. 2!.2.!E_., PP• 170-71. 
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Recall that physical experience, or, technically, physical prehenslon 
ln the primary phase of concrescence, is an aesthetic experience of emotion 
received as felt in another actual occasion and conformally appropriated as 
8 subjective emotion or passion in the subject. 1 Now ln order for appropria-
tion and conformity of theleast degree of complexity to occur lt ls necessary 
that from the welter of the totality of the given, the subject be able to iso-
late some relevant data wlthln lts immediate environment. It nust be able to 
abstract some ••stgnlflcant" and "distinct" data and thereby ellcit some degree 
of intensity of feeling from the nultiplicity of individual emotions arising 
out of the components in the data. The feelings thus elicited are termed 
"narrow. u2 Inasmuch as the subject ls "reacting-to" the data, the extent of 
the narrowness thus elicited is in part determined by the "givenness" of the 
data. 
The importance of ''vagueness"-as opposed to "triviality"-! s that 
3 lt makes "narrowness" possible. The other condition, Whitehead says, is that 
this common characteristic of the data be intensified. By this he means it 
nust be isolated or abstracted and thereby rendered capable of further con-
tributing to the development of the subject's degree of actuality. 'lllls ls 
what Whitehead means when he says that narrowness of feeling derived from rel-
evant data ls one factor characterizing the grade of intensity of satisfaction 
lfili, P• 246. 2 !.21.s!· ' p. 252. 
3°When there ls such vague prehensions the difference between the 
actual entitles so prehended are faint chaotic factors ln the environment, and 
have thereby been relegated to irrelevance. Thus vagueness is an essential 
condition for the narrowness which ls one condition for depth of relevance. It 
enables a background to contribute its relevant quota, and it enables a social 
group ln the foreground to gain concentrated relevance for its coJllllllnlty of 
character." (PR, p. 171.) 
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and thereby the grade or level of actuality of the actual occasion: "The 
tower organisms have low-grade types of narrowness; the higher organisms have 
1 intensified contrasts in the higher categories." 
Coordinating these intensified contrasts in the supplemental phase of 
concrescence develops "wldth" of feeling, the second factor characterizing the 
intensity of satlsfactlon: 
In a sense thls satlsfactlon ls two-dimensional. It has a dimension of 
narrowness, and a dimension of width. The dimension of narrowness refers 
to the intensities of individual emotions arising out of individual com-
ponents in the datum. In this dimension, the higher levels of coordina-
tion are irrelevant. The dimension of width arises a.at of the higher 
levels of coordination, by which the intensities ln the dlmenslon of nar-
rowness become subordinated to a coordination which depends upon the high 
levels of comparlson.2 
The importance of what Whitehead calls the "wldth of feeling" ls that through 
it the complexity of the universe can enter lnto the process of concrescence 
and thereby ultimately contribute, by way of efflclent causality, to the com-
pletion, the satlsfactlon of the subject. 3 
(2) Mentality: the Intrinsic Source of Classlflcation 
Whereas "trlvlaUty," "vagueness,•• "signlflcance," and ''distinctness'' 
pertain lnltlally to the slvenness of the data--or the environment--"narrow-
ness" and "width" primarily refer to the subjects reactlon-12, the data. Since 
an actual occasion ls a causa !!:!.!,, there ls an lntrlnslc source contributing 
to the speclflcatlon of these feelings. This source ls found in the activity 
ot the mental pole and ls ultimately grounded in the activity of creativity. 
1~., PP• 172, 175. 2,f!, p. 252; also pp. 246-48, 175. 
3Ibld., pp. 127-30, 252-53, 245-48. 
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As an indication of the importance of the role of mentality, let us 
return to Whitehead's discussion of ''triviality." It was noted that the sat-
tsfactlon of an actual occasion is "trivial" when no feelings arising from one 
factor of the datum is reinforced by any feeling arising from another factor. 
Whitehead says that the deciding reason for this lack of reinforcement is that 
"the specific constitution of the actual entity in question ls not such as to 
.,1 
elicit depth of feeling from contrasts thus presented. The datum may be such 
as to hinder reinforcement; for Whitehead too, "you can't make a silk purse 
from a sow's ear.u Nevertheless, the mental pole ls the proximate organ whe 
by the subject determines its own ideal of ltself. 2 Therefore the intrinsic 
source of the extent of the "triviality" ls to be found at the mental pole. 
In other words, this source ls due to the operations of mentality manifested 
by the actual occasion. This ls brought out by examining Whitehead's state-
ments concerning the phases of concrescence leading to satisfaction. 
Whereas the initial phase ls primarily conformal, receptive, and re-
petltlve,3 lnthe second or supplemental phase proximate novelties are felt.4 
llli.E_., p. 170 21.!:?!.2.•t pp. 380, 423. 
3see "The Category of Conceptual Valuation," .fS., pp. 39-40, 367-39, 
379-80. 
411In the second phase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. 
This ls the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective fonns, 
both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrasts, is made_µos-
si ble by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives.1 Lin 
this footnote Whitehead refers the reader to !ll, Chapter ill, section 7.:J 
There is conceptual contrast of physical lncompatibles •••• It ls the category 
by which novelty enters the world; so that even amid stability there ls never 
undifferentiated endurnnc.e. 11 (PR, p. 381.) Cf. f!, p. 40, 5th "Categoreal 
Obligation." 
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subdividing the supplemental phase into two subordinate phases, (Whitehead 
calls them the "aesthetic supplementtt and "intellectual supplement"), 1 
Whitehead says that both of these phases may be trivial. When this occurs the 
entire supplemental phase ls trivial and, as a consequence, satisfaction is 
trivial. Instead of introducing an appreciable degree of novelty by illicit-
ing depths of contrast, the actual occasion does little more than reproduce 
the past and transfer it to the future. 
If both phases are trivial, the whole second phase ls merely the definite 
negation of individual origination; and the process passes passively to 
its satisfaction. The actual entity is then the mere vehicle for the 
transference of inherited constitution of feeling. Its private immediacy 
passes out of the picture.2 
But the mental pole is the intrinsic source of the subject's creative 
energy and therefore the degree of mental activity determines, with the data 
upon which it nust integrate, the complexity of activity in the supplemental 
phases and ultimately the degree of intensity of satisfaction: "The origina-
tive energy of the mental pole constitutes the urge whereby its conceptual 
prehensions adjust and readjust subjective forms and thereby determine the 
3 
specific modes of integration terminating in the •satisfaction."' Low-grade 
mentality 1& therefore the intrinsic source which prevents "reinforcement" of 
the data and which renders some data more "trivial," and other data less 
"trivial" or more "significant." But because of the real interrelatedness of 
reality what is "trivial" for an actual occasion exhibiting a low-grade of 
mentality could be "significant" for a higher-grade actuality, and for the 
lf!., p. 325. 3 ~., p. 436; cf. p. 381. 
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highest grade actual entity, for God, nothing ls ••trivial" all is 0 signifi· 
cant." 
A similar analysis could be given of ''vagueness, 11 and "distinctive-
ness." 'lhe process of unification of the datum, whether the unity be "vague" 
or "distinct," involves a synthesis and, lnaS1111ch as every actual occasion ls 
at least minimally novel, involves a subsequent adjustment of the emergent 
subjective forms. As we have just seen, the process of unlflcatlon and syn-
thesis ls guided by the energy of the mental pole. Moreover, Whitehead de-
fines "narrowness•• and ''width" in terms of intensities of emotion in various 
levels of coordination within the process of concrescence. But again, lnas-
J111ch as the actual entity ls causa .!!:!it the coordination of the entire process 
has an intrinsic source and this ls the originative energy of the mental pole. 
c) .!!!.!. Classification .2! Actual Occasions 
Certainly a more detailed analysis of these extrinsic and lntrlnslc 
sources of classification would be required to fully appreciate the intrica-
cies of Whitehead's analysis. The above summary ls meant to indicate the 
general manner in which Whitehead wishes to classify the various grades of 
actual occasions. In the following chapters this summary will be fully worked 
out when we present a Whlteheadlan analysis of human freedom. The importance 
of noting Whitehead's procedure ls that it wlll better enable us to understand 
how Whitehead can hold what otherwise appears as two conflicting propositions. 
On the one hand he argues that all actual entitles are more-or-less free, i.e. 
that the difference ln their freedom ls one of degree. en the other hand he 
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suggests that some actual occasions, such as those constltuting the luman soul, 
manifest a uniquely higher mode of free activity. As we intend to demon-
strate in nuch greater detail in the following chapters, we think that a so-
lution to these textual difficulties may be found in an analysis of the dif-
ferent degrees in which the environment--including God's role in the entire 
process--and the mental powers are operative in the process of concrescence. 
In this chapter our purpose ls more limited. We are now attempting to clarify 
Whitehead's various classifications of actual entitles as a basis for estab-
llshing man's place in the hierarchy of macroscopic entitles. 
An actual occasion ls the synthesis of both efficient and final 
causes and therefore each source is important, equally so in their own way--
which ls why actual entitles can be analysed from either perspective. When 
classifying actual occasions, however, Whitehead usually emphasizes the role 
of mentality as the basis for comparisons, as can be seen when we turn to some 
texts in Process ,!!!!! Reality, Adventures !?!_ Ideas, and !!!!. Function 2!, Reason. 
In Process ~ Reality Whitehead suggests a fourfold division of 
actual occasions: 
In the actual world we discern four grades of actual occasions, grades 
which are not to be sharply distinguished from each other. First, and 
lowest, th,re are the actual occasions in so-called •empty space•; sec-
ondly, there are the actual occasions which are moments ln the life. 
histories of enduring non-living objects, such as electrons or other prim-
1 tlve organisms; thirdly, there are the actual occasions which are mo-
ments in the life-histories of enduring living objects; f<Xlrthly, there 
are the actual occasions which are moments in the life-histories of en-
during objects with conscious knowledge.l 
lf.!i, P• 269. 
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A few preliminary observations are ln order concerning this classification. 
First, Whitehead ls intent on upholding the principle of the continuity of 
nature. By denying that these grades are sharply distinguished, Whitehead 
wishes to emphasize that they differ in degree rather than in kind. That is, 
composed of similar metaphysical principles, actual occasions will be differ-
entiated on the basts of the degree to which the environment and the powers 
of mentality are operative in their process of concrescence. On the other 
hand, he finds it useful to mark certain points at which one may discern sig-
nificant differences between various types of actual occasions. He even 
goes so far as to say that in fact some activities are manifest only in certai 
types of actual occasions. At certain discernible points in the degree of 
complexity, actual occasions begin to manifest different activities--that ls 
activities not found in "lower•• type occasions. It ls useful to mark these 
points as dividing two classes of actual occasions. As we have suggested, we 
think it is fruitful to interpret Whitehead to mean that at these points a 
"critical threshold" has been crossed. With this crossing there emerges an 
actual occasion evidencing an activity or series of activities presently not 
discernible ln tower type occasions. 
Second, Whitehead's classlflcatlon of actual occasions ls often given 
ln terms of the macroscopic entitles of our direct experience. Now this is no 
surprising, for lnasnuch as the macroscopic entitles are built-up from the 
microscopic, the former may be used to indicate the division of the latter. 
It nust be remembered, however, that here the order of our knowledge ls op-
posite that of reality; in the ontological order it ls because actual entitles 
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fall into these basic divisions that nexus can be so classified. 
Finally, it might be well to emphasize the interpretative character 
of the following classifications. our alm in the remainder of this chapter 
ls to present a summary of Whitehead's classlflcatlon of microscopic and mac-
roscopic entitles that ls both faithful to the texts and sympathetic to the 
spirit and intention of Whitehead's philosophy. Consequently the lnterpreta-
tlon we offer to remove apparent contradictions wlthln the texts--namely, 
\lhltehead's assertion that actual occasions differ !u degree and that never-
theless some activities are discoverable only in certain types of actual en-
titles--ls meant to strengthen, not weaken, Whitehead's position. 
What characterizes the lowest or first grade actual occasions--those 
ln "so called empty spaceH4s their extremely low level mental powers. The 
activity of their mental pole in the supplemental phases of concrescence, 
that ls where the mental pole ls viewed as the source for novel conceptual 
activity, ls at the lowest level. In fact, it ls so low that Whitehead char-
acterizes these first grade occasions as evidencing "suJ>plemental" and "men-
ta1° phases that are "lost in the sense that, so far as our observations go, 
1 
they are negligible... Because the mental pole ls the intrinsic source of 
novelty, these inorganic occasions are more enslaved to the data than free. 
They are 0 merely what the causal past allows them to be."2 
Anticipating our analysis of the "modes of perception" that will fol-
low ln Chapters IV and v, we can at least note here that Whitehead's classlfi-
cation of actual occasions ls explained in terms of the occasion's "percep-
libid., P• 269. 
-
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tive" powers. Like all actual occasions, the lowest grade "perceive" in the 
snode of ••causal efficacy••; 1 that ls to say, they prehend the past causally de· 
terinlning (efficient causality) the present. But for these actual occasions 
perception in the subsequent mode of 0 presentattonal lD111edlacy•• 1 s negligible 
.-lf not totally absent--and because perception in this latter mode ls neg• 
Uglble, "presented duration," 1,e. the experience of one's contemporaries, 
ts also negllglble2-..lf non-existent. 
Actual occasions of the next highest or second grade evidence slg-
nlficantly greater mental powers. For these occasions the data given in 
causal vfflcacy are able to be projected onto a 0 contemporary presented lo-
cus," but we have not yet arrived at the level of clear awareness of the con-
temporary world. Here the 11 feellng" ls like that observed in the lower mo-
ments of human experience, namely of a vague awareness of belonging to a 
world inhabited by contemporary entitles, "The past has been lifted into the 
present, but the vague differentiations in the past have not been transformed 
into any precise differentiation within the present." 3 
Life emerges with the third srade actual occasions,4 but lt ls life 
l.!J?!.2.,, PP• 261-62. 2 ~., P• 269, 3lbld., P• 270. 
4otfflcultles with Whitehead's deflnltlon(s) of life are well known. 
For example, see Johnson, Whitehead's Th!O[X, PP• 53, 185. Johnsen notes that 
Whitehead explicitly affirms that life ls predicated of "societies" and not of 
individual actual occasions (AI, p. 266) and at the same time so defines life 
(t!!,, PP• 205-06) that lndlvid;;;l actual occasions nust surely be said to be 
living. However, this ls only an apparent contradiction, for the passage from 
Af. comes from the chapter entitled 0 The Grouping of Occasions'' which prlmarlly 
deals with nextrs and societies. Whitehead ls there primarily concerned with 
the reality of macroscopic entitles and therefore he ls intent on describing 
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at its lower expressions as in the occasions constitutive of unicellular 
the "life'• of these entities. From this perspective ttlifett ls predicated of 
the J11lltiplicities of actual occasions taken as a unity rather than of the 
members taken individually. However in .t!It PP• 205-06, in!]., esp. P• 21, and 
most notably in E£., p. 156 Whitehead ls speaking from a strictly metaphysical 
perspective and there it is clear that what is really and fully real are 
acbial entitles. Which means that societies are called living only to the ex-
tent that the regnant nextls is (are) constituted by actual occasions each of 
which taken individually ls really living. 
A second difficult ls whether !!l actual entities, and therefore all 
ne~us and societies, are living. Whitehead says that societies are more-or-
less living (£!., p. 157), and therefore does it not follow from what was just 
said that actual occasions are more-or-less llving? More than that, are not 
all societies and all individual occasions living? '!his ls the view of Shahan 
in his Whitehead's Tileory !?!,. Experience. Stressing the tr!: text Shahan inter-
prets Whitehead to mean that .. there is no difference in kind between animate 
and inanimate life•• although there are "many differences in degree ... (p.9.) 
Christian also interprets Whitehead to mean that all actual occasions are 
alive. (~ Interpretation, p. 309.) While there are very good reasons for 
agreeing with the interpretations of Shahan and/or Christian, there ls never-
theless, the difficulty that Whitehead does after all speak as if .2!!}.~ soma 
occasions and societies ought to be properly termed living. Therefore it 
appears that some such distinction as we have noted above could allow the pro-
ponent of a Whiteheadian type analysts to maintain both perspectives without 
contrad\ ct ion. For as Lowe says, Whitehead works out the "relative differences 
between the organic and inorganic in terms of 11 novelty of appetltion, in 
rhythm, and in structural integration ... (Understanding Whitehead, p. 261.) 
Add to this the idea of an "underlying difference in degree'' and of a "cri t-
i cal thresholdtt and one can speak of the newly emergent level or kind of liv-
ing occasions and living societies and ne~s. See hortimer J. Adler's The 
filference g! ~ !.ru! Sh! Difference ll. Makes (New York: Holt, _!iinehar~ and 
Winston, 1967; Cleveland and Ne:!! York: Meridian Books, 1968. LThe pagination 
of these editions is identical./ We have not used Adler's dialectical terms 
11 superflcial difference in kind" for fear of being misunderstood, but primaril 
because Adler's term ttsuperflclal difference in kind" leaves unexamined the 
absolutely fundamenta4 question of whether qualitative differences can be ex-
plained as the outcome of quantitative differences. Of course, lt might be 
objected that this already presupposes that there are qualitative differences 
and this is precisely what Whitehead wishes to deny. On the other hand, even 
Whitehead speaks of activities and actuality evidenced onlx by some and not 
all actual occasions, and, we suppose, the question ls whether this implies 
differences in kind when speaking of the nature of actual occasions. 
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bodies, vegetables and low-grade animals like the jellyfish. What different!-
ates thls class of actual occasions ls that perception ln the mode of "presen-
tational lmnedlacy" ls becoming prec1se1 and consequently the vague feellngs 
of the past are able to be more clearly prehended. Here mentality has reached 
the level of conscious awareness of one's past and contemporary world. With 
presentational lnmedlacy mere sense reception ls being replaced by what ln 
ordinary experience we call "sense perception." The degree at this level of 
actuality wlll ln part depend on the degree to which presentational immediacy 
is operative ln concrescence. 
The fourth grade occasions manifest the rather high degree of men-
tall ty Whl tehead calls 0 conscious judgment" and which we term "intellectual 
conception" in the following chapters. At this level mentality has been 
canalized; 2 it has attained a new and unique level of heightened powers of ab-
stractlon and slmpliflcatlon. At this level there emerges "free conceptual 
functionlngs, whereby blind experience ls analysed by comparison with the lmag 
inative reallzation of mere potentiallty."3 'We have reached the grade of ex-
perience evidenced in the higher manifestations of human conscious life. At 
this highest level of mentality of actual occasions "reason" appears as the 
critical judgment of "free imagination." As we shall see, the self-determlna-
tion of these highest grade actual occasions entails ttfreedom of choice" 
properly so called. 
Slmllar classifications of actual occasions based on the role of men-
tality in the process of concrescence appear in Adventures of Ideas and The ___ .....,....., ....... _ -
1f!,, P• 270. 2 .!.!?!!!•, P• 268. See P• 185. 3 .!.!?!&· , p. 270. 
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Function ~ Reason. In Adventures 2!. Ideas, Whitehead gives a very general 
-
division of the phases of concrescence. In the initial phases the real ante-
cedent world ls given: "This ls the •reality• from which that creative ad-
vance starts. It is the basic fact of the new occasion, with its concor• 
dances and discordances awaiting coordination in the new creature. 111 In the 
intermediate phaseL-~7 of concrescence additional conceptual prehenslons are 
introduced. At this phase the mental pole derives its objective content by 
abstracting from the data given with the physical pole and by the immanence 
of the Divine Lure functioning as the sa.arce of novel possibliities. 2 Whereas 
in the initial phase the subject ls receptive of the ''reality" given by the 
datum at the physical pole, at the final phase mentality has affected the ln-
torductlon of "appearance": 
•appearance• ls the effect of_the activity of the mental pole Ltione prod-
uct of mentality", A!,, P• 27!/, whereby the qualities and coordinations 
of the given physical world undergo transformation. It results from the 
fusion of the ideal with the actual.3 
Again Whitehead proceeds to distinguish various grades of actual occasions 
using the macroscopic world as a basts of reference. 
The''l.ower-grade'' actual occasions, those whlch compose societies of 
inorganic bodies or of ttempty space" are characterized by their strictly con-
formal activl ties: "there ls no t'eason to bell eve that in any important way 
the mental activities depart from functions which are strictly conformal to 
those inherent ln the objective datum of the first phase.'A In other words, 
1 &, p. 269. 
3~., also see p. 332. 
2A!,, p. 270. 
4 !.M.s!.·. p. 217. 
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th• supplemental phase is not sufflclcmtly complex "to allow" higher types 
of actual occasions to emerge. As a consequence, no appreciable novelty ls 
introdUced and there is no effective "appearance. '.I In the higher-grade actual 
occasions such as those 'Which are components in animal life, mentality may so 
coordinate the bodlly organism that a personal society of occasions comes to 
dominate the whole. Mentality has enabled appearance to become effective; 
and in connection with mentaltty lt happens that ln the higher animals con-
sciousness arises in the subjective form.2 Finally, the still higher-grade 
actual occasions that are operative in the higher functions of a man are 
characterized by their even higher level mentall ty. Here ''the higher func-
tionings of mentality are socially stabilized in an organism, .. and "appear-
ance merges into reaUty."3 
But then a caution. Whitehead says that we are apt to think of this 
fusion of appearance and reality as belonging only to the higher grades of 
occasions evidenced ln human beings. Quite the contrary. For, "it ls a 
fusion proceeding throughout nature. It ls the essential mode ln which 
novelty enters into the functlonings of the world."4 This ls to say that low-
grade actual occasions are less novel and less free because the actlvltles 
of their mental pole are highly conformal. The activity of the mental pole 
ln the supplemental phase wherein novelty enters through the entertainment of 
novel eternal objects ls, ln a word, negllglble. Consequently the occasion's 
1 Ibid., P• 271. Underlining ls mine. 2!lli· 
)Ibid. 
-
4lbld., PP• 272-73. 
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measure of novelty and freedom tends to be mlnlmal.1 
At the other end of the spectrum of our present experience stands the 
very high ~~-de actual occasions, such as those which constitute the dominant 
consciousness of the organism called a man. These organisms are said to man-
ifest a very high degree of freedom because the mental poles of their doml-
nant actual occasions are much less tied-down, that ls determined, by their 
past data. For them mentality involves nuch more spontaneity and orlglnatlon 
of decision, much more novelty and freedom, though lt nust be remembered that 
tispontanelty, originality of decision belongs to the essence of each actual 
occasion. "2 
In the Functions 2!_ Reason, Whitehead had presented ITUCh the same 
idea. Reiterating that every actual occasion of experience ls bl-polar, 3 he 
says that mental experience, that ls the activity of the mental pole, ls the 
organ of novelty. 4 Mentality ls the appetitive urge, the emotional agency 
whose goal is the integration of the matter-of-fact definiteness of the past 
wlth the novel definiteness of the present occasion and with occasions which 
lie beyond. 5 In the lowest forms of actual occasions mentality ls "canalized" 
1see Chapter ii of thls dissertation, PP• 102-12. 
2A!_, p. 332. 3FR 32 
-' P• • 
40Mental experience ls the organ of novelty, the urge beyond. It seek 
to vtvlfy the massive physical fact, which ls repetitive, with the novelties 
which beekone 0 (!!,, p. 33.) 
5£!, p. 32. 
6 Ibld., P• 30. 
196, 270. 163-65, 
For the "canallzatlon" of mentality also see .!'.!,, pp. 
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tnto slavish conformity with the past. "It ts merely the appetitton towards, 
or from, whatever tn fact al ready ls. 111 At this level mentality takes the 
form of a blind urge towards a given form of expertence. 2 
'Olis lowest form of slavish conformity pervades all nature. It is rather 
a capacity for mentality, then mentality itself. But lt !.!. mentality. 
In this lowly form it evades no difficulties: it strikes out no new ...ays: 
tt produces no disturbance of the repetitive character of physical fact. 
It can stretch out no arm to save nature from its ultimate decay. It ls 
degraded to being merely one of the actors ln the efflclent causation.3 
Toward the other aid of the spectrum, high•grade actual occasions 
originate where there ls a high-level mentality operative at the mental pole. 
Now the higher levelsaf mentality arise as the outcome of complex integrations 
and reintegrations of the mental and physical poles. As a consequence of the 
higher level of complexity, rather than speaking of "slavish conformity," 
Whitehead says that at this level mentall ty 0 brings novelty into the appeti-
tions of mental experlence. 1.4 When mentality becomes self-regulative, it can 
"canalize•' its own operations by its own judgments. Reason emerges, and with 
higher grades of Reason appear those very high-grade actual occasions that 
come to dominate the society of occasions constituting a human belng.s 
Let us sumnarize the above. In these representative passages from 
Process !DS Reality, Adventures s£_ Ideas and lll!, Functions .2!. Reason, Whitehea 
reasons that although all actual occasions are bl-polar, not all exercise the 
same degree of complex! ty of mental activity. He chooses to distinguish the 
grades of actual occasions on the basis of the degree of mentality and the 
1 fil!., p. 33. 
4 Ibid., P• 34. 
2 !lli·' 
5 ll2.1.st, ; 
P• 32. 
cf. PP• 37-41, 8-10, 26-28. 
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degree of complexity of the process of concrescence. In brief, he persists ln 
_.tntalning that occasions differ "only ln degree" or that "they are not 
sharply dlstlngulshed." On the other hand, Whitehead maintains that they form 
really dlstlnct groups. For example, he says that whereas every actual occa-
slon has the capacity for knowledge and whereas there are gradations ln the 
tntenslty of knowledge, nevertheless knowledge seems negligible apart from a 
"peculalr complexity" ln the constitution of some actual occasions, 1 so that 
only these more complex occasions can be said to know. In our oplnlon, White-
head ls lntlmatlng that knowledge emerges when the internal complex.tty of the 
process of concrescence reaches what amounts to a "critical threshold.'' Dls• 
tlngulshlng living from non-living actual occasions Whitehead says that the 
difference between them ls "only a question of degree; but lt ls a difference 
of degree which makes all the dlfferenca--ln effect, it ls a difference of 
quality. 02 That ls, llving and non-living actual occasions differ lnasuuch as 
a critical threshold, called life, has been crossed. The underlying cause of 
this difference ls due to the living occasions• manifesting a higher degree of 
complexity in thelr process of concrescence and ln their greater powers of 
mental activity. 
Again, Whitehead says that while primitive feelings are found at the 
lower levels of actuality, vlth sense perception ve have passed the Rubicon, 
dlvldlng direct perception from the higher forms of mentallty. 3 Once more he 
says that only some actual occasions are conscla.ts, for consciousness arises 
only ln a late derivative phase of catcrescence involving complex integrations; 
1
,f!, P• 244. 2 !ill•, P• 271. 3 !ill•, P• 173. 
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lt ts a prolongation of the stage of supplementation.1 Finally, while all 
actual occasions experience perception ln the mode of "causal efflcacy,"2 
"presentat tonal lmmedl acy" arises only wt th the retatl vely few higher grade 
occasions that manifest more complex or sophisticated activity of the later 
phases of concrescence; 3 and since "perception in the mode of symbollc refer-
ence" arises from stltl higher phases of experience,4 lt ls characteristic of 
still fewer and still higher grade actual occasions. 
Extending this lnterpretatlon to Whitehead's actual classifications, 
we understand him to mean that on the basts ct our present knowledge we are 
able to discern four great classes of actual occasions in <1lr present cosmlc 
epoch. The degree of mentality and complexity of the process of CCl\crescence 
accounts for the "critical thresholds" at whlch polnt emerges Ufa ln only 
higher grade occasions, sense perception only with still higher occasions, 
intellectual cognltlon only with even hlgher type occasions, etc. These dis-
tlnctlons are tentative in that subsequent research may necessitate ascribing 
sensation or even lntelllgence to all actual occasions. Glven the present 
state of e~lrlcal science and of our knowledge ln general, however, the above 
division holds. 
A final observation. When the above lnterpretatlon is related to the 
1 !2.!J!., P• 250, 251; cf. PP• 409, 245. 2 !.2.!J!., p. 261. 
3Ib1d., PP• 261, 268; cf • .§_, PP• 16, 20-21, 23, 
M. Patter, Whitehead's Philosophy .2! Science (<llicago: 
cago Press, 1960) pp. 14Q-41, 142-43, lnct. n. 42. 
4.f!, P• 255. 
25, 4-5. See Robert 
The University of Chi-
169 
findings of Chapter II, a classification could be made on the basts of the 
degree of "novelty" and "freedom" that would correspond exactly to the above 
classification. Exercising the greatest degree of mentality and complexity 
of concrescence, the highest grade actual occasions are also the least deter-
mined, the most novel, and the most free. So on down through the orders of 
actuality until we reach occasions that are most determined, least novel, and 
least free. 1 
Another interesting and very significant correlation appears. Just 
as all actual occasion exercise mentality, but there are different degrees 
of mental activity, so all occasions exercise freedom, but there are degrees 
of freedom. There comes a point, a critical threshold, when the consequence 
of the great difference In degree causes the emergence of a significantly 
higher and unique level of freedom: all actual occasions are free, but dlf-
ferlng in their powers of mentality in the complexity of their concrescence 
they exercise different levels of freedom. 
Before lnvestlgatlng the klnd(s) of freedom peC\.tllar to the actual oe-
caslons constituting a human being it wUl be necessary to conclude this 
chapter by locating man's position In the hierarchy of macroscopic entitles. 
-
'Ihls will involve first completing classlficatlon of nexus begun earlier. 
c. the Classification of Nexus 
- ------
1. Introduction: Wider and Narrower Nexus 
The lnltlal classification of nexus baaed on the "nutual immanence" of 
1 For example, see .tr!., pp. 38-39, ~. p. 62. 
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actual occasions isolated three types of nexus: purely spatial, purely 
temporal, and the four-dlmenslonal spatial-temporal nexus exempllfled ln the 
objects of ordinary sense experience. Actually thls classification ls incom-
plete from two directions, for ~itehead speaks of both wider and narrower 
"societies." Nature, he says, ls to be conceived as a ''series of soeletles of 
increasing wldth of prevalence, the more special societies belng included in 
the wider socletles. 111 <Alr place within Nature, what Whitehead calls our pre-
-sent "cosmic epoch,'' finds lts expression in these three types of nexus and ls 
called the "electromagnetic soclety. 11 2 The "electromagnetic society" is a 
speclflcatlon of a still more general "geometrical society" which lt presup-
poses. 3 
Other m.tltl-dlmenslonal systems besides our awn 4-dlmenstonal system(s) 
are conceivable within thls 0 geometrlcal society," such as those having 5, 6, 
7 ••• Xn dlmenslons4 for space and time express but specific ways in whlch ex-
tension ls evidenced by the entitles of our experlence. 5 The point ls that 
neither space nor time nor their combination exhaust the klnds of extensive 
connection cmcelvable ln the universe. There 1 s no valid reason for perma-
nently restricting our conceptions to these 4-dlmenslons. Nor need we restri 
them to "dlmen.alonallty" at all. The widest or mst general "society" pre-
1£!, p. 141. 2tbld. t P• 139, 141. 
3Ibld., PP• 148-49. 4Ibid., PP• 14C, 442. 
51.!?!J!.., P• 442: " •••• the extensiveness of sp~~~ ls re311y the spa-
tlalization of extension; and the extensiveness of the time ls really the tem-
poraUzation of extension. u Cf. PP• 9.5, 105. 
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-tty conceivable and the "society" presupposed in the "geometrical society," S••• . 
and therefore in our "electromagnetic society," is the "society" of pure ex-
tensiveness, what Whitehead calls at times the "extensive continuum • .,l Very 
l.f!, pp. 147-48. It appears that ln .!'..!.Whitehead ls involved in a 
terminological difficulty, if not a substantive one. It ls puzzllng that Whit 
head would call the extensive continuum a society at all. For, purely spatial 
ne~s are ultimately specifications of the continuum of mere "extensive con-
nection" and yet they are_not societies. But if the extensive continuum ls a 
society, either these nexus do not specify it, i.e., they are outside of it, 
or they do, ln which case they are societies. The point ls that .!,OCleties are 
technically defined ln terms of order, whereas purely spatial nexus are "cha-
ottc. tt (.f!, P• 112.) No, lt would appear that because the extensive contin-
uum refers to those coIU\ectlons manifest by all actual occasions, past, pre-
sent, and future and thereby establishes the general but real possibility for 
there being one common world (!:,!i, pp. 95-126, and esp. pp. 103, 112, and 442) 
this contlruum ought not to be referred to as a "society." Again, "society" 
refers to one kind of nexus, which means that societies are further speclfica-
tlons of the ldea of a nexus. A similar objection could be made to calling th 
"geometrical society" a society. 
On the other hand, it c<11ld be argued that a purely spatial nexus can 
only exist as a member of a ttsoclety," that ts, only within a temporally 
spread series of actual occasions. Indeed, this ls implied by Whitehead, for 
every actual occasion originates with its physical pole, i.e., with lts past. 
Therefore while a nexus can be purely spatial from one perspective, namely, 
when considering its member actual occasions as existing contemporarlly, never 
theless every occasion wlthln that nexus ls also temporally situated: it has 
grown from its past. From this latter perspective every nexus ls ultimately 
temporally spread. Furthermore, this ls consistent with Whitehead's deflnl-
tlon of an actual occasion as a "temporal actual entity. •1 An actual occasion 
cannot be separated from its past or its future. Consequently contemporaries, 
i.e., spatially spread occasions, are perceived "lndlrectly." 
In the Adventures of Ideas Whitehead seems to have removed this source 
of possible confusl on. There he says that the "general common function ex-
hlbl ted by any group of actual occasion ls that of mtual immanence," andthat 
"the groop considered merely in respect to this baste property ls called a 
nexus." (P. 258). Given these considerations perhaps the extensive continuum 
ought not be considered as a society nor even as a nexus. More than that, per 
haps lt should be thought of as the mere real possibility tor the nutual im-
manence of any actual occasion. In itself the continuum ls not a nexus and 
still less a society. Rather it ls no more and no less than the very posslbll 
lty for there being societies and nexiis. 
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generally thenl the "extensive continuum" ls the most general "society"; the 
inore special society within this society of pure extension ls the ttgeC1Detrl-
cal society": within this society are the still more special societies, one 
of which is our own ''electromagnetic society" containing spatially and/or 
-temporally spread nexus. 
Now the physical world of our more direct experience exhibits a be-
wildering complexity of still more special or narrow societies, such as ln• 
dividual electrons and protons, molecules, societies of molecules forming 
organic and inorganic bodies, and societies of cells such as those constitut• 
ing vegetables, animal bodies, and men. 2 It ls these n.Ws which must now 
be classified Whitehead admits that any such further division of nexus ls 
3 largely conjectural, and yet it nust be attempted on the basis of the present 
state of our knowledge. 
2. 'lbe Nexus of OJr More Direct Experience 
The most extensive classification of the grades of nexU's appears in 
Process !ru!, Reality and in a grwp of lectures published as .!!!.! Modes 2l_ 
Thought. 'lbe summary that follows will be based primarily on the material pre 
sented in these two works. Whitehead's technical discussion occurs, as to be 
expected, in Process !ru!, Reality and ls somewhat developed and even modified 
lsee Donald Sherburne, ! Kex, pp. 223-24 for a slightly expanded di· 
vlslon of these societies. 
2_!!!, P• 150. 
3tbld., P• 147; see for example, PP• 157, 158, 164; cf. ~. p. 215, 
"lmmortallty,"§X, PhUosophX 2l_ Whitehead, ed. by SchUpp, PP• 690-91. 
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ln the .Adventures .2! Ideas. The first classification of nexus ls given on the 
basls of "order" (and its correlative opposite *'chaos"). What dlstlngulshes 
••societies'' from non-social nexus ls that the former exhibit a genetic propo-
gatlon of order.1 A society ls thus a nexus of actual occasions which are 
ordered among themselves. 2 Whitehead gives the following definition of "so-
-
clal order": 
A nexus enjoys •social order• where (i) there ls a common element 
of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual 
entitles, and (11) this common element of form arises in each member of 
the nexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehen-
slons of some other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions 
impose that condition of reproduction by reason of that common form. 
Such a nexus ls called a •soc1e5y,• and the common form is the 'defining 
characteristic' of the society. 
The common element of form exemplified in each member of the nexus ls 
4 
a complex eternal object. The notion of ''genetic derlvation°-alternatlvlllly 
called "genetic relations" or "genetic propagation" of the members of the nelU 
expressed by (it) ts the key to dlsttngulshlng societies from non-social nexus 
It points to the fact that the complex eternal object inherited by an actual 
occasion ls derived from its antecedent occasion ln an act of prehension.s In 
l &, PP• l6Q.61. 2 .f!, P• 136. 
3!!!.!!!., PP• 50-51. A slightly modified version of this deflnltlon 
appears in &, p. 261. 
4
.!;!, P• 51. 
5
.!;!, p. 51: "The production of the common form throughout the nexus 
ls due to the genetic relations of the members of the nexus among each other, 
and to the additional fact that genetic relations include feelings of the com-
mon form. Thus the deflnlng characteristic ls inherited throughout the nexus, 
each member derlvlng lt from those other members of the nexus which are ante-
cedent to lts own concrescence." See pp. 137, 334-35. 
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the language of causality, the past occasion ls the efficient cause initially 
determining the ingression of the complex eternal object. 
Here we have, then, an instance of the two-way functioning of an 
eternal object: the eternal object relates the past with the present and 
thereby functions as the ground for the solidarity of the universe. lbe past 
actual occasion is objectified in the present~ the ingression of the com-
plex eternal object in both occasions. Contemporary occasions cannot of 
themselves form societies precisely because they are not genetically con-
1 
nected. Thus while contemporaries may exhibit the same complex eternal ob· 
ject as their defining characteristic, lnasuuch as the contemporary actual 
occasions are causally independent no occasion derlvest:he characterlstlc from 
any of its contemporaries. It follows that whereas all societies are nexus 
only some nexus are societies: non-social nexus are built-up of contemporary 
occasions spatially extended or mediately interrelated, while societies are 
-nexus made up of at least some non-contemporary occasions causally and there-
fore temporally extended or innediately interrelated. 
Having distinguished social and non-social nexus, Whitehead proceeds 
to further specify the basic kinds of societies ln terms of the particular 
type of order evidenced by their members. Ideally the least complex type of 
society would be a physical object having but one strand of actual occasions 
2 
exhlbltlng purely temporal succession. 'lhls ls obviously one of the limiting 
types of nexus previously mentioned as exemplifying the baste kinds of imma-
nence: a purely temporal spread nexus. Whitehead calls such a society an 
l ~' P• 262. 2Ibid. 9 P• 263; £!, P• 52. 
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••enduring object" or "enduring creature•• and says that it ls a society nwhose 
1 
social order has taken the special form of •personal order.'" Now a nexus 
enjoys personal order when 11 (G\) lt ls a •society,• and (f>) when the genetic 
relatedness of lts members orders these members •serially'" so that "the 
2 
nexus forms a single line of Inheritance of its defining characteristic. tt 
Consequently a "persontt ls a society whose members are temporally 
3 . 
spread. A primary example of a personal society ls a man defined as a suc-
4 
cession of occasions of experience. Thls example ls slngularlly mlsleadlng 
however, as Whitehead well knows. It may lead to the idea that to be a person 
the society nust at least be alive and conscious. This ls to misconceive 
Whitehead's technical meaning. First, the deflnltlon of a personal society 
ls not sufflclent to define man, for it has neglected to include man's body 
vhlch is itself a society composed of a swirling complex of super-sophlsticat 
societles. 5 Second, the definition is applied to a living person and there-
fore neglects the extreme generality of the notion of an enduring object. 
Whitehead maintains that enduring objects may or may not form living material 
bodles--an electron constituted by the route of lts electronic occasions being 
an example of a non-living person. 6 The primary example of a personal society 
lf!, P• 50. 2~ •• p. 51. 
3&, P• 263: "Societies of the general type 9 that their realized 
nexus are purely temporal and continuous, will be termed a •person.'" 
p. 263. 265; £!, pp. 137-38, 141-42. 
PP• 263-64. 
P• 141; cf. PP• 139-40. 
1 
wauld be, in fact, something like a stone. 
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lblrd, conversely, not all llvlng socletles are persons, that ls, som 
do not sustain a personal society. For example, Whitehead says that there ls 
no reason for conjecturing living personality in the case of single cells, 
vegetables, and the lower forms of animal llfe. 2 Fourth, the very use of the 
vord "person" ls apt to cause confusion. Consequently Whitehead immediately 
adds (l} that thls use of the word does not necessarily imply consciousness 
--some personal societies are not conscious; (2) he ls using only one of the 
meanings of the Latin word persona, namely, the idea associated vlth sustain-
ing a character; and (3) that ttthls sustanence arlses out of the special 
genetic relations among members of the nexus."3 
The ordinary objects of our experience are not simple enduring object 
Rather they are complex societies made up of subordinate societies and/or sub-
ordinate nexus exhlbitlng definite patterns of structural lnterrelatlons. 
lbese macroscopic wholes made up of macroscopic parts are generically ctassi-
4 fled as ''structured societies." One species of structured society ls termed 
a ttcorpuscular society." A corpuscular society ls one whose member subordi-
nate societies are all strands of enduring objects. A molecule composed of 
strands of electrons, protons, etc. ls such a "corpuscular society.'' lbese 
socletles may be more or less corpuscular "according to the relative impor-
PP• 51-52; ~' P• 64. 2 ~., P• 164; 158; cf. ~, P• 264. 
3pR, P• 52 
4Ibld., PP• 151, 157. 
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tance of the defining characteristics of the various enduring objects com-
pared to that of the defining characteristic of the whole corpuscular nexus. nl 
Taken together enduring societies and corpuscular societies are "the perma-
nent entitles which enjoy adventures of change throughout time and space 0 and 
which" form the subject matter of the science of dynamics. 02 It ls apparent 
that whereas enduring objects are, of themselves, temporally spread, corpuscu-
1ar societies are both temporally and spatially spread, or four-dimensional. 
The spatial dimension of these latter societies derives from the m.altiplicity 
of the strands of the member enduring societies. At any one instant in time 
the material body ls composed of many strands of enduring objects. 
The molecule ls a relatively simple structured society. Crystals, 
rocks, and similar bodies are more complex to the extent that they are com-
posed of many and often differing kinds of molecules grouped in varying de-
grees of complexity. So on up to and including planets and suns which, due 
to their mere size and the variety of their material parts, are vastly ll'Ore 
complex kinds of structured soc1eti es. Though varying in degrees of complexlt 
suns, planets, rocks, crystals, molecules--and, Whitehead conjectures, probably 
even electrons and protons--are all societies of one basic type; they are in-
organic material bodies "belonging to the lowest grade of structured societies 
3 
which are obvious to our gross apprehensions." 
In order to explain what ls coillDOn to these relatively low-grade 
li2!S•, P• 52. 2 ~., PP• 52, 152. 
3Ibld., P• 155; seep. 152 where Whitehead lists electrons and protons 
as probable structured societies. 
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societies and what lt ls that sets them off as a specific class of material 
non-living entitles, Whitehead introduces the notion of an ''unspecialized 
society. 11 He recalls that every society mst be considered within its en-
vironment of wider socleties. 1 It DUst conform to the pattern supplied by 
thl s environment. It must conform to the extent that the environment allows 
the emergence of this society, and it nust conform in that "ln proportion to 
tts importance, this background nust contribute those general characters 
which the more special character of the society presupposes for its members. 112 
Whitehead then proceeds to differentiate between specialized and 
unspecialized socletles on the basts of the degree of stablllty of the society 
in rel at ion to changes ln l ts environment. A society ls an enduring entl ty 
and therefore Whitehead ls attempting to explain how lt ls that societies 
survive changes ln their environment. Now no society ls totally stable or 
totally unstable, and so it ls again a question of degree. Societies are sta-
ble in respect to a changing environment when they can persist throughout that 
particular type of change; they are unstable when they cannot. 3 A complex 
society ls "speclallzed" to the extent that lts survival depends upon the en-
vlronment retaining ttcertain features," namely, those special features re-
quired for survlva1.4 
Whitehead's point appears to be that because the society ls highly com 
plex, that is specialized, its very complexity tends to prevent it from easily 
adapting to changes ln the environment. 5 Take for example human beings. Here 
1 !lli.•t p. 153. 
4rbtd. 
-
2Ibld., P• 138. 
5 Ibid,, PP• 153-54. 
3 
.ilUS•, P• 153. 
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ye have the most complex society of which ve are aware; but man pays the price 
by being the kind of thing that ls extremely sensitive to relatively small 
changes in temperature, ln atmospheric pressure, in acceleration, etc. In 
fact, man has a relatively short Ufa span. "Unspecialized societies," on 
the other hand, can persist even "thr0ugh important changes ln their environ .. 
t "1 JD8n • But they accomplish this feat by tending to be relatively simple. 
thus whereas the life span of a man ls measured ln decades, that of the ordl-
nary "lowly" rock ts measured ln hundreds of millions of years. Yet each 
survive in their om way, given what they are. Basically, then, what char .. 
acterlzes low-level structured societies, be they :molecules or planets and 
suns, ls that they are relatively unspecialized and therefore they tend to 
encllre for very long periods of time. 2 
An initial explanation of how unspecialized societies can survive 
changes in their environment ls that the defining characteristic of these ma-
terlal bodies is "flexible" or general enough to allow the society to adapt 
to the special circumstances of the moment.3 Whitehead further explains this 
"flexibility" in terms of the process of concrescence of the actual occasions 
making-up these societies. Due to enhancemept g! ~ mental pole, the actual 
occasions within these low-grade societies can elicit "a massive average ob-
jectlflcatlon of a nexus, while eliminating the detailed diversities of the 
lill!!• t P• 153. 2Ibld., P• 154. 
-
3tbid., P• 153: tttn general the defining characteristic of a society 
will not Include any particular determination of structural pattern. By rea-
son of this flexibility of structural pattern, the society can adopt that 
special pattern adapted to the circumstances of the moment." 
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vadot.t• members of the nexus in questlon."1 As we shall see ln the following 
chapter, thla will involve the category of transmtatlon. Whitehead Mk•• 
tt clear, however, that he ls talking about a rather low level of mental act 
ltY• At thts level, mentallty ls operatln1 in accordance with the Cate1ory 
of Conceptual Valuation (4th Cateaoreal Obliption)2-as well as with Cat•• 
goreal <J>llgatlona 1·3 and 7.9. 
'l'hls la, to be sure, "the first grade of ascent beyond the mare repro• 
ctuctlve stage 'Which employs nothing more than the Category of Conceptual Re• 
production (l.e., Categoreal ObUgatlon IV)."3 But lnaS11&ch as Conceptual 
Reveralm (5th Categoreal ObUgation) ls mlnlmal or totally lacking in the pro 
cess of concrescence, the emerging actual occasions forming the nexua are to 
that extent bound to reproduce or repeat their past. 4 Granted there will be 
novelty, in that the mental pole has taken the lnitlative in "integrating" the 
many diverse conceptual prehenalona into one unlfled nexus. through neaatlve 
prehenslona, lt has ellmlnated the dlveralttes ad abstracted the COJllDOll d•· 
flnlng charaoterlstlcs. But without conceptual reversion, there cannot be that 
further mental actlvlty 'Whereby orlglnal conceptual prehenalons introduce addl 
tlonal novel eternal objects for lngresslon. 5 To the extent that conceptual 
reversion la unimportant, the compl•ltles of the environment cannot be 
matched by the complextttes in the process of cmcrescence. To thla extent 
novelty and freedom are minimal. 'l'hls ls one of the ways vhlch Nature solves 
1 Ibld., P• 154 2 Ibld., PP• 154-55. 
31!U.sl•t P• 155. 4Ibld. 1 PP• 384-86. 
5tbld., P• 1551 cf. PP• 384-86. 
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problem of survival, of producing "societies which are •structured' with a 
hlsh degree of •complexity,• and which are at the same time •unspeclallzed. •111 
This ts the way of that group of very low level organisms classified as in· 
organic material bodies: Nature has produced organisms of maximal endurance 
coupled with minlmal--relatively speaktng-.complexlty, minimal novelty, and 
minimal freedom. 
The other way Nature has of sol vlng the problem of survival ls by the 
evolution of societies of actual occasions for which lnltlatlve and original-
ity in conceptuAl prehenslon ls Important. Rather than eliminating diverse 
details of the environment In negative judgments and thereby merely abstract• 
ing massive average objectifications, this other way Involves the higher ac-
tlvlties of mentality. As Whitehead says, 
The purpose of this lnltlatlve ls to receive the novel elements of the 
environment Into explicit feelings with such subjective forms as con-
ciliate them with the canplex experience proper to members of the struc-
tured society. Thus ln each concrescent occasion its subjective aim 
orlglnates novelty to match the novelty of the environment.2 
In terms of the process of concrescence, the "hlgher actlvltles of 
mentality" involve the addltlonal mental activity technically called "con-
ceptual revers! on." Thus whereas ln the former mode endurance (of the so-
clety) 1s accomplished •twlthout reversion" lt ls precisely in accordance with 
the additional 5th Categoreal Obligation and the subsequent more complex or 
specialized mental actlvltles that may accompany lt that the higher forms of 
societies come to be and to survive. 
1!,lli., P• 154. 
2p!a. p. 155. Also see ~. Chapter xlll, esp. PP• 288-91, 294-300. 
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On the basts of the role of mentality in the process of concrescence, 
Whitehead proceeds to deflne and distlngulsh the various kinds of structured 
societies. Llvlng or organic societies are structured socletles ln which the 
latter mode of solving the problem of survival ls important while non-living 
or inorganic societies are those for which the former mode of survival ls im-
portant and the latter ls unlmportant. 1 
The same basis ls further used to distinguish the grades of organic 
societies. Just as there are various levels of inorganic socletles, so there 
are levels of Uving structured societies. The lower living organisms are 
those for which conceptual inltiatlve amounts to "thoughtless adjustment of 
aesthetic emphasis in obedience to an ideal of harmony. "2 The single Uvlng 
cell ls an extreme instance of this low grade organism. What are called veg-
etables and the lower forms of animal life emerge as more sophisticated 
structured societies made-up of groups of cells combined in varying degrees 
of complexity. The difference between lower and higher vegetables, between 
higher vegetables and lower animals, and between lower and higher animals ls 
similarlly explained in terms of the degree of mentality and complexity of 
the process of concrescence evidenced by the actual occasions constituting the 
regnant society. When we come to the still higher grade organisms, the pro-
cess of conceptual initiative has reached the stage of complexity that amounts 
to thinking about diverse exper1ence; 3 these latter high-grade organisms are 
l !!!· p. 156. 2 !lli.• , P• 155. 
3lbld. 
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called men. Before turning to examine the structure of these latter high-
grade tthumantt actual occasions, it will be useful to complete this discussion 
of the classification of nexus. 
3. Whitehead's Actual Classification of Nexus 
In order to do so it will be necessary to turn to those passages where 
Whitehead actually classifies societies into various grades. 'lbe important 
texts of Process !!l!t Reality where Whitehead ls relating the classification 
of nexus on the basis of their member actual occasions has already been noted 
and comented upon. 1 In addition, there are many passages in Modes !l!. Thougbt 
where one will find a somewhat different classification. Actually several 
classifications of societies occur in Modes !?!_ Thought. 
In the Modes g£, Thought, Whitehead explicitly appeals to the grades of 
mentality of individual actual occasions to distinguish the grades of macro-
scopic entities. 2 He lists three levels: (1) the inorganic occasions studied 
by the physicist and chemist that evidence an extremely low level of mentality: 
••mentall ty 1s merely latent in all these occasions thus studied; (2) higher 
forms of life that exhibit a variety of significantly greater powers of men-
tality; and (3) the higher animals and man where there ls "clear evidence of 
mentaU ty habl tually effect! ve. •• 
Now a nexus ls derivative in actuality and therefore the degree of 
mentality of the macroscopic entity ls determined by the degree of mentality 
llbid., PP• 269-70. See above: this chapter pp. 157-62 and 166-69. 
2!!!. pp. 230-31. 
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of the actual occasions constituting the nexus. A society can be said to evi-
dence a high degree of mentality when acme of its member lndividlal compcnent 
occasions do. For example, a society is called "ll vlng" when it includes "ltv-
- .7 1 illl Lactuaw occasions as I ta dominant components." 
Another Important claaslflcatlon given ln these 1933 lectures Uata 
2 
slx types of occurances ln nature1 (l) luan exlatence, body and mind; (2) all 
sorts of ani•l Ufa, insects, the vertebrates, and other genera; (3) all veg-
etable life; (4) single living cells; (5) all large scale Inorganic aggregates, 
on a scale comparable to the size of animl bodies, or larger; and (6) all 
those lnflniteslmlly small types characteristic of the subject mtter of 
modem physics. 
In a group of lectures deUvered ln 1937-1938 and pubUshed as Quip. 
ters I·Vl of the Modes .2f. 1.bg.wht, Whitehead writes of the four types of "•1• 
gregatlons of actualities" presently found ln our experience. 3 'Ihese are 
(1) the Inorganic, (2) vegetative, (3) animal, and (4) the human grade of an• 
lmal Ufe. Again, 4 as wlth the previous text, 5 Whitehead cautions against set-
entlflc precision when considering this cpeatlon philosophically; the grades 
of nexU's are not to be sharply dlstlngulshed 1 which ls what enables Whitehead 
to present these somewhat diver1ent classifications. For, just as the division 
between Uvlng and non-Uvlng entitles 1 s not as clear cut as was previously 
1.f!, P• 156. 
3llJ.4.' pp. 38-39. 
5see }!!1 PP• 214-15. 
2!!£, PP• 214-15. 
4 !.!!!!l•t PP• 37-38. 
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' 
thought,l so also the distinction between vegetable and animal is not so sharp;' 
and there ls every gradlation of transition between animals and men. 3 'lbere-
fore given the context of the lectures Whitehead presents now one, now another 
classification; lt ls apparent, however, that these classifications are com-
pllmentary rather than contradictory and that by them Whitehead wishes to main• 
taln that the entitles so classified are ln an important sense different ln 
degree. 
In addition to the above, there ls the very general classification 
4 
of macroscopic entitles given in Process and Reality. As we have seen, White-
head speaks of the macroscopic universe as an unimaginable complexus of nexus 
and soclettes. He contends that it ls possible to discern the following types 
of macroscopic entl ties: the "society" of extensive contiruum; the geometrical 
"society"; and the electromagnetic "society" forming our present cosmic epoch. 5 
Wlthln this latter society are to be found the more special one, three, and 
four dimensional n..,N"s and societies that together form Nature. 6 
The macroscopic entitles of Nature may be further classified on the 
basis of their component actual occasions from which they are built up. As 
we observed when following Whitehead's classiflcatlon of actual occasials, lt 
ls possible to discern four great dlvtstons of actuality. 'lbus macroscopic en-
titles may be slmllarily classified. 'lbe lowest level of macroscopic entitles 
are the inorganic objects of greater or lesser complexity such as sub-atomic 
l~., P• 204. 
4E!,, pp. 147-67. 
2 
,W_s!.' P• 34. 
5 
.!..!!!!! • , P• 1 39 • 
3 ~., PP• 37, 141. 
6Ibld., p. 141 • 
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partlctes and lnoludtng t~ lowest grade unapectatlzed structured soelettes 
1fhlch are obvlous to our direct apprehenston. suoh as crystal•, rock•• planets, 
1 
end suns• These aocletles are more-or-less complex, but they do evidence 
negligible powers of aentallty. The first tvo grades of actual occastons2 
form the component members of these macroscoptc object•• Th9 !l!S, b&&b••~ 
l!V•l of endurlns objects are the lower grade Uvtng organ.las such as single 
uvtng cells, and vegetables. These low-grade speclallzed aootettes charact• 
erlz• a stgnlftcantly greater type of novel activity called life. Th• "res• 
nant" or dominant nexus wtthln thls Uvlng structured society ts composed of 
the third grade of actual occasions. the Jihlfd ~ of Mcroacoplc anttty 
ar• even DIOl'e speclaUzed and comptecc. Here the regnant n.ais ls composed 
of the fourth grade of actual oocaslona. We have arrived at the level of avare • 
ness found tn atmal 1 lfe. thla great dlvtston Includes all the anl•l• tnas-
8.lch as they exerctae aome degrM of conactous aware.nus, ln short, ao• degree 
of sense perception. FlnaUy, Whitehead dlatlngulshea huaan betnsa aa a fouE,Sh 
met, as far as we knov, final grad• of macroacoptc entity. A lllAft ta an ex• 
tremety complex structured society whose dominant act:Uat oceastcns take th• 
special unique form of a unique personal soul. Aa we shall see in the follow-
ing chapters, ln man the bid for novelty which ts the essence of life ts 
eoupted wlth intellectual consciousness. 
On the one hand, Whitehead cont81ds that these macroscopic entitles 
differ only ln degree. On the other hand, he also lntlmat• that th••• entltlet 
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can be grouped and that these groups slgnlfy nexus that also dlffer quallta-
tlvely lnasnuch as thelr members manifest new and unique levels of actuality, 
of actlvlty. For example, malntalnlng that the dlstlnction between man and 
the animals "ls in one sense only a difference ln degree,"1 Whitehead adds 
that the "extent of the degree makes all the dl fference. The Rubicon has been 
crossed."2 In another passage he says that although the difference between 
111en and the other animals "ls not absolute, " 3 It ls also true that "when all 
analogies between animal life and human nature have been stressed, there ~-
4 mains~~ e.e. ln respect to the influence of reflective experience •••• " 
It ls thls difference ln reflective experience that enables Whitehead 
to say that while animals enjoy structure (beavers build dams, birds build 
nests, etc), man "understands structurett; for man can abstract the principles 
5 in the facts and can lmaglne alternative possibilities. Whlle animals know 
6 bodies fall, men formulate laws of falling bodies. But to understand in terms 
of principles ls to begin to possess what have come to be called science and/o 
philosophy, and therefore Whitehead consistently adds that so far as we know 
*'Science and Phllosophy belong to men alone."7 Also, Whitehead acknowledges 
l?;g_, p. 38. 2~., Underllnlng ls mine. 
4!.!?.!il•t p. 141. Underlining ls mine. 
6 !!_, pp. 179-80. 
3Ibld., pp.140-41. 
5 
.!.!?!J:!., pp. 104-05. 
7~ •• P• 179; see£!., p. 65: Speaking of speculative Reason whose 
function ls to ''pierce into the general reasons beyond llmlted reasons, to 
understand all methods as coordinated ln a nature of things only to be grasped 
by transcending all methods," Whitehead adds that "what distinguishes men from 
the animals, some humans from other humans, ls the tncluslon in their natures, 
waveringly and dimly, of a disturbing element, which ls the flight after the 
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1 that only men enjoy civilieatlon. Finally, what ls perhaps at the basis of 
Jll,lch of these differences between man and non-humans, ls the fact that only 
2 
11111n has language. 
4. Summary Interpretation of this Classlflcatlon 
The above section can now be sunmarlzed and interpreted as follows. 
Whitehead malntalns both that all societies differ from one another only ln 
degree and also that they fall into broad classes which can be hierarchically 
ordered. The fCllr main classes of societies seem to be human, animals other 
Sh!ll!!!!!l• plants,~ !!.2n•llvlng entitles. This writers lnterpretatlon of 
these texts should now be somewhat obviC11s. A strong argument can be made for 
interpreting Whitehead to mean that upon the basls of our present scientific 
knowledge we can maintain that with the emergence of man a critical threshold 
has been crossed so that lt ls possible to speak of man's unique activities 
such as intellectual abstraction and human freedom and moral responslblllty 
properly so called. It ls probable--agaln given the present status of our 
knowledge of the facts--that the other three classes of societies can be sim-
llarlly differentiated. Wlthln these classes, however, lndlvlduals dlffer 
from each other only in degree, l.e., their differences do not amount to cross 
lng a critical threshold. 
unattainable. This element ls that touch of lnflnlty which has goaded races 
onward, sometimes to their destruction." 
PP• 4-5; also see PP• 162-64; ~. p. 62. 
PP• 44-57; also see~' Chapter 111, pp. 60-88. 
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Furthermore, the "reason" for these differences on the macroscopic 
ievel ts to be found in the differences on the microscopic level. Men differ 
from animals and all the other kinds of societies, because some of the actual 
occasions that constitute and dominate the super-complex society that ls a man 
are slmllarlly different from those that constitute and dominate other socle-
-ties, and so on down through the grades of societies and nexus. This inter-
pretation ls consistent with the Ontological Principle and with Whitehead's 
insistence that the being of a nexus ls derivative from the being of its mem-
ber actual occasions. Precisely because they are derivative, the freedom man-
lfested by macroscopic organisms ls "built-up" from the freedom of their mem-
ber actual entitles. Here too, one can differentiate the kinds of freedom 
manifest by macroscopic organisms on the basis of the kinds of freedom evi-
denced by the member actual entitles, and this differentiation exactly corre-
sponds to the above classifications: all actual occasions are free, but dif· 
fering in degree across discernible critical thresholds they exercise a unique 
ly higher level of freedom. Consequently, the human person will be found to 
exercise a higher and unique kind of freedom. 
To point out man's place at the top of a hierarchy of macroscopic 
organisms ls not to have fully shown how Whitehead intends to explain the 
nature of his uniqueness. Yet such an explanation in terms of his microscopic 
composition ls required in order to specify precisely the uniqueness of human 
freedom. The following chapters will be addressed to clarifying Whitehead's 
position concerning the nature of man and the place of human freedom in the 
macroscopic scheme. 
CHAPTER IV 
FREEDO~l IN nm t-JACROCOSNIC UNIVERSE 
In the previous chapter, we examined the prtnclples used to establish 
the hierarchy of macroscopic entities and noted man's unique place at the sum-
mit of this classification. lbe purpose of this and the following chapter ts 
to develop a Whlteheadian explanation of human freedom. We will show that 
Whitehead's analysts ts meant to explain the fact that human beings exercise a 
unique mode of freedom, a freedom which, so far as present research can de-
termine, ls not to be found in lower macroscopic organisms such as the higher 
"brute animals." This higher mode of freedom ls such that it ls meaningful to 
speak of human beings as responsible, moral entities. lbat ls to say, their 
mode of self-determination takes the form of freedom of choice cOD1DOnly and 
properly so called. 
In the first section of the present chapter, we will summarize White-
head's discussion of human nature. We wish to specify more precisely than was 
indicated in the previous chapter how Whitehead would have us understand the 
nature of human beings in his philosophical system. As we will see, man ls 
·190-
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taken to be a highly complex society manifesting a unique type of unity and 
organization. The explanation of this fact is to be found ln the types of 
actual occasions "constituting" this macroscopic organism. The source of his 
unity and organization, which ln its higher manifestations takes the form of 
self-conscious, end-directed actlvlty, ls to be found in the regnant actual oc 
caslons constituting man•s soul. 
For this reason it ls necessary to develop Whitehead's explanation of 
the unique mode of conscious freedom evidenced by these regnant occasions and 
to indicate how their freedom affects the freede111 of the human being, that ls 
the macroscopic organism taken as a whole. This entails an analysts of their 
highly complex process of eoncrescence. Because consciousness arises in the 
1 later phases of concrescence of high-grade actual entitles and because every 
2 
subsequent phase presupposes the prior one(s) which it integrates, it ls es-
sentlal that we investigate the various stages in the unique process of con-
crescence of the regnant actual occasions of man. 
In the remainder of Chapter IV we will specify the nature of this 
uniqueness throughout the process-up to but not including the final emergence 
of a high-grade human consciousness and freedom of choice. In the second sec-
tlon of the chapter we will examine the freedom associated with "perception 
ln the mode of causal efficacy" which occurs with the initial phase of concres-
cence. We will see that for the regnant occasions constituting man this mode 
of perception accounts for the origin of our lived experience of self-identity 
and oneness with our bodies throughout a lifetime. As such, lt establishes 
1
,f!, P• 362. 2f,!, p. 250. 
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a basis for the very possibility of human freedom on the macroscopic level. 
In the third section of Chapter IV "perception in the mode of presen-
tational immediacy" ls introduced. The importance of this level of experience 
ts that it ls Whitehead's categoreal explanation of how lndlvldual actual en-
titles are capable of experlenclng the macroscopic world of stones, trees, 
dogs, and men. Its importance for human freedom ls that with lt the subject 
ts able to isolate and vividly prehend clear and distinct groups of actual 
occasions in its imnediate contemporary environment, and, as a consequence, ls 
able to freely form definite bounds of relationship with these macroscopic en-
tlties. Thus beglns the passage to macroscopic freedom in the higher grade 
regnant occasions of animals and men. 
Yet perception in the mode of presmitational lmnediacy does not mark 
a significant advance in mentality apart from its integration within a subse-
quent and higher mode of perception, that of "symbolic reference" arising stll 
later in the process of concrescence. As we will see in the fourth section, 1 
ls with symbolic reference that Whitehead offers his explanation of the emer-
gence of conscious mental actl~ty. When the difference in the various kinda 
of propositional data required for symbolic refermice are noted, we will see 
that there ls a basts wlthln Whitehead's analysts for explaining the uniquely 
higher kind of consciousness associated with human freedom properly so called. 
A. Human Nature: An Introduction to the 
- --
Discussion g! Human Freedom 
It ls difficult to agree with John Cobb's interpretation that Whltehea 
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l tdentlfl .. the man wlth his soul. As Cobb acknovledges, Whitehead •lntalna 
that Uk• the other real actual things that endure,2 a man la a society, al• 
belt an unu11Ual1y co8')1ex one. He ls tn fact a highly "apeclallsed" society 
of socletles manlfeattn.g extreme complexity atd dlverslty of parts as well as 
lcobb says that accordlns to \ilhltehead nman baa, or ts a soul." (! 
Christian NfturaJ Jbtttm, P• 47.) H• also refers the reader to a single pa•· 
iage, .fli1 2.• 141, ".!.thout quoting the passage, for support of hls contention 
that 0 he LWhlteheasf hluelf ordlnarlly ldenttftes the men wlth the soul." 
Ibld., PP• 65-66 and n. 48. The writer of thh dtsaertatton would argue that 
Whi'tehead nelther lmplles such an ldentlflcatlon, nor, contrary to Cobb's aug .. 
gestlon, that Whitehead explloltty affirms tt. There ls slmply no way of ln• 
terpretlng .f.B.1 141 as directly stating or indirectly lmplying that the term 
"man" ls to be taken as synonymous ,.,Ith the term soul. Furthermore, there are 
IMftY tats where 'Whitehead !!pUcitlX affirms that what we ordlnarlly mean by 
man ls ••more than" what ••person" or even "living person" means ln his system. 
Also ve understand Whitehead as wlahlng to follow ordinary usage ln this in-
stance. CUtsld• of God, to be a l.lvlM 2eucn ln Whitehead's •Y•t• necessl• 
tat•• basically three distinct klnda of nexua: (1) the regnant nexus, vhtch 
ls the "person••; (2) the non-social nexus wlthln the brain, vhlch supports the 
regnant nexua and 111hlch ls the prtnclple of Ufe of the person aftd of the or-
ganism ,laken as a ti\ole; and (3) the entire animal body upon which the first 
two nema depend for their very being and ditch ls tho structured society 
aupp0rtlng these two nexus. 
see Donald Sherburne, "Whitehead's Psychological Phyalotogy," !h! 
South•[!! Jou!D!l !f. Pbllo•oRhz, VII, No. 4 (Winter, 1969·1970), PP• 401-07. 
As Sherburne•• paper tmpUea, vlthout an animal body there could be no human 
person. However else men might a.lat, lf, for example they are hmortal, so 
far as we can understand hl8 condition here and nov, acoordtng to Whitehead It 
appears necessary to acknowledge that man ls this totality of body and soul 
which la the complete Uvlng per•Oft• 
Cobb ls glvlng hls interpretation of Whltehead, whlch ta admittedly 
most interesting and demanding of serlou• conalderatlon by Whtteheadhm 
scholars. But hla ls an lnterpretatlon which, lt aeems to thls writer, cannot 
be easUy reooncUed elther vlth other important texts or with what appears to 
be Whitehead'• latent namely to show that the cOllftOI\ sense pronouncements of 
mankind concerning this point are fundamentatty correct. 
2~, P• 262. 
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8 unlque type of unity. Whitehead ls well aware that what must be accounted 
for, phllosophlcally speaking, ls how nature has combined these seemingly di· 
verse elements: personal self-identity with complexity and diversity of parts 
throughout a lifetime. For Whitehead seems to have never seriously doubted 
either (1) that a man ls one and the same person from birth to death, or (2) 
that he ls a unity composed of a body and a mlnd--or soul. That ls to say, th 
human person ls both one and many, a unity composed of diverse orders of parts 
l 
spread spatially and temporally. Contrary to the suggestion of Cobb, it JIUst 
be emphasized that in support of the lived fact that a person ls a unity of 
body and so.al existing throughout a lifetime and against the views proposed 
by Descartes, Hume and Kant in their speculative systems, Whitehead explicitly 
calls upon the common sense pronouncements of manklnd, 2 upon a phenomenologlca 
3 
analysts of self-experience, as well as upon the latest f lndlngs of psycholo 
4 
and the other sciences. Here too as with the more specific question concern-
lng human freedom it appears that Whitehead begins phllosophlcally by never 
seriously doubting the fact. For hlm the question ls how to give a philosoph-
!cal explanation of the lived fact of both the unity and diversity of human 
experience, including as has already been seen, the important fact of human 
freedom. 
libid., P• 239. 
2Ibid., PP• 242-43; Immortality, ~~VII-IX, Philosophy .2£. Alfred North 
Whitehead, ed. by Schilpp, pp. 688-90. 
3~, PP• 231-36. Also see ~, PP• 209-11, 243-44; !1.It PP• 219-21, 155-
61, 218-23; ~' PP• 39-49. 
4!ll., p. 243; 157-67. 
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One of Whitehead's strongest statements concerning the experiential 
fact of composition of the human being occurs ln Adventure 2£_ Ideas, where 
he has just introduced the notion of a special kind of society technically 
called a "person." As we have observed, Whitehead offers as an example of 
such a society a human being considered as a set of contiguous actual occaslo 
causally related ln a one-dimensional serial order. Whitehead observes that 
this definition exactly corresponds to Descartes' definition of a thinking sub 
- -1 stance L Principles 2£_ PhllosophX 1 I, XXI and Meditations, II!}. However, 
Whitehead immediately adds that it ls not the ordinary meaning of the word 
"man•" The difficulty ls, that it ignores man's body. But as Whitehead says, 
There are animal bodies as well as animal minds; and tn 
minds always occur incorporated. Now an animal body is a society lnvolv 
a vast number of occasions spatially and temporally coordinated. It fol-
lows that a •man' ln the full sense of ordinary usage, is not a •person' a 
here defined. He has the unity of a wider society in which the social eo-
ordlnatlon ls a dominant factor ln the behavlo..ars of the various parts.2 
A closely related difficulty arises when Descartes attempts to explain 
the self-ldentlty of a man through time. Locating the personality of man ln 
the so..al conceived as a self-conscious substance, Descartes ls forced to in-
troduce God ln order to account for the adventures of the soul throughout a 
llfetime. God and God alone nust be thought to constantly recreate the so..al 
because at any moment the soul is in Itself complete, unchanging, and essen-
tlally and existentially unrelated to anything else, even "its'' prior and fu-
ture ''selves.•• To Whitehead, Descartes has thus falled to allow adequately fo 
the fact that we do experience our "present self" as a unity of body and mind 
and as causally derivative or determined by ~ ''prior selflt and as determinln 
l!fil., P• 263. 2 &t PP• 263-64. 
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our "future self"-though to be sure God will be operatlve ln thls "process 
----
of endurance." Whl tehead' s most tel Ung attack upon Descartes, as well as 
Hume and Kant, is, in fact, that they have failed to recognize the primitive-
ness, immediacy, and irreducibility of the experience of "non-sensuous percep-
tlons" whlch are at the origin of our f eellngs of this unl ty. Descartes wl th 
his search for clear and distinct ldeas,1 Hume with hls doctrine of clear and 
2 
dlstlnct high grade sensations, and Kant with his 4 prlorl forms of sensa-
bll lty and of the understanding~ have each in their own way denied the prim-
ltlveness and hence the radical Importance of non-sensuous perceptions. As a 
consequence they have failed to give an adequate and/or coherent explanation 
of a man's personal Identity through time and of his experience of unity thr 
thls tlme wlth his body. Responding to thls modern tradltlon Whitehead main-
talns that not only are there what Whitehead calls perceptions ln the mode of 
''causal efficacy,'' perceptions of a non-sensuous nature, but that "the most 
compelling example of non-sensuous perception ls our knowledge of our own lm-
medlate past. u4 Analogous to thla ls an experience of our oneness wt.th our 
bod les. As Whitehead says, ttThere ls th.ts every reason to bell eve that our 
sense of unity with the body has the same original L-sic./as our sense of 
unity with our lmmedlate past of personal experience. 115 
263-70. 
229-37; 
1b!,, P• 155; f!, PP• 9-10, 218-20. 
2Ibid., PP• 152-55. 
-
Also see.§., pp. 30·36; £!!., PP• 198-217, 238-53, 
PP• 37-43, 49-53. Also see !!!, PP• le~-85; f:!., PP• 288-91; E,!, PP• 
PP• 59-61. 
pp. 232-33; .f.!, P• 125; ~. PP• 218-19. 
5.Al, P• 243; ,!!!, 125; trf, PP• 155-58, 218-25. For a flne sunmar of 
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What Cobb acknowledgesl but then seems to disregard ls the fact that 
though the personal soclety--alternatlvely called the soul2 or mind-- ls a so-
ciety in its own right, it nonetheless depends for its very being and activi 
on a non-social nexus in the brain, ani indirectly on the nexU's and societies 
which are the brain and nervous system, and more indirectly upon the even 
targer numbers· of organic and inorganic subordinate structured societies whi 
together constitute the rest of man's body. 3 
Let us begin with the man's body. It ls Whitehead ays, made-up of 
millions upon millions of cells, and since all the life ln the body ls ln the 
life of the individual cells, the body can be conceived as being composed of 
4 
millions upon millions of centers of life. Now the cell ls a structured so-
Whitehead's doctrine of perception and especially non-sensuous perception see 
Pa.al Schmidt, Perception .!W! Cosmologx, pp. 119-26. 
1! <llrlstlan Natural Theology, PP• 51-52. 
2A!_, P• 271; ~' P• 213. 
3see Howard w. Hintz, ••Whitehead's Concept of Organism, 11 Dimensions 
2£. ~' ed. Sidney Hook (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 97-105. While 
we agree wlth Hlntz•s thesis that as far as we have any direct knowledge of 
the mind it m.ast be maintained, according to Whlteheadlan principles, that it 
ls ••tn lts natural-human manifestations, inseparably associated wlth and de .. 
pendent upon the physical organism known as the body," (p. 101) we do not 
agree with another part of hla paper. Hintz goes on to say that "if mlnd per-
meates the whole of reality the existence of it tn animate objects does not 
differentiate these objects in kind from any other natural phenomena, but only 
ln degree." (p. 103). We have argued, of course, that they can be adequately 
differentiated as unique differences emerging wlth the crossing of critical 
thresholds. 
On the other hand, this does not deny the possibility of some ''mind(s)' 
exlstln.g apart from a body. However, we are discussing the ordinary meaning 
of human person, and the point ls that our direct eicoerlence ls of societies 
composed of a body and mind. 
4
,f!, P• 165. 
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ctetY itself made-up of space, the subordinate nexus wherein lurks the life 
of the cell,l and subservient or subordinate Inorganic societies auch as 
JDOleculas,2 the lattar themselves belng made-up of electrons, protons, etc. 
The millions of cells in turn form larger societies of cells, of blood, and 
of bones, 3 of flesh, of organs such as the arteries, the heart, the llver, the 
eye, and so forth. It ls Important to understand that these conglomerations 
of cells form more complex societies each ln turn more-or-less capable of ex-
ercising its own unifying control over its members. Thus the bones can exist 
separated from the body for a very long period of time, and even the heart, 
given the proper stinulants, "can be made to go on beating after lt has been 
taken out of the body. ••4 
Within the body, however, these parts manifest themselves precisely 
as parts, that ls as manbers of a greater whole, as ultimately comlng under 
the control and sustenance of some central organ for the good of the entire 
organism. Thls organ of central control ln man ls the soul located in man's 
brain. 5 Its importance to the organism as a whole ls seen in the fact that 
should this central organ be severed from the rest of the body or be otherwise 
6 
sufficiently damaged, the whole organlsm which ls the man would collapse, and 
with this collapse the subordinate soctetjes would revert to their simpler 
-modes of existence. Those societies and nexus which require the environment 
of the whole complex would cease to be. Thus in the case of eyes and other 
llbid., PP• 161 1 516. 
-
3AI, P• 264. 
-
4!:S,, P• 165; !:!!• PP• 34-36. s!!?!!!,., p. 166; l:fr, p.42. 6m_, P• 34. 
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1110re speclallzed subordinate societies and subordinate nex~s which ultimately 
require the speclallzed envlrorunent of the whole organism, these too w<Xlld 
cease to exist, and wlth thls dissolution the component members would return 
to their simpler modes of existence. 
What dlstlngulshes man among all the macroscopic organisms, then, ls 
that in hlm untold millions of centers of life are coupled wlth an extreme 
and unique kind of unifying force 'Which ls the personal society of actual OC• 
caslons supported within the non-social ntKus ln his brain. 'llte lu.tman grade 
animal body manifests one central actuality and this has as its source within 
the living personal soul which supports and in turn ls supported by the intrl-
cacy of bodily functlonings: 
It ls by reason of the body, with lts miracle of order, that the treasures 
of the past environment are poured into the llvlng occasion. The flnal 
perclplent route of occasions ls perhaps, some thread of happenings wan-
dering ln •empty• space amid the interstices of the braln. It tolls not, 
neither does it spln. It receives from the past; lt lives ln the present. 
It ls shaken by lts intensities of private feeling, adverslon or aversion. 
In lts turn, this culmination of bodily life transmits itself as an ele-
ment of novelty through<Xlt the avenues of the body. Its sole use to the 
body ls its vivid originality: it ls the organ of novelty. 
l.f!, P• 516. "Tl'us ln an animal body the presiding occasion, lf there 
be one, ls the final node, or intersection, of a complex structure of many en-
during objects. Such a structure pervades the human body. The harmonized re-
lations of the parts of the body constitutes this wealth of inheritance into 
a harmony of contrasts, issuing into intensity of experience. The lnhibltions 
of opposites have been adjusted into the contrast of opposites. 'nle human 
mind ls thus conscious of its body lnherltance. There ls al so an enduring ob-
ject formed by the lnherltance from presiding occasion to presiding occasion. 
This endurance of the mind ls only one more example of the general prlnclple 
on which the body ls constructed. This route of presiding occasions probably 
wanders from part to part of the brain, dissociated from the physical material 
atoms. But central personal dominance ls only partial, and in pathological 
cases ls apt to vanish... (flit pp. 166-67). Also see M_, P• 271. 
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The high-grade body and the personal soul together elicit that 
higher form of novelty that gives the human action, at least ln lts higher 
expressions, its unique character: 
When we come to mankind, nature seems to have burst through another 
of its boundaries. The central activity of enjoyment and expression has 
assumed a reversal in the importance of its diverse functlonlngs. 'lbe 
conceptual entertaira:nent of unrealized possibility becomes a major factor 
ln human mentallty. In this way outrageous novelty ls introduced, some-
times beautified, sometimes damned, and sometimes literally patented or 
protected by copyright. The deflnltlon of mankind ls that in this genus 
of animals the central activity has been developed on the slde of its 
relationship to novelty. This relationship ls two•fold. There ls the 
novelty received from the aggregate diversities of bodily expressions. 
Such novelty requires decision as to its reduction to coherence of ex-
pression. 
Again there ls the introduction of novelty of feeling by the enter-
tainment of unexpressed posslbllltles. 'lllis second side ls the enlarge-
ment of the conceptual experience of mankind. The characterization of 
this conceptual feeling ls the sense of what might be and of what might 
have been. It ls the entertainment of the alternative. In its highest 
development, this becomes the entertainment of the Ideal. It emphasizes 
the sense of Importance •••• And this sense exhibits itself in various 
species, such as, the sense of morality, the mystic sense of religion, the 
sense of that delicacy of adjustment 'tlllch ls beauty, the sense of neces-
sity for 1111tua1 connection which ls understanding, and the sense of dls-
crlmination of each factor which ls consclousness.1 
Whitehead observes that with man unlflcatlon reaches the extreme, and 
yet it ls not absolute; for even here there ls evidence of dissociation of 
personality as well as various forms of nultlple personalltles. 2 Furthermore, 
he contends that other macroscopic entitles evidence a similar unity, though 
not of the extreme nature whlch appears in man. 'lbus from one point of vlew 
he ls unwilling to extend the notion of living personality below the level of 
very high-grade living organlsms;3 on the other hand it does appear to be a 
lt!I,, PP• 36-37. 2PR p. 163-64. _, 
3For instance, Whitehead says that ln the case of the single cell, the 
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question of degree, for from another perspecitve !.f.l!.!512 !l2!. presuppose Sh! 
extreme !2£!!! !l1. personal order evidenced !n. man, we can indeed "conjecture, 
-
though without nuch evidence, that even in the lowest form of life the en-
1 
tlrely living nexus ls canalized into some faint form of nutual conformity." 
Below the level of living organisms are those entitles whose members 
form mere aggregations of actual occasions evidencing at most sporadic and 
ineffective flashes of novelty and coordination. 11\ese lowly macroscopic 
structures survive by stifling rather than coordinating the indlvlduallty of 
their members and by eliciting a mere average formal character. 2 Again, these 
two tendencies ln Whitehead's thlnklng--namely his unwllllngness to limit a 
unifying factor to human beings and his unwillingness to deny its special 
exemplification in man--can be synthesized, we think, by the introduction of 
the idea of the "critical threshold." 
vegetables, and the lower forms of animal life "we have no grounds for con-
jecturing living personality. But ln the case of the higher animals there ls 
central dlrectlon, whlch suggests that ln thelr case each animal body har-
bours a living person, or living persons." (,f!, P• 164.) Also see !'!• PP• 
158-59. 
1.f!, P• 164. A similar remark occurs ln &t p. 264: "Also when we 
survey the llvlng world, animal and vegetable, there are bodies of all types. 
Each llvlng body is a society, which ls not personal. But most of the ani-
mals, lncludlng all the vertebrates, seem to have their social system dominate 
by a subordinate society which ls •personal•. lhls subordinate society ls of 
the same type as 'man', according to the personal definition given above, 
though of course the mental poles in the occasions of the dominant personal 
society do not rise to the height of human mentality. 'lbus in one sense a dog 
ls a •person•, and in another sense he is a non-personal society. But the 
lower forms of animal llfe, and all vegetation, seem to lack the dominance of 
any included personal society." 
2 ~. p. 38. 
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Briefly put, man is unique in that this most complex of macroscopic 
organisms evidences an ectreme degree and therefore a unique kind of cen-
trallzed activity. 'lbe reason for this uniqueness ls to be found in the so-
ciety of regnant actual occasions that unifies this vast organism, and given 
-the ontological principle and the derivative status of nexus, lt ls ultimately 
grounded within the very constltutl<¥1 of these individual member actual oc-
casions: in other words, the reason for this uniqueness ls to be found in the 
individual members of the human soul. What DUSt now be examined ls how the 
actual occasions that constitute man•s soul differ from those that do not, and 
inasmuch as every actual occasion ls free, how these occasions are uniquely 
free and thereby ground that macroscopic freedom manifest by the human organ-
ism taken as a whole, body and soul. 
Actually Whitehead's formal explanation of this difference has already 
been noted ln the previous chapter--at least in its general form. In a num-
ber of texts Whitehead claims that vhereas all actual occasions exercise per-
ception ln the mode of ••causal efficacy," not all experience "presentational 
immediacy," while still fewer exercise "symbolic reference'' and the higher de-
gree of mentality commonly designated as intellectlon properly so called. 
Moreover, the higher kinds of perception and intellectlon presuppose and in-
elude the lower. Now the regnant actual occasions that constitute the living 
person are unique precisely ln that they manifest these higher levels of men-
tality, so that what remains to be examined ls the nature of the process of 
concrescence which characterizes these extremely high grade actual occasions. 
Because all subsequent phases of concrescence presuppose the antecedent one(s) 
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upon which they build, it ts necessary to observe the process whereby hlgh 
1evel human freedom comes to be "bullt-up" through the regnant occasion's en-
tire process of concrescence, beginning with the Initial phase and culminating 
in satisfaction at, or rather with, the final phase. 
B. Freedom ,!!!.!!. Perception !!!. ~ 
~ of Catsal Efficacy 
"Perception ln the mode of catsal efficacy" ls an experience or "ap-
proprlatlon" by the emerging subject of past actual occasions that causally 
determine the subject. This causal determination occurs with the lnitlal or 
l 
receptive phase of concrescence. Every actual occasion emerges with this 
lnltlal phase and so Whitehead says that "we uust assign the mode of causal 
efficacy to the fundamental constitution of an occasion so that in germ this 
2 
mode belongs even to organisms of the lowest grad•••••" Whitehead character-
izes this mode of perception ln a passage where he applies the categoreal 
scheme to human experience. Nonetheless, this ought to be read so as to 
extend to all occasions of experience down to the lowest grade actual occa-
slons. Perception ln the mode of causal efficacy can be characterized very 
generally as productive of percepts 
which are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion: it produces 
the sense of derivation from an immediate past, and of passage to an im-
mediate future; a sense of emotional feeling, belonging to oneself in the 
past, passing into oneself in the present, and passing from oneself ln the 
11:!, p. 273: ''The mode of efficacity belongs to the responsive phase, 
in which the objectifications are felt according to their relevance ln the 
datum •••• '' 
2,!lli., P• 261. 
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present towards oneself ln the future; a sense of Influx of influence 
from other vaguer presences in the past• localized and yet evading lo-
cal definition, such influence modifying• enhancing, inhibiting, divert-
ing, the stream of feeling whlch we are receiving, unifying• enjoying, and 
transmitting. This ls our general sensr of existence, as one item among 
others. in an efficacious actual world. 
Several things should be noted concerning this passage. First, White-
head expllcltly rejects the ldea that the data given in this lnltial stage of 
prehension are clear and distinct: they are neither clearly and distinctly 
perceived nor clearly and distinctly conceived. As we shall see, animal sense 
perception and human intellectual cognition arlses as subsequent phases in the 
process of concrescence. 2 Second, the past actual occasions are no longer 
and therefore they cannot be controlled. More than that, precisely lnasJIUch 
as the data are given they nust be reacted-to ln terms of what they are; which 
ls to say that more importantly the data .m!!. data cannot be controlled. ntey 
are the lnltial limit placed upon the subject's freedom. Third, the nulti-
pllclty which constitutes the data are unified ln one experience. The data 
themselves are brought together ln a new synthesis which ls the novel actual 
occasion. At this stage the unity ls an ideal orlglnatlng from the subjective 
aim ln the initial phase of concrescence. Subsequent phases will render the 
ldeal !.!!!.• This latter fact whlch ts the new synthesis has as its source the 
lntrlnslc self-determining factors of the subject. Finally, because the sub-
ject emerges from the past and will pass lnto the future its Initial experlen 
--to repeat, its non-conscious experience--lnvolves a feeling of belng-in-the-
1!!!.!S., P• 271; also see 246-49, 262, 179-82, 185; ~' pp. 43-49. 
2~ •• pp. 178-79 
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world, of being one-among-many. 
What has bean said thus far concerning causal efficacy applies to 
every actual occasion and therefore to all the actual occasions constituting 
the untold billions upon billions of societies and nexus within and without 
man. We can begin to understand what differentiates the regnant actual occa-
sions of man in the initial phase of concrescence when we recall that the 
personal society which ls the "soul" resides in the llving non-social nexus 
1 
within the brain. Sherburne has convincingly argued that this personal so-
clety ls not something other than, something overlapping, the non-social nexus 
but rather that its individual entitles are some of the various member oc-
casions that constitute the non-social nexus. 2 From this lt follows that the 
conception of the human soul uust be extended to embrace part of the living 
non-social nGl'KUs of which it ls a part, and that the soul of man ls better 
understood to be a "llvlng person": Uving lnasnuch as lt ls part of the 
central living non-social nexus within the brain and person inasmuch as it ls 
a personally ordered society wlthln that nexus. 
To the question "what differentiates the regnant actual occasions of 
man's soul?'' we can answer, that initially the difference ls to be found in 
the sc:ul's unlque data. Recall what Whitehead has said: 
It ls by reason of t~e body, vith its miracle of order, that the treasures 
of the past environment are poured into the llvlng occasion. nte final 
percipient route of occasions ls perhaps some thread of happenings wander-
ing ln •empty• space amid the interstices of the brain.3 -
1 Ibid., P• 168. 2•1Whltehead's Psychological Physiology,•• p. 405. 
3
see this chapter p. 199. 
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For the immediate environment of the soul ls the brain and indirectly through 
the brain its environment extends to the whole of the animal body. Whitehead 
wtll even add that lt ls difficult to delineate exactly where the body leaves 
off and the external world begins, 1 which ls to say that its remote environ-
ment extends even beyond the body to external nature. Consequently the initia 
data given in the first stage of concrescence and causally determining the 
emerging living personal occasion ls the outcome of an unimaginably complex 
pattern of past actual occasions, many of which are high-grade occaslcns and 
are themselves highly complex data. 2 1bls ls the body exercising Its causal 
effl cacy "In" the s·out. 
The present ••regnant actual occaslon"-lf we may so term it-within 
the soul also prehends the antecedent occasion ln the personal society. What 
ls peculiar about thls causal transltlon ls that besides physical prehenslons 
lt also gives rise to "hybrid prehenslons." Hybrid prehenslcns may be defined 
as the "prehension by one subject of a conceptual prehenslon, or of an •tmpure' 
3 prehenslon, belonging to the mentality of another subject." Now the hybrid 
physical feelings whose data are temporal actual entitles give rlse--ln the 
second phase of concrescence--to a conceptual feellng within the subject hav-
lng the same data as that of the conceptual feeling of the antecedent subject. 
4 
'nle result ls a significantly heightened Intensity of conceptual feeling. Ul· 
tlmately these hybrid prehenslons are meant to explaln the emergence of the 
l !:!Ii PP• 29-30, 155-56; ~, PP• 289-90. 2 .f!, PP• 36 5-66. 
lzbld., PP• 163, 376, 469. 4Ibld., PP• 376-77. 
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higher grade mentality associated wlth living persons. 
The defining characteristic of a living person ls some definite type 
of hybrid prehensions transmitted from occasions to occasion of its ex-
istence •••• By thls transmission the mental orlglnallty of the living oc-
casions receives a character and a depth. In thls way originality ls 
both •cannallzed•--to use Bergson's word--and lntenstfled. Wlth lt, per-
sonal mentality can be evolved, so as to combine its individual original-
ity with the safety of the material organism on which it depends. Thus 
life turns back into society: lt binds originality within bounds, and 
gains the massiveness due to reiterated character.l 
It should be noted that although It ls possible to analyze these two divergent 
sources of data, ln fact they converge ln the subject as hopelessly intermixed 
and therefore only rarely do immediate hybrid prehenslons have sufficient 
2 
vividness to receive a subjective form of clear conscious attention. 
Finally, included wlthin these lnitlal data ls a hybrid physical feel-
lng of God which, as has been noted, determines in the manner of a final cause 
He determines by being a source of the initial "givenness0 of the subjective 
alm. 3 Yet God ls also the extrinsic source or cause of freedom tnasDUeh as He 
offers a set of real alternatives or possibllitles--potentialities--from which 
the subject can freely choose. Because God functions in conjunction with an 
extremely high grade subject, the form taken by this lure wilt be appropriate-
ly different. To anticipate what wilt be developed shortly let it be said tha 
for the living person these possibllltles will be able to be grasped!! possi-
bilities in their abstract generality. 
Important consequences relating to the nature of human freedom follow 
1 !.!?!S•, P• 163. 2Ibid., PP• 469-70. 
3
•
1Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in 
the world, and no crder in the world." {.f!, p. 377.) 
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from Sherburne' s interpretation of the nature of the personal human soul. 
Now ccnceived as the "living personal society" inhabiting the braln, the soul 
IJIJSt be thought of as consisting of actual occasions each of which originate 
with two divergent but converging sources of past data: each member actual 
occasion prehends in the mode of causal efficacy (1) its immediately ante-
cedent occasion-which accounts for our imediate experience of oneness or 
personal self-identity through time; and (2) the past occasions of the animal 
body-which accounts for our immediate experience of unity with our bodies. 
Taken together these routes of experience are the source of our feel-
ing of oneness with our bodies and our personalities through a lifetime, and 
consequently they are the ultimate reasons grounding the pre-philosophical 
experiences noted in Chapter I,1 namely, that of performing an action in time: 
as, for example, of withdrawing money from a bank. Precisely as such, these 
will also be offered as the ultimate philosophical explanations for the possi-
bility of there being a !£.!.! human !SS, or moral .!!:l. in the first place. It 
will make sense to prosecute the bank robber who unlawfully withdraws money 
because he ls thought to be undoubtedly ~ .!!!!! person-body J!m! .!2!:!!-who 
planned and executed the crime and who now stands before his peers as judged, 
blamed, convicted, and awaiting punishment. 
This ts not to imply, however, that consciousness arises with causal 
efficaey. On the contrary, it uust be emphasized that consciousness emerges 
only later in the process of concrescence of high-grade actual occasions. 
Moreover, self-consciousness such as ts implied in our reflective awareness of 
1 See Chapter l, pp. 18-19. 
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our basic oneness wlth ourselves-body and soul-throughout a Ufetime and in 
our free choices anergea stlll later ln the process and, so far as we know, 
onlY in the highest regnant actual occasions such as those constltutlng the 
11vlng J:uman person. Qne dlstlngulshlng characteristic of these latter high• 
grade ocoaslona ln the f lrst phase of concrescence, then, ls that even their 
tnltlal derivation from the past can SS!!!~!!.!. the subject of conscious 
awareness. thus lt ls possible, though with some effort, to become conscious• 
ly aware of my lnltlal feellngs of grovlna out of the past and lnto the pre• 
sent. 
Howwer, self ldentlty and unity with one•a body throughout tlme, are 
only two condltlons required for a moral act, though to be sure these are 
most Important ones. Again follovlng ordinary experience, but also allying 
himself with the general oonsenms of the classical Western phtloaophlcal 
tradition, Whitehead ls well aware that the other conditions for the moral 
sltuatlon, I.e. for the very posalblllty of praise and blame, reward, and 
punt shmet, of what ls often generally 111,11111arlzed under the phrase "moral 
responslblllty," are that the man's act proceed from lm.O!J.edge and be per-
formed b'••lY. 'lbeae latter characterlstlos wlll also be explained ln terms 
of the unique klnd of actual occasions that are the "ltvlng person," for lt 
appears that man alcne of all the •croscoplc entitles uerclaes lnte1l•c1rt1al 
kru?wleclge and therefore moral frf!dom or freedom of choice properly so called. 
In order to continue this analysts of human freedom, lt wlll be necessary to 
trace the actlvl ty of mm.tall ty ln the supplemental phases of concrescence. 
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c. Freedom~ Perception .le.~ !!2!!.! ~ 
Presentational ID111ediacy 
In a subsequent phase of concrescence of higher grade actual occasions 
what was originally experienced as a vague welter of past actual occasions 
comes to be grasped as well defined, dlstlnct, contemporary macroscopic en-
titles. Whitehead explains thls transformatlm ln our experience ln terms of 
"perception in the mode of presentational lmmedlacy." Its importance for un-
derstanding the emergence of h.lman freedom is that lt ls meant to expl~ln Cl) 
how we perceive-and thus conceive of-•1the world of macroscopic entitles, and 
(2) how we can consequently exercise freedom of choice ln regards to them. 
The.t !3 to say, lt ls the beginning of Whitehead's explanation of our expert-
ence of freedom ln the macroscopic world: as when a man ls free to rob a bank 
-- -----
Presentational immediacy arises ln a later phase of concrescence and 
presupposes a series of mental activities that occur wt.th the second phase of 
concrescence. In order to explain these activities, lt will be necessary to 
introduce briefly Whitehead's discussion ot the 4th, 5th, and 6th "Categoreal 
Obligations," the categories of ''Valuation, 0 "Reversion," and "Transnutation" 
respectively. Their relevance to our dis01ssion will emerge as we proceed. 
Though the mental pole is inseparable from the physical pole, 1 the 
former originates with the second phase of concrescence as the conceptual coun 
terpart of operations of the physical pole. 2 Within this relatively simple 
second phase, the higher grade subject further unifies its data in accordance 
with the 4th, 5th and 6th "Categoreal Obligations. 0 'lhese acts of synthesis 
2 l!?.!s!•t PP• 139, 379. 
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1 
and integration, technically called ''contrasts," originating with the activ-
ltY of mentality are initiated by acts of "negation" or "eltmination"-and are 
thereby grounded in the activity of creatlvlty and the formality of the eter-
nal objects "within" the subject. While the process of synthesis requ lres 
greater complexity of activity wlt~in the process of concrescence, nevertheles 
this process also appears to be a DDVement towards greater abstraction, simpll 
flcation and unification of the data. As \.7hitehead says when speaking of thes 
contrasts, 
Thus •contrast•--as opposite of lncompatiblllty depends on a certain sim-
plicity of circumstance; but the higher contrasts depend on the assemblage 
of a nultiplicity of lower ~ontrasts, this assemblage again exhibiting 
higher types of simplicity. 
As we shall see--especially in Chapter V--with man unification in its higher 
expression amounts to the creation of intelligible systems of interpretation 
ln the speculative order and to artistic, social, and moral activity in the 
practical order. 
1. 4th Categoreal Obligation: Conceptual Valuation 
Although negative prehensions have eliminated the incompatible data 
lnltlally given ln the first phase of concrescence, there ls an important sens 
in which further ellm1natlons or simpllflcatlons or "negations" occur aiming 
at novel coherent synthesis or unification of the data. Because the feelings 
of the lnltlal phase are compatible for integratlon,3 the supervention of the 
l!lli•t P• 33. 2 !lli•, P• 145. 
3see the "Category of Subjective Unity," .f!, P• 39. 
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subsequent phases do not involve elimination by "negations" !! this is taken 
to mean that the subject eliminates the data positively prehended in the in-
itlal phase. For on this supposition, the metaphysical unity required for the 
existence of an actual occasion would be destroyed and the actual occasion 
would cease to ~e: "the concrescent subject 110Uld divide into that subject an 
1 
many subjects, and would divide these many subjects from the superject. 11 
This does not mean that "negations" or "eliminations" do not occur sub 
sequent to the initial phase of concrescence, but that subsequent "elimination' 
must be from some new integral feeling which ls only one component of that 
particular phase. 2 In addition, these subsequent "eliminations'* will also con 
tribute their subjective forms to the final unified subjective form which ls 
the subject in its phase of satisfaction. In the second phase Conceptual Val-
uatlon ls initiated by an elimination whereby the eternal objects originally 
prehended as concretized "inu the physical datum-as concrescent--,,.re now "ab-
stracted" as pure potentials capable of being further integrated ln subsequent 
3 phases of concrescence. At this stage, the process ls a movement ~ the 
concrete !2. the abstract, !.!:gm the actual !2. the potential, !£5?m the temporal 
!2, the eternal. It ls a reaction from something which ls positively and 
definitely given, namely, the data positively prehended in the receptive stage 
also, it culminates in something most definite ana vv~ltive. namely a form 
l~., P• 368. 
3~, p. 270. See Sherburne, ~ Whiteheadlan Aesthetic, P• 50. Sher-
burne• s excellent &&~alysis (pp. 41-88) of the phases of concrescence has been 
most helpful for this and the following discussions concerning the phases up 
to and including the high-grade human mode of concrescence. 
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1 
of definiteness, and eternal object supplied by God and positively prehended 
as potentially concrescent. 
It follows that because Valuation is the conceptual counterpart of 
physical prehenslons of the initial data,.!!!. unigueness .!.:.!. ~.£!!!. ,2{ Sh!. 
human person.!!!! exactly correspond !2. ~ unigueness found !!l~ ~· 
Nentallty will be proportioned to the highly complex data which lt can ab-
street and subsequently unify and therefore the Vsluatlve feelings--elther ad-
verslon or averslon2--wtll be slmilarlly more complex. 
2. 5th Categoreal Obligation: Conceptual Reversion 
With slight modifications what was said of Valuation also supplies 
where the data ls a hybrid physical feeling of God. The difference ls that 
the conceptual feeling is a reverted f eellng and ls of an eternalobject both 
similar and dissimilar to the eternal objects immanent in the prior physical 
feeling. .!l!!, effect g! reverted conceptual feelings .!.! ~ l!.!!b, ~ relevant 
alternatives !!!!! therefore proximate potentialities g! novelty!!.!. introduced, 
and "the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both ln qualitative pat-
tern, and in intensity through contrast ls made posslble •••• " 3 
Because the reverted feelings necessarily contain elements partially 
identical with elements in the feelings of the antecedent phase, it follows 
that even where novelty ls extreme, as ln the case of dominant actual occasions 
within man, novelty is nevertheless not unlimited. It also follows that the 
1 A!_, p. 210. 2ER,, PP• 368-69, 378-79, 388-89. 
3Ibid., P• 381. 
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causal actlvlty of God ls limited, for His Lure ls always within a context 
of the total data within which the subject emerges. God too must do the best 
he can, given the past state of affairs, and this ls true especially where He 
ts determlnlng the concrescence of other actual entitles. None the less, what 
ts equally slgniflcant ls that with reversion additional potentiality for 
novelty ls introduced into the process, for as "dlss!!"!lar" the reverted feel-
lng ls defined in terms of not-being what the eternal object of the valuated 
feeling ls--or would be, were only valuation to occur. The importance of re-
verted feelings ls that with them God supplies novel potentlallties for ln-
gression and thereby supplies the concrescing subject with a definite alterna-
tlve or set of altematives toward which it can direct its reactlon-£!:.2!! its 
past. In a manner of speaking, God thereby saves the creative advance within 
this individual subject from passing into !!!!£!negation and total nothingness 
(simple non-definiteness). 
What dl stlngutshes Conceptual Reversion in the case of the human "l lv-
lng person," ls that the reverted feeling nust be .. s.,..1_,m ... 1.-1,..a-.r ~ !.!. l!.!ll. !.!. fil· 
ferent !!:gm the valuatlve feelings. Since here the valuative feelings are 
slgnlflcantly different (higher grade), God supplies eternal objects propor-
tlonately different to function as appropriate Lures for feeling. What ls 
significant on the part of the human subject ls its ability to hold together 
the manifold complex data derived from the past and from God in the unity of 
its final complex contrast, its satlsfactlon, and thereby elicit that extreme 
level of depth and intensity of feeling that distinguishes the living person 
from all the rest. lbe nature of this final synthesis will be better under-
215 
stood as the analysts of the process of concrescence continues. Prior to lts 
final synthesis and next to be considered ls the important synthesis called 
a tranSDUted feeling. 
3. 6th Categoreal Obllgatlon: TransJJUtation and the 
Third Phase of Concrescence 
A transnuted feeling ls a physical feeling having as its data a mul-
tipllclty of actual occasions prehended as one macroscopic whole, that ls as 
a nexus. 1 Whitehead introduces the Category of Transmutation to account for 
the emergence of this derivative feeling: 
When (ln accordance with Category IV, or with Categories IV and V) one, 
and the same, conceptual f eellng ls derived impartially by a prehending 
subject from its analogous simple physical feelings of various actual en-
titles, then in subsequent phase of lntegration--of these simple physical 
feelings together wlth the derivate conceptual feellng--the prehendlng sub-
ject may transm.tte the datum of those prehended actual entitles, or of 
some part of that nexus; so that the nexus (or its part), thus qualified, 
ls the objective datum of a feeling entertained by this prehendlng sub-ject.2 · 
Although tranSDUtation ls important in high-grade occasions, Whitehead 
maintains that it occurs even ln the lower grade occasions. He accounts for 
this difference ln the following manner. In the third phase of concrescence, 
the physical feeling given in the initial phase and the conceptual feeling 
3 given at the second phase are integrated and synthesized ln a "contrast." To 
1 ~·• PP• 387, 383. 
2~., P• 384; also see P• 40. Whitehead's references to Categories 
IV and V are to the ''Categoreal Obligations.•• 
3see the 8th "Category of Existence," £!, p. 33 and the 17th ''Category 
of Explanation. tt p. 36. 
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simplify, it appears that here there are but a few basic posslbllltles gov-
erning the type of contrast that emerges. The physical datum given ln the 
initial phase can be 
(1) simple and non-reverted; 
(2) simple and reverted; 
(3) complex and all non-reverted; 
(4) complex and at least some and perhaps all reverted. 
Theoretically, in the case of (1) and (2) transnutatlon ls impossible, 
yet see above pages 145-53, esp. 145-48 and footnote 2 on page 147 of Olapter 
III of this dissertation. In the case of (3) and (4), that ls where the data 
are complex, we have the possibility of forming a nexus of the complex physl-
cal feeling through the contrast which ls a "translllltation." With this arises 
the subsequent possi bl U ty for the emergence of more comp! ex "proposl t tonal 
feellngs." 1 The conceptual feellngs given by the subject in the second phase 
can be (1) merely valuated and conformal, in which case there are accordingly 
four main types corresponding to the above dlvlslon of the physical datum; (2) 
reverted, ln which case additional types of contrasts are possible and when 
2 
coupled with either (2) or (4) yield double reversions. 
The above is misleadingly simplified. The possible complexities noted 
in the datum and in the subject are virtually limitless, for these can combine 
to form contrasts ranging from very simple to complex contra~~~ and even con-
3 trasts of contrasts, "and so on lndeflnltely to higher grades of contrast.'' 
l llli•, P• 393. 2 !.!?12.. t p. 386. 
3
,f!, p. 33. See p. 406: "'Comparative feellngs• are the result of 
integrations not yet c<Xtsidered; their data are generic contrasts. The inflnit 
variety of the more complex feelings come under the heading of •comparative 
feelings.•" 
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None the less the resulting contrast of "comparative feellngstt-
derived from a contrast of the data of phases one and two or, in the case of 
intellectual feelings, of one and three--can be divided lnto two main types. 
The originative comparative feelings are divided Into (a) "physical purposes" 
and (b) "intellectual feelings. tt Whitehead calls the comparative feelings 
arising in low-grade occasions physical purposes, for inaS11Uch as they do not 
acquire integration with conscious perceptions or intuitive judgments ln sub-
sequent phase(s) of concrescence, they do not, in themselves, involve conscl 
ness. 1 Depending on whether the physical purposesarlse from the contrast of 
physical feelings wlth conceptual feelings generated either according to the 
IVth or Vth Categoreal Obllgatlons, physical purposes are further divided in-
to those of the First or Second specles.2 In either case, as Sherburne says, 
with a physical purpose the eternal object, which had been pried out of 
immanence Into transcendence at the second phase of concrescence, sinks 
back lnto Immanence at the third phase; the indetermination as its tn-
gressions, which had characterized it ln the conceptual feeling, leaves 
It at the stage of physical purposes. The result ts that lt ceases to be 
a lure for feeling, and the process that isthe concrescence of its subject 
comes to a halt with this .. blank evaluatlon. 11 3 
Since Whitehead ls Intent on naintalnlng that transnutation occurs 
even in low-grade actual occasions, it follows that ln these occasions trans-
mutation at most results ln the simplest form of simple physical purpose. H 
conceptual reversion contrast ls at a mlninum and the contrasted transnuted 
data tend to sink into their previous state of immanent determination as in 
1 
.!.2.llt•t p. 406. 2 !!!.!J:l•• PP• 420-28. 
3see Sherburne,~ Whlteheadlan Aesthetic, p. 57 and~ Key, p. 65. The 
source of Sherburne•s remark seems to be .f!, p. 280. 
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the lnltlat stage of concrescence. Here ln effect no nexus ls adequately 
prehended, which ls to say that for all practical purposes tranS1ll1tatlon ls 
negligible and inslgnlflcant. Thls also explains why lt ls impossible for 
these actual occasions to experience the higher levels of prehenslon such as 
those attending sensation, consciousness, and the higher intellectual expert-
ences; for, any activity In the process of concrescence presupposes the prior 
acts upon which lt depends for its data. At the other extreme ls the "living 
person° composed of actual occasions each of which experiences hlgh level re-
verslon-trans1I11tatlon and consequently can further synthesize the activity of 
the humat organism by the lntroductlon of high-grade consciousness. 
Without having examined the lntrlcacles of the relatively simple 
activity of transnutatlon,we can point out several important aspects of the 
process ln summation. First, transm.ltation involves abstraction, negation, 
and simplification. From the nultipllclty of actual occasions, one eternal 
object (derivative either through Valuation alone or with Reversion) ls ab-
-
stracted and transnuted as a single datum. 1 Subsequently transnutation ls 
completed with the emergence of a transnuted physical feeling in which the nul 
tlpllcity of actual occasions originally given as data ln the receptive phase 
of concrescence are physically prehEnded as one macroscopic entity. Abstrac-
tlon involves negation, for in the process of transnutation the irrelevant 
nultlpllcltles of detail are ellmlnated. 2 Now the activity of negation and 
abstraction as well as afflrmatlon and unification has as lts source the menta 
pole, and since mentality ls the agent of simplification, transnutatlon ls a 
1 
.flit P• 98. 2 Ibid., PP• 388-89; cf. 383. 
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process of simpliflcatlon: 
Mentality is an agent of slmpllficatlon; and for this reason appearance 
is an incredibly simplified edition of reality. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The best acample of this process of simplification is afforded by the 
perception of a social nexus as a unity, characterized by qualities de-
rived from lts lndlvldual members and their interconnections. 
It ls thus that Whitehead introduces transm:.itatlon to further specify the mode 
of activity manifest by creativity ln the second and third phases of concres-
cence. 
Second, Whitehead means to account for our sense perception of a unl-
2 fled conmon world through the doctrine of transnuted feelings, and ln fact 
claims that for the animal life on Earth "by far the most important example of 
Transmtatlon ls afforded by Sense-Perception. 03 He goes so far as to suggest 
that ln practice for human beings "only transmitted feellngs acquire conscious 
ness."4 
Third, while some form of transJDJtation ls present ln most, perhaps 
every, process of concrescence, lt ls only with the higher actual occasions 
that lt emerges as an important distinguishing Category; for its heightened 
presence ls the first step toward intellectual experience properly so called. 5 
These points are well brought together ln the following passage, which because 
of its importance will be quoted in full: 
lAt _, P• 273; also see P• 274. 2pa _, P• 387; :Y,., PP• 273-82. 
3AI _, p. 274. 4PR _, P• 362. 
s Ibid., P• 383. 
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It ls evident that adverslon and aversion, and alsothe Category of 
Transnutatlon, only have importance ln the case of high-grade organisms. 
They constitute the first step towards intellectual mentality, though 
ln themselves they do not amount to consciousness. But an actual entity 
which includes these operations nust have an important intensity of con-
ceptual feelings able to mask and fuse the simple physical feelings. 
Also the examination of the Category of Transnutatian shows that the 
approach to lntellectuallty consists ln the gain of a power of abstractlo 
The irrelevant nultlpliclty of detail ts eliminated, and emphasis ls laid 
on the elements of systematic order in the actual world. In so far as 
there ls trivial order, there must be trlvallzed actual entitles. 'llle 
right co-ordination of the negative prehenstons ls one secret of mental 
progress; but unless some systematic scheme of relatedness characterizes 
the environment, there will be nothing left whereby to constitute vivid 
prehenslon of the world. The low-grade organism ls merely the summation 
of the forms of energy which flow in upon it in all their nultipllcity of 
detail. It receives, and lt transmits; but it falls to simplify into tn-
telllglble system.l 
We nust now relate the previous discussion to the question of human freedom. 
Here it ls necessary to discuss transnutation in conjunction with the higher 
forms of perception in the modes of presentational itmnediacy and symbolic re-
ference. 
4. Presentational Immediacy 
With transnutatlon in its more slgnlficant manifestations, arises the 
possibility of perception ln the mode of 0 presentatlonal immedlacy"-and with 
this the further possiblllty of perception in the mixed mode of "symbol lc re-
ference. 1' Perception in the pure mode of presentational immediacy ls an out-
growth in a later phase of concrescence of the complex data given with causal 
efficacy. To be precise, the data in both pure modes ls the same. But what 
was given as vague, 111 defined, and hardly relevant tn causal efflcacy,2 be-
l llli·' pp. 388-89. 
2see this chapter pp. 203-04. 
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COllles by the originative power of mentality in the supplemental phase "dis• 
1 
tlnct, well defined, and importantly relevant •••• •• lbe perception of pre-
sentational immediacy claims to be of something given contemporaneously with 
the perceiving actual occasion. 
Recall that contemporary occasions are def lned as being causally in-
dependent and consequently as manlfestlng only spatial extensiveness among 
themselves. Consistently Whitehead formally defines perception in the mode of 
presentational llillledlacy as perception "which merely, by means of a sensum, 
rescues from vagueness a contemporary spatial region, in respect to its spatia 
2 
shape and lts spatial perspective from the percipient... It ls important to 
understand that presentational lDBediacy involves an activity of abstraction 
from what was orlglnally given for the purpose of rendering this data clear, 
simple, and consequently capable of becoming more manageable. 
Whitehead says that obvious examples of presentational immediacy in 
which there ls no admixture of symbolic reference--i.e. no conscious interpre-
tatlon would be "delusive perceptions" such as viewing an image of a grey ston 
ln a mirror; visual delusions arising from some delirium or imaginative excite 
ment; some Instances of double vision; seeing the stars and nebulae of the 
Milky Way at night; feeling pain ln an amputated limb; and referring a bodily 
1
,f!., p. 262. Consequently the characteristics of the data of presen-
tational Immediacy are exactly opposite those of causal efficacy: 0 In comparl 
son they are distinct, definite, controllable, apt for immediate enjoyment, an 
with the mlnimJm of reference to the past, or to future." (.f!_, p. 271.) 
2!J?!.!!.., P• 185; see~, p. 277. 
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1 pain to some part of the body not ceustn-:; the riain. Powever, perception in 
the pure mode of presentatior..tll immediacy is n,:>t rc!Ztr!.ctcd tn delusive nnd 
deluslYe-llke sensati'.:lne. t,Ttii,tehead rmintalns that this mode ,-,f perception 
plays the d()J!llnant role in direct scient!fi c observations "::hi ch <:?im at ~'er .. 
ception purified of any !.nterpret:atiYc elaments. :~llmnles of thi ~ ·1':Y.tld b·~ 
"measuremente, detemlnetlons of relative spatial 'loslt!ons, dete!"rninatlo::-'3 of 
sensa-deta such es colours, ~ounds, tAstes, .'.9J!!ells, tenpere.ture fe~l!n~s, 
touch t eel i nr;~, etc. 112 
5clentific theory, "" the other hand, "ls stated in tarms referrtnn 
exclusively to the scheme of relatedness, which, so far as lt ls observed, in-
volves the percepts ln the pure mode of causal efflcacy. 113 To which can be 
added that lnasnuch as it ls interpretative and seeks to verify its theories 
in future as well as past experience scientific theory involves perception in 
the mixed mode of symbolic reference. 
In addition to the more S!lecinl cnse of ncientlftc theorizing, "in-
terpretative perceptions" are es~leclally evidenced ln our more ordinar~-' sense 
perceptionR. In fact, Wht tchenrt mAintatns thAt what me ordinArtly meAn~ by 
senne perception ls exompllfled in our direct vidual ~erceptlon of a ~rey stone 
-al": oppoi:ed to seeing lt in a mirror. In this type of perception, there ls 
alrea~/ nn element of synthesis and interpretation beyond the nere given of 
prP.~entational immediacy. There is a reference to a grey stone as an entity 
1
,f!, p. 186; also see pp. 100-01; !U_, pp. 274-75, 316-18. Yet cf. ~' 
PP• 21-25. Also cf• ~' 23, 3-23, 5, PP• 84-85; f.!i, PP• 38, 151-53. 
3 Ibid., P• 257. 
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having a past and a protsble future. Which is to say that here "symbolic 
reference" plays some part in the perception. Because the greater part of 
1 
conscious perception in human experience involves symbolic reference it ls 
some'What difficult to describe and analyze perception which involves nothing 
more than presentational irnmediacy--and the causal efficacy which it presup-
poses. What follows ls but an outline of such an analysis. 
Visually perceiving a stone, to use a more obvious instance of sense 
perception, ls made possible lnasnuch as the animal organism has evolved a 
rather elaborate structured society capable of supporting the necessary organs 
of sensation, ln this case the eye and optic nerves, embracing of course the 
nerv<1..1s system up to and including the brain. The visual perception of the 
stone ls a rather complex activity involving a causal passage through the many 
strings of actual occasions from the external data to the eye, through the 
nervous system, and culminating in the present actual occasion ln the personal 
society in the brain. 2 
There ls no question of direct perception of the contemporary occas-
sions, no direct perception of the nexus which ls the stone, for the original 
data of the final percipient ls its imnedlately antecedent actual occasions 
which are the directly prior personal actual occasion "and" the brain-and 
only through the brain the body and finally the stone. 3 Which is to say that 
ll..!tl.S,., PP• 255-56. 2 12.!.4· t p. 260. 
3~. P• 276; also see pp. 251-52; .f!i, PP• 188, 257. Finally see~. 
PP• 256-59, esp. 258 where w'hl tehead concludes that ttthe an lmal body ls the 
great central ground underlying all symbolic reference. tt 
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presentational ismnediacy arises in the supplemental phases of concrescence 
l 
and involves a projection (unfortunately so called) -also called "preclpi-
tation"2--of the sensa given in causal efficacy upon a region contemporary 
with the perceiving actual occasion. The result of this projection ls the 
perception of a nexus of occasions perceived as being &!!:£, there, !!!?X• 'nlls 
can be stated a bl t more technically. 'nle datum of perception in the mode of 
presentational lnaedlacy ls "the objectlflcatlon of a c<ntemporary nexus of 
actual entitles ln its unity as a nexus. The nexus ls illustrated as to its 
constitution by the spatial region, with lts perspective relatlons. 113 Com-
mentlng on this passage Schmidt summarizes how this datum arises: 
Thls nexus of contemporaries ls provided by the datum of a perceptive 
proposltlonal feeling wherein, by transnutatlon of content provided by 
past physical feelings, a group of entitles ls perceived as a unlty. The 
character of the unity derived from the past ls projected upon an ex-
tensive region as characterlzlng contemporary entitles which for that sub-
ject are potential, not actual, and are caUed4an ''image" ln contrast to an "object" in causal efficacy (.f! 98a, 386d). 
The importance of presentational immediacy for human freedom ls that 
wlth lt the animal ls able to begin to isolate groups of occasions in lts 
lillDedlate environment as distinct, definite, controlable and highly relevant 
ltems existing contemporaneously with itself, which ls slmllarily prehended 
as a macroscopic entity. As a consequence, the animal ls able to form deflnlt 
l~, P• 276; also see 251-52; l:S,, pp. 188, 257. Finally see .f!, pp. 
256-59 where Whitehead concludes that "the animal bocly ls the great central 
ground underlying all symbolic reference." 
2~ p. 314. 3PR 98 _, p. • 
4Perceptlon ~ Cosmology, p. 136. See all of Schmidt's flne detailed 
analysts of perception ln the mode of presentational iDllledlacy, Chapter lx, pp. 
134-47. 
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bonds of relationship with these other macroscopic entities. 'lhus the dog 
or the man ls able to percelvE the E!!I. there ~ as existing ln a commm en-
vlronment. 
However, and thls ls important, apart from some subsequent interpre-
tative element or what Whitehead calls of symbolic reference, the perception 
which is presentational lnnnediacy remains ln itself inefflclous to cause an 
addltlonal element of freedom to enter into the world. For considered in it· 
self and apart from the other modes of perception, the pure mode of presenta-
tional immediacy gives only lnformatlon of the present and none at all of the 
past or the future. 1 What ls ordinarily meant by human perception and by sens 
perception ln the higher animals and what is entailed ln exercising freedom on 
even this level of conscious awareness has a reference to the past and the 
probable future. Th.ta the dog perceives the .8£!2. stone there !!2l!. as the par-
ticular object within its total environment that !!!.!. thrown by the man and .!.!. 
striking him, and he fil!l l?.!. thereby free to react to l t accordingly. He may 
bite it, or flee from it, he may attack the man or run lovingly to him, recog .. 
nizing his master's playful act, or whatever. Tile point of thls freedom ls 
that wlth presentational lnnediacy the dog and the man can vividly perceive 
themselves &s present within a rather complex world of macroscopic entitles. 
As a consequence, they can subsequently through symbolic reference vividly 
perceive themselves as emerging from a conanon past and together affecting the 
macroscopic future. 2 But in the absence of symbolic reference the data of pre 
l.f!, PP• 189, 255, 261. 
2wtth symbolic reference comes the experience of a sense-perception 
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5entatlonal lmmedlacy in effect remain barren to lntroc:llce stgnlflcantly 
higher levels of freedom. 
D. Freedom .!!!.!!. Percept ton !!!. .sh!. ~ 
2£. Symbolic Reference 
Ordinary human perception, then, almost always has a reference to the 
past and the probable future, which ls to say that It includes some degree of 
conscious awwreness. Now conscious awareness emerges with perception In the 
mixed mode of symbolic reference arising In a still higher phase of concres-
cence: 
In the transition to a higher phase of experience there ls a concres• 
cence ln which prehenslons In the two modes are brought into a lU\lty of 
feeling: this concrescent unity arises from a congruity of their subjec-
tive forms in virtue of the identity relation between the two prehensions, 
owing to some components in common. Thus the symboUc reference belongs 
to one of the later originative phases of experience. These later phases 
are distinguished by their new element of originative freedom •••• When hu· 
man experience ls in question, •perception' alrost always means •percep-
tion in the mixed mode of symbolic reference.• 
Two things especially should be noted concerning symbolic reference. 
Flrst,2 the possibility for this mixed mode of perception ls ultimately to be 
that ls common to man and at least the higher subhuman animals (!:!,!, p. 99), 
and which can be characterized as the triumph of abstraction In animal experi-
ence: "Such a~stractlon arlses_from the growth of selective emphasis. It 
endows human Lan4 higher animal/ life with three gifts, namely, an approach to 
accuracy, a sense of the qualitative differentiation of external activities, a 
neglect of essential connections. 
These three characters of the higher animal experlence ..... namely, approx 
lmate accuracy, qualitative assignment, essential omisslon--together consti-
tute the focus of consciousness, as ln human experience." (fil, pp. 100-01.) 
1£!, P• 255. 2tbld., P• 262; cf. ~• PP• 49-56. 
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found in the common ground of the pure modes. Second, 1 whereas presentational 
lThere has been some controversey among Whitehead scholars over the 
precise relationship maintaining between symbolic reference and consciousness. 
At one extreme ts the position of Blyth. In his Whitehead's Theory .2! ~­
!edge (p. 84), Blyth crltlclzes ~'hltehead for not coordinating the explanation 
of conscious perception with the two modes of unconscious perception (causal 
efficacy and presentational Immediacy). Commentating on this, Sherburne in 
turn criticizes Blyth for falling to give an adequate interpretation of Whlte-
head' s meaning of the "datum0 which in presentational immediacy ls felt uncon-
sciously and which ls perceived consciously in symbolic reference. (~White­
headian Aesthetic, pp. 87-88, n. 10). Sherburne has shown that symbolic re-
ference ls a judgment occuring as a complex comparative feeling (or intellec-
tual feeling) and which as such involves propositional feelings and conscious-
ness. (l!!..l:!,., PP• 82-88; also see~ Key, pp. 113-14, 214-15, 246-47.) This 
would mean that every instance of symbolic reference Involves consciousness. 
On the other hand ls the interpretation of Schmidt. In his Perception 
and Cosmologx, Schmidt says that "Consciousness only arises in the developed 
phases of concrescence of highly complex organisms in connection with the vi-
vidness of the data of presentational immediacy in symbolic reference ... (p. 
132.) This does not mean that every act of symbolic reference involves con-
sciousness, however (p. 149.) It appears that Johnson views the matter nuch 
as Schmidt does, though perhaps for different reasons. (Whitehead's Theory. 
P• 86.) 
To us the most accurately stated interpretation occurs as a passing 
comment by Lawrence in his Whitehead's Philosophical Development, (pp. 335-
38.) Like Blyth, Lawrence observes that the two pure modes are meant to ex-
plain how the subject ls provided with perceptive content while their synthe· 
sis in symbolic reference accClJnts for conceptual analysis. Lawrence points 
out that symbollc reference must not, however, be identified with conceptual 
analysis, although there ls a strong interplay between the two. Indeed in ~' 
P• 19 Whitehead goes on to say that symbolic reference nust be explained an-
tecedently to conceptual analysts, and he uses the example of Aesop's dog 
(pp. 19, 20-21) to illustrate symbolic reference (conscious sense perception) 
operating the absence of conceptual analysis. This example, as Lawrence ls 
suggesting, indicates that there are degrees of symbolic reference and con-
sciousness, ranging from mere conscious attention of sensually perceived par-
ticulars to the higher forms of conceptual analysts. By using the distinctions 
introcllced earlier the positions of Schmidt, Lawrence, and perhaps Johnson 
can be combined with the excellent analysis of the process of concrescence of-
fered by Sherburne with the result that Whitehead's intended position would be 
stated more precisely and accurately: all symbolism will be seen to involve 
consciousness, but there are degrees of conscious activity and critical thresh· 
olds to be crossed. These thresholds wll 1 distinguish the conscloos actlvl ti es 
of the higher animals from the conscious activity proper to man alone and will 
in turn serve to specify the unique activity which ls man's freedom. This will 
specify precisely wherein lies the uniqueness of human freedom as a different 
and higher type of actlvlty. 
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tmmedlacy need not involve consciousness, lt ls precisely conscious prehenslon 
arising ln conjunction with presentational immediacy which gives rlse to sym-
bolic reference and which constitutes the emergence of a higher level of free-
dom. 
Whitehead explains that consciousness emerges as the subjective form 
of a feeling that involves a "proposltion.tt Therefore, before the conscious 
element of symbolic reference can be examined it will be necessary to say som 
thing about the nature of "propositional feellngs. 0 In the third phase of 
concrescence, there arises ln higher grade actual occasions. such as those 
constituting the living person, a contrast between the physical data given in 
the initial phase and conceptual feelings given ln the supplemental secondary 
phase. This contrast ls called a "proposition"- or "theory"l-and the result 
ing feellng of this datum ls termed a "proposltlonal feellng." 2 It ls called 
"proposltlonal'' because Whitehead conceives it as belng constituted by the in-
tegration of a "logical" subject and predicate; the former being the physical 
data felt now as a bare logical subject, a bare nul tipllcl ty, a bare "it••3 and 
the latter being the conceptual feelings now called the "predicative pattern • .A 
The manner in which propositional feelings differ from physical pur-
poses can now be stated more precisely. Whitehead explains that the latter 
are more primitive, lnasnuch as they are the result of a contrast of physical 
280. 2 !!tl.S•t PP• 35-36, 397, 391-92. 
P• 398; see~, p. 327. 
173. 
4£,!, p. 393. See Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy, (2nd. ed.) pp.161-
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and conceptual feelings culminating in an eternal object that does !l2S reduce 
the objective datum of the physical feeling to a llUltipllclty of bare logical 
subjects. In other words, abstraction and simplification ls not as complete 
l 
or extreme as ln the case of propositional feelings. Because the subject ls 
2 
reduced to a bare llllltipllcity, propositions function as lures for feeling. 
As such, though they JlllSt be either true or false, the importance of proposl-
tlons in the process of concrescence and especially for intellectual activity 
ls in their arousal of interest rather than ln their truth-value--though, as 
Whitehead says, the true ls usually more interesting than the false. 3 
By comparing the "indlcatlve feeling" from which the logical subjects 
are derived with the 0 physical recognition" from which the predicative pattern 
is derived propositional feelings can be divided very generally into (1) "per-
ceptive feeUngs" and (2) "imaginative feelings": where these feelings are 
identical there ls a ''perceptive feeling'' and where they are different there 
ls an 11 lmaglnatlve feellng. 114 Perceptive feelings are ln turn divided into 
(a) authentic!!!!!. directly derived feelins, i.e., involving no (or rather very 
little) tranSII1Jtatlon or reversion; 5 (b) authentic !!llt indirectly derived £.!!!. 
.!!l&t i.e., involving trans111.1tation; 6 and (c) unauthentic feellns, i.e., involv 
lng reverslon. 7 Because imaginative feelings arise from a difference between 
l.f!, PP• 280, 285-86, 421. 2 Ibid., PP• 37, 281-82, 394-96, 402. 
3tb1d., PP• 283-85, 395-97; .!l!_, 312-14. 4l,!, PP• 399-401. 
5 ~., P• 401. 6 .!JU!!.' p. 410. 
7.l.!2.!S.•t pp. 399-400. See Schmidt's Perception~ Cosmology., pp. 112 
13; Sherburne•s ~ Whiteheadlan Aesthetic., PP• 56-68. 
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the "lndlcatlve feelings'' and the "physical recognition," and because there 
are degrees of difference ranging from virtual identity all the way to ex-
treme ranote disconnection, imaginative propositional feelings simllarlly 
differ greatly in degree. Yet so far as there ls this difference, there ls 
1 
"some trace of free lmaglnatlon." When Whitehead considers the intellectual 
feelings--termed "lntultive judgments"-- which derive from imaginative propo-
sitional feelings lt will be seen that this species of propositional feelings 
are further divided into three basic sub-species. 
lbe above divisions of propositional feelings ls very important in 
Whitehead's system and therefore demands a nuch more extensive presentation 
than the above outline might indicate. For the purpose of this work, however, 
it will suffice to emphasize these points. First, intellectual feelings will 
be distinguished according to the propositional feelings from which they are 
2 in part derived. As we shall see. this will be the basis for dlstlngulshing 
human cognition as a uniquely higher kind of awareness and as a consequence, 
human freedom as being similarly unique ln kind. 
Second, thro.agh propositional feelings Whitehead wishes~ further 
specif)".~ manner !!l which ~ creative advance occurs !!. ~higher level 
2!. actua1 occasions. 3 Here two points nust be kept in mind. The proximate 
organ of novelty wlthln the concresclng subject ls lts mental pole, and there-
fore Whitehead ought to hold that th,e emergence of propositional feelings ls 
due to the increased activity mentality evidenced in higher grade actual occa-
l.f!.t PP• 401-02. 2 !..!?!!!•t p. 417. 3Ibld., pp. 286-87, 396. 
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slons. In fact thls ls Whitehead's explicit position. Comparing physical 
pUrposes with proposltlonal prehenslons, Whitehead says that the acquisition 
of the eternal objects in the former instance evidences the "'abruptness• of 
mental operations," whereas proposl tlonal prehenslons are the result of the 
increase ln mentall ty: "But with the growth of lntensl ty in the mental pole, 
evidenced by the flash of novelty in appetltlon, the appetltion takes the form 
1 
of a 'propositional prehenslon. "' The second point has to do wlth the mode 
ln which creativity manifests itself at the level of propositional perceptions 
nie discussion of these perceptions ls meant to be a further specification of 
the principle that creativity determines by negation. For propositional feel-
ings are made possible by a double elimination or abstraction, that ls by a 
two fold negation: 
In this integration L";f "indlcatlve" and 11predlcatlven feellns!l the two 
data are synthesized by a double elimination involving both data. 'nle 
actual entitles involved in the datum of the indlcatlve feeling are re-
duced to bare mltlpllcity in which each ls a bare "it" wlth the elimina-
tion of the eternal object really constituting the deflnlteness of that 
nexus. But the integration rescues them from this mere 11Ultlpliclty by 
placing them in the unity of a proposition wlth the glven predicate pat-
tern. Thus the actuallties, which were first felt as sheer matter of fact 
have been transformed into a set of logical subjects with the potentiality 
for reallzlng an assigned predicative pattern. nie predicative pattern ha 
also been llmlted by ellminatlon. For as a datum ln the conceptual feel-
lng, lt held lts poAslbllity for realization in respect to absolutely any 
actual entitles; but ln the ~roposltion its possibilities are limited to 
Just these logical subjects. 
With this double negation initiated by the high-grade level of mental-
ity, proposltlonal feelings continue the process of ellmlnatlon and abstractio 
characteristic in tttransmutatlon," only now at a higher level in actuality. 
1 ~., PP• 286-87, 280. 
232 
consequently additional levels of complexity, of negation and of synthesis are 
introduced. Thls the mode creativity or the creative advance takes with 
l higher grade actual occasions. 
Third, because propositions come into being with the creative advance 
of the world, lt ls necessary to note ln passing the role played by God in the 
advanced stage of thls process. nie principle that God supplies the novel 
forms of definiteness for ingression still applies, though we are here at a 
higher level ln the hierarchy of actuality and consequently a higher order po-
tentiallty will be required. A proposition ls a hybrid type of entity tnvolv-
tng a complex eternal object contrasted as an lngredlent within some logical 
subject. It functions as a novel lure for feeling. Therefore the question ls 
what ls the source of the orlgln of these lures for feeling. Here Whitehead 
says, 
The primary element ln the 'lure for feeling• ls the subject's pre-
prehenslon of the primordial nature of God. Conceptual feelings are gen-
erated, and by lntegratlon with physical feelings a subsequent phase of 
proposltlonal feelings supervenes. The lure for feeling develops with the 
concrescent phase of the subject ln question. I have spoken of lt else-
where (cf. Science !.!!S! Sh! Modern World, Ch. XI). 
"It ls thls realized extension of eternal relatedness beyond the nutual 
relatedness of the actual occasions which prehends into each occasion the 
full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term thls abrupt realization the 
•graded envlsagement• which each occasion prehends into lts synthesis. 
This envlsagement ls how the actual includes what (ln one sense) ls •not-
belng• as a posltlve factor ln lts own achievement. It ls the source of 
error, of truth, of art, of2ethlcs, and of religion. By lt, fact ls con-fronted with alternatives." 
l~., PP• 286-87, 396, 427-28. 
2Ibld., P• 287; cf. 381-82. See Parmentier, 1::!, Phllosophle S!_ White-
head, Chapter lx, esp. PP• 399-417. 
233 
In other words, the uniqueness of the proposition as a datum for higher grade 
intellectual feeling has as lts extrinsic source the high-grade eternal ob-
ject offered by God to be integrated into the process of concrescence of the 
emerging subject. 
Fourth, though a necessary ingredient for consciousness, propositional 
feelings need not themselves involve consciousness, and still less do they 
necessl tate judgments. In fact, Whitehead says that "judgments" and "con-
1 
sclousness" are rather rare components in propositions. It ls only When 
propositl anal feelings are taken-up into another and subsequent synthesis that 
conscious feelings and lntellectlon arises; it ls at this point that symbolism 
occurs. 
To better understand perception in the mixed mode of symbolic referenc 
it ls important to grasp (1) that symbolic reference involves a "judgment"; 
(2) that this judgment involves ccnsclousness; (3) that consciousness ts the 
mode of activity manifest by creativity ln high-grade actual occasions; and (4 
that here consciousness is at a comparatively low level. 
As to the !!.!:!S,, Sherburne has shown2 that symbolic reference ls a 
judgment3 ln a high-grade actual occasion whose component parts are the data 
perceived in the mode of causal efficacy and in the mode of presentational im-
mediacy. Speaking of this synthesis Sherburne says, 
1E.B,, P• 281. 
2~ Whiteheadian Aesthetic, PP• 82-88. 
3A judgment ls a synthetic feeling, embracing two subordinate feelings 
ln one propositional feeling. In this context judgment ls not to be understoo 
as meaning "intuitive judgment." 
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The pinnacle of enhancement achieved at c Lvlth presentational irnmediac:./ 
by actual occasions of the highest order is a lifting of the past into 
the present, a lifting into ''distinct, prominent, relevance" in the mode 
of presentational lnmedlacy of sensa but va8!!,ely felt in the mode o! ca.asal 
efficacy. The final synthesis occurs at d Lwlth symbolic referenC!,f; the 
heavy, vague feeling of efficacy associated with a prel\ended nexus has 
superimposed upon it the brilliant clarity of distinct regions exhibiting 
sensa. This superimposition ls more than the sum of the two more priml· 
tlve modes of perception, more than a mere reference from one mode to an-
other; it ls one unified mode of perception, the mixed mode of percep-
tion, i.e. symbolic reference. It has a metaphysical unity correspondinf 
to the unity of everyday perceptual encounters with stones and trees •••• 
Secondly, symbolic reference involves consciousness. "Conscious-
ness," says Whitehead, "ls the subjective form involved in feeling the con-
trast between the 'theory• whlch may be erroneous and the fact whlch is 
•given. '"2 The "given facts" in conscious experience refer to the data phys-
lcally prehended at the initial phase of concrescence, while the "theory" re-
fers to the propositional feeling arising in the subsequent third phase. 
Whitehead calls the feelings that emerge from these types of genetic contrasts 
"intellectual feelings" and, depending on the type of propositional feelings 
from which they in part emerge, he further divides them into "conscious per-
ceptions" and "intuitive judgments. 113 
Whitehead's description of conscious perception points to its identi• 
ficatlon with perception in the mixed mode of symbolic reference. Conscious 
perception is said to arise "from the integration of the perceptive proposi-
tional feeling with the original physical feellng. 114 Now perception in the 
1~ Whiteheadian Aesthetic, p. 86. 
2
,f!, P• 245. Also see 13th "Category of Explanation": "That there 
are many species of subjective forms, aich as emotions, valuations, purposes, 
aversions, consciousness, etc." (.fB,, p. 35.) 
3 !.!?!.4•t PP• 406-07. 4ibtd.' p. 409. 
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mode of symbolic reference appears to satisfy this description, 1.e. symbolic 
reference involves consciousness. 'lllis mixed mode of perception arises as a 
synthesis of the given "factstt which are the original physical feelings pre-
hended in the mode of causal efficacy with the "theory" which ls the percep-
tive propositional feeling prehended in the mode of presentational immediacy. 
Depending on the particular species of perceptive propositional feel-
ing involved in this synthesis, i.e. depending on the presence and degree of 
transmutation and/or reversion involved in presentational immediacy, symbolic 
reference evidences more-or-less freedom, or novelty, more-or-less fidelity 
with the given fact. To this extent perception in the mode of symbolic re-
ference, that ls, conscious perception, may yeild untrue or erroneous percep-
tions. Error is possible when presentational immediacy takes the form of 
either unauthentic or indirectly authentic perceptive propositional feel-
1 ings. Error and even evil-pain, suffering, death-! s often the price an 
animal pays for the freedom that accompanies conscious perception. 
Thirdly, in high-grade actual occasions the activity of creativity 
takes the form of consciousness. Again calling to mind the interpretations o 
Chapter II concerning the role of mentality ln the process of concrescence 
and the fact that creativity actuates through negation, it remains to be ob-
served that Whitehead consistently maintains that an integral part of con-
scious awareness, be it perceptive, conceptual, or, as ls often the case, a 
mixture emphasizing one or the other, that this awareness involves a radically 
10n the possibility of error in conscious perception see Schmidt, 
Perception !,ru! Cosmology, pp. 112-13, 145-47, 152-87; Sherburne, A. Wbitt• 
headian Aesthetic, PP• 66-69, 82-87, esp. 87. 
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negative element as its distinguishing characteristic. 
Whitehead introduces this negative element where he further specifies 
the manner in which consciousness emerges as the subjective form in high-grad 
actual occasions. Consciousness belongs to the subjective form when an ''af-
firmation-negation" contrast has entered into it: 
The subjective form will only involve consciousness when the 'af flrmation 
negation' contrast has entered into it. I.n other words, consciousness 
enters into the subjective forms of feelings, when those feelings are com 
ponents in an integral feeling whose datum ls the contrast between a nexu 
which !.!.• ~nd a proposition which in its own nature negates the decision 
of its truth or falsehood. 'llle logical subjects of the proposition are 
the actual entitles ln the nexus. Consciousness is the way of feeling 
that particular real nexus, as ln contrast with imaginative freedom about 
it. nte consciousness may confer importance uron ~ the real thing ls, 
or upon what the imagination ls, or upon both. 
In an intellectual feeling the datum ls the generic contrast between a 
nexus of actual entitles and a proposition with its logical subjects mem-
bers of the nexus. In every generic contrast its unity arises from the 
two-way functioning of certain entitles which are conponents ln each of 
the contrasted factors •••• The cormnon 'subject• entertaining the two feel-
ings effects an Integration whereby each of these actual entitles obtains 
its one rate of a two-way functioning in one generic contrast. As an ele 
ment in the subject no objectified actual entity can play two disconnedte 
parts. ntere can only be one analysable part •••• 'lllls one analysable part 
involves in Itself the contrast between the sheer matter of fact, namely, 
what the objectified entity in question contributes to the objectified 
nexus in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality, of the same 
actual entity for playing its assigned part in the predicative pattern of 
the proposition, in the eventuality of the proposltlon•s realization. 
This contrast ls what has been termed the 'affirmation-negation contrast.• 
It ls the contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the 
physical feeling, and the mere potentiality which ls the negation of such 
affirmation, in the propositional feeling. It is the contrast between 'i 
!!.sl' and 'might '!!.!,' in respect to particular instances in .!;h!!, actual 
world. ntus in experience, consciousness arises by reason of intellectual 
feelings, and in proportion to the variety and intensity of such feelings. 
As these texts indl cate, it ls termed an "affirmation-negation con-
1
.!!!i, P• 399. 2 !!tl.2.·· pp. 286, 407. 
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trast," because it expresses the fact that consciousness ls the result of a 
synthesis of physical data which are "affirmed" and a proposltim which fur-
ther abstracts from or "negates" these same data. In extreme instances, ne-
gation wlll be absolute and the predicate will be simply denied of the logical 
subject. The afflrmatlon ls grounded in the initial phase of concrescence 
and expresses the relationship of determination by means of causal efficacy. 
The subject nev.- totally frees itself from its past, however, and consequent-
ly this is Whitehead's explanation of the fact that the past determines the 
present subject, not only in the lnitlal phase of concrescence but also sub-
sequently throughout the latter phases--and this holds even where the subject 
ls a high-grade actual occasion such as those dominant in high-grade animals 
and including man. 
Nevertheless, the subject does manifest a rather high degree of free-
dom, and this is agaln explained by Whitehead's appeal to the data themselves 
and to the subject's mental activity. Concerning the data, recall that sense 
perception ls possible inasJ111ch as the animal has developed a sophisticated 
and unimaginably complex structured society which ls the animal body. In 
higher animals are developed the organs of sensation which enable the complex 
welter of sense data to be Isolated and transmitted to the prehendlng regnant 
occasion in the brain. But the subject can introduce novelty to match the 
complex environment, and it ls able to do so because of its heightened degree 
of mental activity. It will be remembered that mental experience is the organ 
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of novelty, 1 and that mentality ls the agent of slmpllflcation. 2 
It follows that in very hlgh-grade occasions, such as those domlnat-
lng high-grade animals, the creative advance which ls operative through the 
agency of the mental pole manifests itself differently, that is at a slgnlf-
lcantly higher level of actuality. Since the important threshold of con-
sclousness has been crossed, Whitehead introduces a new term and says that th 
agency of the mental pole manifests itself as the "afflrmatlon-negatlon con-
trast." Or rather, l t ls the presence of J:.!!!S, ~ and ~ mental l ty that 
together make there to be a prehenslon of !!!!.! macroscopic organism that ls 
common-senslcally, and here philosophically and sclentlflcally, recognized 
as a high-grade animal. 
As specifying the manner in 1dllch eternal objects ingress in crea-
tivity, consciousness manifests the special way negation determines these 
high-grade occasions. The negation in this contrast takes the form of a 
proposition which, it was shown, has itself simplified the indicative and 
predicative feelings through a double negation that effected an important ab-
stractlon. With consciousness thls process of negation, slmpllflcatlon, and 
abstraction continues at a still higher level; for the propositlon,whlch ls 
itself a synthesis lying between physical and conscious purposes, 3 ls here 
1FR 33 
-' P• • 
2.6,!., P• 273: "It ls a mistake to suppose that, at the level of human 
intellect, the role of mental functionlngs ls to add subtlety to the content 
of experience. The exact opposite ts the case. Mentality ls the agent of 
slmpllflcatlcn •••• " 
3!!!, P• 427. 
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taken-up into a further synthesis which involves an additional "negations," 
and which results in what Whitehead calls a conscious prehension. 'llte !!-
flrmative and negative element within conscious experience ls well brought 
out in the following passage; 
Also, all awareness, even awareness of concepts requires at least the 
synthesis of physical feelings with conceptual feeling. In awareness 
actuality, as a process in fact, ls integrated with the potentialities 
which illustrate either what it is and might not be, .2£ what it ls not 
and might be. In other words, there is no consciousness without refer-
ence to definiteness, affirmation, and negation. Also affirmation in-
volves its contrast with negation and negation involves its contrast with 
affirmation. Further, affirmation and negation are alike meaningless 
apart from reference to the definiteness of particular actualities. Con-
sciousness ls how we feel the afflrmatlon-negatlon contrast. Conceptual 
feeling ls the feeling of an unqualified negation; that ls to say, it is 
the feeling of a definite eternal object wlththe deflnlte aKtruslon of 
any particular realization. Consciousness requires that tho objective 
datum should involve (as one slde of a contrast) a qualified negative 
determined to some definite situaticn •••• this doctrine implies that there 
ls no consciousness apart from propositions as cne element ln the objec-
tive datum.l 
That negation ls meant to play an important role in perception in the 
mode symbolic reference is seen ln that even here at the level of mere sense 
perception consciousness entails perceiving not only what is but also what ls 
not. Recurring to the example of consciously perceiving the grey stone, that 
is perceiving it ln the mode of symbolic reference, Whitehead says that within 
this perception there ls an element of negation, of perceiving the stone as 
not-g?"ey. To be sure, there will be degrees of negation, and this will ex-
plain how perceptive propositional feelings may take one of three forms. 
Rather, these forms are expressions of these diverse negations: depending on 
1!!?.!.4• t P• 372. 
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the presence and extent of transnutation and e:spec1ally reversion conscious 
l perception introduces an additional element of novelty into experience. As 
we shall see presently, when we come to man, the actual occasions exercising 
domination as the living person are able to explicitly fornulate this nega-
tlve conscious perception, with the result that what emerges ls the highest 
manifestation of conscious perception: 
The general case of conscious perception ls the negative perception, 
namely, •perceiving this stone as not grey.• The •grey• then has ingres-
sion In its full Character of a conceptual novelty, illustrating an al-
ternative. In the positive case, 'perceiving this stone as grey,' the 
grey has ingression in its character of a possible novelty, but in fact 
by its conformity emphasizing the dative grey, blindly felt. Conscious-
ness ls the feeling of n_!g~tion: in perception of 'the stone as not 
grey,• ~uch feeling is Lin/ full development. Thus the negative percep-
tion ls the triumph of consciousness. It finally rises to the peak of 
free imagination, in which the conceptual novelties search through a uni-
verse in which they are not datively exempllfled.2 
Fourthly, with perception in the mode of symbolic reference conscious-
ness ls at a comparatively low level. What has been said concerning conscious 
perception applies to each of its manifestations. It applies to the conscious 
perceptions of the so called "higher brutes" as well as to man. Consequently 
its presence serves to identify the unique mode of freedom that both groups 
have in common and which is lacking in the vegetative klngdom--so far as can 
be presently determined. ~ow conslousness evidences itself in varying degrees 
1Beslde the threefold division of perceptive proposition'!! frn1 ings 
see Whitehead's division of "conformal" and "non-conf'>rmal 11 propositions in 
!:lit P• 284. 
2£!., P• 245. As we shall see, what differentiates conscious percep-
tion from ••intellectual conceptionstt ls that whereas the former ls character-
ized by a feeling of the contrast on the level of mere particularity, the lat-
ter ls characterized by an explicit conscious awareness of the generic feature 
of the contrasted data. 
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and there is an important threshold to be crossed. In order to establish the 
basis of this threshold, it will be necessary to consider the activities that 
differentiate the actual occaslais constituting the living human person from 
all the rest and which, as a consequence, specifies the unique mode of freedom 
manifest by man. This is the subject of the following chapter. 
-CHAPTER V 
HUMAN FREEDOM: ITS PLACE IN ntE MACROCOSMIC SCllEME 
In Chapter IV we investigated the earlier stages ln the process of 
concrescence of the regnant actual occasions of the human scul. We observed 
how freedom ls built-up through a series of perceptions in the modes of 
causal efficacy, presentational immediacy, and low-grade symbolic reference. 
We are now in a position to complete our study of human freedom in Whitehead's 
phllosophy. First, we will introduce the higher mode of "perception" associ-
ated with high-grade hulllln mental activity, namely, what we call "intellectual 
consciousness." We wll 1 show how, in Whi teheadSterms, thl s can be understood 
to be a unique mode of consciousness not at all to be found in lower grade 
actual occasions such as the regnant occasion of the higher "brute animals." 
Second, we will show how as a consequence of this level of consciousness 
Whitehead wishes to explain the unique mode of self-determination exercised 
by these higher actual occasions and thereby wishes to explain the unique mode 
of self-determination evidenced by the macroscopic organism taken as a whole. 
-242-
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A. Ih!, Hlsher Phases g!_ Concrescence 
lntellectual Conceptlon 
What we have chosen to call 11lnte11ectual conception" is a relatively 
rare happening in nature. As we shall see presently, Whitehead malntains that 
as far as we know only human belngs are so constltuted that thelr regnant 
actual occasions are capable of exerclslng thls hlgher type of mental activity 
and the higher type of freedom associated with lt. In order to understand 
Whitehead's meaning, we have had to examine the various stages in the process 
of concrescence prior to lntellectual conception. There ts no gainsaying this 
order of procedure, for higher human conscious activity ts not to be separated 
from the process of concrescence taken as a whole, unlfled actlvlty. We wlll 
now examine the final phase of concrescence and show that ln terms of White-
head's philosophy it ls correct and meaningful to speak of the unlqueness of 
intellectual conception and human freedom. 
Though Whitehead does not use the term, we have selected 11 lntell actual 
conception" as a generic name to refer to all of those consclous experlences 
which are on a hlgher level than mere "consclous perceptlon," "perceptive lm-
agination," "perceptive abstractions" and memories of these that man shares 
with the sub-human animals. 1 The term "intellectual" follows Whitehead's 
11n ~ Whitehead speaks of "conceptual analysts" ln order to distin-
guish between perceptual and conceptual awareness, but he does not explain 
how this mode of awareness dl ffers from low-grade "symboU c reference." (S, 
PP• 18-21). When ln .f! he does introduce the categoreal ldeas in terms of 
which such a distinction can be explalned, unfortunately he does not develop 
that explanation and he does not make use of the older term. 
In developing Whitehead's explanation we have therefore selected a 
phrase which ts closely related to Whitehead's later terminology and which 
conveys his intentions, as it seems to us, to dlff erentiate sharply human con-
ceptual awareness and free choice as a uniquely hlgher mode of activity. 
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terminology and conveys his explicit contentlan that these and all subsequent 
and derivative feelings are on the level of cmsciousness. ••conception" was 
chosen to refer to the common characteristic of these feelings when dlstln-
guished from the lower types of "intellectual feelings." Sense perception 
entails cognition of the particular or singular physical data as physical and 
particular and at most occasionally rises to the level of perceptual general! 
zatlon. "Perceptive imagination" and memory of conscious perception retains 
this reference to the orlgtnal sensible experience. The freedom associated 
with these levels of consciousness ls limited to choosing between this and 
that perceived macroscopic entity. Unlike these, "conception'' conveys the 
ldea that the higher conscious experiences bear upon the uniquely human grade 
of cognitive experience that goes "beyond'' the mere particular sensible and 
perceptual generalizable and attends to the cmceptually Entertained "general 
proposl ti ans. tt 
It ls necessary to introduce some such term because Whitehead's dis-
cussion of "intellectual feelings" ln Process .!!!!.!, Reality simply does not ex-
plicitly treat of many types of higher conscious feelings that he recognizes 
in this and many other works. In fact, as Schmidt has observed, Whitehead 
has not even formally explained how memory of sense experience ls possible, 
though his system can be shown to easily accomodate the experlence. 1 
Before analyzing "intellectual conception" ln some detail, lt ls ap-
propriate to present at least a tentative division of the more basic types of 
intellectual feelings. Schmidt has offered an alternative to Whitehead's 
lperceptlon ~ Cosmology, P• 157 (see PP• 154-60). 
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division of "intellectual feellngs" and therefore lt is best to begin with 
it. 
Observing that Whitehead discusses only two species of intellectual 
feelings, namely, conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments, Schmidt sug-
gests that Whitehead's division be so modi fled as to accomodate "conscious 
men,ory." Intellectual feelings would then be divided into (l)''intuitive 
judgments," (2) "inferential judgments," and (3) "conscious recognitions,'' 
these latter belng subdivided into (3a) ••conscious perceptions" and (3b) "con 
scious memories. 111 Schmidt shows that by extending the theory of prehension, 
rather than by seriously modifying it, Whitehead's several references to con-
scious memories can be explicitly appended to his discussion of intellectual 
feelings. He proceeds to argue convincingly that the two species of conscious 
recognitions are to be distinguished by the presence or absence of presenta-
tional immediacy in their constitution: it being present in (3a) and absent 
in (3b), i.e., conscious memories are to be explained solely by causal effi-
cacy.2 
The inclusion of lnferentlal judgments (also called derivative judg· 
ments) ln Schmidt's division ls certainly warranted on textual grounds and 
would seem to account lnlarge measure for the .!!!.!!. !!!2£.! complex types 2£. 
••comparative feelings" alluded to by Whitehead. 3 For whlle Whitehead llsts 
only two main species of intellectual feelings, it DUst be remembered that•\n-
tellectual feelings•• and ''physical purposes" are but two classes from an ''in-
l!.!!1$!., PP• 154-57. 3.f!, pp. 292-93, 416; 418. 
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finite variety of the more complex feeltngs" that come under the heading of 
''comparative feelings," and they are "simple types" at that. 1 Inferential 
judgments would consequently appear to be a major type of those complex com-
parative feelings arising in still higher phases of concrescence. They will 
depend in the main uponthe intuitive judgments from which they are derived 
and upon the subjective alm guiding the process. 
It seems to us that Schmidt's classification needs to be expanded 
so as to allow for a further differentiation of the major types of complex 
comparative feelings. For as it stands, lt does not serve to sharply dlf-
ferentiate the unique characteristic of high-grade human consciousness nor, 
therefore, can lt function to distinguish the uniqueness of high-grade human 
freedom. In the first place, on the level of the more simple intellectual 
feelings a place uust be made for at least two other important feelings: for 
"conscious imagination," which Whitehead discusses ln conjunction with "in-
tuitive judgments" with which they are not to be confused2 and for conscious 
1 l.!?!S.• , P• 407. 
2.f!., pp. 419-20. It ls somewhat surprising to find Sherburne identify. 
lng conscious imagination with suspended intuitive judgments. Discussing this 
species of intuitive judgments Sherburne says that lt "ls quite indifferent to 
truth or falsehood, as when a fairy tale begins with the phrase •once upon a 
tii:ie. • This latter ls an instance of conscious imagination.•• (A Whl teheadian 
Aesthetic, P• 67.) It ls true that Whitehead does speak of their identity 
where he says, 0 Suspended judgments are weapons essential to scientific pro-
gress. But in intuitive judgments the emotional pattern may be dominated by 
indifference to truth or falsehood. We have then •conscious imagination.• We 
are feeling the actual world with the conscious imputation of imagined predi-
cates be they true or false." (,f!, P• 419.) However, Whl tehead clarl fl es hls 
meaning when he lmmedi ately adds that ''When we compare these three cases of in· 
tultlve judgment (involving attention to truth) with conscious lmaginatlon 
(involving inattention to truth), that ls to say with •tmputative feeling,• we 
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aesthetic experience which ls such an important part of human experlence. 1 
In the second place, Schmidt does not sufficiently distinguish be-
tween different kinds of memories. 'Dlere are two distinct kinds of memory 
experience depending largely upon the original experience, and therefore 
memories ought to be divided into (1) memories of conscious sense perception 
and (2) memories of intellectual conception, be they of intuitive judgments, 
conscious aesthetic experiences, conscious imagination, or of the many varl· 
etles of even more complex comparative feelings such as derivative judgments 
and religious feelings. 2 
note that except in the case of negative judgments, the datum of the consclou 
imagination ls identical with the datum of the corresponding judgment. Never 
theless, the feelings are very different ln their emotlon~l patterns. One 
emott2nal pattern ls dominated by lndl ff erence to truth L"consc!ous imagina-
tion!!,/; 8!,ld the other emotional pattern by attention to truth L"intuitive 
judgment!/. {.!:!,, pp. 419-20.) Textual considerations thus prevent any facil 
identification of suspended judgments and consciCA.ls imagination. Rather con-
scious imaginations are distinguished from intuitive judgment; moreover, thl 
reading dispels the disconcerting suggestion {certainly not explicitly intend 
by Sherburne) that schmtiflc hypothesis begin with "once upon a time." 
lsee for example, !\!., PP• 324-351. 
2At this point an objection might be forthcoming to the effect that 
Schmidt's analysts is adequate to explain memories of intellectual conceptions 
and therefore lt ls unnecessary to further subdivide the category of conscious 
memory. For an argument would be made, and would have to be granted, that 
memories of intellectual conceptual experience can also be explained solely 
in terms of causal efficacy and that consequently the memories are on the same 
level. As Schmidt says concerning conscious memories, "It seems that presen-
tational immediacy ls not involved in conscious memories for the following 
reasons. There ls no projection of content on a contemporary region. There 
ls not even association of the content with the seat-region but only with 
some past region. On the other hand, there ls a sense in which the content 
{eternal objects) ls immediately present to our awareness, but this need only 
be an awareness of an actual entity in our personal society and not of any co 
contemporaries. We might call this 'subjective immediacy• in contrast to pre-
sentational immediacy, which involves a reference to contemporaries. Con-
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In the third place, Schmidt's division does not adequately indicate 
the scope of the more complex types of complex comparative feelings. Thus he 
speaks of but inferential judgments and omits such feelings as aesthetic and 
religious experience. That ls, tt ls not at all apparent that religious ex-
perience and statements of religious beliefs or conscious ae~thetlc feelings 
are identical with any cne of the species of feelings listed by Schmidt. 
Furthermore, a good argument could be made for including all of the 
sciences and philosophy as well as common-sense reflections among the still 
more complex types of comparative feelings especially when considering them 
as either speculative or practical bodies of knowledge. As such, they have 
inferential parts or moments; also they no less than the arts are moved at 
sci<lls memories seem to involve only causal efficacy." (Perception ,!!!!! .£2.!.-
mology, p. 157.) While this may well explain the similarity among memories, 
namely their unique genesis as the integration of the objectified satisfac-
tion of some past actual occasion ln my personal society with the specious 
present actual occasion of this same society (p. 156-57), it ignores the fact 
that the objectified data that are remembered are very different ln each case. 
It ls telling that Schmidt joins conscious memory with conscious perception 
to form the category of conscious recognitions. This seems to restrict mem-
ory to sense experiences, and tn fact hts examples of conscious memory are of 
past sense experiences, of seeing a red-winged bird or of hearing lts nuslcal 
chants. Explaining how conscious memory differs from conscious perception 
Schmidt consistently appeals to the double reference or double integration of 
the perceptive propositional feeling. But intellectual conceptions are deri-
vative from lmagtnatlve propositional feelings, and therefore lnasnuch as 
these give rise to a different and higher kind of cognitive experience the 
memory of intellectual conceptions will similarily be of a different and 
higher kind. Yet Schmidt's analysts holds, but here it ls the lmagtnattve 
propositional feeling which evidences a double reference: (1) a direct ref-
erence to some members of the personal society constituting the remembering 
self, and (2) an indirect reference to those actual entitles which the !.!!!l-
lnative proposition describes. (p. 157.) This ts a cJ:Uctal distinction, for 
there ls a great difference between remembering the red-wing bird and calling 
to mind Godel's proof. 
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least lmpllcltly by beauty, i.e. the aesthetic experience, almost as nuch as 
by the desire to seek the true or do the good. Which ls not surprising, sine 
for Whitehead the basic and original form of experience ls aesthetic. More-
over, the greater part of lmaglnatlve artistic creation would seem to bel<Xlg 
here, for the works of art are concerned with !!2£.!S!!!!l the mere aesthetlc 
experlence. 'lbus, for example, the artistic creation ls not totally uncon-
nected with truth, though its primary purpose ls to grasp the Truth of reallt 
as lt ls revealed ln lts Beauty. 
This ls not the place to enter into a detailed examination of the 
dlvlslon of these and other types of "intellectual conceptions." We are con-
cerned rather to call attention to Whitehead's sometimes implicit sometimes 
explicit contention that these conceptions are on a higher order than mere 
sense perceptions, sense imagination, and sense memory. Moreover, it ls im-
portant for our topic lnasnuch as the uniqueness of h.lman freedom ls directly 
bound up with the uniqueness of higher human conscious awareness. It will 
therefore suffice that the common characteristic unique to these high-grade 
feelings be examined, and that this be related to the task of discerning the 
ground of human freedom. 
Whitehead's explanation of the uniqueness of intellectual conception 
follows the pattern already observed ln his analysis of transnutatlon, prop-
ositions and propositional feelings, and conscious perception. A higher level 
of actuality emerges as the consequence of greater complexity of integration 
in the process of concrescence. In turn, this ls traced to two underlying fac 
tors: the significantly more complex and varied data at this stage ln concres 
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cence and the subject's greater power of mentality which introduces slgnlfl-
cant novelty to match and re-organize the data in a higher synthesis. 
The datum of an "intuitive judgment" is a contrast of the physical 
feeling of a nexus of actual occasions and an imaginative propositional feel-
tng. The uniqueness of this datum for regnant actual occasions forming the 
tuman personal soul is to be found primarily in the ,.imaginative proposl tlonal 
feeling," which already manifests an especially high degree of novelty and 
which ls here contrasted with a physical feeling. In other words, what was 
itself a propositional feeling now functions as the logical predicate of a 
more complex comparative feeling whose logical subject ls a nexus of actual 
entitles. The intuitive judgment ls the high-grade conscious feeling, and 
this complex comparative proposition ls what ls felt. However, the judgmen-
tal feeling will be seen to be more than just the feeling of this complex 
comparative propositional feeling, for it will involve a judgment of confor-
mity concerning logical subject and predicate. But what of the datum that ls 
felt? 
'nle imaginative propositional feeling results when the lndlcatlve feel 
lng ls n2t identical, that ls, ls different-~ the physical recognition feel 
ing (also called physical recollectlon.)1 As was observed, there will be de-
grees of difference between these feelings ranging from near identity to re-
mote disconnection, and that this ln part explains the origin of different 
kinds of lntultlve judgments. Yet even where there ls virtual identity this 
lpR, P• 415. 
-
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difference remains, and consequently Whitehead chooses to give them a special 
name. Manifesting what Whitehead calls "free imagination," he chooses to term 
1 
these special propositional data "imaginative propositional feellngs.'' 
Whitehead's discussion of imaginative propositional feelings ls some-
what complicated because he wants to hold two diverse views. He wants to dif-
f erentiate between imaglnatlve and perceptive propositional feelings. At the 
same time he maintains that they are not absolutely distinguishable. In order 
to understand his meaning and clarify his position a few additional words of 
explanation are in order. On the one hand, Whitehead claims that intuitive 
judgments are not to be absolutely dlstlngulshed from "conscicus perceptions" 
lnasnuch as their respective propositional data similarlly are not absolutely 
distinguishable. In support of his claim he offers two observations. 
First a comparison of these species of intellectual feelings can be 
made from the side of the "conscious perception." To the extent that transmu-
tatlon and/or reversion accompanies conscious perception, this mode of intel-
lectual feeling tends to "take on the general character of intuitive judg-
ments. "2 Whitehead's meaning appears to be that the greater the degree of 
ltisut there are deg,£ees of difference Lbetween the indicative feeling 
and the physical recognition/• which can vary from the case when the two nexus 
forming the objective data of the two feelings respectively, enjoy the extreme 
of remote disconnection, to the case at the other extreme when the two nexus 
are almost identical. But in so far as there is diversity between the feelings, 
there is some trace of free imagination." (.f!• p. 402.) Underlining ls mlne. 
See Sherburne•s brief but illuminating diagram and explanation of the differen 
between "perceptive•• and "imaginative" propositional feellngs. A Whiteheadian 
Aesthetic, PP• 65-69. -
2E.S,, P• 415. 
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transnutation and/or reversion ln the perceptive propositional feeling, the 
closer the resultant conscious perception approximates an intultlve judgment. 
lnasDllch as indirect authentic and especially unauthentic conscious perceptions 
introduce "substantial" amounts of novelty, they tend to resemble intuitive 
judgments. 
A second observation concerns the comparison made from the side of the 
intuitive judgment. For this comparison, Whitehead appeals to the difference 
ln contrasts between perceptive and imaginative propositional feelings. Where-
as only one set of actual occasions ls involved ln the formation of the percep-
tive feeling, there are two sets involved in the imaginative feellng. 1 More 
precisely, in the former the indicative and recognition feelings!£!. identical, 
whereas ln the latter they !£! diverse-- at least minimally. Minimal diver-
sity, that ls the key; for Whitehead says that where diversity between the in-
dicative and recognition feeling ls trivial the intuitive judgments tends to 
approximate a conscious perception.2 This may occur in the "yes-form" lntui-
tive judgment to be discussed presently. Therefore Whitehead maintains that 
this species of judgment may be difficult to distinguish from conscious percep-
tion based on direct perceptive propositional feeling. Here, then. affirmative 
lntuitlve judgments tend to resemble consciQ.ts perceptions. Emphasizing this 
resemblance based on minimal diversity between the two sets of actual occasions, 
Whitehead goes so far as to claim that a "conscious perception ls a very sim· 
plified type of affirmative intuitive judgment; and a direct affirmative intui-
tive judgment ls a very sophisticated case of conscious perception. "3 
l~., P• 417. 2 ~., P• 415. 3 .!.!ll51•t pp. 417, 412. 
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On the other hand, Whl tehead does after all dlstt'ngu ish between con-
sctous perceptions and lntultlve judgments. For lf they resemble each other 
tn some of their manifestations, they are clearly different and irreducible in 
their extreme forms. 'lbls ls ln part explained in terms of the difference 
between thelr propositional datum. Whitehead does not deny that an imaginatlv 
feeling arises as the integration of two dlstlnct physical feelings, and ln 
1 this they differ from perceptive feelings. This dupllclty wlthln the physi-
cal feeling will be one source of the possibility of a manifestly great dif-
ference betweal the two main types of propositional feellngs. 2 'nlereby it ls 
a source of the possibility for the manifestly great difference between the 
two major classes of intellectual feellngs. 3 Depending in part on the degree 
of diversity between the indicative and recognition feelings, imaginative 
propositional feelings may yield three distinct types of intellectual feelings 
when synthesized in a conscious intuitive judgment. 
Now it seems to us that some clarification can be brought to White-
head's discussion of "imaginative propositional feelings" if we interpret him 
to be intimating that the uniqueness of this propositional data and conseqient-
ly the subsequent 0 intui tlve judgment'' ls to be explained as follows. As one 
approaches the extreme diversity in degree a critical threshold ls crossed and 
and a new level of consciousness emerges. Between imaginative and perceptive 
ltbid., PP• 401-03, 413. 
2speaking of imaginative and propositional feelings Whitehead says 
that "These kinds are not sharply distinguished, but their extreme instances 
function very differently." C.f!h P• 397.) 
3.f!, P• 412. 
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propositions, and between their corresponding conscious perceptions and intui-
1 
tlve judgments, there emerges a new and higher class of consci<11s awareness. 
That ls to say, an evident conclusion from this analysts of White-
head's ls that (1) however similar the physical feelings in an intuitive prop-
osltlonal feeling may be, they are never identical, and in this there ls a 
real difference 'When compared to perceptive feelings; (2) this difference ls 
explained in terms of the underlying complexity of the process of concrescence 
and, as wlll be presently seen, ls grounded in the higher level of mental 
activity evidenced by the emerging subject actual occasion; (3) in part as a 
lThls clarification ls not meant to suggest that all the difficulties 
in Whitehead's position are thereby resolved. For example, one is puzzled tha 
Whitehead distinguishes between imaginative propositional feelings on the ba-
sis of the degree of difference between the indicative and recognition feel-
ings, which admittedly can be very great, and seems to ignore the role of re-
version in the process. Thus, (1) reversion in the objective datum--elther in 
the indicative or/and recognition datum--and/or (2) reversion of the recogni-
tion feeling in the subject would seem to account for an even greater dlver-
si ty between the physical nexus and predicative pattern. This can be vis-
ualized by integrating Figures 1, 3, 4, and 6 ln Sherburne's work, a White-
headian Aesthetic, pp. 56, 60-67. 
Not that Whitehead totally ignores the role ot reversion when explal 
ing intuitive judgments, for at least in one passage he says that the predica-
tive feeling originates from the physical recognition feeling either iillnedl-
ately according to the 4th Categoreal Obligation (conceptual valuation) or 
mediately according to the 5th (conceptual reversion) (f!, p. 413.) He also 
observes ln passing that the indicative feeling can possibly involve rever-
sion ln its origin. (.f!, P• 414.) Yet Whitehead does not work out these or 
the other mentioned possibility and therefore what has been attempted by way 
of clarification ls based on the distinctions Whitehead does emphasize as 
accounting for the major different types of complex comparative feelings. In 
other words, Whitehead introduces these underlying distlnctions--the types of 
propositions differentleted on the basis of the diversity between the indica-
tive and recognition feeling, etc.-..as an explanation for what comes to be a 
different kinds of activities: for distlngulshlng between sensory perception, 
recognition, and perceptive generalizations common to man and sub-human ani-
mals alike and conceptual abstractions that are proper to man alone. 
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consequence of the difference between these propositional feelings, intel-
lectual conceptions dlff er from conscious perceptions lnasm.ach as they evi-
dence a higher level of awareness not at all present in the lower grades of 
actuality; (4) this does not preclude differences ln degree within the divi-
sion of perceptive feelings or within the division of Imaginative feelings, 
and consequently It requires that there similarily be differences in degree 
within the species of conscious perceptions and lntultive judgments. 
Finally, it ls here suggested that the imaginative propositional data 
yields intellectual feelings that are unique. lbis uniqueness takes the form 
of conscious attention to the general and even universal features of things, 
as general and as universal, and in this intellectual conceptions differ from 
conscious perceptions, perceptive images, and conscious memories, which attend 
only to particular or concrete features in things, and which at most are form-
ulated as perceptive generalizations. This interpretation is reinforced and 
amplified when the role of mentality in intuitive judgments ls examined. 
Because the mental pole functions as the subject's agent of novel 
activity througha.at the entire process, and because its functions within the 
general purpose of the subjective aim which it Initially fashions, it ls only 
by artlflcially dividing the process of concrescence that one can speak of the 
mentality operative in isolated phases. With this in mind, let us none the 
less observe Whitehead's discussion of the role of mentality ln the formation 
of the emotional pattern of the two main types of propositional feelings, and 
then examine how mentality ls further manifested in the formation of Intuitive 
judgments. 
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As lures for feeling, propositions function to heighten the emotional 
pattern of experl ence. 
The propositions are lures for feelings, and give to feelings a definite-
ness of enjoyment and purpose which ls absent in the blank evaluatlCI\ of 
physical feeling into physical purpose. In this blank evaluation we have 
merely the determination of the comparative creative efficacies of the 
component feelings of actual entitles. In a proposltloal feeling there 
ls the 'hold up•--or, ln lts original sense, the epoch--of the valuation 
of the predicative pattern in its relevance to the definite logical sub-
jects which are otherwise felt as definite elements ln experience. There 
ls the arrest of the emotional pattern round this sheer fact as a possi-
bility, with the corresponding gain in distinctness of lts relevance to 
the future. The particular possibility for the transcendent creativity--
in the sense of its advance from subject to subject--thls particular pos-
sibility has been picked out, held up, and clothed with emotion.l 
Now the emotional pattern ln this context ls the manner in which or 
"how" this particular subject feels this particular proposition. It depends 
upon the subjective alm, and therefore this subjective form2 ls determined 
internally, 1.e. freely, by the subject's mental pole~ its subjective aim 
as a further reaction £2_ the physical data. Stressing the element of "re-
action" Whitehead says that the difference between perceptive and imaginative 
feelings lies in the emotional patterns of the two feelings rather than in the 
felt propositions themselves. Whereas the emotional pattern of a perceptive 
feeltng "reflects the close connection of the predicate with the logt cal sub-
jects," the emotional pattern of an imaginative feeling "reflects the 1nltlal 
dlsconnection of the predicate with the logical subjects •••• 113 
l.f!, PP• 427-28. 
2see .f!, P• 35 where emotions are listed as a species of subjective 
form. 
3 lli!!.•t P• 417. 
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'nlis passsge once DK>re brings together the two aspects of mentality 
tn the formation of propositional feelings. In the first place, mentality 
"reflects" the relationship given in the propositional data, and this ls true 
even where the predicative pattern ls different from the logical subjects as 
ts the case with imaginative propositional feelings. 'lhe mental pole will have 
to at least initially ''reflect" the status of the diverse propositional data-
even where they are diverse to the extreme. In the second place, the agency of 
mentality functions to organize the data ln a novel synthesis. With proposi-
tional feellngs this synthesis takes the form of ''helghtenlng" the emotional 
pattern of a contrast between the logical subject and predicate. 'lhe predlca-
tlve pattern ''held•up" or "abstracted" as a bare possibl llty ls here isolated 
so as to function as a lure for subsequent novel ingressions. In the case of 
lmaglnatlve propositional feelings emphasis ls placed upon the dlsconnectlon of 
the predicate with lts logical subject. 'nils disconnection will be in turn 
reflected within the emphasis of the conscious subjective form ln intellectual 
conception. 'nlat ls to say, the emotional pattern of experience can clothe 
the pure posslbilltles thus experienced: either as we consciously experience 
these posslbllitles, at least lmpllcltly, wlthln the concrete facts of our 
sense experience, as happens most strlklngly in conscious aesthetic experience; 
or as we abstract the possibility from the concrete facts as happens for ex-
ample, ln logic and mathematics. 1 Whitehead maintains that even ln these lat-
ter instances there ls an experience of aesthetic satisfaction. 
l!!I, PP• 83-87; also see pp. 165-71. 
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In a similar fashion, the subjective form of an intuitive judgment 
reflects the contrast from which lt ls derived. 'lbus the judgment "confers 
importance" initially upon what the diverse data of the imaginative proposition 
ts. In this lt differs from conscious perceptions which ••confer importance" 
1 tnltlally upon what the real thing ta. Now ln an intellectual conception, 
the novelty of the extremely high-grade datum la matched by the novelty of the 
subjective form of consclouaneaa. At thla point ln the process, mentaUty 
evidences itself as the attempt to integrate into a higher Intellectual synthe• 
ala the concrete feelings physically experienced with high.grade abstracted 
potentialities which are conceptually entertatned-..what .l!. with what max be. 
Mentality here takes the form of consctousneas attentively holding up a logical 
subject (be lt singular, general, or unlversa1)2 ln a contrast with a potential 
predlcatlve pattern that lt ax ex•pllfy. 
!!E.! contloufUSS J1 lb!. so•tl•• !Fllclt sgmetlmes gellcit aware-
Jl!.!!. Jrhl1 lht eag;g;mi 1! Jl.2l mereJx restrl9g;able 12 Shl!, logl91l subtest• !2£ 
.!f.!ll whtE! S!i! gttem i!. exempllfl!d Ja rgllSXt 1•.!.• 8Ctutllty1 .2!!lI Jn this 
particular subJect s, s.&x !U subJecb! s11ta .!slal• !1 ~ !!llh level !?! J!!l!l• 
talltx .Qt. p9ttsn SS ncpetheless .!!.! cenceptyal lx ents-taln!d aest from l ts 
lngrgalog J.n ~ earthular lodcal subfegt. ll!!! lb.! gu•ttto.e 2f. lts !.!.• 
1At-tlV\ahf.n lf.Wl .th1I. 191lcal aabJ19t .can be conacloualx mt•rtaln!d• 3 
lsee l!,, P• 339. The relevant passage ws quoted tn tbapter tv, P• 
236, n.1. 
2!l?.l!!.•• PP• 282·316; A!,1 P• 312. 
3AI.. PP• 313-14. Shahan lmpUes thls where he speaks of lntultlve 
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To grasp the nature of this higher intellectual synthesis, it ls 
crucial that here one call to mind the repeated observation that the subjective 
form arises from the subjective aim dominating the entire process of concres-
cence, The point ls that the particular manner in which this present actual 
entity feels the contrast of this particular objectified nexus of actual entl• 
ties and the complex eternal object which ls this particular i~aglnatlve prop-
osition ls dependent upon the subjective aim governing the entire process. 
!i!.£! ~subjective.!!.!! functions 12 distinguish intellectual conception.!!.!. 
different~ .2!. feeling~ further differentiates~~ their various 
~-classes, 12.t ll. speclfles Sh!. purpose ~which Sh!. intellectual conception 
~ entertained. Intuitive judgments arise as a consequence of the high level 
of mental activity which enables the subjective aim to attend to the "truth-
value" or "belief-value" of the datum. "Conscious aesthetic experience" and 
11conscious imagination° are not necessarily attentive to the "truth-value" or 
"bellef-value•• and will be distinguished from the various species of ''intuitive 
judgments" by virtue of their different kinds of subjective alms. 1 
At this point lt might be well to emphasize the emotive function of 
intuitive judgments. Although we are speaking of a species of intellectual con 
judgments as enabling one to do more than consciously perceive: "An 'intuitive 
judgment,• on the other hand, ls a feeling derived from the integration of the 
physical feeling of a nexus and the imaginative propositional feeling whose log. 
lcal subjects refer to the same nexus. Thus, an intuitive judgment tends to 
emphasize possiblllty rather than actuality. This enables one to do more than 
consciously perceive--lt permits one to say •yes,• •no,• or •maybe.• (White-
head's 'lheory S?!_ Experience, pp. 64-65.) 
lThis point ls excellently developed in Sharper's article "Aesthetic 
Perception," pp. 214 .. ao. 
260 
ceptions, it nust not be thought that these high-grade cognitive experiences 
have totally abstracted from the emotive aspect of the original percepts given 
in causal efficacy. On the cm.trary; as w'hltehead says, "emotion ln human 
experience, or even in animal experience" ls "emotion interpreted, integrated, 
transformed into higher categories of feeUngs. 111 Intuitive judgments and 
conscious lntellectlon ln general continue this process of transformation, but 
now on the order of higher grade conceptual awareness. 
But whereas the emotional pattern ln conscious imaglnatlon and con-
scious aesthetic experience are inattentive to the truth or falsity, the sub-
jectlve form of an intuitive judgment has as its aim just such conscious at-
tentlon.2 For lntultlve judgment ls a conceptual (at least implicitly con-
ceptual) comparison-or judgment of compatiblllty-between the lmaglnatlve prop~ 
osltlonal feeling and the original concrete facts given emotionally in the in-
itlal phase of concrescence. 'lbese facts are perceived as a macroscopic enti~ 
(or entitles) ln my environment, as for example, when I intuitively judge that 
thls stone was hurled at that dog by that man for no apparent reason. (By ••my 
judgment" I mean, of course, that judgment made by the regnant actual occa-
slons of my personal soul. How thls judgment affects my whole macroscopic 
being wlll be noted shortly.) 'Ihis intuitive judgment has "held up" the emo-
tion as a pure possibility to be realized in my present and future conscious 
llfe. Rather than instinctively reacting to this surging anger, my conscious 
judgment entails a vivid awareness that I am angry, even, in its more clearly 
1 
.f!., P• 248. 2 l!?.!s!•t PP• 418-20. 
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cognitive function, that I am feeling anger(ness). As a consequence thls 
new cognitive experience of anger, that I know it as well as feel it, it ls 
possible for me to consciously choose the form my reaction will take. I may 
even choose to gl ve full vent to this anger and thus intuitive judgment can 
add to the original emotive content. We will return to the question of human 
freedom in the following section. 
What distinguishes intuitive judgments as a separate class of feelings 
ls their explicit conscious assertion, usually verbalized, of the truth or 
falsehood of the imagined predicate datum contrasted with the physically felt 
nexus. Depending on the relationship malntalnlng between the predicative pat-
tern and the character of the contrasted actual entitles, the subjective form 
asserts this attention to truth-value in one of three distinct judgments: (1) 
"yes-form" where the data may be so 111.lCh alike and compatible that the lntui-
tlve feeling based on them ls judged to be true--ln which case there will be 
contained a feeling of belief. (2) "no-form" where the data are so unlike and 
incompatible that the intuitive feeling based on them ls false--in which case 
there will be contained a feeling of disbelief; and (3) ttsuspense-form" where 
the data are unlike but compatible--ln which case there will be contained a 
feeling of suspended-belief or what Whitehead simply calls a "suspended judg-
ment.111 
1
,f!, PP• 409-16. By belief Whitehead clearly means neither the case 
where 11 there is a measure of doubt clue to incomplete knowledge of the facts,•• 
(Mays, lh! Philosophy$?! Whitehead, P• 169.) nor what Josef Pieper or Martin 
Marty describe as unconditional assent to some matter based on the testimony 
of someone else, i.e., as involving both "belief inn and "belief that." (Pie-
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Whitehead •s discussion of "suspense-form" and *'no-form" judgments ls 
especially slgnlflcant lt tends to further support the lnterpretation that at 
least some of the more important human activities such as intellectual judg-
ments are specifically different and not at all to be found in non-human anl-
mal actlvlty. It also throws additional light on his explanation of the emer-
gence of hlgh-grade human freedom. First conslder "suspense-form" judgments. 
They assert that what ls neither actually identical nor actually diverse and 
lncompatlble data may ln fact be actually compatible for lngressian. They in-
troduce on the level of consciousness the possiblllty that the contrast af-
flrms real potentiality for novel lngresslon. As such they amount to concep-
tual knowledge that goes beyond knowing what ls or what ls not: lt ls knowl-
edge of what might actually be true. 
The slgniflcance of suspended intuitive judgments for human freedom 
ls that with them novel potentialities for future actualization pass into con-
sctous awareness. With these judgments comes the possibility of conceiving of 
novel modes of thinking about experience and novel modes of acting. Let us 
return to the example of felt anger. In virtue of my freely entertained sus-
pended judgment, we can thlnk that perhaps that man threw the rock because he 
per, Belief and Faith, translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Chicago: Hen-
ry Resnery eo., 1963, esp. Chapters 1-11, pp. 3-24 of Logus ed; Marty, Vari-
eties .2!, Unbelief, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, esp. Chapter l, PP• 17-
26.) Whitehead is giving a rather different definition: "A feellng ts termed 
a 'belief,• or ls said to include an element of 'belief,' when its datum ls a 
proposition, and its subjective form includes, as the defining element in its 
emotional pattern, a certain form, or eternal object, associated with some 
gradation of intensity. This eternal object ls 'belief-character.• When this 
character enters into the emotional pattern, then, according to the intensity 
involved, the feeling, whatever else it be, ls to some degree a bellef." (PR, 
P• 408.) --
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recognized the dog from a previous unhappy encounter. Once aware of this pos• 
slblllty, I am able to act accordingly, and so I may walk over and offer as-
slstance. My anger would have become sympathy. I can pragmatically verify 
my novel ldea and the wisdom of my chosen course of action by actually en-
co.anterlng the lndlvldual. 
The importance of suspended judgments as well as their uniqueness ln 
human conscious awareness ls brought out where Whitehead observes that these 
feelings are lndlspenslble for our progress ln sclentlflc theory. In effect 
Whitehead ls mcplalning the fact of science ln terms of his categoreal scheme, 
and he ls clalmlng that the explicit and reflective creative insights con-
sclously fornulated as scientific ideas or even hypothesis to be used in unl-
fying and explaining matters-of-fact often take the form of suspended-judg· 
ments. 
This suspended judgment ls our consclo.asness of the llmltatlons involved 
ln objectlflcatlon. If, in the comparison of an imaglnatlve feeling with 
fact, we merely know what ls and what ls not, then we should have no basis 
for discovering the work of""objectlflcation-ln effecting omissions from 
the formal constitution of things. It ls this additional knowledge of the 
compatibility of what we imagine with what we physically feel, that gives 
us this lnformatlon •••• Our whole progress in scientific theory, and even 
ln subtllity of direct observation, depends on the use of suspended judg-
ments. It ls to be noted that a suspended judgment ls not a judgment of 
probability. It ls a judgment of compatlblllty. The judgment tells us 
what may be additional information respecting the formal constitution of 
the logical subjects, information which ls neither included nor excluded 
by our direct perception.1 
Suspended judgments play an equally important role ln non-sctentlflc conceptua 
experience, where ln similar ways they function to elicit into consciousness 
1,!!!, p. 419. 
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novel modes of thinking about experience and also where they facilitate novel 
modes of acting. In other words, they may be fornulated either as a specula-
tive or practical judgment and either within or withcut general schemes of 
ideas--such as science, philosophy, conunon-sense beliefs, art, religion, mor-
ality, etc. 
'Io be sure, the other two forms of lntultive judgment are lndlspenslble 
throughout the hlgher grade intellectual process, and therefore they also 
function within these schemes. For without an ultimate ground in affirmation 
or denlal, suspended judgments would be totally lllusory and meanlngless. 
Therefore suspended judgments also retaln at least an indirect reference to 
the real state of affairs in the world in so far as this state can be judged 
ln ••yes0 and "no" form lntultlve judgments. That ls to say, suspended judg• 
ments are possible only on condition that some--at least one-.judgment ls not 
suspended. For further confirmation that intuitive judgments are to be found 
only ln the regnant actual occasions of the human person we need but recall 
Whitehead's statements about the source of science and philosophy. Because 
intuitlve judgments may, and very often do, occur within a general scheme of 
ldeas such as in science or philosophy, frequently they are made within a gen-
eral context of inferential judgments. Now if suspended intuitive judgments, 
with all they entail in terms of the other types of intuitive judgments, are 
indlspenslble for science and if ttas far as direct evidence reaches, Science 
and Philosophy"--as well as the other higher types of knowledge concerned with 
at least implicit understanding of general prlnclples..- ttbelong to man alone,"1 
lAI., P• 179. 
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then it would seem that .2!!lZ the high-grade occasions of the personal human 
soul are capable of intuitive and inferential judgments and the higher kind of 
freedom accompanying them. 
Whitehead's analysis of negative intuitive judgments also points to 
man's unique position at the sumnit of the hierarchy of macroscopic organism 
and illumines his explanation of human freedom. Whitehead explains the emer-
gence of intellectuality in nature as consisting in gain of the power of ab· 
straction. 1 
Therefore he quite consistently appeals to the types of abstraction as 
a basis for differentiating the various grades of regnant actual occasions 
and thereby the various grades of macroscopic entitles. 
The final conclusion from the discussions included in this course of 
lectures ls the importance of a right adjustment of the process of ab-
straction. Those characteristics of experience which separate the higher 
from the lower species of actualities all depend upon abstraction. lhe 
llvlng germs are distinguished from lifeless physical actlvlties by the 
abstraction inherent in their existence. The higher animals are distln· 
gulshed from mere llfe, by their abstractions, and by their use of them. 
Mankind ls distinguished from animal life by lts emphasis on abstractions. 
The degeneracy of mankind ls distinguished from its uprise by the domln 
of chill abstractions, divorced from aesthetic content. 
The growth of consciousness ls the uprlse of abstractions. It ls the 
growth of emphasis. Tile totality ls characterized by a selection from its 
details. That selection cla!ms attention, enjoyment, action, purpose, all 
relative to itself. 'ntls concentration evokes an energy of self-realiza-
tion. It ls a step towards unification with that drive toward realiza-
tion which discloses the unity of aim in the historic process.2 
Within the member actual occasions forming human personal society ab-
stractlon evidences itself in an especial manner with negative intuitive judg-
2 !:!It PP• 168-69. 
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ments. Mental progress, it will be recalled, depends in great measure on the 
1 
right co-ordination of negative prehenslons. The significance of negative 
intuitive judgments in human consciousness ls that with them the possibility 
of this right co-ordination is raised to a new level of experience. Negative 
intuitive judgments are mentality become conceptually aware of its ellmina-
tlons, even of its original negative prehenslons. With negative intuitive 
judgments, abstraction has attained the form of extreme conscious awareness 
of ~ .!.!. !l!?S. as important for !'h!.E. .!.!. and !.!:!!!! might .!?.! as well 
have been. 
--
In the case of the imaginative feeling, this emotional pattern refle 
the initial disconnection of the predicate from the logical subjects. This 
example illustrates that in the integration of f eellngs, components which 
are eliminated from the matter of the integral feeling may yet leave their 
mark on its emotional pattern. Ih!. triumph £!. consciousness comes with 
Sh! negative intuitive judgm!Bt. In this case there ls a conscious feel-
ing of what might be, and ls not. The feeling directly concerns the de-
flnl te negative prehenslon enjoyed by lts subject. It ls the feeling of 
absence, and lt feels this absence as produced by the definite exclusive-
ness of what ls really present. Thus, the explicitness of negation, which 
ls the peculiar characteristic of consciousness, ls here at lts maxlmum.2 
Whitehead would approve of Robert Frost's "The Road Not Taken" which concludes 
with the words 
lfili, P• 389. 
I shall be telling thls with a slgh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged ln a wood, and I-
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference.3 
2Ibld., pp. 417-18. Underlining ls mine. 
311The Road Not Taken," 1'h!. Complete Poems g!, Robert Frost. (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1949, 15th printing, 1963), p. 131. 
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That decision by the regnant actual occasions not to take the one road comes 
to constitute the very being of the man who takes the other road. 
Whitehead has tl'us re-introd.tced the prlnclple with which he has at-
tempted to differentiate the various grades of actual occasions and thereby 
the various grades of macroscopic organisms. While the lower grade actual 
occasions experience positive and!!!!!!. negative prehension, with the higher 
occasions there ts evidence of conscious awareness of negation, elimination, 
and abstraction. Thus the ••sub-human animal grade actual occasions" are 
capable of negative perception as ls evidenced in sense perception, while the 
0 human grade actual occasions" are, in addition, capable of negative intuitive 
Judsment as ls evidenced in intellectual conception. Ute significance of neg-
ative intuitive judgments, then, ls that their appearance manifests the pre-
sent culmination of the evolutionary process that began with the lowest grade 
actual entitles and nexus with positive and mere negative prehension. 
In Adventures£!! Ideas Whitehead discusses the four ways an actual 
occasion may deal with the disharmony of the world as given for initial pre-
henslon.l Recall that in Process ~Reality Whitehead wrote 
The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to 
conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entities given in dis-
junct ion. The nowl entity is at once the togetherness of the "many0 whicl 
it finds, and also it ls the one among the disjunctive "many" which it 
leaves; it ls a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entitles which 
lt synthesizes. Ute many become one, and are increased by one.2 
The four ways actual occasions may deal with the disjunction initially 
encountered as their environment depends upon the degree of spontaneity stem-
l~, PP• 332-40. 2PR P• 32: _, "Ute Category of the Ultimate.•• 
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mlng from the mental pole. They are (1) the way of mere negative prehenslon, 
also called "Anaesthesia" whereby there ls complete lnhlbltion or non-lnclusl 
of an actual entity as datum; the way of (2) lnconplete inhibition whereby the 
ellmlnatlon of incompatible data ls accompanied by a positive feeling disrupt• 
tng the emotional affective tone; (3) the way readjustment, whereby the rela· 
tlve lnsensitlvltles of incompatible feelings can occasionally be reduced to 
compatibilities; and (4) the way of "Appearance," whereby the heightened de-
gree of mentality transforms the physically given data by consciously fusing 
lt with the ideal. With the fourth way mentality has introduced significant 
novelty to match the complexity and diversity of the data. Whitehead adds 
that the second and third ways are examples of low type of mental function-
ings termed "physical purposes," whereas the fourth way evidences the presence 
of a nuch higher level of spontaneity. With the fourth way the high-grade 
level of mentaU ty "preserves the massive qualitative variety of Reallty from 
1 
simplification by negative prehensions." 
Not that the high-grade actual occasions capable of more than "physi-
cal purpo~as 1 " l.e., that are capable of "intellectual feeltngs," do not ex-
erclse negative prehenslons; rather that with them consciousness can attend 
even to the negative prehenslons lnasllllch as these can be isolated, simpll-
fled, and made clear and distinct, either as negative perception on the level 
of mere sense perception or as negative lntultlve judgment on the higher level 
of intellectual conception. The point ls that consciousness ls ccnsclousness 
lAI, P• 335. 
-
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not only of what !! but also of ~ .!!. !!,2!, and therefore of !!!,!! may !!.!.• As 
Whitehead says in the case of man this amounts to the entertainment of ideas. 
But--considering ocsasions at their highest, with effective exercise 
of mental 2riginality Li.o, the regnant actual occasions forming the lu-
man pers,2!y'--the preservation of zest, after the attainment of a stage of 
perfection, first requires the exploration of all variaticns which do not 
introduce discordance into the type of perfection attained. The varia• 
tion of styles and of decorative detail in medieval Gothic architecture 
may serve as an illustration. But such variations are easily exhausted. 
Bolder adventure ls needed-the adventure of ideas, and the adventure of 
practice conforming itself to ideas. The best service that ideas can ren-
der is gradually to lift into the mental poles the ideal of another type 
c~ perfection which becomes a program for reform.1 
For the actual occasions in the human personal soul, maximizatlcn of 
spontaneity evidences itself as a new and higher kind of freedom. In the 
lower grade occasions freedom appears at most as incomplete inhibition and un-
conscious readjustment of incompatibilities of negative prehenslons. In the 
higher"anlmal occasions" lt appears as the lower manifestation of appearance 
in sense perception. But in the case of the regnant actual occasions forming 
the tuman person, freedom "finally rlse to the peak of free imagination, ln 
which the conceptual novelties search through a universe in which they are not 
dati vely exempli fled. "2 With th!- rise of conceptual experience as evidenced 
in judgmental cognition, the ''human actual occasions" are able to exercise a 
higher kind of freedom. 
With some modification, the analysis of intuitive judgments is appli· 
cable to "conscious imagination" and "conscious aesthetic experience." Their 
similarity to intuitive judgments--1.e., their origin in the latter phases of 
concrescence-makes lt apparent that these modes of conscious awareness arise 
1.!..2!S,. t PP• 332-33. 
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only in extremely coq>lex actual entitles, such as those forming the human 
soul. What dlfferentlates these as three separate classes of intellectual 
feelings ls their different subjective forms, and ls grounded. in the different 
subjective alms guiding the process of concrescence. 
G'vf!I'\ the purpose of our study, lt ls unnecessary to state more pre-
clsely the manner in which these other major types of intellectual feelings 
differ. We wish merely to point out that the importance of conscious lmagl-
. 1 
nation for freedom ls to be found in its lndlff erence to truth. Whitehead 
offers this mode of awareness as accounting for both perceptual and concept-
ual flights of free imagination. As such, he offers it as an explanation of 
the human experience of creatively, i.e. freely, entertaining novel images 
pertaining to sensible experience and novel ideas pertaining to conceptual 
experience. It ls this power of free imagination, as exemplified in its 
heightened pure form ln conscious imagination, that gives rise to the enter-
talnment of the very high-grade novel mental constructs uniquely manifested 
in the regnant actual occasions forming the human person. 
In an excellent article Eva Sharper has shown that human conscious 
aesthetic experience ls no less abstract than conceptual understanding, since 
both involve abstractions of formal features of concrete experlence.2 From 
this perspective, both types of awareness manifest the high-grade mental ab-
stractlon characterizing human experience properly so called. As Sharper says, 
"ln cognitively directed experience, what matters are those formal features 
which can be stated and repeated ln more or less complete independence of the 
l!.21.s!.•t PP• 419-20. 2uAesthetic Perception." 
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lnltlal situation of encounter," vhUe in aesthetic experience what matters 
"are those formal features as they were prevl ously felt ln their uniqueness. ,.l 
Because lt ls genuine lnslght, aesthetic feelings can be important factors in 
human freedom; for by keeping our abstractions ln contact with the aesthetic 
feelings given ln our concrete free choices, they can function as needed cor-
rectives to abstract conceptual analysts. 
B. !!Y.!!!m Freedom J!W! Intellectual Conception 
As we observed tn Chapter III, there are many passages in his writings 
where Whitehead claims that given the current status of our knowledge we are 
led to conclude that among all the macrocosmlc entitles only human beings en-
gage in certain activities. Only men can understand structure; only men can 
abstract the principles in the facts and can imagine alternative posslbllities; 
only men can foruulate scientific laws; ~men possess what have come to be 
called science and philosophy; cmly men enjoy clvtltzatlon with all that this 
entails; and what ls no doubt at the basts of man's unique powers of mentality 
only men possess fanguage. 2 The principles Whltnhead uses to explain these 
unique activities have been examined in Chapters IV and v. 
Because of the derivative mode of existence exercised by macrocosmlc 
entitles, Whitehead's explanation was to be found in the microcosmic order. 
The source of man's uniqueness was located in the activity of the regnant 
actual occasions forming the human personal so..tl. Only these actual occasions 
1Ibld9 , P• 279. 
-
2see Chapter ill of this dissertation, esp. pp. 186-88. 
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are sufficiently complex and have sufficient powers of mentality to introduce 
into real lty the extremely high-grade modes of prehenslon called "intellectual 
conception." It was important to establish that, since Whitehead means to ex-
plain the fact of man's unique place in nature by appealing to the differences 
within actual entities, then it is necessary for him to explain how actual en-
titles manifest different levels of prehensions. It was argued that Whitehead 
attempts to do so (1) by dlstingulshlng between "perceptive" and ••tmaginative" 
proposltlms and consequently between "conscla.1s perceptions" and "intellect-
ual conception" and by (2) appeal lng to the different and higher degrees of 
mental power exercised by the regnant actual occasions of the human person. 
The effect of Whitehead's analysis, as we have interpreted it, ls 
that there ls a specl fie difference between the activity or "nature" of the 
regnant actual occasions forming the human soul and all other lower grade 
actual occasions, such as those forming the rest of the macroscopic human or-
-ganism or the personal and non-personal societies and nexus of the sub-human 
animals. This difference is explained in terms of the increasing degree of 
coq>lexlty of the process of concrescence ("The higher forms of intellectual 
experience only arise when there are complex integrations, and reintegrations, 
of mental and physical experlence. 11 ) 1 and in terms of crossing of a critical 
threshold in the power of mentality (as evidenced in imaginative propositions 
and intellectual conceptlon--lt being argued that only the regnant actual oc-
caslons forming the soul evidence the entertainment of imaginative propost-
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tions and the subsequent lntell ectual conceptions.) It remains to be shown 
that this analysts also entails that the regnant actual occasions of the hu-
man person evidence a specifically higher grade of freedom and that as a con-
sequence on the macroscopic level human beings can be said to exercise a 
unique mode of freedom--• level of freedom that, so far as one can ascertain, 
ls not at all to be found in the sub-human animals. 
As to the first point, ve can say ln summary that as with all actual 
occasions, the concrescence of the regnant actual occasions of the hlman per-
son ls a process of self-determination. In an important sense, the goal of 
the process ls the completion or satisfaction of the actual entity: to be 
causa .!!!!. ls to freely establish oneself ln existence as one complex fully 
l determinate subject. The act of self-determination culminates ln the final 
decision of "cutting off" all possible modes of becoming but the freely chosen 
one.2 What ls unique about the freedom of regnant actual occasions ls the v 
3 high level of awareness that ls characteristic of their "decisions. 1' For 
them, self-determination entails a conscious, even self-conscious choice; 
based on an °tnte11 ectual conception" of the known determining circumstances 
and known posslbllltles, ''decision" takes the form of free choice properly so 
called. Choosing this possibility entails an lmpllctt, and sometimes quite 
expllclt awareness of not choosing those others. In the extreme form, we are 
conscious of choosing this one precisely because we choose to reject the othe 
In an equally important sense, the goal of this cholce ls not satlsfac 
l.f!., P• 135. 2Ibld., PP• 68·69, 241-42. 3PR 68 
-' P• • 
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tlon, for the subject is also super ject. 'l'he uniqueness of the superjectlve 
aspect of these regnant occasions also ls due to their high level mental ac• 
tivity. For these occasions there ls high level conscious awareness of the 
fUture as being a real factor ln the present and of the present growing or 
flowing into the future. That ls to say, there ls awareness that self•decl• 
slons becomes appropriated as an-other•s decislms: what ls decided by the 
present occasion will have determining consequences for future decisions. 
there ls awareness that subsequent subjects wll 1 have to react differently ln 
the future bec!u•• of thts present choice. 
The next thing to notice ls that the regnant occasions of the soul 
are themselves prehended by the body: immediately by the brain and pratti• 
mately down through the occasions constituting the brain and ultimately by the 
whole body-and even beyond. Thus the occasions of the soul themself come to 
be objects for the f eellngs of the other actual occasions that make-up the 
hunan body. In this way the radical freedom manifest by the regnant human 
1 
society ts "poured into'' or ''fed back" into the occasions that make-up the 
-socl eti es and nexus of the human body. 
This ls not to say that these "subordinate occasions" can thereby ax• 
erclse the higher grade freedom of choice evidenced by the regnant occasions. 
On the contrary, not existing "within" the context of the complex sort of 
environment such as 1• found ln (wt th) the regnant occaaiona, and not exercls• 
lng comparable powers of mentaUty, th• various types of "subordinate occulms• 
ltbld., pp. 516 and 166-67 (quoted in Chapter tv. P• 199; also see 
footnote.) 
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are more determined than free. Consequently, the decisions of the regnant 
occasions comes to be appropriated by them: appropriated more-or-less freely 
depending upon where the subordinate occasion ls located within the corpus• 
cular society. What has been said applies mJtatls J11Jtandls to the choices of 
the regnant occasions of the brute animals. 
Let us now consider the second point, namely, that Whitehead intends 
to explain the unique kind of freedom exercised by human beings. It should 
be recalled that for Whitehead the activity of freely choosing among possible 
alternative modes of thinking and acting ls the natural and basic type of 
human freedom given in our ordinary lived experience. 'Dtis freedom of self-
determlnation ls natural in the sense of being possessed by all humans simply 
on account of their being human, and lt is basic lnasrnwch as it ls entailed 
in the freedoms of self-realization, self-perfection, and polltlcal llberty. 1 
Our immediate conscious experience of self-determination ls of an act of chol 
which creatively establishes our present moment of existence. It does so 
within the limitations placed upon choice by the immediate past experience-. 
of our past bodily and mental experlences--and in virtue of anticipated future 
consequences. Furthermore, our self-determination involves a conscious aware• 
ness ~we are choosing and lf!!!! we are choosing; which ls to say that it ls 
a self-conscious choice. Not only do we choose, but we know that we choose. 
What, then, ls unique about the human self-determination? 
There are not many texts in Whitehead's writings where he specifically 
lsee Chapter l, PP• 7-12. 
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alludes to the different modes of freedom found ln human and sub-human entl• 
tles. The few remarks Whitehead does make, however, are very slgnlficant. 
Most important ls a passage occuring in a late work, the short lecture "Mathe-
matlcs and the Good." Whitehead says, 
The flrst_animal on this Earth, who even for a moment entertained 
this notion Lthe notion of "'Any example of a given sort, in abstraction 
from some particular exemplification of the example or of the sort.•',!/, 
was the first rational creature. You can observe animals choosing be-
tween Sh!.! thlng or !!!!! thln5. But animal lntelllgence requires concrete 
exempllflcatlon. Human intelligence can conceive of a type of things in 
abstraction from exemplification. The most obvious disclosures of this 
characteristic of humanity are mathematical concepts and ideals of the 
Good--ideas which stretch beyond any tnmediate reallzatlon.1 
Interpreting this passage in the light of our findings up to this 
point leads us to make the following observations. In this passage Whitehead 
ls speaking of freedom on the macroscopic level, and he is saying that what 
differentiates the free choices of men and 0 brute animals" ls the different 
order of mentality evidenced ln their diverse powers of abstraction. In their 
syntheslzlng acts of sense perception, ttanimals" are able to abstract and to 
hold ln vivid consciousness objects that were originally felt as vague data 
in their exterior environment. With sense perception comes the ability to 
distinguish between ".s.h!!. thins" and "that thtng"; between S!!!.!. 1.£.!X. stone 
being thrown and by !!!!! !!!!l• 
Now the total meaning of the sensed object--in part determined by the 
perceiving animal-evokes an anticipation in the subject. The object ls per-
oeived as one to be sought out or avoided, as pleasant or painful, as desir-
1§VII, PP• 672-73 (Schitp•s ed.). 
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able or undesirable, attractive, fearful, and so forth. Accompanying sense 
perception ls thus the ability to choose freely between alternatively per-
celved or imagined courses of re-action. The 11decision° of the regnant oc-
caslons of the dog are ''poured out" into the body and the dog ls free to bite 
the stone or flee from lt, he may attack the man or run lovingly to hlm recog-
nlzing his master's playful act, or whatever. Though remaining on the level 
of conscious awareness of particular alternatives and choices among these par-
tlculars, Whitehead maintains that the animal does exercise genuine freedom. 
But it ls freedom limited to the animal's relatively low powers of creative 
lmaginatlon. On this level eholce ls restricted by the animals ability to act 
only in light of remembered past sense perceptions and only in terms of 
sensed or lmaglned particular alternative courses of action. Its anticipation 
of the consequences of its choice ts also restricted to anticipating~ 
rather than~ particular future happenlng. 1 
In addltlon to conscious sense experience, human animals are capable 
of conceptual abstraction, of entertaining concepts or ideas apart from their 
exempllficatlon within sensible particulars--whether sensibly perceived, lmag-
lned, or remembered. Consequently they are capable of exercising a greater 
degree of freedom, a degree which amounts to passing a critical threshold and 
which makes human freedom speclflcally different, or unique. 
Thls means that for the human animal free choice entails a factor not 
at all present ln the choices of "brutes." This factor ls the entertainment 
lsee W. E,. Agar, a Contribution ~ ~ Theory .2.{ !!:!.!. Llvlns Organism 
(2nd ed., rev., Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1951), esp. 
Chapters 111-lv, PP• 68-153. 
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of the idea, the understanding of the general principle !n terms g! which ~ 
!!l cognizance .2! which the human person can exercise his choices. By virtue 
of the regnant actual occasions man can choose between ~ ideal or Sh!!!t be-
tween !b!!, theory or Sh!!' between ~ course of action or ~' and so fort}\ 
on the basis of understanding at least lmplicltly what kind of objects these 
are, and on the basts of understanding, again at least implicitly, what kinds 
of ends he ls thereby establishing for hlmself. 1 
Moreover, what ls most slgnlflcant, the human being ls self-conscious. 
He knows himself and he knows that he knows; he knows that he has choices and 
he knows that he knows this; he knows that he ls actlng for a purpose, or 
series of purposes, and he ls aware of himself doing so. With man mentality 
has reached the stage where intellect has turned back upon itself. It has 
become self-crltlcal. 2 
This ls to say that with the human animal self-determination emerges 
as freedom of choice properly so called. Human self-consciousness evidences 
a level of abstraction which radically frees the organism from the determining 
factors of its iD111edlate environment. The dog's choices are limited by what 
it can perceive and imagine as alternative re-actions to its given world. 
With man, however, mentality has evolved to the level where, at least ln some 
moments, (1) there can be conscious awareness of the forms within the facts 
(we understand the facts to be of a certain type and thereby we conceive of 
1~, pp. 5-6. 
The whole of this small volume ls relevant to this point. 
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things ln abstraction form thelr exempllficatlon); (2) to where mentality can 
introduce novel ideas for thought and action (ideas not simply ldentlcal wlth 
those abstracted from the facts of experience or wlth those older stock of our 
ideas); (3) to where self-determlnatlon ls grounded ln conceptual awareness, 
i.e. ln at least lmpllclt understanding of what ls chosen; and (4) to where 
free choice comes to be examined reflectively, which ls to say that not only 
do we choose, but we know that we are choosing. 
With man thls higher kind of self-determination ls evidenced especial-
ly ln two dlstlnct though related areas: freedom to choose among alternative 
modes of thought and among alternative modes of action. 
Whitehead observes that 0 Mankind and the animals with analogous abili-
ties are distinguished by their capacity for the introduction of novelty. 
'lhls requires conceptual power which can imagine, and a practical power which 
can effect."1 In the case of sub-human animals, the relatively lower power of 
intellection limits the area of choices to the selection between particulars, 
as was noted, and this entails that their powers of activity are similartly 
restricted. This ls most clearly observed ln the actlvitles of insects and 
the lower forms of animal llfe where action ls llmltad to instinct or at most 
reflex action (habitual action in response to sense perception.)2 The spider 
spins his web with a precision and exactness grounded in instinct and perhaps 
reflex action. Exercising a rather low-level mentality, it cannot vell adapt 
to changes in lts environment; and if for any reason the environment becomes 
1 fil, P• 42. 2§., p. 82. 
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incompatible with the particular design of its web, the spider will perish 
for lack of ablllty to imagine an alternative design and for lack of power to 
effect the change. 
The particular manner in which men adapt to the environment ls char-
acterized by a significantly higher level of mentality which Whitehead at 
times chooses to call "reason." Whitehead says men react to their environ-
ment through the functions of reason: 
The higher forms of life are actively engaged in modifying their environ-
ment. In the case of mankind this attack on the environment ls the most 
prominent fact in his existence. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The primary function of Reason ls the direction of the attack on the 
environment. 
Whitehead explains that there are two baste functions of reason: 
We can think of lt !,S one among the operation!. involved in the existence 
of an animal body Lthls ls "practical reason::.J, and we can think of it in 
abstraction from any particular animal operations. In this latter mode 
of consideration, Reason ls the operation of theoretical realization. In 
theoretical realization the Universe, or at least factors in it, are un-
derstood in their character of exemplifying a theoretical system. Reason 
realizes the possiblllty of some complex form of definiteness, and con• 
currently understands the world as, in one of lts factors, exemplifying 
that form of definlteness.2 
While these two functions cannot be absolutely separated-..and in fact 
lb.! Function !?! Reason was written to demonstrate their complementary nature--
nevertheless they are directed to different ends (or more exactly, these 
functions represent the two main p..rrposes for which reason may be engaged ln) 
as can be seen when we notice their more extreme manifestations. On the cme 
l!!• P· a. 2 !.l?.ll!•, P• 9. 
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hand, reason may be primarily engaged in for the sake of some practical ac-
tivity, as when the Egyptians developed Geometry ln order to build pyramids, 
or when the early man understood how to kill hls prey. On the other hand, in 
time human reason can come to be engaged in for its own sake. At this level 
mentality ls guided by the desire simply to know, as when the Greeks de-
veloped the Geometry into a theoretical science. But man ls a unity of body 
and mind ex:lsting in the world of matter and ideas, and therefore both func-
tions of reason are interdependent components in the concrete human situation. 
Both evidence the high degree of free choice associated with the entertain-
ment of possibilities understood conceptually--elther alternative possibili-
ties of action for practical or for spea.alative ends. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING EVALUATION 
A. Sunmary 
We have attempted to give a sympathetic interpretation of Whitehead's 
explanation of human freedom as it ls developed in his later philosophical 
writings. In Chapter I, evidence was introduced to show that Whitehead does 
not seriously doubt the full reality of our ordinary lived experience of hu-
man freedom. The feeling of self determination given within this experience 
is that of freely choosing among conceptually grasped alternative modes of 
thinking and acting. Self-determination ls natural, primary, and the source 
of other kinds of freedom--freedom of self-realization, self-perfection, and 
political liberty--and therefore we have attempted to elucidate lts nature in 
the chapters that followed. 
Whitehead understands that to offer an ultimate explanation ls to 
engage in metaphysical speculation. He ls therefore intent upon locating the 
discussion of freedom squarely within the scheme of speculative ideas, as they 
come to be fornulated ln his philosophical works especially Process and Real-
---- - -
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!.Sl.• Whitehead ls also convinced that lt ls lmposslble to fathom the depths 
ln the nature of things and that as a cm.sequence any such scheme of ideas 
"mst not even hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement.'' More-
over, lt is necessary to ttverlfy" the truths of the scheme by applying lt to 
experience. 'lhls ls to say that the llved experience of human freedom ls for 
Whitehead a stubborn and irreducible fact whlch his speculative philosophy wll 
attempt to explain and not explain away. 
In Chapter II, we endeavored to outline Whitehead's explanation of the 
metaphysical basis of freedom. The res verae were seen to be conceived of as 
-
a mltlpllclty of actual entitles all of which are free and none of which are 
unchanging, simple, or self-contained. Their actlvlty, nultlpllcity, and re-
latedness suggest that the !.!.!. verae are composite existents. Introducing a 
novel metaphysical explanation, Whitehead maintains that actual entitles are 
composed of really distinct formative elements termed eternal objects and 
creativity. In the terminology of the schoolmen, eternal objects and crea-
tlvity are correlative metaphysical principles of belng--or, for Whitehead, 
principles of becoming: eternal objects functioning as purely potential forms 
of definiteness and creatlvlty functioning as absolutely formless activity are 
each ••that by whl ch" the actual entl ty comes to be constl tuted in l ts process 
of concrescence as a *'that which ls." The non-temporal actual entity which ls 
God plays a radically unlque role ln this process and this ls why Whitehead 
introcllces God as the third formative element in the total metaphysical situ-
atlon. In hls prlmordlal nature, God ts the ground of the totality of eternal 
objects considered as an lnflnlte realm of pure potentlallt1es. In his conse-
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quent nature, God gives ultimate meaning to the objective lmmortallty of 
actual occasions. In hls superjective nature, God ls the lure for feeling at 
the orlgln of the subjective alm of the concrescing actual occasion. 
An analysis of the 9th Categoreal Obligation, •11be Category of Free-
dom and Determinism," and its relation to the ncategory of the Ultimate" lead 
to the conclusion that, creativity and eternal objects are the actual entlty•s 
ultimate intrlnslc principles of freedom. In order to understand how these 
principles are the ground of freedom, it was necessary to place the discussion 
within the context of the problem of causality, for to be free ls, for White-
head, to be causa .!!!.!.• to be self-determined. 
Past actual occasions were seen to provide the immediate environment 
out of which the subject grows. !hey function as efficient causes initially 
determining or limiting the subject's freedom of self•determinatlon. God, to 
determines the emerging subject, but He does so after the manner of an extrin· 
sic final cause. As the extrinsic source of the (initial phase of the) subje 
tlye aim, God lures the subject to choose the best al temative mode of exis-
tence. 
We observed that in explaining how the subject freely re-acts to these 
extrinsic causes and thereby establishes itself as an independent existent, 
Whitehead C<Xlstructed a metaphysics that bears a striking similarity to that 
of Plato•s. As radical and purely formless activity, creativity functions in 
this system as a principle of relative non-being. By virtue of its creative 
activity, the subject determines its own mode of actuality: it actualizes 
boundless abstract possibll ity by a "decision" that entalls negations and 
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exclusions. The "decision" within potentiality. the decision which ''ellml• 
nates from feeling" and which "cuts off" 0 this" from "that" ls grounded withi 
the very activity of the actual entity as a creature of creativity: it ls 
accounted for by what Whitehead terms "negative prehension." By reason of 
negative prehensions an actual occasion initially emerges as ''not-belng0 ex-
actly what its past was and "not-being" simply as God desires. It's 
to these others constitutes an element in its own novel actuality. 
All ls not meant to be negation, however. According to Whitehead. to 
be an actual entity ls. after allt to be something definite. Whitehead's an-
alysis of negative prehenslons makes it rather clear that in every instance 
"reaction-from" what ls given mustr sillllltaneously be "action-for" some other 
possible definite synthesis, and conversely every "action-for" an-other novel 
synth-esls originates as a "reaction-from" the past with its settled forms of 
definiteness-and even "from" God with His Ideal lures for novel forms of 
definiteness. 'lbus ~ts not-being those others constitutes a real relationship 
establishing what the entity actually ls. 'lllis ls what we should expect ln a 
metaphysics where formless creative activity functions as the ultimate yet 
correlative principle with purely potential forms of definiteness. 
In other words, there ls more to the "creature's" activity than !!!.!!:!. 
negative prehension, mere "Anaesthesia... For the end of every process of con-
crescence ls the final satisfaction which ls the novel synthesis of an indlvl 
ual actual entity, and not the mere annihilation of the past. An actual enti-
ty ls constituted by its prehensions, and therefore there can be an actual 
entity only lf some of its prehensions are positive. Nevertheless there is an 
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ontologlcal priority here• for the emerging subject begins to be what it ls 
lnitlally by reacting to the past from which it in part ls derived and which 
it wlll subsequently re-organize in a novel synthesis. 
Thls can be stated ln terms of freedom. While negative prehenslon 
functions as the lntrlnslc source of so called negative freedom, l.e. of "fre 
dom-from" the extrlnslc determlnatlng causes; post tlve prehenslons, both of 
the past and of novel posslbllitles, are the intrlnslc sources of the positive 
dimension that freedom manifests. i.e. of "freedom-for0 the actual occasion to 
determine itself as a deflnlte existent according to lts own subjective aim 
and ln conjunction with the operations of lts own level of mentality. The 
alm of the individual concrescing actual occasion ls to coordinate lts nega-
tive and positive prehenslons in terms of its level of mental activity and ln 
so far as it ls able givai its particular environment. 
Whitehead contends that like other "macrocosmlc entitles," human 
beings are nexU's 0 butlt-up'' of lndlvldual actual entitles. In Chapter III, we 
attempted to explain the nature and divlslon of these "derlvatlve" entitles 
with the aim of discovering man's place within the macrocosmlc hierarchy. Be-
cause of the "derivative" nature of nexus, the division of the macrocosmic 
wrld has its basis ln the division of the "microcosmic world." It was there-
fore necessary to begln by presenting Whitehead's explanation of the classifi-
cation of individual actual entitles. 
The ideal ls that there would be one genus of actual entitles and that 
all actual entitles would exemplify identical metaphysical principles and 
consequently be members of this one genus. Thus not even God would "be treated 
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as an exception to all metaphysical prlnclples, invoked to save their col-
lapse"; rather, He would be "their chief exempllflcatlon." It turns out, 
however, that God ls radically unique. For upon examination lt ls seen that, 
though exhlbltlng some baste slmllarltles as temporal actual entitles, many of 
the properties of God's nature(s)--for example, hls eternality, non-tempor-
allty, and transcendence-are not at all found ln actual occasions, nor can 
they be explained merely in terms of the categories that explain the actuality 
and activity of actual occasions. The extent of God's difference can be 
measured by the fact that serious consideration has been given to the question 
of whether Whitehead should have held that God ls a society of actual entitles 
When we turned to Whitehead's classlflcatlon of temporal actual oc-
casions, ve observed that he ls intent on upholding the principle of the con-
tinul ty of nature. Composed of similar metaphysical principles, actual oc-
casions vlll be differentiated on the basis of the degree to which the envi-
ronment--lncludlng God--and their powers of mentality are operative ln their 
process of concrescence. Actual occasions are similar in that none of them 
has any principle ln its metaphysical make-up not possessed in some degree by 
any other actual occasion. 'nley are dissimilar ln that each has more-or-less 
of than the others. Where the process of concrescence of an actual occasion 
ls sufficiently more complex and where the activity of mentality ls sufficient• 
ly greater, we have argued that in effect a critical threshold ts crossed. 
'nle result ls the emergence of an actual oceaslon exhlblting unique activities, 
aetlvitles not to be found in lower grade actual occasions. 
In the light of this interpretation, Whitehead's four-fold classitica-
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tion of individual occasions was seen to signify that at certain discernible 
points in the degree of complexity and in the powers of mentality, actual 
occasions begln to manifest actlvlties not found in "lower" type occasions, 
and that lt is useful and proper to mark these points as dlvldlng the known 
classes of actual occasions. Furthermore, these differences were seen to be 
mirrored when we distinguish the extent and nature of freedom manifest by ac-
tual occasions. Exercising the greatest degree of mentality and complexity, 
the highest grade actual occasions manifest a specif lcally dlf ferent and 
higher kind of freedom: they are the least determined, the most novel, and 
the most free. So on dovn through the orders of actuality to the class of 
occasions that are most determined, least novel, and exercise the lowest kind 
of freedom. 
Because of the "derivative'' nature of nexus and soclet:l e~, the divi-
sion of individual actual entitles serves as the ultimate basis in terms of 
which macroscopic entitles are to be classified. 'Whitehead consistently clas-
sifies the macroscopic entitles of our present cosmic epoch into four basic 
classes depending on their constitutive member actual occasions, and especial-
ly upon the presence and nature of the regnant member actual occasions. These 
four classes range from (1) the lowest kinds of simple enduring objects and 
the unspecialized corpuscular societies constituting all the types of lnor-
ganic material bodies; to the more specialized forms of societies evidencing 
various levels of life roughly associated with (2) vegetation, (3) non-luman 
animals, and (4) human animals. 
In brief, human beings are unique macroscosmlc entitles because the 
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regnant actual occasions that dominate and organize the unique super-complex 
structured aocl ety that ls a man are thanse1ves unl quely higher level actual 
occaalons as compared to those that constitute and dominate other societies 
and nexU"~--anct so on down through the grades of societies and nexU's. Slm-
Uarty, the freedom manifest by nacroscoptc organlama corresponds to thls 
classlflcatlon. The freedom proper to human beings la, for Whitehead of a 
uniquely higher order as compared to the freedom exercised by non-human anl• 
mala, p1mta, and lnmlute •croscoplc entltl••• 
The problem of spaclfylng the nature of human freedom was taken up 
ln Chapters IV and v. To thla end, we bepn by outllnlng Whltah•d's concep• 
tlon of h.aman nature. What dlatlngulshes •n among all the macroscoplc organ• 
lama ls that ln hlm untold mllUma of centers of Ufa are coupled with an 
extreme kind of unlfylng force, mlch ta the personal society of actual oc-
casions supported wlthln as a part of the very being of the non-aoclal nexus 
vhlch ls the brain. 'lbus the hwnan person, body and mlnd or soul, manifests 
a unique type of unity and organlzatlon. Thls bas as lta source the llvlng 
personal soul whlch supports and organizes and ln tum ls supported by the 
intricacy of bodily functlonlngs. 
To understand what thla meana ln ter• of human freedom, the process 
of concrescence of the "regnant actual occaslcns" constltutlng the personal 
soul was then lnveatagated. It waa shown that the high-grade freedom of these 
occasions ls bullt-up ln the process of concreacence which entalled a series 
!Of perceptive activltles. Thus freedom was examined in the context of percep• 
tion in the modes of cau•l efficacy, presentational lDDedlaey, and low-grade 
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symboUc reference. It was also seen that in addition to these, the actual 
occasions constituting the personal human soul manifest a freedom that ac-
companies the conscious activity of the hlgher phases of concrescence we chos 
to call "intellectual conceptions." Exercising intellectual conception, the 
regnant actual occasions and thereby the human animal ls able to "conceive of 
types of things in abstraction from exemplification." Only men can under-
stand struoture1 only men can formulate scientific laws; only men can create 
science and philosophy; only men enjoy civilization; and only men possess 
language. 
Human beings are capable of conceptual abstraction, of entertaining 
ideas apart from their exemplification within sensible particulars. As a con 
sequence of this, human beings are capable of exercising a greater degree of 
freedom. In fact, this significantly greater degree amount• to crossing a 
critical threshold and makes man's freedom unique and not to be found in 
lower grade macroscopic entitles. What distinguishes tuman freedom ls that 
man ls able to choose between this ideal or that, between thls theory or 
that, between this course of action or that, and so forth on the basis of 
understanding at leaat implicitly what kJnds of objects these are, and on the 
basts of underatanding, again at least lmpllcitly, what kinds of ends he ls 
thereby establishing for hi11Self. Finally, this unique form of human freedom 
was seen to be exercised ln two distinct though related modes, freedom of 
thought and freedom of action directed either to speculative or practical ends 
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B. Concluding Evtluatlon 
Alfred North Whitehead la undoubtedly one of the most important 
phllosophers of the twentieth century. He has written creatively and in many 
instances extensively, on a wide range of subjects that include logic, mathe-
matics, science, the philosophy of science, and educational, social, and po-
lltlcal philosophy. In addition, he has given a metaphysical exposition that 
stands alon1sld• of the great speculative systems of Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Leibniz, Kant and He1el. Process !!!l Reality has rightly been called monu-
mental, a lendmark, a masterpiece in metaphysical speculation. This work, as 
well as Science and the Modern World and Adventures sf.. Ideas, evidence a depth 
of vlston, novelty of insight, and power of synthesis seldom equalled ln the 
hlatory of ideas. It hardly needs mphaslzlng, then, that it la lmposslble 
to offer anything llke a comprehensive evaluation of Whitehead's philosophy 
in a fev concluding pages. Qar aim ls much more modest. In what follows, we 
will suggest only what seems to us to be some of the more slgniflcant strength 
and weaknesses of Whitehead'• explanation of human freedom. It should be 
emphasized, however, that our critlcis .. of Whitehead's philosophy, both from 
wt thin and from without that system, are meant as tentative observations 
rather than fixed opinions. We are still ln the process of thinking and re-
thinking Whitehead'• system in tel'IDS of our Uved experience and in terms of 
our reading of the history of philosophy. Therefore the following ta but an 
outllne of what to us, and in some instances to others, as well, are some 
problems arising from Whitehead's analY•ls of human freedom. 
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One of the most important aspects of Whitehead's writings ts hls 
realistic respect for the stubborn and lrreduclble facts given within human 
experience. Whitehead's many crlticlsms of common sense experience are 
balanced by as many defenses on lts behalf. Althcugh Whitehead lnslsts that 
there are no isolated facts and that there can be no facts apart from some 
theory of lnterpretatton. at the same tlme he wrl tea that ln a important 
sense some facts are more fundamental than other•-!!!• the Uved fact of 
human freedom-and that at least as regards these primary facts theory ls to 
be dictated by fact, and not the other way around. More than that, he con• 
tends that the theory ls to ~e verlfled by lts ability to accomoclate by way 
of etplalnlng and not merely descrlblng these and all the other facts wlthln 
particular dlsclpllnes. For the philosopher no less than for the man of com. 
mon sense or th• sclentlst, the lrreduclble and stubborn facts are the foun-
dations upon whlch explanations are base and even tested. On this we are ln 
agreement wlth Whitehead. 
Yet if we are not mistaken there ls a lacuna in Whitehead's wrltlngs 
that tends to weaken the whole enterprise at the very beginning. For lt 
seems to us that he does not adequately dlfferentlate between either the var• 
ious types of facts given on the many levels of experience or between the dif· 
ferent formaltttes and methods employed by the intellect ln its many acts of 
cognition. It ls not clear, for example, how Whitehead means to dlstlngulsh 
between the flights of free imagination that characterize the metaphysical 
enterprise from those incorporated ln common sense or science. Also, he 
sometimes writes as lf the concepts used in the empirical sciences are able 
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to be more-or-leas simply adopted by the metaphyslctan. In short, Whitehead 
has correctly distlnauished the obJeqJ: or subject matter of philosophy gen• 
eraUy and •taphyslcs speciflca11y 1 but he has not, we judge, sufflclently 
speclfled the forpalltx and !!thosl used by the philosopher. Consequently, 
whlle lt ls apparent that for Whitehead so• facts are stubborn and irredu· 
cib1e1 we do not know how ln principle these facts are to be recognized. Nor, 
therefore do we know the praclse relationship between fact and theory. 
There can be no doubt that facts and explanations are somehow inter• 
depandet; that explanations are meant to aplain fact and that often, if not 
always, the acknowledgement of a fact implies some a.planatory theory. Few 
would disagree with thls general fonulatlcn of the problem. There ts mch 
disagreement, however, as to the precise nature of this relatlonshlp. cur own 
posltlan ls basically ln accord with that ecpreaaad by the late Yves Slmon. 
the fonulatlon of a fact canslsta ln making an existential judgment under 
the guarantH of a sensation. In wery such judgment of fact one nust distln.• 
gulsh betwffft the object of sensation, the judgment of existence, and .the 
object of tntellectton. 
Now what prod.aces the diversity of types of facts ls not the dlverslty of 
sensations. When the galvanometer moves, the layman and the sclentlst 
aperlence ldentlcal sensations, and yet the former knows only a wlgar 
fact the latter knows a sclentlflc fact. Nor ls lt the exlatentlal char-
acter of the factual judgment: at the sight of the same sensible phenome• 
na both learned and ignorant parsons thlnk that something really exists. 
But for the one tt ts something wlgar, ••I•• the movemtnt of a mirror 
and of the Ught lt reflects, produced by sane unknown cause; for the 
1For example, see hls dlacuaalon of quanta theory ln relation to the 
nature of actual occasions in SMW • PP• 52·56. Thi a ta dwe1 oped ln .f!, for 
example PP• 176-79, 470-71, 12·23. 
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other it ls something sclentlf!c, e.g., the closing of an electrical cir-
cuit. In effect• within the structure of a fact the object of sensation 
plays only a material role; the formal side ls taken care of by the objec 
of the concept. But, all diversity of types results from a formal diver-
sity. ntus, what distinguishes the different kinds of facts ls the diver 
slty of concepts lmplled ln the fornulatlon of a fact; to a vulgar con-
cept corresponds a vulgar fact; to a scientific concept, a scientific 
fact; and to a philosophic concept, a philosophical fact •••• It all depend 
on the intellect's interpretation, what the intellect reads ln the object 
of sensation. If the interpretation ls of a vulgar type, there will be a 
vulgar fact; if of a sclentlflc typef a sclentlflc fact; lf of a phllo· 
sophlcal type, a p~ilosophlcal fact. 
From this it follows that even where the datum of sensation ls ex-
actly the same, the fact which science incorporates lnto itself cannot be 
identical with the fact that philosophy incorporates into itself. Moreover, 
as Simon observes, 
ll. ll. !! .£!:!!! that ll. .!.! impossible S,2. integrate ~ ~ sxstem s! phll· 
osophlcal thought any !.S.!!! borrowed 1£2!!! £h! system 2f. scientific thought, 
.!.£. ldJJ.. !?.! impossible S,2. incorporate ~ philosophy any scientific fact, 
for a scientific fact connotes a scientific mind, with lts characterls· 
tlcs which are opposed to those of the philosophical mlnd.2 
Therefore the philosopher ought not to ape the scientist, nor vice versa, 
either as regards the acceptance of fact or the forn.alation of theory. 
To us this implies that our common experience of sensible objects en-
joys a priority over other data. It stands at the origin of our experience 
of matters of fact. To th1s extent our "wlgar experience" constitutes at 
least some of the stubborn and irreducible facts, to use Whitehead's term. 
l!h! Great Dialogue g! Nature ~ Space, trans. by Gerard J. Delcourt 
(Albany, New York: Magi Books• Inc., 1970), pp. 147-48. All of Chapter vlil 
ls important, PP• 139-62. Also see Jacques Maritain, lb.! Degrees g£_ Knowl-
edge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan, .!! al. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1959), esp. Chapters 11-v, PP• 21-244; and Robert J. Henle, Method !!l ~­
physics (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1951). 
2areat Dialogue, p. 149. 
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All speculative conceptions will have to be measured by these facts. Merleau-
Ponty well summarizes the reason for this priority: 
All my knowledge of the world, even my scientlflo knowledge ls gained fr 
my particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without 
which the symbols of science would be meaningless. 'Ihe whole universe of 
science ls built upon the world as directly experienced and lf we want to 
subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise as• 
sessment of its meaning and scope, we nast begin by reawakening the basic 
experience of the world of which science la a second-order experlence.l 
As we have seen, Whitehead, on the other hand, makes sensatlcn-per-
caption ln the mode of low-grade symboUc reference- a derivative rather than 
a primary perceptive mode. Consequently he la able to ccnclude coherently 
that the macroscopic beings of our ordinary sense experience, what common 
sense takes as real lndlvlduals, are r•a11Y dertvatlve ln their being, and 
that what ls reatt;y real are imperceptible lndlvidual actual entitles. 
The difficulty with this as regards human freedom ls that my lnnediate 
awareness of an act of free choice ordinarily ls an experience en the macro-
scopic order, and one which usually entalls sense perception. lhus I am aware 
of choosing to turn on the TV rather than finish the novel. But in White• 
head•s philosophy such macroscopic experiences are really derivative and pro-
jected rather than ianediately given ln presclentific and prephllosophlcal 
sense experience as Merleau-Ponty .!£.fl suggests. 
1Pheeomenol91Y !l1., Perception, translated by Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1962) as reprinted in Reality, Man ~ E1iatence, 
ed. by H. J. Blackh• (New Yorki Bantam Books, Inc., 1965),pp. 352-53. 
Phenomenologtc .!!!!!. perception (Part~: Librairle Galltmard, 1945), pp. ii-
lli: "Tout ce que je sals du monde, meme par science, je le sals a partlr 
d'une vue mtenne ou d'une experience du monde sans laquelle las symboles de la 
science ne vou~raient rlen dire. Tout l'univers de la aclen~e eat constrult 
sur le monde vecu et st nous 'YOUlons penser la science ellememe avec rlgueur, 
en apprecler exactement le sens et la port••, il nous taut r'veiller d'abord 
cette exp,rience ell monde dont elle est 1 'expression seconde." 
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Before turning to the problem that arises as a consequence of con• 
siderlng macroscoplc entitles as derlvattve beings, a few observations con-
cernlng th• materials discussed ln Chapter II are ln order. First, ln seeking 
to forattate an ultimate explanation of th• nature of the res verae, of the 
fully or really real, Whitehead evidences a profound grasp of the nature of 
phllosophlcal inquiry. On thls point he ls within the spirit of the Western 
philosophical tradltlon stemming from Plato and Aristotle. 
Second, we agree with Whitehead that radical monism ls to be avoided 
only if the res verae are composed of really dlstlnct principles whether God 
needs be so composed would have to be shown. According to the ontological 
principle, only indlvldual actual entitles are fully real. Everything else 
ls either a principle of the belng, or rather we should say of the becoming, 
of an actual entity, or else ls derived ln some way from tndlvldual actual 
entitles. If thls interpretation of Whltcll~ed's position la correct, then 
problems arise with some lnterpretatlons of Whitehead's philosophy such as 
Hartshorne'• doctrine of the "compound lndlvlc:tual." Speaking of Whitehead's 
phtlosophy of organism Hartshorne says, "The theory of the enduring indlvldual 
as a •society• of occasions, interlocked wlth other such indlvlc:tuals into so-
cteties of socletles, ls the first complete emergence of the compound indi· 
1 
victual into technical terminology.'' By compound individuals, Hartshorne 
means n..Us and/or societies. 'lbe compound lndlvldual ls thus an enduring 
individual substance (._.bstance belng regarded by Hartshorne as "simply the 
lttnte Compound Indlvtdual," in Phllosophical Essays m Alfred North 
Whitehead (New York: Russell and Russett. 1967), P• 211. 
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technical terms for lndlvlduaUty as a phlloaophlcal category,"1) that ts 
composed of other compcund 1ndtvtduala, and so on until we reach the ultlnat• 
components, lndtvldual actual entities. As we shall see presently, the prob-
lem with this interpretation ta that it violates the ontological principle, 
for Whitehead certainly writes ln many passages that lndlvlduallty and ext•-
tentlal actuation are predicated properly and originally of an actual entity, 
-and not of nexus. 
Hartahorn•'s suggestion ls mlaleadlng lf we attempt to apply it to 
actual occasions. For individual actual occasions are not composed of other 
Individual actual occasions, and therefore on the microscopic level of the 
fully real there are no compound lndlvlduals--indlvlduals composed of parts 
that are themselves lndlviduals. On the contrary, we have endeavored to show 
that indlvldual actual entitles are composed of principles none of which ls 
itself an lndivldual, a "that·whlch-ls." By lntroduclng creatlvlty and eter-
nal objects as "formative elements" Whitehead ls ln fact rejecting the idea 
that the ultimate individuals can be "compound lndlvlduals." 
The point of cur dlsagreemnt with Hartshorne, then, has to do with 
hls interpretation of the reality to be ascribed to nmcroscoplc entitles ln 
Whlteheadlan metaphysics. Whlte Whitehead clearly subscribes to the idea 
that some macroscopic entitles are compounded of other macroscopic entitles, 
lt ls certainly proper to ask ln what sense macroscopic entitles are "indl-
viduals" at all? In other words, given Whitehead'• categoreal scheme, can 
there really be anything llke Hartahorne•s "compound lndlvlduals?" 'lbe very 
1.!.!?!,A., P• 194. 
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phrase seems contradlctoryJ Furthermore, given our lnterpretatlon, lt ls 
difficult to understand hov a macroscopic entity could fully exist at all as 
an "tndlvl<l.aal substance" let alone be "compounded. 0 
Least there be some mlsunderatandlng at this juncture, lt should be 
emphasized that our critlclsm of Hartshorne ls directed prlmarlly at hls ln-
terpretation of Whitehead. It ls not meant to be a criticism of Hartshorne•s 
own phllosophlcal posltlon-or, at this point, with that intended by 'Whtt ... 
head--wlth which we flnd nuch to agree. The question we are exmnlnlng con-
-cerns the status t~ be assigned to nexus and societies in Whitehead's writ• 
lngs. In thls Ught cur question ls, given the form.alatlon and the intent of 
- -the ontological principle, can we ascribe to a nexus and to nexus of nexus 
the kind of organic reality Hartshorne suggests? 
-Third, Whitehead's discussion of the composition of the I!! verae 
entails serious dlfflcultlea. By making creatlvlty his baste metaphysical 
principle of activity, Whitehead has explicitly given priority to becoming 
over being. In this system, change ls the baste !!s,S. of existence, so nuch 
so that whatever form actuallty takes lt can ~ only ''becominglY"-or ''chang-
lngty." As creatures of creativity, all actual entitles, God included, neces• 
sarlly change. The processes of concreacence and transition are the two ul• 
tlmate modes of this change. Endurance la a "mode of being" predicable of 
nexU's and societies, while strictly speaking actual entitles, the res verae, 
_....,.. ......... 
do not end.are. But why ls l t necessary to identify change and actlvl ty, as 
Whitehead does? For while every change, to be sure, necessarily involves ac-
tlvlty, it ts not obvious that every activity precisely as activity necessarl• 
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ly involves change. As Aristotle suggests, motion (which we may understand 
as signifying all types of change or becomlng.-we do not mean to imply, how• 
ever, that all change is motion) ls an imperfect klnd of act,1 and therefore 
we shall be mislead if we look to lt as the primary analogue of activity. We 
think that the primary analogue of "perfect activity" might indeed be found 
ln the lived human experiences of "perfect" actlvltles such as contemplation, 
joy, and saneother forms of love; which ls to say that the broad concept of 
motion or change including both perfect and imperfect has an analogical 
unlty. 2 
Another difficulty arises as a consequence of "conceiving'• of crea• 
tivlty as unlimited and formless activity. 'nle upshot of this ldentlflcatlon 
lt to locate a radical surdal principle at the heart of reality. In a sense, 
there ls simply no explaining the self·creatlve actlvlty of an actual entity 
ln terms of causes other than itself. Whitehead introduces creativity as the 
final ••explanation" of the fact that the actual activity ls a novel concres-
cence, that ls, in order to explain novelty .m!!. novelty. Inaaaach as the 
ground of freedom ls to be found ln part in creativity it follows that ln the 
end freedom also tums out to be irrational. 
Recall that Whitehead compares creatlvlty to Spinoza's one substance, 
Plato's receptacle, and Aristotle's material substrate, by which he implies 
that it functions in part as a material ce.ase, a "that out of which." In a 
lphysica, III, l, 20lal0-ll; Metaphxslcs, IX, 61 l048b 25-34. 
2see Simon, Gr!!t Dialogue, Chapter lv, "The PhUosophy of Change, 0 
PP• 59-87; "On Order ln Analo1tcal Seta," .I!l! !!!! Scholastlclsm, XX.XIV (1960), 
PP• 1·42. 
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manner of speaking, receiving a form, creativity ls thereby made a determinate 
something, an actual entity: an entity possessing this definite mode of ac-
tivity. But by locating a principle of novelty and therefore of freedom ln 
the material cause and by conceiving lt as activity that ls totally formless, 
indefinite, lacking determlnatlon, lt ls necessary that freedom ls ultimately 
conceived of as spontaneous and unintelligible activity. Nov as Simon has ob-
served, such conceptions are reminiscent of the doctrine of Epicurus, for 
whom freedom ls explained as the outcome of the causeless swerve of the atom. 1 
'While they disagree on the precise meaning of the term "freedom"-and on whe• 
ther and to what extent humans are free.-vriters as diverse as Moritz Schlick, 
John Hospers, Corliss Lamont, and Yves Slmon2 are agreed ext one point at least 
If we mean by freedom an act which ls ultimately causeless, in the sense of 
being totally spontaneous in its initial negative moment, then it ls impos-
slble to understand how freedom cculd exist. lbls ls to say that, it ls lm• 
possible meaningfully to explain freedom as a radically causeless activity: 
you are merely juxtaposing incompatible terms. We think that 'Whitehead's for-
nutation of the principle of creativity has the same result. It makes the free 
1Yves Simon, Freedom ~ Choice, ed. by Peter Wolf (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1969), PP• 14-15. It should be noted that Simon makes no 
mention of Whitehead in this connection. 
2Moritz Schlick, Problems .21, Ethics, trans. David Rynin (New York: 
Prentice-Ha11 9 Inc., 1939) 1 PP• 145-58. John Hospers, ttWhat Means this Free• 
dom?'' ln Determinism .!W! Freedom Jn the Age .2! Modem Science, ed. by Sidney 
Hook (New Yorks Collier Books, l96lr;-"°pp. 126-42; "Free Will and Psychoan-
alysis, 11 in l!!.! Problem .2! Free Wlll 1 ed. Willard D. Enteman (New Yorks 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 195-215. Corliss Lamont, Freedom .2! Choice 
Affirmed (New Yorks Horizon Press, 1967) 1 esp. PP• 56-96 and 122-138. Yves 
Simon, FreedQ!! .2!. Choice, PP• 1-15. R. M. 0\1Bholm, "Human Freedom and the 
Self" in Reafon and Responsiblllty, edited by Joel Feinberg (2nd ed.; Enclo and 
Belmont, Callfornias Dickenson Pub., Co., 1971) 1 PP• 361·62. 
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act ultimately causeless.-lacking fOF!!fl specification-.and radically unlntel-
llglble.1 In thl s sense Whitehead has not succeeded ln giving an adequate 
setenatlm of the bash of freedom. 
Thls brlngs us to the fourth and final set of observations concemlns 
'Whitehead's analysts of the nature of lndlvldual actual entitles. Hts dla-
cusslon of the process of concrescence entails two addltlmal dlfflcultles 
that should be noted at least ln passing. First. as Ushenko, Shahan, Stokes, 
2 3 
and Esllck have pointed out, and as Whitehead himself has admitted, on the 
one hand negative prehanslons are lndlspenatble to the system, and on the 
other lt appears that they are ultimately unlntelllglble. lllat they are tn• 
dlspenslble there ls little doubt. When the various phases of concresccce 
were examined, especially ln Chapters IV and V, we dlscemed that the activity 
of creativity manifests itself as different modes of negation and ellmlnatlona 
as mere negative prehenslon, as negative perceptlon, and as negative tntultlve 
judgment. Despite lts Importance, Whlteheadlan scholars have not yet agreed 
1Ectward Pols makes a stmtlar observation. See his passing comment ln 
"Freedom and Agency: /.. Reply." Ib!, Southern JoumaJ ,9! Phllosophy, VII• No. 
4 (Winter, 1969-70) p. 410a. For an extensive and perceptive analysts of this 
weakness ln Whitehead'• system made from a somewhat different perspective see 
Robert c. Nevllle, "Whitehead Cb the One and the Many," ll!!. Southern Joumat 
$?!. PhilosophY, VII, No. 4 (Winter, 1969-1970), PP• 387-93. 
2
ushenko, •'Negative Prehenstons," lb!. Joumal ~ PhUosophY, XXIV, No. 
10 (May 13, 1937) 1 PP• 262-67. Shahan, Whitehead's Theory$?!. Experience (New 
York: Klng Crown Presa, 1950), esp. PP• 121-24. Stokes, "The Function of 
Creativity ln the Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead," (unpublished PhD dls 
sertatlon, St. Louts Univerlsty, 1960), esp. pp. 194-98, 370-72. Eslick, 
''Existence and Creativity in Whitehead," Proceedlys $?!.the American Catholic 
PhlJosophlcal Association, XXXV (1961), esp. PP• 161-63. 
3
"Analysls of Meaning," ln !if• PP• 130-31. 
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upon an adequate solution to thls difficult notton--and ln fact conslderlng t 
fundamental role negative prehenslon plays lt ls rather surprlslng that so 
llttle attentlan ls given to such a baste component of the system. 
The second dlfflculty concerns the lntelllglblllty of Whitehead's an• 
alysls of the phases of concrescence. Because concrescence ls not ln tlme, 
but rather time la an abstraction from the succession of actual entitles, how 
are we to understand the priority of one phase to mother? There ls Uttle 
doubt that tn some sense cancrescence en.tans a division of the subject into 
a mltipliclty of successive phases. 'lhe question ls how are we to understand 
this In the light of the epochal theory of tlmei Arguing that lt ls not a 
temporal, logical, part•whole, or dlalectlcal priority, Chrlstlan concludes 
that "we mat accept lt as something of lts own klnd."1 Sherburne acknowl• 
edges the dlfflculty of finding a better suggestion, but he admits that 
Chrlsttan•s appeal to .!!:!! gen.eris prlolrty seems to many as E, h2!a and unsatls· 
factory. 2 More recently, the critical study by Pols has caused \lhlteheadlan 
scholars to re-examine the doctrine of genetic analysis. Pols' critique has 
touched off a flurry of responses and has even been. the toplc of a formal dls-
cusslon at the recent meeting ln Toronto of the "Society for the Study of Pro-
3 
cess Philosophies." The status of these developments ls that as of yet there 
15!, tntarpretatlon, P• 81. 24 Key, P• 38. 
3Pols, Whitehead's Metaphysics, esp. PP• 101-25; Cobb, "Freedom ln 
Whitehead's Phllosophy: A Response to Edward Pols," lb.! Southern Journal a! 
Philosophy, VII, No. 4 (Winter, 1969•1970), PP• 409-13. See Pols' response, 
''Frffdom and Agencya A Reply,•• lbld., PP• 415-19. Lewla Ford, "On Genetic 
Succeaalveness: A Third Alternative," lbld., PP• 421·25. Donald Sherburne, 
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ls no consensus as to an adequate interpretation or rethlnklng of this seg-
ment of Whitehead's theory. 
We have seen that the analysis of· concrescence lnto distinct though 
inseparable phases manifesting priority and posteriority ls absolutely indis-
pensible to the system. Whitehead introduces the notion of phases to explain 
the very activity of self-development of the actual entity and to explain how 
in principle actual occaslons--and thereby also ne,N's and socletles--are dlf· 
ferentiated both existentially and essentially. In so doing he attempts to 
explain the fact of freedom on both the microscopic and macroscopic orders. 
We mst canclude that, as with the question cancernlng negative judgments, 
until an adequate resolution of these real difficulties is forthcoming it is 
not possible to be satisfied with Whitehead's explanation of our lived expert-
ence of human freedom, all of his most important and often valid insights to 
the contrary notwithstanding. For in this system our ordinary lived temporal 
experience of human freedom ls said to be derived from the non-temporal free-
dom of indlvldual actual entitles, and therefore unless we have adequately 
explained metaphysical basis of microcosmic freedom, we shall not, according 
to Whitehead, be able to explain the freedom evidenced on the macrocosmic 
level. 
To be sure, mention of the macroscopic universe assumes the lnterpre-
tation introduced in Chapter III concerning the derivative mode of existence 
••Vbitahead's Psychological Physiology," .!J?.!it•, PP• 406a-407; Paul Schmidt. 
"Whitehead's Metaphysics: A Critical Examination," Journal .2!,Sb,! History .21 
Philosophy, VII, No. 1 (January, 1969), p. 100. 'lhe participants of the March, 
1971 SSPP meeting included, among others, Cobb, Ford, Pols, and Sherburne. A 
verbatim transcript of this discussion ls available from SSPP c/o George Allan, 
Dickenson College, Carlisle, Pa. 
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exercised by nexus and societies. 'nlis leads us to consider another tension 
in Whitehead's position which we thlnk ls ultimately irresolvable short of 
drastically modifying the system. For while intending to explain the ground 
of our common human experience of such things as stones, trees, cats, and men, 
Whitehead comes to condlude that whatever reality they do manifest ls to be 
explained in terms of their individual actual occasions which alone are really 
real lndivlduals. Everything else ls thought to be "built-up" from them. A. 
H. Johnson states the matter preciselys 
It ls very important to grasp Whitehead's contention that the characteris-
tics of a society are, without exception, the characteristics of at least 
some of its component actual entitles. 'nlat ls to say, n2. new character-
istics emerge ln the social organization which are not present in the com• 
ponent memers. 
If lt be objected that Whitehead has not accounted for complex social 
organization, his reply can only be that in the lfst analysts we do !ll!.· 
cover societies in varying degrees of complexity. 
We agree with Johnson that Whitehead does not wish to deny the reality 
of stones, trees, and men, for we do discover them, and that's a fact. But 
what kind of a fact? Here we DUst reintroduce Christian's distinctions ccn-
1wtatt!h•d'a Theory .21, Reallty, p. 52. Cobb makes llLlch the same point 
"A nexus in l ts formal coq>leteness has no other value for itself than the 
values of the occasions that compose lt. An objectified nexus la always ob· 
jectlfled by some actual occasion and has its value for and in that occasion. 
Intrinsic value ls the value of indlvldual occasions of experience." (! 
Christian Natural Theoloax, p. 100.) 
The followtna examples give both meaning and support to Johnson and 
Cobb's statements. Whitehead speaks of the following as derivative: apace 
!!14 time as derivative from the transitlcn of events (!t!,1 PP• 173-86; g, p. 
34; "Time"; .f!, PP• 105-08, 442-43); macroscopic fluency as derivative from 
microscopic fluency (.f!, PP• 320-26); life as derivative from actual entitles 
and predicated secondarily of societies (l,!1 p. 156; t!!• pp. 205·06; !!t p. 21 
--yet, lt will be recalled, this ls appareptlY denied tn A!t p. 266); beauty 
as derivative from actual entitles and predicated secondarily of societies 
(~, PP• 324, 328). 
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cemlng the sorts of discourse found ln Whitehead's wrltlngs. In presyste-
matte language, lt ls perfectly proper to say that we discover stones, trees, 
and men; moreover, these are thought to be real. They are the data of ordl-
nary concrete sense experience, one would say. In the post-systematic lan• 
guage, however, these concrete facts are explained as derlvatlve abstractions 
formed ln the later phases of concreacence by the emerging subject In accord-
ance with the appropriate categoreal obllgatlons-especially "trannutation.•• 
In short, the perceptive actual occasion perceives as a nexus and/or society 
what ln reality are lndlvtdual actual occasions. But then in what sense are 
macroscopic entitles real? 
Whitehead ls making an absolutely fundamental option. To the basic 
metaphysical question as to what ls fully and really real ln the final analy-
sts, Whitehead has answered, "lndtvidual actual entitles." These are the u1 ... 
tlmate existents out of which everything else la explained. They are the prl-
mary Jityalcal existents of natural betnas. Leclerc has presented a brtlllant 
analysts of Whl~ehead's position on thla a.abject and has well developed lts 
meaning and lmpllcatlons. As be says, 
If the atamtc elements be the ultimate existents, then a body, which ls 
a composite of these elementary constituents, ls an •all"egatton, an 
Arlatotellano-~v9~£ns of th•. Now tbls lmpllea that, ontologically con• 
sldered, body la different ln kind.from the atomic constituents; that ta, 
body ls an entity on an ontologically different level from that of the ele• 
mentary constituents. Only the atomic elements are ultimate, or true, 
physical exlstenta; a body can thus not be an ultimate existent but ls an 
entity of a derivative kind.l 
1nnte Problem of the Physical Existent," International Phllosophlcal 
quarterJz, IX, No. 1 (March, 1969), p. 47; also see pp. 52-53. See Gordon s. 
Treash, "Whitehead and Physical Existence: A Reply to Professor Leclerc," Ibl 
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On the other hand, Leclerc points out that by developing a theory ln 
which actual entitles exercise real interrelatedness lnasBUch as they are ln• 
formed by some cormnon eternal object as their deflnlns character, Whitehead 
maintains "that he can have what Leibniz strictly could not, namely, a com-
1 pound or body wt th a character of its own qua that compcund. '' For l t appears 
that Whitehead ls well aware that unless the nexus and society sustain a de-
fining character which la not ultimately recllclble to that of its component 
individuals, l.e., unless there ta some additional definite reality not pre-
sent in the indivlduat actual entities taken as a collection, then he has 
succeeded only in explaining away the macroscopic world as mere phenomena-
as Kant and Lelbnls had done each in their own way. the question ccmes down 
to this. In terms of his own principles, specifically the intent of the on• 
tological principle, as it comes to be formulated in Process and Reality, can 
Whitehead coherently argue that n~s and societies sustain a defining char-
acteristic which ls not reducible to that sustained by the component lndlvid· 
ual actual entitles? To this we fully agree with Leclerc•s negative reply. 
the only way, phi1oaophlca11y, for compaunds to have a unity and a char· 
acter of their own qua those compounds, ls for compaunds to be admitted 
to the status of actual entitles or real beings. And this entails the 
abandonment of the fundamental metaphysical theory whloh was adopted ln 
the seventeenth century and which since then has co• to be accepted as 
a tacit presupposition, that the real of actual entitles, the ultimate 
X, No. l (March, 1970), PP• 118-25; and Leclerc•• reply, "Whitehead and Phys-
ical Existence: A Rejoinder," ..!!?!£., PP• 126-28. Finally, see Leclerc'• very 
important recent study, the Nature of Phfislcal Existence (London: George All 
and Unwln, Ltd., New YorKT" RumanltT'isress, Inc. ,1972), especially Part IV, 
PP• 241·351. 
1
••the Physical &clatent," P• 53. 
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physical existents, nust be conceived as a restricted to the final con-
stitutents of compounds.l 
Whitehead explicitly rejects the view that compounds have the metaphysical 
status of actual entities, and consequently we think he is prevented from 
giving an adequate explanation of the metaphysical basis of human freedom. 
In our judplent, in the end he has not succeeded in explaining our lived ex-
perience of human freedom. 
'lbere are many interesting and important facets to Whitehead's analy-
sis of human freedom. We would like to conclude our study by noting three in 
particular. 
Flrat, tn maintaining that a degree of freedom ls found ln all axis-
tents and is not limited to man alone• Whitehead ls in basic agreement with 
such outstanding contemporary thinkers as Henrl Bergson, Bernard Lonergan, 
Teilhard de Chardln, Paul Tillich, a:id Paul Welss. 2 For prior to Darvin, the 
Western philosophical consensus came together with the common sense pronounce-
ment of mankind and with generally accepted scientific explanations to the 
effect that only human beings exercise intellectual cognition and therefore 
libld., pp. 58·59. Also see Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead, PP• 
44, 290, 378. 
2Henrl Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: 
Random House, 1944), PP• 287-94, 123. Bemard Lonergan, Insight: ! Study.!?!, 
Hwnan Understanding (England: Longmans, Green, and Co., Ltd., 1958), pp. 245-
70. Tellhard de Chardln, !b.! Phenomenon ,g! ~. trans. Bernard Wall (New York 
Harper & Row Pub., 1959), Book I, Chapter it, pp. 53-66. Paul Tillich, Syste-
matic Theologx, Vol. I (Chicagos University of Chicago Presa, 1951), P• 185. 
Paul Weiss, Nature and Han (New Yorki Henry Holt and Co., 1947), pp. 215-17; Me!!'• Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), PP• 28·29; "Cammon 
Sense and Beyond," ln Determinism ~ Freedom, edlted by Sldney Hook, Collier 
Books (New Yorks Macmillan Co.; Landon: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1961), PP• 
231-36. 
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1 
only human beings exercise freedom--and consequently are moral agents. While 
not unique in the history of ideas, this doctrine of ••pan-freedom," if we may 
so call lt, does represent an lmportant departure, then, from the mainstream 
of Western philosophical speculation by these distinguished and very orlglnal 
contanporary thinkers. 
It ts necessary to realize, however, that these men do not wish to 
deny that in some important sense humans exercise a different kind of freedom. 
None of them wish to deny the unique quality of human freedom properly under-
stood. For all of them, only human beings manifest the higher kind of freedom 
that we rightly associate wlth the moral quality of existence. 
Second, when we turn to Whitehead'• analysts of this unique quaUty 
of human freedom, we discover a striking similarity between it and the Western 
tradition stemming from Aristotle. For it will be recalled that the freedom 
exercised by human beings was said to be directly related to the unique nature 
of human lntellection. Whitehead maintains that because men are capable of 
what amounts to conceptual abstraction from sensible particulars, their free-
dom entails a real choice. For Whitehead, human freedom ts therefore freedm 
of choice property so called. For lt ls not merely a choice between thls or 
that particular good thing, but between good things ln the llght of our intel-
tactual conception of what we conceive to be our more remote and even ultimate 
purpose for acting. therefore we are able to choose this or that good as so 
1 For a succinct statement of the history and the current status of 
this subject see Mortimer J. Adler, the Difference of~ and the Difference 
ll. Makes (New York: Hott, Rinehart ;d° Winston, 1967'), esP:-ch&Pters lli, lv, 
and xll, PP• 36-65, 191-226. 
many means to cur ultimate end, and we are even free to establ lsh our own ends. 
All of this la, in lts general tenor, very Aristotelian and basically ln accord 
with the pronouncements of common sense. This in no way nust be Interpreted to 
deny the 1reat dlsslmllarltles between Whitehead and Aristotelian tradition, 
however. Whitehead's rejection of substance, fixed species, and faculty psy-
shology would alone suffice to deter any facile ldentlty. Moreover, for an 
hArlstotellan,h free choice ls thought to be anything but a purely spontan-
eous act. 1 Nonetheless, 'Whitehead's appeal to the unique mode of human cog• 
nltlon as an Integral aspect of hls explanation of man's unique freedom ls 
within the Western tradition stemming from Arlstotle.2 
Finally, Whitehead's explanation of freedom has a definite eontempo-
rary quality abcut lt. Recall that Whitehead dlstlngulshes between actual 
entitles and thereby between macroscopic entitles on the basis of their degree 
of complexlty--of the process of concrescenee--and their power of mentality. 
Where the macroscopic entity exercises a sufficiently greater degree of com• 
plexlty and mentality, in effect a critical threshold ls crossed. In the case 
of man, intellectual conception and free choice ls born. As Adler has shown, 
It ls just this type of explanation that enables contemporary sctentlsts and 
philosophers to adhere to the evolutionary principle of continuity of nature 
on the one hand, and to the manifest fact of human uniqueness on the other. 3 
lFor example see Simon, Freedom st Choice, esp. pp. 1·15. 
2
see Adler, l!!!. Difference st ?!In• for references to many of the most 
important writers subscribing to this position. 
3tbld. 
-
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Whitehead's gmlus ls that he ls one of the first philosophers to work out a 
complete metaphyslcal explanation that attempts to synthesize these two fac• 
tors. 1 
lTo our knowledge only TeUhard has endeavored a synthesis of slmUar 
magnitude and importance. Notable in this regard ls his "Law of complexity 
and consclousnesa, 11 as st.ated ln lh! Phenomenon ~ J:!!n, PP• 58-66. 
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